Stephanie Brown

The appellant, Andrew Myles, appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in her assessment of credibility and reliability by relying on stereotypical reasoning, finding fabricated evidence, and implicitly finding tailored evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge's factual findings were rooted in the evidence and did not constitute impermissible stereotypical inferences or improper findings of tailored evidence.

The court emphasized the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial judges on credibility assessments.

Jahrell Edwards pleaded guilty to unauthorized possession of a loaded restricted handgun.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the Defence argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing the impact of anti-Black racism and social context on the offender, as per R. v. Morris.

The court considered the gravity of the offence, Mr. Edwards' personal circumstances, and numerous mitigating factors, including his lack of prior record, stable employment, and engagement in counseling.

The judge found that a conditional sentence of two years less one day, to be served in the community, followed by 24 months probation, was the proportionate sentence, prioritizing rehabilitation and restraint while still addressing denunciation and deterrence.

The applicants, Lakhpreet Brar and Sukhvir Singh, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of their section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay for Brar as 22 months and 10 days, and for Singh as 24 months and 8 days, both exceeding the 18-month Provincial Court ceiling.

The court found minimal defence delay (3 days for Brar, 4 days for Singh) and rejected arguments that COVID-19 or the case's complexity constituted exceptional circumstances justifying the delay.

Consequently, the court found a breach of the applicants' Charter rights and ordered a stay of proceedings for both.

The Applicant father's motion for contempt was adjourned.

At the outset of the contempt motion, the Respondent mother brought motions for recusal and to vacate eleven prior orders.

The court heard the recusal motion, with reasons to follow separately.

The motion to vacate was granted leave in part, specifically to vacate certain orders but not to strike the Applicant's Application, and was adjourned for the Respondent to prepare a Factum.

The Applicant's contempt motion was also adjourned.

The appellant appealed his convictions for importing heroin, possessing heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and possessing proceeds of crime over $5,000, and sought leave to appeal his global sentence of 12 years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's refusal of a mistrial due to non-disclosure of alternate suspects, the handling of eyewitness identification evidence (applying the curative proviso), the admission of police opinion evidence, or the instructions on post-offence conduct.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-year global sentence fit given the seriousness and quantity of the drugs involved.

The appellant, Tyrell Stewart, appealed convictions for unlawful possession of a firearm with ammunition and possession of a firearm while prohibited.

The central issue at trial was the appellant's possession of a handgun and ammunition found during a search warrant execution at a basement apartment.

The trial judge inferred knowledge and control based on circumstantial evidence, including the appellant having keys to the premises and a "lived-in quality" of his possessions there.

The appeal raised arguments concerning misapprehension of evidence, reversal of the burden of proof, unreasonableness of the verdict, and lack of formal arraignment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions reasonable and that any procedural irregularities did not cause prejudice.

The appellant, Asher Veliz, appealed his convictions for drug trafficking and a related firearm offence, and his global net sentence of 4.5 years.

He argued breaches of his Charter rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) concerning arbitrary arrest, an invalid search warrant, and denial of his right to counsel of choice.

He also appealed the sentence, alleging the trial judge imposed a higher custodial sentence for the drug offence than sought by the Crown without allowing submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge regarding reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, the validity of the search warrant, or the right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the sentence, noting the global sentence imposed was lower than what the Crown had sought.

The appellant, O.A., appealed convictions for six firearms offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, arising from an incident where he allegedly shot at a car.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's findings regarding misapprehension of evidence concerning car dents and the reasonableness of the verdict based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material misapprehension of evidence and that the trial judge's conclusion of guilt was the only reasonable inference available, even without expert evidence or recovery of the firearm.

The court affirmed that common sense inferences are permissible and that the definition of "firearm" under the Criminal Code could include replica or BB guns if they cause similar damage.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant, Nicholas Baksh, appealed his convictions for four counts of drug trafficking and three firearm offences.

The appeal raised three grounds: improper use of similar act evidence across trafficking counts, erroneous limitation of cross-examination on an arresting officer's prior discreditable conduct, and unreasonable firearm verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly distinguished between similar act evidence and cross-count evidence used for identification, properly limited cross-examination consistent with precedent, and that the firearm verdicts were reasonable inferences from the totality of the circumstantial evidence.

Jerome Derby pleaded guilty to four firearm-related offences, including discharging a firearm with intent to endanger life, unauthorized possession of a prohibited firearm, occupying a vehicle with a prohibited firearm, and breach of a weapons prohibition order.

The sentencing judge considered aggravating factors such as the seriousness of the offences, the public setting of the shooting, and the offender's significant criminal record, including a prior manslaughter conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, the offender's lived experience with anti-Black racism and poverty, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9.5 years, which, after credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 5 years and 3 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction for aggravated assault, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing eyewitness identification evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge improperly treated a witness's testimony as recognition evidence, failed to adequately consider alleged tainting of identification, and erred by not self-instructing on cross-racial identification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to recognition evidence, her treatment of alleged tainting from a name utterance and Facebook photo, or the absence of a specific self-instruction on cross-racial identification given the trial context and the nature of the recognition evidence.

A case management conference was held for a personal injury action arising from a 2015 motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiff's previous lawyer had passed away, and the plaintiff had declared bankruptcy in 2019.

The parties required assistance scheduling the remaining steps in the litigation.

The court established a consent timetable for updated records, further discovery, independent medical examinations, mediation, and setting the action down for trial, and directed the Registrar not to administratively dismiss the action before July 31, 2022.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault of a police officer, breach of probation, uttering threats to kill, attempted theft of a motor vehicle, and mischief.

The offences occurred on October 30, 2019, and involved threatening a homeowner and her family, assaulting a security guard with racial slurs and damaging his phone, and spitting on a police officer's face while in custody.

The Crown sought 15-18 months imprisonment; the defence sought 9-12 months or time served given COVID-19 circumstances.

The court imposed a sentence of 1 day plus 252 days of enhanced presentence custody (8.2 months), effectively time served, along with a 12-month probation order with no-contact conditions and ancillary orders including a DNA order and 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control of a motor vehicle and refusing to provide a breath sample after police responded to a noise complaint at her residence.

The accused was found sitting in the driver's seat of a van in her driveway with the keys in the ignition and beer cans in the centre console.

The trial judge found that while the accused was in the driver's seat and had consumed alcohol, the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was impaired or that there was a realistic risk of danger.

The judge also found that the breath demand was not made in unequivocal terms and therefore did not constitute a valid demand.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The plaintiffs, having achieved partial success against individual "HOPE defendants" for breach of loyalty but failing entirely against "Carpenter defendants" for interference with economic interests, sought substantial costs.

The defendants, having largely succeeded, proposed the plaintiffs pay a portion of their costs or that each party bear their own.

The court, emphasizing proportionality and the modest damages awarded against the HOPE defendants, ordered that each party bear their own costs, finding this outcome to be fair and proportionate given the complex "turf warfare" between unions and the disparate success against different defendant groups.

The plaintiff union sued former employees and officials associated with a rival union following the creation of a new local that successfully organized workers previously represented by the plaintiff.

The plaintiffs alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, breach of employee duties of loyalty and confidentiality, and unlawful interference with contractual relations.

The court held the principal departing employee was not a fiduciary and that most information used in the organizing campaign was either public or not proven to have been misused.

However, several former employees breached basic duties of loyalty by preparing and initiating a competing organizing campaign before resigning and by failing to give reasonable notice of departure.

The court rejected claims of tortious interference against the rival union and its representatives.

Limited damages were awarded against the former employees for breach of employee duties.

The plaintiff, a 56-year-old Director of Business Development with 22.5 years of service, was terminated without cause by the defendant pharmaceutical company.

On a motion for summary judgment, the court determined the reasonable notice period to be 24 months, considering the plaintiff's senior role and the specialized nature of his employment.

The court also awarded damages including a 2% salary increase and a bonus based on the average of the two years prior to termination.

The court ordered that any income earned by the plaintiff during the post-judgment notice period be held in trust and paid to the defendant upon the expiry of the notice period.

Following a jury trial for a motor vehicle accident where the plaintiffs were awarded $137,000 plus interest, the court determined costs.

The plaintiffs' recovery exceeded the defendant's offer to settle of $125,000.

The court found the plaintiffs were the successful parties and awarded them partial indemnity costs.

After reducing fees for duplication and disallowing disbursements for experts who did not testify, the court awarded the plaintiffs $322,500 in costs.