Katie Doherty

The appellant, a police officer, appealed convictions for various criminal offences, arguing that he was entrapped by police.

The trial judge had previously found him guilty of 11 counts, staying 3 on entrapment grounds, and convicting on 8.

The appeal specifically challenged 5 of the remaining 8 convictions, alleging errors in the trial judge's analysis of both the "opportunity" and "inducement" branches of the entrapment test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's application of entrapment law, including her assessment of police conduct and the appellant's independent actions in committing the offences.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference, alleging the trial judge erred in treating similar fact evidence and analyzing the complainant's motive to fabricate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the grounds raised did not constitute errors of law alone, which is the only basis for a Crown appeal of an acquittal.

The court affirmed that weighing evidence or assessing credibility, unless based on ungrounded stereotypical assumptions, are not errors of law.

The appellant, Thavanathan Sithravel, appealed a nine-year imprisonment sentence for robbery, arguing for a reduction to eight years based on the parity principle.

The original sentencing judge had treated the appellant's absconding as a factor and, crucially, relied on the appellant being the "mastermind" of the robbery as a significant aggravating factor, despite this fact not being admitted during the guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by relying on the "mastermind" fact as admitted, as it was specifically denied.

While absconding could diminish mitigation, it did not alter the requirement for the Crown to prove aggravating facts beyond a reasonable doubt in a Gardiner hearing.

The error impacted the sentence, leading the Court of Appeal to reduce the sentence to eight years and three months to align with the parity principle, while still accounting for the diminished mitigation due to absconding.

The court also commented on the unsatisfactory practice of not clarifying admitted facts before a guilty plea.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal against his firearms convictions, arguing his guilty plea was uninformed due to alleged non-disclosure by the Crown regarding the firearm's connection to a prior homicide.

The Court of Appeal applied the three-factor test for extensions of time (bona fide intention, explanation for delay, and merit of appeal).

The applicant conceded he did not form a bona fide intention to appeal within the period, and the court found his assertion of non-disclosure lacked substantiation, failing to meet the "not frivolous" merits threshold.

The court emphasized the public interest in the finality of guilty pleas and dismissed the motion.

The appellant, M.C., appealed his conviction for child luring and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The core issue was whether the trial judge erred by excluding M.C. and his counsel from an ex parte hearing during a s. 278 Criminal Code third-party records application.

The Court of Appeal found that the s. 278 application was part of the trial, making M.C.'s exclusion a jurisdictional error under s. 650 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as the exclusion impacted M.C.'s ability to make full answer and defence and harmed the appearance of justice.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) due to mental illness, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition maintaining his detention at a high-security psychiatric facility.

The appellant argued the ORB failed to consider all statutory factors under s. 672.54 of the Criminal Code, recognize a treatment impasse, and exercise its inquisitorial and supervisory powers.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the ORB's decision reasonable.

The court held that the ORB properly considered all relevant factors, reasonably declined to find a treatment impasse given the facility's ongoing efforts to find treatment options, and adequately fulfilled its supervisory responsibilities.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of weapons trafficking, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code, following an investigation into illegal firearms trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in law in his jury instructions on the definition of 'criminal organization' by failing to explain that such an organization must have structure and continuity, as required by R. v. Venneri.

The Supreme Court of Canada (majority) held that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that a criminal organization must pose an enhanced threat to society by virtue of its structure and continuity constituted an error of law, as the bare statutory definition is insufficient without this gloss from Venneri.

The majority further clarified the functional approach to appellate review of jury instructions, explaining that a properly equipped jury is one that is both accurately and sufficiently instructed, and that trial circumstances — including evidence, counsel's arguments, and the absence of objection — cannot substitute for a mandatory accurate and sufficient instruction on the law.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction on the criminal organization count set aside, and a new trial ordered on that count.

Dellen Millard and Mark Smich appealed their first-degree murder convictions for the death of Timothy Bosma.

The appeals raised issues concerning the admissibility and jury instructions on bad character evidence in a joint trial with antagonistic defences, jury instructions on planning and deliberation, and the propriety of closing addresses by the Crown and co-counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of corrective instructions for closing arguments.

The appellant, R.R., appealed convictions for ten offences involving child pornography and counselling to commit sexual interference, arguing entrapment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's finding that the police had reasonable suspicion to initiate an investigation based on the appellant's Craigslist ad and that the investigation did not constitute entrapment.

The court found the appellant's statements in the ad were sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion.

The appellant's appeal from sentence was abandoned.

The appellant, Dellen Millard, appealed his conviction for the murder of Wayne Millard and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit in his arguments regarding the unreasonableness of the verdict, including the trial judge's reliance on a dangerous witness, the sufficiency of alibi evidence, and cellphone findings.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction.

The sentence appeal was granted, and the s. 745.51 order was quashed, though the sentence otherwise remained intact.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged errors in jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence and the relationship between intoxication and accident, and the unreasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's comprehensive and fair instructions on after-the-fact conduct, which were vetted by the parties and relevant to the appellant's state of mind.

The court also found no reversible error in the intoxication instructions, noting that the jury was properly equipped to consider all evidence.

Finally, the court concluded that the second-degree murder verdict was reasonable, as there was sufficient inculpatory evidence for a properly instructed jury to reach that conclusion.

The appellant, Kevin Hanse, appealed his convictions for two firearm offences (attempting to obtain possession of a firearm and transferring ammunition) and his sentence.

The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence, with the defence challenging the admissibility of expert and lay witness testimony regarding code words for firearms and marijuana.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh post-sentencing evidence concerning a workplace injury and argued the trial judge erred in assessing aggravating factors and imposing a consecutive sentence for a marijuana trafficking offence to which he had pleaded guilty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, upholding the trial judge's evidentiary rulings and finding no error in the sentencing principles or the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant was one of 104 individuals arrested in Project Raphael, an undercover online police investigation targeting the buyer side of the juvenile sex work market.

He responded to an ad posted by an undercover officer on Backpage.com, was told the officer was 15 years old, and was arrested upon arriving at a designated hotel room.

He was convicted by jury on three child luring-related offences and applied for a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

Following the companion decision in R. v. Ramelson, 2022 SCC 44, the Court held that Project Raphael constituted a bona fide inquiry and dismissed the entrapment application and the appeal.

The appellant was arrested as part of a large-scale online police investigation targeting the buyer side of the juvenile sex work market.

He responded to an undercover officer's ad on an escort website, and after being told the purported escort was 15 years old, attended a hotel room where he was arrested and convicted of child luring-related offences.

He sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise space and that officers should be limited to offering only the exact offences they suspect, not rationally connected ones.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, applying its concurrent reasons in R. v. Ramelson, 2022 SCC 44, and holding that Project Raphael was a bona fide inquiry and the appellant was not entrapped.

The appellant was one of 104 people arrested as part of Project Raphael, an online police investigation targeting buyers in the juvenile sex work market.

The appellant responded to an advertisement on Backpage.com and, after the undercover officer disclosed being underage, attended a hotel room and was arrested.

He was convicted by jury on child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor.

The appellant sought a stay of proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing both opportunity-based entrapment (no bona fide inquiry, no personal reasonable suspicion) and inducement-based entrapment (personal vulnerability from undiagnosed Asperger's Syndrome).

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that Project Raphael was a bona fide inquiry per the companion case R. v. Ramelson, 2022 SCC 44, and that the inducement framework revision argument was better left for another case as no error in the findings below was demonstrated.

The appellant was convicted of child luring and related offences after responding to a police-created ad on an online escort website.

The appeal turned on whether 'Project Raphael', a buyer-side undercover sting operation run by the York Regional Police on Backpage.com, constituted a bona fide inquiry under the entrapment doctrine.

The Court held that the police had reasonable suspicion over a sufficiently precise virtual space — namely, ads within the York Region escort subdirectory of Backpage that emphasized extreme youth — and that the child luring offences offered were rationally connected and proportionate to the s. 286.1(2) offence the police suspected was occurring.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay of proceedings denied.

The appellant, Kyle Sparks MacKinnon, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and wounding, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting a dying victim's statement as a spontaneous utterance or under the principled hearsay exception, and in the jury instructions regarding its treatment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the statement admissible as a spontaneous utterance due to its spontaneity and the victim's state, and that the jury instructions were adequate.

The court affirmed the trial judge's finding that no "special features" undermined the statement's reliability.

The appellant, Dwayne Gordon, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with 14 years parole ineligibility.

The appeal raised three issues regarding conviction: adequacy of jury instructions on identification evidence (including recognition evidence), the instruction on adoptive admissions, and the failure to discharge a juror with colour distinction difficulties.

On sentence, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by considering youth court disposition and conditional discharge as a criminal record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, found no error in the jury instructions on identification or adoptive admissions, and upheld the decision not to discharge the juror.

While acknowledging errors in considering the appellant's youth record for sentencing, the court found these errors did not impact the parole ineligibility period.

The appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim fine surcharge.

The appellant, Adonay Zekarias, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and committing an indignity to a dead body.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence to establish motive, the reliance on inferences for motive, and the use of after-the-fact conduct to prove intent.

The appellant also raised Charter breaches but conceded them given the outcome.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasoning on motive or intent, and adjourned the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and the imposition of an indeterminate sentence following convictions for sexual assault and prostitution-related offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in concluding that the appellant showed a likelihood of causing harm through a failure to control sexual impulses, as required for a dangerous offender designation under s. 753(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the evidence of prostitution-related activities, while harmful, did not demonstrate a failure to control sexual impulses.

The appeal was allowed, the dangerous offender designation was set aside, and the appellant was designated a long-term offender with a determinate sentence of 6.5 years and a 10-year long-term supervision order, effective from the original sentencing date.