The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee Garry Cass v. Michael Almendinger and Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No, 864.
2026 ONSC 4710
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00004662-0000
DATE: 2026 08 14
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Michael Allmendinger
Frederick Simon Hawa, for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee, Garry Cass
Stephen Turk, for the Defendants
Defendant
HEARD: November 17 and December 12, 2025
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00004358-0000
B E T W E E N:
The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee Garry Cass
Stephen Turk, for the Plaintiff
Plaintiff
- and -
Michael Almendinger and Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No, 864.
Frederick Simon Hawa, for the Defendant Michael Almendinger
Self Represented, for the Defendant
Defendants
Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No, 864.
HEARD: November 17 and December 12, 2025
DECISION ON APPLICATIONS HEARD NOVEMBER 17 AND DECEMBER 12, 2025.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Background.. 3
Application v. Action.. 4
Materials. 4
Positions of the Parties. 6
Ms. Brown’s will is not a mutual will. 6
Mr. Allmendinger is not entitled to possession of the condominium and must vacate. 7
Mr. Allmendinger’s constructive trust claim is dismissed. 8
Mr. Allmendinger is a dependant within the meaning of the Succession Law Reform Act. 8
Succession Law Reform Act Factors. 9
What is the value of the estate?.. 21
Analysis. 22
Further Orders on Timing of Support Payments. 25
Draft Order. 26
Costs. 26
1. Application, by Brown Estate, for possession of condominium. Application, by Mr. Allmendinger, for dependant’s support.
Background
2. Heather Ruth Brown died on November 17, 2023 at the age of 64. Her will left her entire estate to her adult daughter, Lillian Jones. At the time of her death, Ms. Brown had cohabitated with Mr. Allmendinger for ten years, since 2013. Ms. Brown’s will made no provision for Mr. Allmendinger.
3. At the time of her death, Ms. Brown owned a condominium in Etobicoke. Mr. Allmendinger was not on title. Following the death, Mr. Allmendinger remained in the condo and refused to move out.
4. In September 2024, the estate commenced an application for possession of the condominium.
5. In October 2024, Mr. Allmendinger commenced an application, seeking dependant relief pursuant to the Succession Law Reform Act.
6. Although the two applications were not formally joined, they were heard together and this decision applies to both applications.
7. Ms. Brown did nothing to change her will between 2006 and when she died in 2023. There is no evidence that she intended to change her will. There is no evidence that she intended to provide for Mr. Allmendinger in her estate. However, the practical reality is that Mr. Allmendinger was a dependant of Ms. Brown for the entirety of their ten-year relationship and he was going to remain dependent upon her as long as the relationship lasted.
8. For the reasons below, the court makes the following orders:
a. On the application for possession, the estate is entitled to possession of the condominium. Mr. Allmendinger shall deliver vacant possession by October 15, 2026, at noon.
i. The condominium is to be left in clean, broom swept, undamaged condition; and
ii. Any possessions belonging to the estate, including, but not limited to furniture and appliances, are to remain in the condo.
b. The estate has leave to commence enforcement proceedings on October 16, 2026, if Mr. Allmendinger has not delivered vacant possession.
c. Mr. Allmendinger’s claim for constructive trust is dismissed.
d. On the application for dependant relief, Mr. Allmendinger is a dependant and entitled to support from the estate.
e. By August 31, 2026, the estate shall pay Mr. Allmendinger $34,650 for the arrears of living expenses for the period December 1, 2023 to August 31, 2026, plus $2,525 in pre-judgment interest.
f. Starting September 1, 2026, the estate will pay Mr. Allmendinger pay $1300 per month for living expenses and transportation.
g. When Mr. Allmendinger provides proof of new living arrangements, the estate shall start paying, on the 1st of the next month, $3,300 per month, for living expenses, transportation, and housing.
h. When the estate starts paying Mr. Allmendinger dependant’s support of $3,300 per month, those payments shall be made bimonthly. The payments shall stop upon Mr. Allmendinger’s death.
i. The remainder of the estate passes to Lillian Jones. The timing is in the discretion of the estate trustee. The estate trustee is responsible for ensuring that the estate meets its support obligations imposed above.
Application v. Action
9. These parties elected to proceed by way of application. Most of the cases referred to by the parties had been argued as trials. These parties elected to proceed by way of application. That choice does not lower the evidentiary threshold for the admissibility of evidence, nor does it lower the burden on each party to prove their case.
Materials
10. There were voluminous materials before the court.
11. Neither party put any expert evidence before the court.
12. The court reviewed both notices of application and the multiple affidavits (19 in total) and all exhibits.
Preliminary Motion re: Additional Evidence
13. On the first day of oral argument, the court heard a motion to admit further evidence. The parties were given oral reasons about what additional evidence was permitted. The court reviewed and considered that additional evidence (included in the affidavits noted above).
Cross Examination, Refusals, and Undertakings
14. Mr. Allmendinger did not cross examine any of the affiants for the estate.
15. The estate cross-examined Mr. Allmendinger on his affidavits. Mr. Allmendinger refused to answer eight questions during his cross examination. The estate elected not to bring a motion on refusals. In the absence of a motion, the court cannot make any findings on the refusals.
16. Mr. Allmendinger also gave nine undertakings to provide more information and documents. He answered none of the undertakings. Mr. Allmendinger submitted, during oral argument, that the undertakings were not really relevant to the case. The court disagrees. The court draws an adverse inference against Mr. Allmendinger that the answers to undertakings were unhelpful to his case.
General Comments on the Materials
17. Mr. Allmendinger was represented by his long-time friend, Mr. Hawa. No conflict was asserted and the court is not critical of someone in the legal professional trying to help. However, one consequence is that there were five affiants who swore affidavits based on Mr. Hawa’s information. One of those affiants is Ms. Flores, who is connected with this case in three different ways: as a friend of Mr. Allmendinger, spouse of Mr. Hawa and part-time assistant to Mr. Hawa. This reduced the reliance the court could place upon the information.
18. Four friends of Mr. Allmendinger swore affidavits. These affidavits were of great concern. Read together, the content of the four affidavits was at least 95% the same. There were multiple paragraphs in each affidavit which were identical to each other. This sort of bulk evidence lacks credibility and reliability. The dominant purpose of these affidavits was to demonstrate that Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger were common law spouses. Given that the estate conceded this point, the court did not rely on these affidavits, with the exception of the last three paragraphs of Mr. Richter’s affidavit which deals with real estate issues.
19. The findings about Mr. Allmendinger’s affidavits and the materials of the estate are made throughout these reasons.
Positions of the Parties
20. The estate seeks a possession order for the condominium. The estate also opposes Mr. Allmendinger’s request for dependant support, on the basis that such a claim is precluded by the mutual wills of Ms. Brown and her deceased first husband, Mr. Jones. If the court awards support, the estate submitted that Mr. Allmendinger should receive $1800 per month over a short, unspecified period of time.
21. Mr. Allmendinger seeks a dependant support order. In his original application, he also sought a constructive trust order, but this was abandoned during the oral argument.
22. The respondent Condominium Corporation No. 864 is the condo corporation which runs the building in which Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger lived. They filed no materials on the applications and did not attend oral argument. The court was advised that the corporation intended to implement any order arising from these proceedings.
Ms. Brown’s will is not a mutual will.
23. Ms. Brown and her first husband, Mr. Leighton Jones, made their wills a few days before Mr. Jones died in 2006.
24. The couple’s investment advisor, Mr. Goral, put them in contact with a lawyer, Mr. Cass, who drafted the wills.
25. There is no question that the two wills mirror each other. The estate asks the court to go further and find that they are mutual wills.
26. If the wills are mutual, then the estate argues that Mr. Allmendinger’s claim is defeated.
27. A mutual wills agreement is a binding contract not to revoke wills. The purpose of the contract is to prevent either testator from changing their will without the other’s consent. There are three components to the doctrine:
a. The agreement must be a binding contract, not a loose understanding or sense of moral obligation;
b. It must be proven by clear and satisfactory evidence; and
c. It must include an agreement not to revoke the wills[1].
28. The onus of proving a mutual will rests with the party alleging its existence, in this case, the Brown estate. The onus of proof is the balance of probabilities. The quality of the evidence must be clear and cogent[2].
29. The agreement may be proven by the wording of the will or from extrinsic evidence[3].
30. The evidence of the estate does not prove mutual wills. There is no evidence of an agreement:
a. There is nothing in the wills themselves;
b. Neither advisor (Mr. Goral or Mr. Cass) opine that the intention was to make mutual wills, despite both being involved in drawing the wills.
c. Indeed, Mr. Cass does not say that he advised the couple about the existence of mutual wills, how they would work and the pros and cons of such an approach.
d. The wills were drafted and signed just days before Mr. Jones’ death in hospital. That is not a circumstance that lends itself to thoughtful, sophisticated estate planning.
31. The court accepts that Mr. Jones and Ms. Brown wanted to provide for their daughter and that was their sole focus at the time of Mr. Jones’ death. However, that, in and of itself, is not proof of mutual wills. On the evidence presented by the estate, the court cannot find that the 2006 wills of Mr. Jones and Ms. Brown were mutual.
Mr. Allmendinger is not entitled to possession of the condominium and must vacate.
32. As noted above, the estate started the first application, seeking possession of the condominium. Mr. Allmendinger asserted a constructive trust claim, which meant that he was permitted to remain in the condo pending the adjudication of this case.
33. However, during his oral argument, Mr. Allmendinger abandoned his constructive trust claim.
34. The estate owns the condominium. Mr. Allmendinger is not, and has never been, on title.
35. Mr. Allmendinger has not made any financial contribution to the condominium: the purchase price or the ongoing carrying costs. Since Ms. Brown’s death, the estate has paid all carrying costs.
36. There are no grounds for Mr. Almendinger to remain in the condominium.
37. The court therefore orders Mr. Allmendinger to vacate the condominium by October 15, 2026, at noon.
38. Additionally, the court orders:
a. The condominium is to be left in clean, broom swept, undamaged condition; and
b. Any possessions belonging to the estate, including, but not limited to furniture and appliances, are to remain in the condo.
c. The estate is at liberty to bring enforcement proceedings as of October 16, 2026.
Mr. Allmendinger’s constructive trust claim is dismissed.
39. Mr. Allmendinger abandoned his constructive trust claim during oral argument. The final order prepared by counsel will reflect the dismissal of this claim.
Mr. Allmendinger is a dependant within the meaning of the Succession Law Reform Act.
40. Section 57 of the SLRA defines dependant to mean a spouse, parent, child, or sibling of the deceased[4].
41. At the outset of oral argument, the estate conceded that Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Brown were common law spouses. Even this concession had not been made, the court would have found that Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Brown were common law spouses based on the evidence, which included:
a. Their ten-year cohabitation;
b. Their income tax filings; and
c. Mr. Allmendinger’s receipt of federal government survivor benefits.
42. The SLRA defines a dependant to include the spouse of a deceased, to whom the deceased was proving support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before her death[5].
43. The SLRA defines spouse to have the same meaning as section 29 of the Family Law Act, which includes common law relationships for partners who have cohabited continuously for a period of not less than three years[6].
44. Mr. Allmendinger therefore meets the definition of dependant within the meaning of SLRA.
Succession Law Reform Act Factors
45. Section 62(1) of the Succession Law Reform Act lists the factors the court must consider in determining the amount and duration of support, if any. How the factors are weighed depend on the individual circumstances of each case.
Factor A: dependant’s current assets and means
46. Other than federal government benefits, Mr. Allmendinger’s unchallenged evidence is that he does not have any other sources of income. He presently receives approximately $1833 per month from the federal government: $1470 CPP plus $363 in GIS (guaranteed income supplement).
47. Although Mr. Allmendinger is not on title to the condo, he has also benefitted from living in the condo, cost free, since Ms. Brown’s death in November 2023. The estate has paid all costs associated with the condo, including property taxes, property insurance, and common expenses. The estate demonstrated that the annual costs are approximately $17,000, consisting of condo fees, property taxes, insurance and other costs.
Factor B: dependant’s likely future assets and means
48. Mr. Allmendinger is unlikely to have future assets and means. He is 71 years old and will turn 72 in October 2026. He was not working when he met Ms. Brown in 2013 and has not worked since then.
49. Mr. Allmendinger gives no information about his education. It is only through hearsay that the court was informed that Mr. Allmendinger attended university (Mr. Hawa told others that the two men went to university together and those people put that information in affidavits).
50. Mr. Allmendinger was extremely vague about his prior work life. He provided conflicting information about his professional skills, suggesting that he was in trade and logistics. He told Ms. Brown’s investment advisor that he was a former accountant. He says he took over the management of Ms. Brown’s investments and through his own research and skills, did better than the professional investment advisor (more on this below).
51. Despite these skills, Mr. Allmendinger says he can no longer work, through a combination of age and poor health.
52. Mr. Allmendinger’s evidence gives no information about his family members. His estranged daughter says that Mr. Allmendinger has four siblings, but she believes they are not in contact with their brother. His parents are deceased. There is no evidence of support from other family members.
53. The court accepts that, at the age of nearly 72, Mr. Allmendinger is unlikely to obtain employment.
Factor C: dependant’s capacity to contribute to his own support
54. Mr. Almendinger gave conflicting evidence on this factor.
55. On one hand, he says that, during his ten-year relationship with Ms. Brown, he was extremely industrious: he did all the cooking, cleaning, and laundry for both himself and Ms. Brown. He was in charge of cleaning and maintaining the car. From 2018 onwards, he was in charge of managing Ms. Brown’s investments. He was responsible for organizing all aspects of the couple’s impending retirement, from making a plan to sell the condo, committing to purchasing a trailer property in the Kawarthas (for two or three seasons a year) and organizing housing in Central or South America for the winters. He asks the court to consider that he was not paid for any of these tasks.
56. On the other hand, Mr. Allmendinger says that he is now incapable of doing anything. The reasons are not precise, the court understands one of the contributing factors to be the shock and grief from Ms. Brown’s unexpected death.
57. The court finds that Mr. Allmendinger can take care of his activities of daily living. As noted above, he is unlikely to obtain employment.
Factor D: dependant’s age and physical and mental health
58. Mr. Allmendinger was born October 21, 1954. He is 71 years old, turning 72 in October 2026.
59. Mr. Allmendinger is a years-long smoker. He and Ms. Brown smoked three packs a day between them. Ms. Brown’s family members deposed that Ms. Brown was a long-term smoker, but that two things happened when she entered her relationship with Mr. Allmendinger:
a. Ms. Brown’s cigarette consumption increased; and
b. She started smoking inside the house, which is something she had never done.
60. Although Mr. Allmendinger said he and Ms. Brown smoked three packs a day between them, he did not specify his own rate of consumption.
61. Mr. Allmendinger says his physical health is poor, with mobility problems, arthritis, and carrying too much weight. He also says his mental health is poor, and he suffers from depression which renders him unable to make decisions and take action, sometimes for months at a time.
62. There is no evidence of Mr. Allmendinger’s health before the court, other than his own self-diagnoses. There can be no evidence because Mr. Allmendinger does not have an OHIP card and therefore cannot access state-funded medical care. He offered no information about why this is the case. He offered no evidence that he planned to obtain OHIP coverage.
63. Mr. Allmendinger describes a precarious health situation, and the court appreciates that this must be frightening and destabilizing for him, but access to health care seems to be a solvable issue. The court has no visibility into why this has not happened.
Factor E: dependant’s needs, having regard to dependant’s accustomed standard of living
64. Mr. Allmendinger described his life with Ms. Brown as simple and quiet, not living lavishly, but well. The couple rarely ate out. There is no evidence of money spent on travel or entertainment (the couple went to a friend’s lake house on occasion).
65. In his relationship with Ms. Brown, Mr. Allmendinger had shelter and food security. He had access to transportation because Ms. Brown owned a car and drove them places. His health and healthcare were insecure, but Ms. Brown could not have provided this.
66. The monetary support sought by Mr. Allmendinger shifted several times over the life of this proceeding.
67. Mr. Allmendinger abandoned his claim to the condo.
68. During oral argument, Mr. Allmendinger abandoned his constructive trust claim.
69. During oral argument, Mr. Allmendinger offered different monthly budgets, but at the conclusion of oral argument, the court confirmed that he seeks an order for the following $4873 per month for the rest of his life, which calculates to $58,476 per year.
70. When asked to break this number down, Mr. Allmendinger’s numbers did not add up to $4873:
a. Rent: $2500
b. Living expenses: $1790
c. Automobile: $500
d. Taxes: $1000
71. Mr. Allmendinger asks for taxes of $1000 (without a calculation of potential taxes) because he submits that taxes are payable on monthly support amounts, but a lump sum would not be taxable.
72. Mr. Allmendinger did not provide an evidentiary basis for any of these amounts.
73. Further, as discussed below in factor (m), Mr. Allmendinger did not prove how the parties were going to live in retirement.
Factor F: measures available for the dependant to be able to provide for his own support and the time and cost required to achieve this
74. Given his age, reported health, and work history, as detailed in these reasons, the court finds that it is unlikely that Mr. Allmendinger will be able to provide for is own support (financially) in future.
75. This is not a case of a party who could achieve independence if given training or education.
Factor G: proximity and duration of dependant’s relationship with deceased
76. Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger met in 2013. Ms. Brown’s sister and daughter understood that the couple met through an on-line dating site. Mr. Allmendinger’s gave no information about how the couple met.
77. As an example of Mr. Allmendinger’s lack of specificity, Mr. Allmendinger did not say when he moved into Ms. Brown’s house at 27 Hertle. However, nobody disputes that he moved into the house, and this seems to have happened early in the relationship.
78. The court finds that Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Brown were in a relationship for ten years: between the time they met in 2013 and her death on November 17, 2023.
79. The court further finds that the physical proximity of the relationship was close: several witnesses describe Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Brown being inseparable.
80. The court need not make findings about the emotional proximity of the relationship. There is conflicting evidence on this point. Some witnesses describe the couple as being emotionally close, other witnesses describe tension and bickering. Regardless of the emotional quality of the relationship, there was a ten-year relationship.
Factor H: contributions made by dependant to deceased’s welfare
81. The court must assess any contributions made by Mr. Allmendinger to Ms. Brown’s welfare, including indirect and non-financial contributions.
82. Mr. Allmendinger argues that he made several contributions to Ms. Brown’s welfare, divided into the following categories:
a. Monetary
b. Services;
c. Saving Ms. Brown money (there is overlap between categories b and c, as described below); and
83. On the monetary front, Mr. Allmendinger says that he gave his benefits cheques to Ms. Brown and she deposited them in her Simpli account. Although Ms. Brown had other finances, the parties agree that Ms. Brown lived from her Simpli account. (When Ms. Brown’s mother died and she inherited approximately $176,000, she decided to deposit that amount into her Simpli account and live from it).
84. However, Mr. Allmendinger’s own evidence contradicts this assertion. Mr. Allmendinger moved for temporary support but later withdrew the motion. However, his affidavit of November 20, 2024, is still a sworn statement which was filed with this court. In his November 2024 affidavit, he stated that he was receiving CPP benefits of $1470 per month. In order to support himself, he had to cash 14 CPP cheques which he had been saving. Paragraph 8 of that affidavit states that Ms. Brown did not need him to deposit all the CPP cheques into her accounts and was content that they would and could be used for a rainy day.
85. Further, Ms. Brown kept a detailed, handwritten ledger of the deposits and withdrawals from the Simpli account. That ledger does not support that Mr. Allmendinger gave her his CPP benefits.
86. Finally, it was conceded during oral argument that Ms. Brown was also receiving some government benefits and the Simpli deposits may have referred to her benefits. Her tax returns (produced by Mr. Allmendinger) show that Ms. Brown was receiving both OAS and CPP benefits as of 2021, for a total of approximately $15,341.45. In the years before that, she was receiving CPP.
87. Mr. Allmendinger does not have a bank account. He provided no explanation for this atypical approach to his finances. If he needs to cash a cheque, he does so at a non-bank financial services company such as Money Mart.
88. Mr. Allmendinger ran his finances on a cash basis but did not give any evidence to this court about how he tracked his money (like Ms. Brown kept a ledger).
89. This court cannot find, on a balance of probabilities, that Mr. Allmendinger made any contributions to Ms. Brown’s welfare by giving her money.
90. Mr. Allmendinger says he provided services to Ms. Brown. As described above, he says he was in charge of all cooking, cleaning, laundry, car cleaning, investment management (starting at some point in 2018), and retirement planning.
91. There is nothing to contradict the evidence that Mr. Allmendinger did cooking, cleaning, laundry, and car maintenance. Some friends who attended for dinner recalled Mr. Allmendinger cooking. I find that Mr. Allmendinger performed these tasks.
92. Mr. Allmendinger also says that, starting at some point in 2018, he took over Ms. Brown’s investment advice. Mr. Allmendinger says that he got much better returns for her than her professional advisor, Mr. Goral. The court cannot find either of these statements to be proven.
93. Ms. Brown left her professional investment advisor in 2018. Mr. Goral deposes that the transfer triggered a sizeable capital gain which reduced Ms. Brown’s ability to make money. This is because Ms. Brown instructed that some of the investments to be converted to cash.
94. There is no evidence of any trades or investments made by Mr. Allmendinger for Ms. Brown. His three affidavits contain not a single example. He did not explain how he made the money back which was required to pay the capital gains tax. On cross examination, Mr. Allmendinger admitted:
a. He is not a licensed financial adviser and has no training in the area;
b. His knowledge of securities is based on public information;
c. He cannot recall his investment strategy.
95. The other information which undercuts Mr. Allmendinger’s claims about his investment strategy comes from Ms. Brown’s tax returns.
96. In 2017, when Mr. Goral was managing the investments, the court was not provided with the tax return, just the cover page.
97. In 2018, when Mr. Allmendinger took over, Ms. Brown declares $887.55 in dividends (line 120), $3,152.92 in interest and other investment income (line 121) and $42,217.10 in taxable capital gains (line 127).
98. In 2019, Ms. Brown declared $1,950 in interest and other investment income.
99. In 2020, Ms. Brown declared only $609.60 in interest and other investment income.
100. In 2021 and 2022, the court was provided only with the thumbnail summary which did not disclose the individual line items. There is no record of any interest of investment income being declared.
101. Mr. Allmendinger chose not to answer undertakings from his cross-examination which pertained to his investment work on behalf of Ms. Brown. The court infers that the information would have been unhelpful to Mr. Allmendinger.
102. There is no basis to find that Mr. Allmendinger played the role of investment advisor to Ms. Brown, even if he did have access to her investment accounts.
103. There is no basis to find that Mr. Allmendinger generated better returns on the portfolio than her professional investment advisor had.
104. Mr. Allmendinger also says that he provided a service to Ms. Brown by locating a private buyer for the house on 27 Hertle Avenue.
105. There is no evidence to support this submission. See property analysis in next factor.
106. On the topic of saving Ms. Brown money, Mr. Allmendinger submits that he did this in at least three ways:
a. Saving money on household items, particularly cigarettes.
b. Saving money on the renovations at 27 Hertle; and
c. Saving money on the purchase of the Lakeshore condominium.
107. On household items, Mr. Allmendinger originally asserted that he was saving the household $2000 per month by shopping for the best deals, but on cross examination, admitted that it was a much smaller number and he could not quantify it.
108. The couple saved money on cigarettes by driving an hour to purchase cigarettes from a First Nations enterprise. Mr. Allmendinger did not prove how much money they saved.
109. On the 27 Hertle house, Mr. Allmendinger says he saved Ms. Brown money on various renovations that were done. There is no evidence of this. See the property analysis (factor I), below.
110. Mr. Allmendinger also says he saved Ms. Brown on the purchase of the condominium. See the property analysis (factor I) below.
Factor I: contributions made by dependant to acquisition, maintenance and improvement of deceased’s property or business
111. Ms. Brown did not have her own business. She was employed part time at a Marshall’s store. During the time of her relationship with Mr. Allmendinger, Ms. Brown owned two properties.
112. In 2013, when the relationship with Mr. Allmendinger started, Ms. Brown owned a house at 27 Hertle Avenue in Toronto. She was the sole title holder. Mr. Allmendinger moved into that house.
113. Ms. Brown later sold 27 Hertle and purchased a condominium at the Marina Del Rey, a complex at 2267 Lakeshore Boulevard, also in Toronto. She was the sole title holder. Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger lived at the condo until Ms. Brown’s death. Mr. Allmendinger remains in the condo, pending the adjudication of these applications.
114. Mr. Allmendinger also gave conflicting evidence on the topic of real estate. In one affidavit, he stated that Ms. Brown was not very knowledgeable about, or interested in, real estate and deferred to him. In another affidavit and in his cross examination, he stated that Ms. Brown was vey good at real estate.
115. 27 Hertle: Mr. Allmendinger says that he provided value by:
a. Saving money on renovations;
b. Acting as general contractor on some of the renovations;
c. Finding a private buyer for 27 Hertle.
116. There is no direct evidence that Mr. Allmendinger saved money on renovations or acted as general contractor. The affidavits were devoid of any detail or examples. If Mr. Allmendinger played these roles, then that would contribute to the maintenance and improvement of the property.
117. With respect to the sale of 27 Hertle, Mr. Richter, the real estate agent who acted for Ms. Brown on the transaction, also says a private buyer was found. Ms. Jones believes the private buyer to have been a neighbor (also a real estate agent) who expressed interest in the house on various occasions over the years. The witnesses who know who the private buyer is (Mr. Allmendinger and Mr. Richter) gave no information.
118. Importantly, Mr. Richter says nothing in his affidavit about what value Mr. Allmendinger brought to the transaction. This information would be in his possession.
119. Even if Mr. Allmendinger found a buyer for the 27 Hertle house, the court cannot find that this was a contribution. There is no evidence that the house was difficult to sell. There is no evidence that a higher price was achieved because of it.
120. Lakeshore condo: Mr. Allmendinger says he saved Ms. Brown $100,000 on the purchase of the condominium because Ms. Brown had no idea of the right market price.
121. There is no evidence to support this opinion from Mr. Allmendinger.
122. There is also no evidence to support this statement from Mr. Richter, the real estate agent who was both the selling and purchasing agent on this transaction and a witness who put in a 24-paragraph affidavit on this application. The court infers that Mr. Richter did not share Mr. Allmendinger’s opinion.
123. The court cannot find that Mr. Allmendinger made any contribution to the acquisition, maintenance and/or improvement of the Lakeshore condo.
Factor J: contribution by the dependant to the realization of the deceased’s career potential
124. This factor is irrelevant to this case. As noted above, Ms. Brown worked part time in a retail position. Mr. Allmendinger made no contribution to Ms. Brown realizing her career potential.
Factor K: whether the dependant has a legal obligation to provide support for another person
125. Mr. Allmendinger does not ask the court to consider this factor.
126. Mr. Allmendinger has a child from another relationship. Vanessa Lanch was born in 1983. She says her mother and Mr. Allmendinger divorced in the mid 1990s.
127. Ms. Lanch is now an adult, supporting herself with her own career. There is no evidence that she is actively seeking support from Mr. Allmendinger.
128. At some point, there was a family law order for support. Although the order was not given to this court, the estate proved that the Family Responsibility Office (FRO) has a writ against Mr. Allmendinger for $35,402.02 dating back to 1993.
129. Mr. Allmendinger acknowledges that he has a FRO debt, explaining that this is why he does not have a driver’s licence: FRO suspended his driver’s licence as part of their enforcement procedures. Mr. Allmendinger said, on cross examination, that his license was suspended about 14 years ago, which would have been 2011.
130. Mr. Allmendinger says, without evidence, that the FRO debt is approximately $14,000. He provided no documentary evidence, just a cover letter from FRO which referred to an enclosure which was not provided to the court. In contrast, the estate proved that the FRO writ against Mr. Allmendinger is $35,402.02.
131. The court therefore finds that Mr. Allmendinger has a judgment against him for child support for Ms. Lanch, but for the purposes of the SLRA analysis, it is not an ongoing legal obligation.
132. The estate should not have to pay Mr. Allmendinger additional support so he can pay his debt which was incurred at least 20 years before he started his relationship with Ms. Brown.
Factor L: the circumstances of the deceased at the time of death
133. In November 2023, Ms. Brown had a heart attack while at work. This was a shock to everyone. Ms. Brown died a few days later in the hospital.
134. Neither party identified any circumstances of Ms. Brown at the time of her death which would impact the SRLA analysis.
Factor M: any agreement between the deceased and the dependant
135. Neither party pointed to any formal, documented agreement between Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger.
136. Mr. Allmendinger admitted that he knew:
a. He was never on title to the 27 Hertle property (which Ms. Brown owned before she started her relationship with Mr. Allmendinger);
b. He was never on title to the Lakeshore condominium property, which Ms. Brown purchased during the relationship;
c. He was not in Ms. Brown’s will. He knew that the sole beneficiary of Ms. Brown’s will was Ms. Brown’s daughter.
137. Mr. Allmendinger says, without evidence, that Ms. Brown always expressed an interest in amending her will.
138. There is no evidence of any plan or intent of Ms. Brown to change her will to include Mr. Allmendinger.
139. This is a significant fact given that Ms. Brown learned the value of planning through difficult personal experience. For instance:
a. Ms. Brown and her first husband were fortunate to be able to complete their wills just days before Mr. Jones’ death. Ms. Brown was left a young, single mother with a daughter to raise.
b. At one point she sent a thank you note to her investment advisor for his historical advice about insurance, which resulted in her having a policy of $250,000 to fall back on after Mr. Jones’ death. Those funds made a difference.
140. Ms. Brown understood the value of planning. She did not change her will to include Mr. Allmendinger and Mr. Allmendinger knew it.
141. The other topic which is relevant to this factor is the retirement plans of Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger. Mr. Allmendinger says they planned to retire in 2024 – in retrospect, 2.5 months after she died.
142. Mr. Allmendinger says that the plan was for Ms. Brown to stop her part-time retail position, she was going to sell the condo, buy a seven-month vacation home in the Kawarthas in the Melody Bay development ($200,000), invest the remaining $1.45 million and spend 5 winter months each year in Panama, Brazil or Costa Rica. Mr. Allmendinger says their pensions would have brought in $3500 a month and the investments would give an additional $7500 per month.
143. There is no evidence of:
a. The cost of a Melody Bay home;
b. Whether Ms. Brown had put down a deposit on Melody Bay.
c. The cost of living out of country per month;
d. What country and where within the country they planned to live in;
e. Whether Mr. Allmendinger had a passport;
f. How their pensions would have totalled $3500 per month (Mr. Allmendinger’s CPP was only $1470 per month);
g. How their investments would generate $7500 per month (as an example, a 5% return would only generate $6,042 per month).
h. How their investments would be invested.
144. For people who intended to retire in 2024, this plan could only be described as wishful and skeletal. There is no evidence to support the assertions that Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger would have $11,000 to live on.
Factor N: any previous distribution or division of property made by deceased in favour of the dependant by gift, agreement, or court order
145. There is no evidence any previous gift, distribution, or division of property.
146. Mr. Allmendinger has had the benefit of living in the condo, at no cost to him, since Ms. Brown’s death November 2023.
Factor O: claims that any other person may have as a dependant
147. The court was not made aware of any other dependant claims.
148. The sole beneficiary Ms. Brown’s will is her adult child, Lillian Jones.
Factors P and Q: N/A
149. Factors P and R are not relevant as they pertain to dependant children.
Factor R(i): was there a course of conduct by the dependant that is so unconscionable as to constitute an obvious and gross repudiation of the relationship
150. The estate asks the court to find that Mr. Allmendinger was abusive to Ms. Brown.
151. Ms. Brown’s family members did not like Mr. Allmendinger, nor did Ms. Brown’s financial advisor. They all found him to be unpleasant, rude, abrasive, and unwelcoming. They were all under the impression that Mr. Allmendinger would prefer that Ms. Brown not stay in touch with them and thought that Mr. Allmendinger was isolating Ms. Brown.
152. Ms. Brown’s sister, her daughter and the investment advisor all provided numerous and specific examples of rude and abrasive behaviour by Mr. Allmendinger. Mr. Allmendinger does not deny these examples. Indeed, the tone of Mr. Allmendinger’s own affidavits in this litigation are needlessly critical of others.
153. Ms. Brown’s sister raised her concerns with Ms. Brown and Ms. Brown was dismissive. The sister and the investment advisor wanted to keep channels of communication open and be a support for Ms. Brown if needed.
154. The estate relies on an affidavit from Gary Cass (Ms. Brown’s wills lawyer and Estate Trustee) dated January 13, 2025, in which he expresses concerns that Ms. Brown may have been abused by Mr. Allmendinger. He appends a document from the Canadian Women’s Foundation entitled “Warning Signs of An Abusive Relationship”. The document contains 25 bullet point questions which may point to abusive or controlling behaviour.
155. There is no evidence that, during Ms. Brown’s lifetime, anyone in her life reported the suspected abuse to the police or other agencies.
156. Intimate partner violence is real, serious, all too frequent, and underreported. It is a topic of great concern to the courts.
157. There is evidence that Mr. Allmendinger was, at times, a deeply unpleasant and abrasive person. That does not come close to proving that there was any abuse of Ms. Brown. This allegation is not made out.
158. Using the language of factor R(i), there is no evidence that Mr. Allmendinger did anything to repudiate the relationship.
Factor R(ii): length of cohabitation
159. As noted previously, Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger cohabited for ten years.
Factor R(iii): effect of dependant’s responsibilities on his earning capacity.
160. The household responsibilities assumed by Mr. Allmendinger had no impact on his earning capacity. He was not employed when he met Ms. Brown and made no effort to become employed during the relationship.
Factor R(iv, v, vii and viii): N/A
161. These subfactors pertain to parties with childcare responsibilities. They are not relevant to this case.
Factor R(vi): the effect of any domestic service performed for the family as if the spouse had devoted the time spent in performing that service in remunerative employment and contributed the earnings to the family’s support
162. This factor asks the court to consider the remunerative value of the household labour performed by Mr. Allmendinger.
163. While the court accepts that the household labour had some value, the lack of detail in Mr. Allmendinger’s evidence makes it impossible to quantify this factor. Ms. Allmendinger says, broadly, that he did all the laundry, cooking and cleaning for the couple and that he shopped for deals to save them money. The evidence contains no specifics, which makes the claims less persuasive.
164. These are just a few examples of relevant details which the court would expect to see in the evidence.
Factor S: any other legal right of the dependant to support, other than out of public money
165. There is no evidence that Mr. Allmendinger has any other sources of support, other than public funds. It was not clear to the court whether Mr. Allmendinger has exhausted his public funds entitlements, but that is not relevant for the analysis in this case.
What is the value of the estate?
166. The parties agree that the major holding of the estate is the condominium.
167. The parties elected not to provide expert evidence on the value of the estate. Instead, the parties relied on their own opinions about the value of different assets, particularly the condominium. During oral argument, counsel seemed to agree that the value of the condominium was $740,000.
168. The court declined to consider internet searches of properties done by counsel or the parties purporting to be of comparable properties.
169. Interestingly, the real estate agent who acted on Ms. Brown’s acquisition (he represented the seller as well) did not provide an opinion about the value of the condominium, although he swore an affidavit.
170. During oral argument, counsel for the estate submitted that the value of the estate was approximately $1.4 million. Counsel for Mr. Allmendinger argued the value of the estate was approximately $1.8 million.
171. The parties did not give the court sufficient information to determine the precise value of the estate, but notes that the range between the two estimates is fairly narrow.
Analysis
172. The Divisional Court in Quinn v. Carrigan set out the steps in the analysis on a dependant’s support claim[7].
Step one: who are the dependants?
173. Mr. Allmendinger.
Step two: what is the value of the claim of the dependant?
174. Based on the section 62 factors, discussed above, Mr. Allmendinger has a claim for support. Other than receiving federal government benefits of $1470[8] per month, Mr. Allmendinger was financially dependant upon Ms. Brown during their ten-year relationship.
175. In this case, the court must not only consider the value of the estate and the lifestyle and Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Brown enjoyed, as described above. The court must also consider that Ms. Brown was living beyond her means in her relationship with Mr. Allmendinger. Simply put, she was spending more than came in. As noted above, they were living on her $176,000 inheritance from her mother. Mr. Allmendinger did not prove that, once Ms. Brown retired, the couple would be able to sustain that lifestyle.
176. The Simpli account went from $285,501 on March 4, 2018, to $41,966 on September 22, 2023. They were spending approximately $44,279 per year from the Simpli account. That account was going to be exhausted by September 2024.
177. In 2022, Ms. Brown was receiving $1,115 per month in federal government benefits. The thumbnail document provided by Mr. Allmendinger shows no employment income.
178. These numbers do not add up. As noted earlier, there is no evidence before the court to demonstrate how Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger were going to generate $11,000 per month ($3500 in benefits and $7500 in investment income for a total of $132,000 per year).
179. The court finds that the couple would have had to make changes and reduce their expenditures. Therefore, Mr. Allmendinger has no reasonable expectation of sustaining the same lifestyle for the remainder of his life.
180. In oral submissions, Mr. Allmendinger confirmed that he valued his claim at $4,873 per month ($58,476 per year or $818,664 for 14 years). As noted above, there was no evidence to support this.
181. Given the evidentiary gap created by Mr. Allmendinger, the court turns to existing evidence. The court accepts that Ms. Brown was providing shelter, living expenses and transportation for herself and Mr. Allmendinger. In 2022, it appears that she accomplished that on $44,279 drawn from her Simpli account. That will be the basis for assessing the annual expenses.
182. Of that $44,279, $17,000 ($1416 per month) would have gone to shelter. Ms. Brown owned the condo outright but had to pay $17,000 for ongoing expenses: condo fees, property taxes, and insurance.
183. Mr. Allmendinger put no evidence before the court of what a rental apartment would cost, but the court estimates that it will be higher than $1416 and assigns $2000 to this head.
184. Taking the property expenses away from $44,279, that would leave $27,279 for living expenses and transportation.
185. Dealing with transportation next: there is no evidence before the court how much it costs Ms. Brown to run her Mercedes diesel car per year. Mr. Allmendinger asks, without supporting evidence, for $500 per month for a car. Mr. Allmendinger has not held a driver’s license since 2011. There is no evidence he will acquire his driver’s license, but there he will need funds for public transport or hired rides. The court estimates $250 per month ($3000 per year).
186. Continuing to use the annual rate of $44,279, that leaves $24,279 for living expenses. Those funds would have been divided between Ms. Brown and Mr. Allmendinger for food, clothing and household supplies. Dividing that and rounding up slightly, that is $12,600 per year or $1,050 per month.
187. These figure for shelter ($2000 per month, $250 for transport and $1050 for living expenses) totals $3,300 per month, or $39,600 per year. In addition, Mr. Allmendinger has his federal benefits of approximately $21,600 per year for a total of $61,200.
188. The court finds that Mr. Allmendinger would be responsible for paying any taxes owing from those support payments.
189. The court also agrees that the entitlement to this support ends upon Mr. Allmendinger’s death. There is no entitlement by his estate.
190. Mr. Allmendinger claimed that his life expectancy was 14 years, by appending a 2013 European cardiology study of London (U.K.) male civil servants who were smokers. This study is inadmissible and even if it were inadmissible, it deserves little weight. It is not relevant or helpful to the court.
191. There is no reliable evidence before the court of Mr. Allmendinger’s life expectancy. However, given the degree of dependency of Mr. Allmendinger upon Ms. Brown, the court accepts that the support is for Mr. Allmendinger’s lifetime.
192. The court finds that this valuation includes both the legal and moral components of the claim. As noted in the section 62 analysis above, this was a late-in-life relationship. Mr. Allmendinger failed to prove many of his claims about what he brought to the relationship. The relationship was to the considerable benefit of Mr. Allmendinger. Unlike in other cases, Mr. Allmendinger did not give anything up for, or during, the relationship.
Step three: identifying and valuing the claims of non-dependants
193. Lillian Jones, Ms. Brown’s adult daughter is not a dependant. Ms. Jones is the sole beneficiary under Ms. Brown’s will. She was the sole beneficiary from the time her parents drafted their wills in 2006 to her mother’s death in 2023. Ms. Brown did not revise her will at any time.
194. Ms. Jones (legal and moral) claim is for the value of the entire estate.
Step four: balancing competing claims
195. Size of estate: The size of the estate is in the range of $1.4 to 1.8 million dollars. The parties did not prove the precise value.
196. Strength of claims: The claim of the dependant, Mr. Allmendinger, takes priority over the claims of Ms. Jones.
197. Intentions of testator: As noted previously, Ms. Brown made her will in 2006, shortly before her first husband (and Lillian’s father) died. She wanted to provide for her daughter. This is confirmed by her lawyer and investment advisor. For the reasons articulated above, she understood the value of planning.
198. There is no evidence that Ms. Brown planned to revise her will. Her death in November 2023 was sudden, but the unanticipated nature of her death does not mean that revising her will was on her “to do” list.
199. Ms. Brown’s property was hers to dispose of as she saw fit. However, the practical reality is that she entered a ten-year relationship with a dependant who had no assets and his only means of support was federal benefits. If Ms. Brown did not know Mr. Allmendinger’s financial status at the outset of the relationship, she would have learned it shortly thereafter.
200. The balancing therefore requires the estate to support Mr. Allmendinger, but this is not a windfall for Mr. Allmendinger. He is entitled to be supported to a similar degree that Ms. Brown was supporting him. The amounts found above ($39,600 per year or $3,300 per month) reflect the annual outlays Ms. Brown was making. This level of support also achieves a balance of the rights of Mr. Allmendinger and Ms. Jones.
Further Orders on Timing of Support Payments
201. Mr. Allmendinger asked to receive a lump sum payment of $818,664, representing his requested monthly amount for his anticipated life expectancy of 14 years.
202. The estate asked, if support is ordered, that it be paid monthly (the estate trustee confirmed that he is prepared to do this).
203. The court agrees that these funds should be paid periodically. The court orders that the funds be paid bimonthly (six times a year). Starting September 1, 2026, the estate shall pay $1300 per month to Mr. Allmendinger until he provides proof that he has secured his own housing. $1300 is the monthly living expenses ($1,050) plus the monthly transportation expenses ($250). Upon receiving proof of housing, the next month, the full payment of $3300 shall begin.
204. Past support: Mr. Allmendinger asked for his requested monthly amount ($4,873) to be paid to him since Ms. Brown’s death to present. The court disagrees. Although there is a past claim, it is for living expenses. Mr. Allmendinger had the benefit of living in Ms. Brown’s condo, with all costs paid by the estate. He put no evidence before the court of his transportation expenses.
205. The court therefore orders the estate to pay Mr. Allmendinger a lump sum of $34,650, which represents $1,050 per month for living expenses from December 1, 2023, to August 31, 2026 (33 months). These funds will permit Mr. Allmendinger to secure housing before October 14, 2026, so he can vacate the condo.
206. Pre-judgment interest: The court further orders the estate to pay pre-judgment interest of 2.65% on the amount of $34,650 for 2.75 years for a total of $2,525. The court used the fourth quarter rate of 2023 (5.3%) and used the typical approach of halving it to reflect that this loss was not incurred on all at once on November 17, 2023, but rather accrued over time.
Draft Order
207. A draft order may be sent for my signature to scj.judicialassistant.brampton@ontraio.ca.
208. If there any issues with the content of the order, the parties may request a 9am attendance before me via Zoom.
209. If there are any issues with the implementation of this order, the parties may ask to see me on a 9am appearance.
Costs
210. The parties had no agreement on costs.
211. The court was advised that there were offers which may impact costs.
212. The court urges the parties to agree on costs. If they will not, written costs submissions will be served, filed, and uploaded to Case Centre on the following schedule:
a. Mr. Allmendinger by September 15, 2026, at 4pm;
b. Brown Estate by October 15, 2026, at 4pm
c. No reply is permitted.
213. These deadlines cannot be varied unless by court order. If submissions are not received by these deadlines, the court will proceed on the basis that costs are not being sought. If costs are resolved, the parties should inform the court.
214. Costs submissions will be double spaced, in 12-point font, and three pages, maximum (exclusive of offers, authorities and bills of costs).
__________________
L.B. Stewart, J.
Released: August 14, 2026
The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee Garry Cass v. Michael Almendinger and Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No, 864.
2026 ONSC 4710
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00004662-0000
DATE: 2026 08 14
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
Michael Allmendinger
Plaintiff
- and –
The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee, Garry Cass
Defendant
DECISION ON APPLICATIONS HEARD NOVEMBER 17 AND DECEMBER 12, 2025.
Stewart J.
COURT FILE NO.: CV-24-00004358-0000
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
The Estate of Heather Ruth Brown, Deceased, by its Estate Trustee Garry Cass
Plaintiff
- and –
Michael Almendinger and Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No, 864.
Defendants
DECISION ON APPLICATIONS HEARD NOVEMBER 17 AND DECEMBER 12, 2025.
Stewart J.
1Gefen Estate v. Gefen, 2022 ONCA 174, para 30.
2Gefen Estate v. Gefen, 2022 ONCA 174, at paras 33 and 37.
3Gefen Estate v. Gefen, 2022 ONCA 174, at para 31.
4Succession Law Reform Act, R. S. O. 1990, c.S.26.
5Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.26, s.57.
6Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, s.29.
7Quinn v. Carrigan, 2014 ONSC 5682 (Div. Ct.), paras. 138 to 158.
8The court is referring to the benefits received by Mr. Allmendinger during the relationship. He started to receive an additional $363 in survivor benefits sometime after Ms. Brown’s death.