Re Anwar Hamada, 2026 ONSC 4774

CITATION: Re Anwar Hamada, 2026 ONSC 4774

COURT FILE NO.: 32-2555871 /32-2555888

DATE: August 18, 2026

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

IN BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY

In the matter of the consumer proposal of

Anwar Hamada (AKA Abu Nawaf)

of the City of Mississauga,

in the Region of Peel, in the Province of Ontario

AND

In the matter of the consumer proposal of

Maha Al Hawamdeh (AKA Maha Mohamed)

of the City of Mississauga,

in the Region of Peel, in the Province of Ontario

BEFORE: Associate Justice Ilchenko, Registrar in Bankruptcy

Preet Wadhwa, (“Wadhwa”) for Consumer Debtor Maha Al Hawamdeh (“Maha”) at the hearing, and initially also for Consumer Debtor Anwar Hamada (“Anwar”), who represented himself at the hearing (collectively, the “Consumer Debtors”)

Gagan Chopra (“Chopra”), Creditor requesting annulment of Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors

Mark Morgan, LIT (“Morgan”) for the Prior Bankruptcy Trustee of the Consumer Debtors, (the “Trustee”), David Sklar & Associates Inc. (“Sklar”), also appearing at relevant times in his capacity as President of Ontario Association of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals (the “OAIRP”)

Caryl Newbery-Mitchell, LIT (“Caryl”), for MNP Ltd., Administrator of the Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors (the “Administrator”), as replacement for the late David Gowling, LIT (“Gowling”)

Tara Woodfull (“Woodfull”) for Superintendent of Bankruptcy (the “OSB”), intervening in Annulment Motions, as replacement for the retired David Marshall

Sean Zeitz for Bank of Montreal, creditor of Anwar, not appearing as unaware of these Consumer Proposal Proceedings

HEARD: Initial appearance in motions Court on March 1, 2022 for certain relief sought by Chopra, adjourned to Special Appointment Scheduling Conferences on June 9, 2022, November 29, 2022, April 18, 2024, and November 26, 2025, all pending completion of reconsideration motions and appeals from underlying November 1, 2021 Judgment of Deputy Judge Nadler (the “Nadler Judgment”) of the Small Claims Court in Brampton in Action SC-17-7046 in favour of Chopra, to Divisional Court and then the Court of Appeal in 2025. Consumer Proposal Annulment Motions heard on April 23, 2026 with further materials ordered to be filed by June 30, 2026.

endorsement

[1] Initially these Motions regarding the Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors arrived on a regular Zoom Motion date March 1, 2022, with Chopra seeking various relief under s.173, 178 and s.198 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985, B-3. (the "BIA”).

[2] The relief sought by Chopra at that hearing was not grantable by the Bankruptcy Court in that context, but the allegations made by Chopra at the hearing regarding the conduct of the Consumer Debtors, and the circumstances of the filing of the Consumer Proposals, were sufficiently alarming for me to send these estates over to a Special Appointment Case Conference on June 9, 2022 with the participation of Morgan as the prior Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Consumer Debtors, to be scheduled to be heard as possible as annulment motions of the Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors (the “Annulment Motions”).

[3] Raised at the June 9, 2022 Case Conference by Morgan was the systemic issue of how the Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors were filed, given that at the time of the filing of the Consumer Proposals with MNP, each of the Consumer Debtors were:

• undischarged Bankrupts with Sklar,
• the Trustee had opposed their discharges on the basis, inter alia, of s.173(1), s.173(1)(o) and s.199(1)(b) of the BIA, including obtaining credit or property by false representations, and
• where the OSB had conducted s.161 examinations and was considering a referral of the conduct of the (then) Bankrupts to the Special Investigations Unit (the “SIU”), and also recommended the opposition of the discharges of the Bankrupts.

[4] The OSB reported at the time of the April 2026 hearing of the Annulment Motions that the Crown declined to prosecute Maha and Anwar due to the passage of time since the date of the alleged offences in 2019-2021.

[5] Instead, the Bankruptcies with Sklar of the (now) Consumer Debtors were annulled by the filing and approval of the Consumer Proposals with MNP, and until the intervention of Chopra, the Consumer Debtors were proceeding towards full performance and discharge of their pre-filing obligations, untroubled by the inconvenience of dealing with the prior oppositions to their discharges by Sklar and by OSB.

[6] The chronology at Schedule “A” of these Reasons of the dates and legal effects of the multitude of transactions and litigation steps relating to the Consumer Debtors, Chopra, the OSB, the Trustee and the Administrator over the last 10 years is necessary, as it reveals the interrelation of dates and transactions with the dates of Court proceedings to reveal the general mindset of Maha and Anwar, as well as contradicting some of the submissions that they made to the Court.

Preliminary issue- the Evidence of Chopra and of Maha and Anwar

[7] Each of Chopra, Maha and Anwar had filed multiple voluminous Affidavits, in each case replete with:

• requests for relief that this Court cannot grant, like injunctions,
• dueling accusations of malfeasance and of misleading of the Court,
• requests for the striking of the other sides’ materials on the basis of presenting argument instead of evidence, or misleading the Court on various issues, or improper affidavits of service, or
• in one particularly pettifoggerous instance, that one of the “affidavits” filed by Chopra should be struck because it was not titled “Affidavit”.

[8] Much of the evidence going back and forth dealt with re-litigating the underlying Chopra dispute with respect to the circumstances of Chopra obtaining a Small Claims Court Judgment in 2021, and the attempts by Maha and Anwar over the next 5 years to have it set aside, and in particular the fraud determination, on the basis of improper representation by counsel or paralegals.

[9] As I pointed out to the parties in my June 9, 2022 endorsement:

“The irony of this situation, is that in attempting to escape Mr. Chopra's Judgment, which was found by the presiding Judge to be caused by the Fraudulent statements of the Consumer Debtors, and therefore possibly a debt that the Court could find would not be discharged by bankruptcy anyway, the Consumer Debtors have blundered into conduct that could be found to constitute Bankruptcy Offences, and a situation where, upon the possible annulment of their Consumer Proposals, a Trustee could recover the sizable equity in the Lech Walesa property for the Creditors, and in particular, Mr. Chopra.”

And in my November 29, 2022 Endorsement:

“As I have stated previously irony of this situation, is that in attempting to escape Mr. Chopra's Judgment, which was found by the presiding Judge to be caused by the Fraudulent statements of the Consumer Debtors, and therefore possibly a debt that the Court could find would not be discharged by bankruptcy anyway, the Consumer Debtors have blundered into conduct that could be found to constitute Bankruptcy Offences, and a situation where, upon the possible annulment of their Consumer Proposals, a Trustee could recover the sizable equity in the Lech Walesa property for the Creditors, and now possibly an interest in the Fairview Property, given the denuding of the equity in the Lech Walesa Property by Maha WHILE A CONSUMER DEBTOR.

NONE OF THESE ISSUES WILL DISAPPEAR EVEN IF THE CONSUMER DEBTORS ARE SUCCESSFUL IN QUASHING MR. CHOPRA’S JUDGMENT”

[10] Notwithstanding, I granted Wadhwa’s request to adjourn the hearing of these Annulment Motions, now joined by the OSB in its intervention on the Motions. Whether or not Maha and Anwar were successful in setting aside the Nadler Judgment did have an significant impact on distributions from each Consumer Proposal, given the size of the Chopra Claim.

[11] Now that all appeals with respect to the Chopra Claim have been disposed of, these Annulment Motions can be dealt with.

[12] I have reviewed all of the Chopra Affidavits (the “Chopra Affidavits”) and Exhibits, and all of the Maha Affidavits and Exhibits (the “Maha Affidavits”) prepared by Wadha.

[13] Given that most of the issues of concern of the Court that I will deal with are from admissions made by Maha in her own sworn evidence, I do not need to rely on the Chopra Affidavits, and allegations made within, and whether or not those affidavits and exhibits were pristinely prepared, or all evidence presented was properly admissible.

[14] The bigger concern is evidence of transactions that Maha admitted to in her own sworn evidence, or that Anwar admitted to at the hearing or in written submissions.

The Bankruptcies of Maha and Anwar

[15] The OSB has filed a Report as its admissible evidence for the OSB Intervention on the Annulment Motions under the provisions of s.5(4)(a) of the BIA, which Report contains the majority of the ordinary Bankruptcy and Consumer Proposal documentation as exhibits (the “OSB Report”).

[16] Maha and Anwar, as well as Anwar’s brother Amir Hamada (“Amir”) assigned themselves into Bankruptcy on September 10, 2019.

[17] Maha declared assets worth $6600 with no realizable value, mostly a non-operational Honda Accord. Maha declared on her sworn Statement of Affairs liabilities of $34,471, being mostly an amount declared as owing to Chopra in the amount of $14,000, credit cards with Scotiabank ($9000) CIBC ($1500), BMO ($7000) and RBC ($1) and some unpaid traffic fines for Ministry of Transportation ($2700). Maha declared she was single and unemployed with 1 person in her family unit and living at 156 Enfield Place, Apt 1105 Mississauga, Ontario.

[18] Her causes of Bankruptcy were: “Unable to secure employment in field of expertise; no income; credit mismanagement; lump sum demands by creditors; legal action against debtor associated with law suit against friend.”

[19] Maha declared that her total income was $980 per month from “Family Support”. Her surplus income was calculated at $200 per month. She declared that she had no housing expenses.

[20] Anwar declared assets worth $2001 with no realizable value, including shares of “Squeezy Group Inc. (Inactive)”. Anwar declared on his sworn Statement of Affairs liabilities of $69,073, being mostly an amount declared as owing to Chopra in the amount of $14,000, credit cards with Scotiabank ($9000) CIBC ($1500), BMO ($6905 and $2565), Capital One ($8690) TD ($500) and RBC ($1), National Student Loans ($12,000), Money Mart ($1200) 407 ETR ($1300), Rogers ($1500) Fido ($4000) and Freedom Mobile ($1000), Cooperators Insurance ($1500) and Ministry of Transportation for Traffic fines ($4000). Anwar declared he was single and General Contractor (self employed) with 1 person in his family unit and living at 1068 Strathy Ave. Mississauga, Ontario.

[21] He stated he operated “Squeezy Group Inc. O/A Squeezy Renovations (Inactive), General Contracting (Not operating), February 26, 2018 to September 01, 2018 Squeezy Renovations (Inactive), General Contracting (Not operating), December 31, 2014 to February 01,2018” His causes of Bankruptcy were: “Failed business venture; no income; business debt; legal action by creditor; credit mismanagement.”.

[22] Anwar declared that his total income was $1825 per month from “Family Support”. His surplus income was calculated at $200 per month. Anwar declared $1000 per month in housing expenses.

[23] Each of Maha and Anwar were examined by the OSB under s.161 of the BIA on October 29 and 30^th 2019, respectively.

[24] Of concern in Maha’s examination under oath was her admission regarding how she obtained Credit Cards while unemployed and earning no income and other issues as summarized by the OSB, as the basis for the OSB recommending opposition on the basis of s.173(1)(a)(o) and s.199(b):

“ The bankrupt is 31-years-old without dependants. During the examination, her marital status vacillated between single, having a friend, and a “boyfriend” relationship with Anwar Hamada- also a bankrupt. She been in a relationship with him since, at least, 2015. During the examination, she explicitly denied being married to the same degree she stated she was single. Various documents made available to the OR indicate declarations with Anwar as her husband. Further to this, her Estate Information was updated with the OSB weeks after her examination attendance indicating her new address was that of Anwar’s. The bankrupt’s work history is declared as non-existent since 2014, claiming that she is supported by either her parents or Anwar. When asked if she ever worked at all, she stated she did so, outside of Canada, prior to 2014, as a Secretary/Administrative assistant in the construction field. When probed as to her ability to support herself and her daily expenses (such as cell phone bills and car related expenses) she declared that Anwar and her family support her and she is able to get by with S 1000/month in assistance. When probed as to the reasons for filing for bankruptcy, the debtor explained in no uncertain terms that she’s seeking protection from creditors on the basis of Anwar’s instruction to do so, and the advice provided to her by Anwar’s lawyer. The debtor was named in a lawsuit relating to a construction business run by Anwar, wherein she too is named as a defendant and was seemingly employed. In various documents made available to the OR by creditors, the debtor presented herself as an employee of Anwar’s. During the examination, she denied any employment in some responses but confirmed that she was responsible for managing administrative affairs during Anwar’s absences out of the country (usually for a month at a time). The bankrupt attended her examination without any supporting documentation relating to her assets, dispositions or declarations.

Refer to the responses to question numbers I, 3, II. 13-19-25, 32-39, 41,44, 54-55, 63, 65, and 101.

The bankrupt’s declarations, during the examination, of income and employment over the last 5 years appear to be problematic in the context of lifestyle, available credit and her credit history as a whole. She clearly stated to the OR that although she has been “unemployed” she did in fact declare employment with Anwar on her application for her BMO Credit Card, asserting “I lied”. The bankrupt provided vague, misleading or contradictory information during the examination. Bankruptcy is a legal process designed to relieve honest but unfortunate debtors of their debts. Missing in this estate are elements of being unfortunate; furthering this challenge are statements devoid of honesty.

Refer to the response to question number 55, 66, 97, 99.”

[25] At the 161 Examination it was Maha’s testimony that the debts on the Scotiabank, RBC and CIBC credit cards were cards she got jointly with Anwar, and that the traffic fines were for cars that Anwar and Amir had put under Maha’s name, but actually owned and traded by Anwar and Amir.

[26] With respect to Anwar’s testimony, the OSB had the following concerns:

7. The bankrupt stopped paying his credit card debts in 2015 and making payments to any creditors in 2017. During and subsequent to this period from 2016 to 2018 he had a car hobby where he purchased many different vehicles. (Q8, 9, 58 Cooperators)

8. The bankrupt was unable to account for the assets and records for his construction and cleaning businesses. (Q48, 108, 109, 113)

9. The bankrupt sent $40,000.00 to $50,000.00 to his parents at various locations in the middle east from 2014 through 2017. (Q72)

10. The bankrupt stated that a personal trailer containing his tools of trade valued at $15,000 was stolen in February, 2017 while he was out of the country. He claims that the police refused to make an official report of the incident and that he failed to pursue a claim through his insurance. (Q48).

[27] The OSB recommended that the Trustee oppose Anwar’s discharge under s.173(1)(a),(b),(d),(e).

[28] On May 22, 2020 the Trustee issued Notices of Intended Opposition for Maha (s.173(1)(a) and (o) and s.199(b) and Anwar (s.173(1)(a) and (o) and s.170 Reports dated the same day (the “S.170 Reports”).

[29] In addition to the concerns indicated by the OSB, for Maha the Trustee specified the following breaches of her s.158 duties:

The bankrupt has failed to provide any Statements of Income and Expenses, with proof of Income, since October 2019. The Trustee is unable to determine what, if any, surplus income contributions are required. The bankrupt failed to attend the mandatory Second Counselling Session. The bankrupt failed to fulfil her payment requirements to the Trustee. The bankrupt has failed to provide Pre and Post Tax information.

[30] In addition to the concerns indicated by the OSB, for Anwar the Trustee specified the following breaches of his s.158 duties:

“The bankrupt failed to perform the following duties: Deliver all documents relating to his property or affairs

Generally do all such acts and things in relation to his property and the distribution of the proceeds

Section 173 (1) (o) The bankrupt has failed to perform the duties imposed on him under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The bankrupt has failed to provide any Statements of Income and Expenses, with proof of Income. The Trustee is unable to determine what, if any, surplus income contributions are required. The bankrupt failed to attend the mandatory Second Counselling Session. The bankrupt failed to fulfil his payment requirements to the Trustee. The bankrupt has failed to provide Pre and Post Tax information.”

[31] On May 25, 2020 the Trustee wrote to Maha requesting an updated address as it appeared she had moved. On February 3, 2021 the Trustee wrote again to Maha advising that the Court was again scheduling discharge hearings and advising her of her outstanding duties as a Bankrupt.

[32] Anwar called the Trustee on February 4, 2021 and according to the notes kept by the Trustee of the conversation and introduced at the hearing, was very angry that he was not receiving his discharge.

The Consumer Proposals of Maha and Anwar

[33] On February 16, 2021 Maha, Anwar and Amir all filed Consumer Proposals with MNP as Administrator.

[34] At the preliminary case conferences I was quite sceptical that these three bankrupts could have, on their own, figured out that they could file consumer proposals as Bankrupts, annulling their Bankruptcies as way to deal with the Sklar and OSB oppositions to their discharges, given the very niche level of insolvency expertise that would require.

[35] Gowling at the Case Conference confirmed to me that MNP had not received these three Consumer Debtors through a referral from a Debt Counsellor that had been paid a fee. It was through another Debtor client of MNP that knew these Consumer Debtors.

[36] Gowling also confirmed that he had not contacted Sklar or Morgan prior to filing the Consumer Proposals.

[37] Maha’s liabilities on the sworn statement of affairs in her Consumer Proposal were similar to her sworn Statement of Affairs in her Bankruptcy, totalling $34,471, the same amount as her Bankruptcy. She advised that she and Anwar were now married, and living together at 3415 Stoney Crest Mississauga and that she was a full time labourer with “Squeezy Group Inc.”

[38] On the sworn Statement of Affairs for the Consumer Proposal, Maha disclosed assets valued at $4300, mostly a 1997 BMW 7IL worth $2800.

[39] Anwar declared on his Sworn Statement of Affairs in the Consumer Proposal assets of $1501.00 – all exempt. Unlike the Bankruptcy Statement of Affairs he did not declare the “Squeezy Group Inc.” shares, despite Maha declaring that was her full-time employer on her sworn Statement of Affairs.

[40] Anwar also declared the same debts on the Statement of Affairs in the Consumer Proposal that he did in the Bankruptcy.

[41] Bank of Montreal (“BMO”) was reported by Anwar to MNP to be a creditor in the amount of approximately $10,000 at February 16, 2021 but did not file a proof of claim. BMO will play a role in these proceedings, as described later in these Reasons.

[42] Both the Maha and Anwar Statements of Affairs disclose the prior Bankruptcy with Sklar.

[43] In response to the question “Do you expect to receive any sums of money that are not related to your normal income, or any other property within the next 12 months?” Both Maha and Anwar answered “NO” on February 16, 2021.

[44] On the statements of income and expenses filed with the Administrator, Maha and Anwar disclose total monthly income of the Family Unit at $3,630 for both parties. Rent/Mortgage is listed as $1800 with total monthly discretionary expenses for the family unit being $3615.00.

[45] The total proven claims in the Anwar Consumer Proposal are $73,439.51 and $36,253.92 in the Maha Consumer Proposal. In the case of each estate, Chopra is the largest individual unsecured creditor.

[46] The next largest proven Creditor in the Anwar Consumer Proposal is CRA with a $13,152.32 claim, which had not been declared on the Statement of Affairs in the Anwar Bankruptcy.

[47] The Consumer Proposals of Maha and Anwar, as amended were accepted by the Creditors, including Chopra, who appears to be the only creditor voting in person at any of the 4 joint meetings of creditors.

[48] The terms of the Consumer Proposals were that Maha would pay to the Administrator $9,000 and Anwar would pay $12,000, both over a 60 month period.

[49] As of the date of the hearing of the Annulment Motions in April of 2026 the Administrator reported that both the Maha and Anwar Consumer Proposals had been fully performed.

[50] This left approximately a 15% dividend for Anwar’s creditors, and a approximate 22% dividend for Maha’s creditors, once the Administrator determines how to deal with some of the duplicate creditors and the Chopra claim, as well as the calculation of interest on claims.

[51] Amir had also filed a consumer proposal, and was also previously a Bankrupt with Sklar, but by the time of the hearing of these Annulment Motions his Consumer Proposal had been deemed annulled due to non-payment under the Consumer Proposal, and Amir had been deemed assigned into Bankruptcy with MNP, as he had previously been a Bankrupt He did not take part in the Motions before me.

The Lech Walesa Property purchase and refinancing by Maha

[52] As will be seen from the chronology I have prepared, the timing of the filing of the Consumer Proposals on February 16, 2021 is crucial, because unbeknownst to either Sklar as Trustee, or MNP and Gowling as Administrator, Maha had signed an agreement of purchase and sale on January 28, 2021 to purchase a property at 237 Lech Walesa Drive, Mississauga, Ontario (the “Lech Walesa Property”) for $973,000, while still a Bankrupt.

[53] This transaction closed on February 22, 2021, only 5 days after Maha’s Consumer Proposal was filed on February 16, 2021.

[54] However, because of the provisions of s.66.4(2)(d) of the BIA, Sklar remained the unwitting after-acquired property owner of the Lech Walesa Property until July 23, 2021, the date that deemed Court Approval occurred per s.66.22(2), and the date on which Sklar’s ownership of the Lech Walesa Property revested in Maha.

[55] Also on February 22, 2021, Maha granted a Mortgage to Royal Canadian First Mortgage Corporation for $632,450, secured by the Lech Walesa Property (the “Royal Canadian Mortgage”).

[56] Again, as of this date, Sklar was still deemed the owner of Maha’s interest in the Lech Walesa Property, so Maha had mortgaged property actually legally owned by Sklar, until July 23, 2021 when it revested in Maha.

[57] According to a PurView report obtained by the Administrator for a March 1, 2022 Case Conference before me, as at February 15, 2022, the remaining equity in the Lech Walesa Property was estimated at $648,399 and the estimated value of the Lech Walesa Property was $1,280,849, having appreciated $307,949 since purchased by Maha a year earlier.

[58] At that March 1, 2022 Case Conference, where Chopra was seeking injunctive relief in relation to Maha dealing with the Lech Walesa Property that I cannot grant, I stated in my endorsement:

“However, Mr. Chopra has done a service to the Court and to the Administrator by providing documentation that appears to indicate, and which the Administrator confirms in the Administrator's Supplementary Report, that there is something desperately wrong with the conduct of this Consumer Debtor.

It appears that, while an undischarged bankrupt whose Trustee, Mr. Morgan at Sklar had opposed the discharge on the basis of inter alia s.173(1), s.173(1)(o) and s.199(1)(b) obtaining credit or property by false representations, and where the Superintendent had conducted an examination:

1. signed an agreement of purchase and sale for the purchase of a $973,000 property while a bankrupt, creating a possible interest in that real property for Mr. Morgan;

2. likely applied for and obtained a $632,450 mortgage while a bankrupt, obtaining credit while bankrupt, being a possible Bankruptcy Offence;

3. then filed a Consumer Proposal with the Administrator on February 16, 2021, failing to reveal this pending real estate transaction to her Administrator, effectively discharging herself from the inconvenient opposed bankruptcy with Mr. Morgan, and avoiding a discharge hearing, before me;

4. then closed the purchase of the house as a freshly minted Consumer Debtor, on February 22, 2021, thus avoiding the house becoming after-acquired property in her bankruptcy with Mr. Morgan.

One of these issues alone would be grounds, if proven, to annul the Consumer Proposal. Put together, if proven, would be an affront to the Bankruptcy system.”

[59] Notwithstanding what I stated to the parties at the March 1 Case Conference and in my endorsement, two days after that Case Conference on March 3, 2022 Maha granted a Mortgage for $800,000 to Atrium Mortgage Investment Corporation secured by the Lech Walesa Property (the “Atrium Mortgage”) with the proceeds paid to Maha. The monthly payments under the Atrium Mortgage were $4660 per month. The Mortgage had a 1 year term and was “interest only”.

[60] This Atrium Mortgage transaction appears to have extracted the equity in the Lech Walesa Property.

[61] The Atrium Mortgage had a Balance Due date of April 1, 2023 for repayment of the $800,000 owing under that mortgage.

[62] There is no evidence before me as to whether this Mortgage was repaid or renewed by Atrium, or whether the term was extended beyond the initial one year or was refinanced.

[63] No interest in the Lech Walesa Property is disclosed by Maha on her sworn Statement of Affairs in her Consumer Proposal, which interest she would have had on February 16, 2021, having signed the Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

[64] Nowhere on the Statement of Affairs is it declared any possible liabilities under the Royal Canadian Mortgage, for which a commitment letter may have been signed by Maha before February 16^th, 2021, with the advance of funds and the closing of the Lech Walesa Property transaction being 6 days after she swore the Statement of Affairs.

[65] Also, as Maha and Anwar declared that their total combined family income for Surplus Income Purposes at the time of the filing the Consumer Proposals was $3,630, it is inexplicable how either Maha alone, or Maha and Anwar together, could pay the $4660 per month payable under the Atrium mortgage alone, if they were being truthful regarding their family income in the Consumer Proposal documentation.

[66] As at the time of the swearing of the Income and expense statements the Royal Canadian Mortgage had not been registered because the purchase by Maha of the Lech Walesa Property had not closed, this statement does not reflect the amounts payable under the Royal Canadian Mortgage, or certainly the $4660 monthly payment under the Atrium Mortgage, which alone would be almost be $1000 greater than the total family income of Maha and Anwar declared at $3,630.

[67] Maha’s specific testimony relating to the Lech Walesa Property Transactions, and the role played by her father Mohamad Al-Hawamdeh (“Mr. Mohamad”) in her final Maha Affidavit sworn September 8, 2022 was:

“52. The property in my name, located at 237 Lech Walesa Drive, Mississauga, hereinafter referred to as "the property", is held in an oral trust agreement, with my father, Mohamad Al-Hawamdeh, hereinafter [sic] referred to as Mr Mohamad, as the beneficiary.

53. I have been allowed by Mr Mohamad to hold the property in my name, even though Mr Mohamad is the actual owner of the property.

54. The down payment to purchase the property, in the amount of $400,000, was also given to me by Mr Mohamad. Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "9" is the proof of transfer from Mr Mohamad to me

55. As per our arrangement between me and Mr Mohamad, I have to make monthly mortgage payments, in place of paying rent to him.

56. I have to act on the instructions of Mr Mohamad and hold the property as per instructions of Mr Mohamad.

57. Mr Mohamad also advised me to get the property refinanced, as he wanted to purchase another property. Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "10" is the proof of the new charge registered on the property after refinance.

[68] Chopra in his submissions focused on the “oral trust” claim violating the provisions of s.9 of the Statute of Frauds, RSO 1990, c S.19, that reads:

Declarations or creations of trusts of land to be in writing

9 Subject to section 10, all declarations or creations of trusts or confidences of any lands, tenements or hereditaments shall be manifested and proved by a writing signed by the party who is by law enabled to declare such trust, or by his or her last will in writing, or else they are void and of no effect. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.19, s. 9.

[69] I am not determining whether the Lech Walesa Property is legally or beneficially owned by Mr. Mohamad. But that “oral trust” is very problematic to the proving of an express bare trust for the reasons set out by Doi, J. in Do v Do[1]. However, the Statute of Frauds does not preclude a Court determining that a Resulting Trust existed.

[70] As I advised the parties at the November 29, 2022 Case Conference Endorsement, this transaction, by a Bankrupt, and then a Consumer Debtor, was extremely concerning for the following reasons, once I discovered this had occurred 2 days after my prior Case Conference:

“I find it inconceivable that a Mortgagee would knowingly lend over $632,500 to an

undischarged Bankrupt or to a borrower who advised the Lender that she was actually

holding the property on a Bare Trust for her father. Mohamad is not listed as a

Borrower on any Mortgage on the Lech Walesa Drive property.

The Title to the property does not apparently reflect such a trust arrangement, which

could contravene both the Land Titles Act and the Land Transfer Tax Act. It also raises

the issue as to who can properly claim the “Principal Residence Exemption” on the sale

of that property under the Income Tax Act, and many other tax issues.

This mortgage was refinanced by Maha on March 3, 2022 to $800,000 WHILE A

CONSUMER DEBTOR (Tab 10 to her September Affidavit) and Maha apparently

admits to providing the proceeds to Mohammad WHILE A CONSUMER DEBTOR to

use in the purchase of another property BY MOHAMAD, A RELATED PARTY.

No Mortgage Application is before the Court, but one cogent question to ask is “what

income did the Bankrupt (at the time) declare to the lender to obtain the Mortgage and

is it different than what she advised the Administrator of her Consumer Proposal”.

[71] At exhibit 9 to the Maha Affidavit is a RBC Bank Statement for Mr. Mohamad that shows the amount of $400,000 being deposited to Mr. Mohamad’s account on January 15, 2021, then an immediate branch to branch transfer of $400,000.

[72] Following at Exhibit 9 is a CIBC Bank Statement for Maha (which does not show her address) showing that Maha deposited $400,000 in her account on January 15, 2021, while a Bankrupt.

[73] She appears to have utilized a portion of the funds to pay Mastercard and Capital One credit card bills, and then made a $70,000 withdrawal on January 29^th for unknown purposes, with the balance remaining in the account being $341,398.14 at January 31, 2021.

[74] There is no other supporting documentation before the Court for the Lech Walesa Property Transaction, like how the rest of these monies in Maha’s account were utilized, such as proof of the actual making of the downpayment by Maha for the Lech Walesa Property.

[75] There is no corroborating evidence before the Court that the $400,000 deposited in Maha’s account in January 2021 was actually paid toward the purchase of the Lech Walesa Property. There is proof in the Maha Affidavits that she received the money, and that there was a similar payment out of Mr. Mohamad’s account.

[76] The Purchase Price of the Lech Walesa Property appears to be $973,000. The Royal Canadian Mortgage amount appears to be $632,450 leaving a $340,550 shortfall. The $59,450 difference between that remainder and the $400,000 “down payment” that Maha testifies was provided by Mr. Mohamad, is not explained.

[77] Also, there is no evidence whatsoever that either of the Mortgagees advancing funds under the Royal Canadian Mortgage or the Atrium Mortgage were aware of Maha’s status as either an undischarged Bankrupt or a Consumer Debtor, respectively, or what financial documentation she provided to the Mortgagees to convince them to make advances to her to purchase and refinance the Lech Walesa Property when her monthly income declared to her Administrator at the time was $1815 per month, net.

[78] I find it unlikely that the Mortgagees would have granted a mortgage and advanced any funds to Maha alone, in relation to the Lech Walesa Property, if Maha had advised them of the “oral trust” in favour of Mr. Mohamad, the alleged actual beneficial owner of the property, and advised them that she had no beneficial interest in the Property.

[79] Maha was an undischarged Bankrupt in January 2021. The monies in Maha’s bank account in that month were, barring proof to the contrary, after-acquired property of the Bankrupt owned by Sklar.

[80] Maha also appears to be paying Mastercard and Capital One credit card bills in January 2021, as a Bankrupt. No Capital One Card was declared by Maha on her statement of affairs and under s.158(1.1) and Superintendent’s Directive 3 a Bankrupt cannot have or use a credit card.

[81] Anwar did have a Capital One card declared, but testified in the Anwar s.161 Exam that he had ceased paying that card 5 years earlier in 2016. And yet payments were being made on a Capital One card by Maha in January 2021, while both were Bankrupts.

[82] In the almost 4 years since that endorsement Maha and Anwar have not provided any better explanation or further evidence as to how Maha as a Bankrupt then Consumer Debtor managed to purchase and finance the Lech Walesa Property worth in excess of a million dollars in 2022, as a bare Trustee for Mr. Mohamad, and extract the equity.

[83] No actual evidence has been produced from Mr. Mohamad, or other third party, such as the financial institutions that financed this transaction, as to the truthfulness of Maha’s evidence that Mr. Mohamad was the real beneficial owner of the Lech Walesa Property, despite the lack of a written trust agreement.

[84] However, that was not the end of the real estate transactions participated in by Maha and Anwar while Consumer Debtors.

The 495 Fairview Road West Mississauga Transaction (the “Fairview Property”)

[85] In the Maha Affidavit at paragraph 58 Maha states:

“58. I got the property refinanced, as per the instructions of Mr Mohamad and sent the amount, to the real estate brokerage, as deposit, of the property located at 495 Fairview Rd, Mississauga ON.

59. Mr Mohamad advised Anwar to enter into and sign Agreement of Purchase & Sale to secure 495 Fairview Rd, Mississauga, as Mr Mohamad relies on the advise of Anwar as his construction expert and Mr Mohamad was sick.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "11" is the Agreement of Purchase & Sale.

60. It was decided that the Agreement to purchase 495 Fairview Rd. will be changed to Mr Mohamad's name, as Mr. Mohamad was purchasing the above said property with the purpose of reselling it to make profit.

61. The above said agreement, to purchase 495 Fairview Rd, Mississauga ON, was later put in the name of Mr Mohamad, as decided previously.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "12" is the Amendment to Agreement of Purchase & Sale, naming Mr Mohamad as purchaser.

62. A Bank Draft was made by me from my Account from the refinanced amount and given to the real estate brokerage.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "13" is the image of the Bank Draft in the name of the real estate brokerage.

63. The above said Draft, in the amount of $75,000, in favour of real estate brokerage, was deposited with the listing brokerage, of 495 Fairview Road, Mississauga, as per instructions of Mr Mohamad.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "14" the image of the receipt from the listing brokerage, on behalf of Mr. Mohamad.

64. The above said property was later registered in the name of Mr Mohamad, as the registered owner.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "15" copy of the Parcel Register and Registered Transfer showing the name of Mr Mohamad, as owner.

65. Mr Mohamad has given the contract of renovation of the above said property purchased by him to my husband Anwar as Mr Mohamad wants to re sell the above said property purchased by him after renovation.

66. I have kept the rest amount of the refinance, as deposit, towards the above said renovation contract for the newly purchased property, with the permission of Mr Mohamad.

Attached herein, to this Affidavit as Exhibit "16" copy of the renovation contract between Kings Construction and Mr Mohamad pertaining to 495 Fairview Rd West, Mississauga”

[86] Maha’s above statements from the Maha Affidavit in relation to the purchase of the Fairview Property are devoid of both dates of transactions and the amounts at issue, all of which are crucial to following the flow of funds.

[87] As set out in the chronology at Schedule A, the transaction to purchase the Fairview Property, and the flow of funds went as follows based on the exhibits appended to the Maha Affidavit:

1. May 21, 2022 – 82 days after the March 1, 2022 Case Conference endorsement Anwar signs an agreement of purchase and sale to purchase the Fairview Property for $1,500,000, and while the Annulment Motions were pending, while a Consumer Debtor;

2. May 24, 2022 – Maha provides a $75,000 CIBC Bank Draft, to the selling broker as a deposit on the Fairview Property, from the proceeds of the Atrium Mortgage on the Lech Walesa Property, while a Consumer Debtor;

3. May 29, 2022 – Anwar assigns the agreement of purchase and sale to Mr. Mohamad.

4. June 9, 2022 – Case Conference before me where in response to the evidence provided by Chopra regarding the mortgaging of the Lech Walesa Property with the Atrium Mortgage I stated in my endorsement (the “June 9, 2022 Endorsement”), but the pending transaction involving the Fairview Property was not revealed to the Administrator, the OSB or the Court:

“I impressed upon Mr. Wadhwa the legal peril the Consumer Debtors are in now, and asked him to impress upon his clients the further legal peril they will find themselves in if the 237 Lech Walesa Drive property is in any way dealt with, or encumbered with further charges, prior to the next case conference in this Matter that is to be scheduled before me in August to advise on progress.”

5. June 20, 2022- Fairview Property sold to Mr. Mohamad, who registers a $1.5 million charge on the property in favour of RBC (the “RBC Mortgage”).

6. June 20, 2022- Mr. Mohamad signs an agreement with “Kings Construction Group” a trade style used by Anwar, a Consumer Debtor, to renovate the Fairview Property, in anticipation of resale for profit, for the amount of $739,020 inclusive of HST (the “Fairview Renovation Contract”).

7. June 20, 2022 – Maha retains “the rest amount of the refinance, as deposit, towards the above said renovation contract”. The exact amount Maha and Anwar retained 4 years ago from the proceeds of the Atrium Mortgage, as Consumer Debtors, is not known, as there is no evidence before the Court as to what amount was owing on the Royal Canadian Mortgage, when it was (presumably) refinanced with the $800,000 Atrium Mortgage, and then $75,000 of the Atrium Mortgage proceeds were used as a down-payment on the Fairview Property.

8. January 15^th, 2023- End Contract date when entirety of $739,020 amount payable under the Fairview Renovation Contract is due and payable by Mr. Mohamad to Anwar o/a Kings Construction Group

[88] The dizzying flow of these funds to Maha and Anwar (as first Bankrupts and then Consumer Debtors) and then to Mr. Mohamad, and then back to Maha and Anwar, was:

a) Maha is the legal owner of the Lech Walesa Property worth $1,283 Million (at February 2022), purportedly as bare Trustee for Mr. Mohamad;

b) Maha may have a resulting trust interest in the Fairview Property (worth $1,500,000 in June 2022) as the legal owner of the $75,000 deposit used to purchase that Property, having borrowed those funds from Atrium;

c) Maha had retained the “rest amount” of the advances made under the $800,000 Atrium Mortgage on the Lech Wales Property to secure payments to Anwar by Mr. Mohamad under the $739,020 Fairview Renovation Contract;

d) Anwar owned a chose-in-action of $739,020 under Fairview Renovation Contract payable by Mr. Mohamad, and may been paid those amounts in January 2023 while a Consumer Debtor.

[89] If Maha is to be believed that the Lech Walesa Property is held in a bare Trust by her for Mr. Mohamad, then at the end of the transactions involving the Lech Walesa Property, Mr. Mohamad with an alleged $400,000 payment to Maha to purchase the Lech Walesa Property, became the beneficial owner of 2 properties with a value in 2022 of almost $2.9 million, with Maha being liable for at least $800,000 under the Atrium Mortgage and Mr. Mohamad being liable for $1,500,000 under the RBC Mortgage.

[90] Maha and Anwar also received access to $739,020 in funds from the Atrium Mortgage under the Fairview Renovation Contract, which amounts should have been paid to Maha and Anwar by January 15, 2023 through a combination of Maha retaining the “rest amount” advanced under the Atrium Mortgage on the Lech Walesa Property or paid by Mr. Mohamad. While being Consumer Debtors.

[91] There is no evidence provided to the Court by Maha and Anwar, in the 4 years between the initial return date of the Annulment Motions in March 2022 and the hearing date on April 23, 2026 as to:

-the utilization of the “rest amount” of the Atrium Mortgage proceeds by Maha and Anwar since 2022,

-whether the renovation of the Fairview Property has been completed by Anwar,

-whether the amounts payable to Anwar by Mr. Mohamad under the Fairview Renovation Contract have been paid, and

-whether Mr. Mohamad has resold the Fairview Property, as was planned; or

-whether Maha has repaid any of the $800,000 owing under the Atrium Mortgage on the Lech Walesa Property, which was due to be repaid on April 1, 2023.

[92] There is no evidence before the Court whether Anwar declared the income from the Fairview Renovation Contract on any tax return, whether any HST was remitted from the sale of the Fairview Property by Mr. Mohamad, or if the Fairview Property has been sold after being renovated for profit, as intended.

[93] Every transaction between Maha, Anwar and Mr. Mohamad was between related parties.

[94] I note that none of the exhibits attached to the Maha Affidavit contains the Land Transfer Tax Affidavits for the Purchase of the Lech Walesa Property or the Fairview Property.

[95] At the time of these transactions related to the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property Mr. Mohamad was 82 years old, and at the time of these Reasons, 86 years old.

The Chopra Claim

[96] The central conflict that underlies all of the insolvency proceedings between Chopra and the Consumer Debtors was the November 1, 2021 Nadler Judgment of the Small Claims Court in Brampton that Chopra obtained in an action against Anwar, Maha, as well as Amir, Thaer Ahmed Sayed Yousif and “Squeezy Inc.”.

[97] Thaer Ahmad Sayed Yousif defended the action, while Maha, Anwar and Amir initially did not. “Squeezy Inc.”, despite the name, was a sole proprietorship and business name registered by Anwar. “Squeezy Group Inc.” appears to have been a CBCA corporation with Anwar as Director, in evidence filed by Maha.

[98] The Nadler Judgment obtained by Chopra was the precipitating factor for the filing of the Bankruptcies and Consumer Proposals by Maha, Anwar and Amir.

[99] The dispute was over a failed basement renovation in 2017 to the home of Chopra conducted by the defendants. Chopra plead fraud and misrepresentation for contracting in the name of Squeezy Inc. which he alleged was a non-existent corporation, and for not completing the renovation despite receiving a deposit.

[100] On November 26, 2019 Chopra obtained from AJ Jean an Order under s.69.4 of the BIA lifting the stay of proceedings against Maha, Anwar and Amir to allow the Small Claims Court Action to go forward. AJ Jean ordered costs of $250 payable by each of Maha, Anwar and Amir to Chopra.

[101] On November 1, 2021, at the Third Trial of the Chopra Claim, Deputy Judge Nadler issued reasons and a judgment at trial for the $14,000 deposit, and an additional $10,000 and $2,000 in costs, as well a pre- and post judgment interest.

[102] None of the Defendants attended this Third Trial, after Default Judgments issued in the first two Trials held in January 2018 and December 2019 had been set aside.

[103] Key to the reasons in the Nadler Judgment is the finding by that:

“I further find that the damages were suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of a fraud and/or misrepresentation of the status of Squeezy Inc. and the fact that the Defendants benefitted from the money [taken] but have provided no benefit to the Plaintiff”

[104] The defendants and their paralegal did not appear at the Trial, and had not apparently filed a Defence. The defendant Yousif did file a defence so the Nadler Judgment did not affect him.

[105] At the June 9, 2022 Case Conference Wadhwa appeared and advised that he had been retained by the Consumer Debtors to set aside the Nadler Judgment. One of the grounds was that the Consumer Debtors had not been properly represented by their Paralegal in the Small Claims Court Action, which resulted in, effectively, an undefended Default Judgment.

[106] One key issue was the determination of fraud and misrepresentation in the Nadler Judgment made that debt a non-dischargeable debt for the purposes of s.178(1)(d) and (e) of the BIA, making the bankruptcies and then Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors ineffective in preventing collection by Chopra under the Nadler Judgment.

[107] The Motion to set aside was heard in Small Claims Court by Anderson D.J, on February 1, 2024 and the motion was dismissed. The Motion before Anderson, D.J was by each of Amar, Maha and Amir according to the reasons.

[108] An Appeal to Divisional Court, on October 30, 2024 was dismissed by Lemay, J. in reasons released November 4, 2024 [2]. The Appeal before Lemay, J. in Divisional Court was by Maha and Amir, but not Anwar. Lemay, J. ordered a further $5000 in costs against the respondents Maha and Amir payable to Chopra.

[109] The Court of Appeal on March 28, 2025 denied leave for Maha and Amir to further appeal the decision of Lemay, J. in the Divisional Court, and ordered a further $5000 in costs against the respondents Maha and Amir payable to Chopra.

[110] After the conclusion of all of the Appeals of the Nadler Judgment, Chopra remained a creditor of the Consumer Debtors, with a proven pre-insolvency date (February 16, 2021) claim of $29,298.68, and the post-bankruptcy/proposal costs awards not being compromised by the Consumer Proposals.

Position of Maha and Anwar

[111] At the hearing, Anwar speaking for himself at the hearing and in written submissions that the transactions involving the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property were transactions by Mr. Mohamad trying to provide a home for his daughter Maha and her children.

[112] Maha was initially involved because of Mr. Mohamad’s age, illness and language issues. Anwar initially signed the agreement of purchase and sale for the Fairview Property for the same reasons.

[113] Their submissions were that Mr. Mohamad has beneficial ownership of both the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property in their entireties, only his money was used in both transactions and that Maha and Anwar were not trying to defraud anyone, and were only implementing the wishes of Mr. Mohamad.

[114] The general submissions of Anwar at the hearing, and in the written submissions he emailed to the Court on April 21, 2026 (the “Anwar Written Submissions”) that I permitted him to file were:

“At no point did we attempt to conceal assets, misrepresent our financial situation, or defeat the lawful interests of creditors. Simply put, there were no assets available that could have been hidden or transferred.

What occurred was nothing more than a genuine act of family support from a father seeking to help his child during a moment of profound financial hardship.

The property that is now the subject of this matter is not an investment property, nor was it acquired as a financial vehicle or speculative asset. It is our family home. It is the only residence in which our family lives.”

[115] This may explain the transaction involving the Lech Walesa Property, but does not explain the Fairview Property and why Mr. Mohamad could take that property in his own name, and borrow from RBC. Anwar had no credible answer.

[116] Anwar also insisted that the mortgagees of the Lech Walesa Property were fully aware of the status of Maha as a Consumer Debtor, because Maha advised them, and because the mortgage was effectively “rent” because it was interest only no principal.

[117] I find that, taking judicial notice of standard credit granting practices by Mortgagees , very difficult to believe.

[118] Morgan advised that in February 2021 Sklar received a call from a potential mortgagee for Maha who stated that the Bankruptcy had turned up on a credit report. Sklar advised the Mortgagee that Maha had not been discharged.

[119] Anwar did not provide evidence whether Maha had disclosed to the Mortgagees that she would be holding the Lech Walesa Property as a bare trustee for Mr. Mohamad.

[120] Whatever the internal dynamics and desires of Mr. Mohamad, Maha and Anwar, the mortgagees in the Lech Walesa Property transactions appear to be completely unaware that Maha as the legal owner and mortgagee of their property is a bare trustee, and that the proceeds of the Mortgage advance were used to fund the purchase of the Fairview Property, a commercial renovation property for the benefit of Mr. Mohamad, who they have no direct claim against.

[121] Anwar also testified at the hearing and in the Anwar Written Submissions that he and Maha had relied on insolvency professionals at Sklar and at MNP and followed their advice in filing and completing the Consumer Proposals:

“Throughout this difficult period, we relied heavily on professional guidance in navigating complex legal and financial processes that were entirely unfamiliar to us. As individuals without legal training, we trusted that the advice provided to us accurately reflected the legal implications of the steps we were taking.

Only later did it become apparent that certain consequences of those decisions may not have been fully explained or understood at the time.”

[122] Anwar also testified that he and Maha had filed the Consumer Proposals because they could not afford the “payments” in the Bankruptcies.

[123] When asked about the $400,000 + in the Maha bank account in January 2021 Anwar’s testimony was that it was “Not her money” and “Not our money” and “Not my money. I can’t have something that’s not my money” when questioned by me as to why that money could not be used.

[124] But in January of 2021 Maha was paying from the money in that same account Mastercard and Capital One credit card bills for credit cards she did not disclose to Sklar. How could she make those payments if it wasn’t her money in the account? Where did the $70,000 withdrawn on January 29, 2021 go?

[125] Prior to the $400,000 deposit in the account attributed to Mr. Mohamad, the account still had a balance of $14,361.91 on January 15, 2021. Whose money was that? That amount alone was 5 times the combined amount owing to Sklar by Maha and Anwar that allegedly was the driving force for filing the Consumer Proposals.

[126] Morgan had also produced a letter from January 21, 2021 that explained what were the outstanding issues preventing the discharge of the Bankrupts, that those payments from Anwar were $1350. Anwar had no credible explanation as to how he could not afford to pay $1350 to Sklar, but could afford to pay a total of $11,000 in the Consumer Proposal.

[127] Morgan also advised that as the Bankrupts had not cooperated with the Trustee in providing their required statements of income and expenses, and backing documentation requested, the Trustee could not determine whether either of the Bankrupts owed surplus income.

Position and Evidence of the OSB:

[128] The OSB was of the opinion that use by Anwar and Maha of a consumer proposal to circumvent the implementation of a conditional Order may be an abuse of the insolvency system. In this case, the problematic conduct was evident by the Bankrupts’ own declarations during their s.161 examinations and in the Maha Affidavits, as summarized in my November 29, 2022 Endorsement.

[129] The OSB supports an Application for Annulment of both Consumer Proposals on these grounds, as to allow the conduct to remain undiscouraged would be a blow to the integrity of the insolvency system.

[130] The basis of the position of the OSB is that the Debtor’s failure to disclose their financial circumstances and the after-acquired mortgages and property demonstrates a level of bad faith that is detrimental to the integrity of the insolvency system, which may qualify the proposals for an annulment under BIA s.66.3(1)(b).

[131] The OSB takes the position that the failure of both Consumer Debtors to accurately represent their financial position at the time of filing the proposals may also be enough to meet the requirement of BIA s.66.3(1)(a) or (b), as ownership in the properties could have rendered them solvent and thus ineligible to file the Consumer Proposal.

[132] In the March 12, 2020 Report of the OSB on the Maha Bankruptcy the OSB advised that the discharge of Maha should be opposed because, inter alia, she admitted in the s.161 examination that she lied on credit applications by citing her employment with Anwar’s renovation company, while alleging that she did not work for Anwar’s company, but only assisted with administrative matters when he was out of country.

[133] In the March 15, 2020 Report of the OSB on the Anwar Bankruptcy the OSB advised that the discharge should be opposed because, inter alia, that he admitted he in his s.161 examination that he had sent $40,000.00-50,000.00 to his parents between 2014-2017; that his trailer with work equipment was stolen but that police refused to make a report, so no insurance claim was made; and that he could not account for his business records for his renovation company; and that he bought and sold cars from 2016-2018, but had stopped paying creditors in 2017.

[134] In addition, for both Maha and Anwar, the OSB had taken the position in 2020, supporting the position of the Trustee, that the discharges of both Maha and Anwar should be opposed under s.173(1)(o) because both Maha and Anwar had failed to fulfill their duties, as reported by the Trustee for both Maha and Anwar.

[135] The OSB alleges that the bankrupts failed to provide any Statements of Income and Expenses, with proof of Income to the Trustee, Sklar, and that the Trustee was unable to determine what, if any, surplus income contributions are required.

[136] The OSB argues that Anwar and Maha each breached their s.158 duties and that s.173(1)(o) facts are provable as they have failed:

-to attend the mandatory Second Counselling Session.

-to fulfil their payment requirements to the Trustee.

-to provide Pre and Post Tax information to the Trustee to enable to the Trustee to file tax returns for their estates.

[137] The OSB argues that at the time of the procurement of the Lech Walesa Property, and subsequently when the Fairview Property was initially purchased in Anwar’s name, that but for the filing of the Consumer Proposals, the Trustee Sklar would have been able to realize on the properties for the benefit of creditors.

[138] The OSB argues that once the consumer proposals were filed, creditors were disadvantaged at the outset of the proposal by Maha’s initial failure to disclose the purchase of the Lech Walesa Property. Had more property with equity been available at the outset of the proposal filing, creditors likely would have asked for more in the proposal.

[139] The OSB argues that Anwar’s proposal is immediately affected by Maha’s lack of disclosure, as the Division II Statement of Affairs lists that they are married in September 2020. Based on Maha’s stated income level during the bankruptcy, it appeared that Anwar was the primary earner in their relationship, and his marital interest in the property is highly suspect and again undisclosed.

[140] In the view of the OSB, part of Maha’s debt is in relation to Anwar’s business, as other than the one BMO card, and the Chopra debt, her other debts declared on her statement of affairs are all credit cards where she was joint obligor with Anwar, and which he testified in his s.161 exam were from his businesses, including the car selling business.

[141] The OSB’s position is that these obligations pre-date their marriage, suggesting that they were financially entangled prior to becoming legal husband and wife.

[142] The OSB also argues that although Maha has sworn in her Affidavits that she holds the Lech Walesa Property in an “oral trust” with Mr. Mohamad being the source of funds and that she was holding the property in trust for Mr. Mohamad, the fact that she lied on previous credit applications before the bankruptcy affects her credibility, as she has established that she is willing to lie if it is financially beneficial. This makes the proposals as they stood at the time of filing unreasonable to creditors, as they voted with an incomplete picture.

[143] The Superintendent referred these two estates to the Special Investigations Unit (“SIU”) in 2023. With the offenses having been noted in 2022 or earlier, by the time the SIU was able to review them in 2025, the limitation for prosecuting offences under the BIA had expired, and as therefore an annulment of the Consumer Proposals under BIA para. S.66.3(3) is stymied without an actual conviction.

The BMO Claim

[144] In attempting to find in CaseCentre the documents for the Annulment Motion to write these reasons, I happened to stumble upon documentation relating to an action commenced by BMO against Anwar “o/a Kings Construction Group”.

[145] These are pleadings and affidavits in a Motion by BMO to obtain a Substituted Service Order for the Statement of Claim on Anwar, as he had allegedly been evading service. Associate Justice McGraw granted a Substituted Service Order in writing on March 19, 2026 to serve Anwar by mail at the Lech Walesa Property, and by email.

[146] The Action was commenced by BMO on January 28, 2025 (the “BMO Action”). The claim is for $66,062.76, interest, costs and a declaration that the claim is a s.178(1)(e) BIA debt for Anwar obtaining property or services by false pretences and/or fraudulent misrepresentations.

[147] The Statement of Claim alleges that Anwar made deposits of cheques, then withdrew funds immediately from a BMO Business Banking Account he opened on June 10, 2020 in his name under the trade name “Kings Construction Group”, the same trade style that Anwar employed for the $739,020 Fairview Renovation Contract with Mr. Mohamad.

[148] At that time Anwar was a Bankrupt, but it does not appear that BMO was aware of his status as a Bankrupt or his current status as a Consumer Debtor.

[149] Anwar did not disclose the BMO Business Bank Account or his active operation of “Kings Construction Group” to Sklar.

[150] In his sworn s.161 Examination in October 2019 Anwar stated the following regarding Kings Construction Group” at question 94:

“Where and under what name(s) did you carry on business? Was it a corporation, limited partnership or sole proprietorship?

Answer: Squeezy Group Inc. Squeezy Clean Squeezy Renovations Squeezy Developments, King's Construction and Developments Crown's way Construction, 360 Basements and Renovations

6 names owned by Squeezy Group Inc. and I own Squeezy Group Inc. Corporation since February 2018

Before that only Squeezy names existed as sole proprietorships.”

[151] In his sworn Statement of Affairs for his Consumer Proposal sworn February 16, 2021 Anwar stated in response to the statutory question

“8. Have you operated a business within the last five years?”

“Squeezy Group Inc. O/A Squeezy Renovations, general contracting, From 01-Jun-2018 to present Squeezy Renovations, general contracting, December 31, 2014 to February 01, 2018”

[152] In the Motion Materials for the Substituted Service Motion is a Ontario Ministry of Public and Business Service Delivery Corporate Profile Report for “Kings Construction Group” that stated that from March 9, 2020, the initial registration date, “Kings Construction Group” was a Business Name Registration – Sole Proprietorship” by Anwar, not by any Squeezy entity.

[153] This makes his sworn s.161 Testimony false and his Sworn Statement of Affairs in his Consumer Proposal fails to include the “Kings Construction Group” business, which at the time of swearing had an opened BMO Business Banking account.

[154] The cheques deposited in the BMO “Kings Construction” account were returned NSF. These cheques were deposited on March 11 and March 14, 2024, and Anwar then immediately made Interac e-Transfers, debit card purchases, and bill payments that led to an overdraft on the Account that totalled $66,062.76 at August 23, 2024.

[155] None of these facts have been proven to date. These alleged debts owing to BMO would appear to be post Consumer Proposal debts, not compromised by the Consumer Proposal of Anwar.

[156] However, of relevance to these expungement Motions is that the process server attempting to serve the Statement of Claim swore in the Affidavit of Attempted Service that he attended at the Lech Walesa Property on February 11, 2025 and spoke to tenants who lived there and who advised that Anwar was their landlord, but did not live there.

[157] If Anwar is referring to the Lech Walesa Property in the Anwar Written Submissions as at April 21, 2026 that:

“The property that is now the subject of this matter is not an investment property, nor was it acquired as a financial vehicle or speculative asset. It is our family home. It is the only residence in which our family lives.”

Is the above statement made by Anwar in April of 2026 true, if a process server for BMO encountered tenants in the Lech Walesa Property in February of 2025?

[158] The Affidavit sworn in support of the Substituted Service Motion had attached Anwar’s Linked-In page where he describes himself as “CEO/Broker” and “Real Estate Broker – self employed” in Dubai, United Arab Emirates since September of 2024 to the present date – at the time that affidavit being November of 2025. The picture on the Linked In page is the same person that appeared before me at Case Conferences and the Annulment Motions.

[159] Again, this evidence of BMO has not been tested through cross-examination, but does raise issues about the truthfulness of Anwar and his fulfilment of his duties under s.158 of the BIA to both Sklar as Trustee and MNP as Administrator regarding:

• material changes to his financial condition,

• the current address where the Consumer Debtors live,

• whether Maha or Anwar are receiving rental income for leasing out the Lech Walesa Property,

• whether Anwar is now a Real Estate Broker resident in Dubai.

[160] More importantly, given Anwar’s testimony that the purpose of the transaction to purchase the Lech Walesa Property was the desire of Mr. Mohamad to provide his daughter and grandchildren with a home, why is that home now potentially being leased?

LAW AND ANALYSIS

The BIA

[161] As a starting point, the sections of the BIA relevant in this case to the annulment of Consumer Proposals read:

66.3 (1) Where default is made in the performance of any provision in a consumer proposal, or where it appears to the court

(a) that the debtor was not eligible to make a consumer proposal when the consumer proposal was filed,

(b) that the consumer proposal cannot continue without injustice or undue delay, or

(c) that the approval of the court was obtained by fraud,

the court may, on application, with such notice as the court may direct to the consumer debtor and, if applicable, to the administrator and to the creditors, annul the consumer proposal.

Annulment for offence

(3) A consumer proposal, although accepted or approved, may be annulled by order of the court at the request of the administrator or of any creditor whenever the consumer debtor is afterwards convicted of any offence under this Act.

Annulment effect

(5) Where a consumer proposal made by a bankrupt is annulled,

(a) the consumer debtor is deemed on the annulment to have made an assignment and the order annulling the proposal shall so state;

(b) the trustee who is the administrator of the proposal shall, within five days after the order is made, send notice of the meeting of creditors under section 102, at which meeting the creditors may by ordinary resolution, notwithstanding section 14, affirm the appointment of the trustee or appoint another trustee in lieu of that trustee; and

(c) the trustee shall forthwith file a report thereof in the prescribed form with the official receiver, who shall thereupon issue a certificate of assignment in the prescribed form, which has the same effect for the purposes of this Act as an assignment filed pursuant to section 49.

[162] All underlined and bolded text in these reasons is emphasis added by me for these reasons.

[163] The Court has considered all materials and arguments raised by all of the parties on these Motions. Any failure by the Court to refer in these reasons to specific arguments and materials raised does not reflect that the Court has not considered those arguments.

Motions for Annulment

[164] Under the provisions of s.66.3(5) of the BIA, if the consumer debtor was bankrupt, made a consumer proposal, and then the consumer proposal is annulled by court order, the consumer debtor is deemed to have made an assignment: s. 66.3(5) and Form 54.1.

[165] MNP, Sklar and OSB all agree that MNP will be the Trustee that will be appointed as Trustee in Bankruptcy of the Consumer Debtors, if the Consumer Proposals are annulled by the Court.

[166] The legal tests for Annulment of a Consumer Proposal were set out by my colleague Associate Justice Rappos in the leading case of Re Singh (“Singh”)[3], which also includes the “duty of fairness” test under s.4.2 of the BIA governing the conduct of all participants in proceedings under the BIA, including Consumer Debtors and Creditors.

“22 The test for the annulment of a consumer proposal is set out subsection 66.3(1), which provides that:

Where default is made in the performance of any provision in a consumer proposal, or where it appears to the court

(a) that the debtor was not eligible to make a consumer proposal when the consumer proposal was filed,

(b) that the consumer proposal cannot continue without injustice or undue delay, or

(c) that the approval of the court was obtained by fraud,

the court may, on application, with such notice as the court may direct to the consumer debtor and, if applicable, to the administrator and to the creditors, annul the consumer proposal.

23 Subsection 66.3(1) does not contain language that restricts the timing when such an application for an annulment of a consumer proposal may be made.

30 Having considered the principles of statutory interpretation and the purposes of the BIA, I agree with Justice Gunn's conclusion from the Engdahl . To interpret the section in any other way could result, in theory, with a consumer proposal not being annulled even where "the approval of the court was obtained by fraud",22 simply because the consumer proposal was completed prior to the discovery.

31 In my view, such a situation being possible cannot be what was intended when this section was introduced into the BIA.

32 Accordingly, the Court has the authority under subsection 66.3(1) to annul a completed consumer proposal.”

[167] Associate Justice Rappos then comprehensively synthesized from prior jurisprudence the following test for annulment of a Consumer Proposal:

Factors to Consider When Exercising Discretion Under Subsection 66.3(1)

54 The authority to annul a proposal is discretionary. In exercising such discretion, the Court should take into account the interests of the debtor and his or her creditors and balance their interests while maintaining the integrity and confidence of the public.23

55 Based on my review of the Automotive Finance[4] and Engdahl[5] decisions, the following are factors to be taken into consideration when the Court is considering exercising its discretion to annul a consumer proposal:

(a) the knowledge of the debtor;

(b) the creditor's knowledge of the consumer proposal;

(c) the eligibility of the consumer debtor to file a consumer proposal;

(d) the amount and nature of the debt;

(e) the timing of the application;

(f) the interest of the debtor and creditors; and

(g) the integrity and public confidence in the BIA and the process of consumer proposals.”

24 This differs from the language of subsection 66.3(3), which provides that a consumer proposal may be annulled after it is "accepted or approved" where the consumer debtor is afterwards convicted of any offence under the BIA.

POLICY CONTEXT FOR CONSUMER PROPOSALS

[168] Houlden & Morawetz§ 4:152. Consumer Proposals Generally states the following with respect to the general policy provisions underlying the Consumer Proposal provisions of the BIA:

“The provisions for Consumer Proposals were added to the Act to help prevent consumer bankruptcies. Previously, consumers who owed $75,000 or less, excluding mortgages on their principal residences, were able under Division II to negotiate with their creditors for the reduction or extension of the time for payment of their debts. That amount increased to $250,000 in 2009. “Consumer proposal” is defined in s. 2(1). See definition of “proposal”.

Consumer proposals are intended to be less labour intensive and less costly for smaller debtors than Division I proposals: Re Jalal (2003), 2003 CanLII 64273 (ON SC), 42 C.B.R. (4th) 260, 2003 CarswellOnt 1750 (Ont. S.C.J.).

Division II can only be used by individuals. The making of a consumer proposal under Division II is cheaper and simpler than the making of a proposal under Division I. Except in unusual cases, there is no meeting of creditors and no application to court for approval of the proposal: see s. 66.15(1), s. 66.18(1) and s. 66.22(2). Similarly, the amendment of a consumer proposal for default can in most cases without the necessity of applying to the court for an order annulling it: s. 66.31.

The purpose of the consumer proposal sections is to permit consumer proposals to be handled quickly, efficiently and with a minimum of administration and attendant expense. Negotiations, correspondence and discussion must be carried on within a very narrow time frame: Re Sutherland (1995), 1995 CanLII 9206 (AB QB), 34 Alta. L.R. (3d) 356, [1996] 2 W.W.R. 379, 36 C.B.R. (3d) 208, 1995 CarswellAlta 732 (Q.B.).”

[169] The deemed statutory approvals by creditors and the Court, where objections are not filed with the Administrators within the statutory time periods, are mandatory and not discretionary on Administrators, and are a key feature of the Consumer Proposal process intended to lessen administrative costs in order to increase the efficiency of distributions of smaller amounts to creditors.

[170] In Singh, Associate Justice Rappos set out the general principles for interpreting the BIA in a Consumer Proposal context:

“18 The principles of statutory interpretation require that the words of the BIA be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the BIA, the object of BIA and the intention of Parliament.

19 As well, every statute is deemed remedial, and is to be given such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects.

20 The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the BIA (then known as the Bankruptcy Act) has its origins in the business world, and its interpretation must take these origins into account. — “To interpret it using an overly narrow, legalistic approach is to misinterpret it.”

21 The Supreme Court has also held that the BIA is intended to further two purposes: (a) the financial rehabilitation of the bankrupt or debtor; and (b) the equitable distribution of the bankrupt’s or debtor’s assets among his or her creditors.”

Role of Bankruptcy Registrar:

[171] In Syndic d'Isolation Techno-Pro inc., Re (“Techno-Pro”) [6]Riordan, J.S.C. stated following regarding the Court having to intervene in Bankruptcy proceedings it is supervising to deal with obvious impropriety, generally:

“105 Moreover, the judge in Tariq recognizes this. Although an application of the court's inherent jurisdiction or discretionary power was neither sought nor required there, the judge nevertheless accepts the possibility of unilateral intervention when he states that this was not "one of those exceptional cases where a registrar might be able to act proprio motu (sic) « contrôler les abus manifestes de façon à maintenir la crédibilité générale du système. » of the BIA".

106 In our view, the present matter is, in fact, one of those exceptional cases.

107 Everything said, it simply does not make sense that a court should be barred from acting on its own initiative in situations like we have here. The actions to be sanctioned under section 125 are serious. They would include at the very least some level of improper behavior, and could go as far as fraud or criminal acts.

108 Where the Court becomes aware of such circumstances in a proceeding of which it is seized, it cannot sit idly by and allow an injustice to be perpetrated simply because that proceeding is invalid for procedural reasons - or otherwise. We have the implicit power to intervene based on a large and liberal interpretation of the provisions of the BIA. We could also justify our intervention on the basis of an exercise of our discretion or inherent jurisdiction to see that justice is done.”

[172] The Jurisprudence is clear that the position of Registrar is not to passively sit and accept input of evidence. The Registrar must also take a more active role where the only counsel at the hearing was Wadhwa, acting for only Maha. Anwar, the Administrator, Sklar and the OSB were not represented by counsel.

[173] This is also particularly the case given the seriousness of the allegations made by Chopra and OSB, based on the testimony of the Consumer Debtors in their s.161 Examinations and the admissions made by Maha in the Maha Affidavits.

[174] As stated by Hood, J. in King, Re (“King”)[7]:

“The master sitting on such a hearing then has a different role, and takes more part in the proceedings than does a trial judge, where the issues to be decided are solely between the parties whose interests are represented by advocates who adduce the evidence. The master or judge has a discretion to question the witnesses, as well as to call them, not only for the purpose of clarifying testimony or evidence, but also to ascertain other evidence, not brought out by counsel, relevant to the issue of discharge and which would enable him to properly exercise his discretion.”

[175] This is clearly a case, per King, that I have “…insufficient relevant evidence before him on which to properly exercise his judicial discretion”, and the “…interests of the public and the integrity of the system” required a determination whether the Consumer Debtors’, the OSB or the Chopra narrative is correct, and what role the BMO Action has to play in all of these facts and transactions.

[176] Per Techno-Pro I have therefore exercised my:

“…implicit power to intervene based on a large and liberal interpretation of the provisions of the BIA. We could also justify our intervention on the basis of an exercise of our discretion … to see that justice is done”.

[177] In particular, the claim by BMO against Anwar O/A Kings Construction Group, the same business style that obtained the $739,020 Fairview Renovation Contract, is very relevant to these Annulment Motions, as it appears that BMO is completely unaware of the Consumer Proposal and prior Bankruptcy of Anwar, and the Administrator, Sklar and OSB are unaware of Anwar’s banking relationship with BMO, which if BMO is correct, commenced June 10 2020, while he was Bankrupt, and after his s.161 examination testimony.

The “Hole” in the BIA

[178] In his submissions, Morgan in his capacity as Trustee of the Bankrupts, as well as President of the OAIRP, pointed out that what occurred in this case came as a result of a “hole” in the BIA dealing with what authorizations are required for a Bankrupt to file an in-bankruptcy Consumer Proposal.

[179] Under the provisions of s.66.4(2)

“(2) Where a consumer proposal is made by a consumer debtor who is a bankrupt,

(a) the consumer proposal must be approved by the inspectors, if any, before any further action is taken thereon;

(b) the consumer debtor must have obtained the assistance of a trustee who shall act as administrator of the proposal in the preparation and execution thereof;

(c) the time with respect to which the claims of creditors shall be determined is the time at which the consumer debtor became bankrupt; and

(d) the approval or deemed approval by the court of the consumer proposal operates to annul the bankruptcy and to revest in the consumer debtor, or in such other person as the court may approve, all the right, title and interest of the trustee in the property of the consumer debtor, unless the terms of the consumer proposal otherwise provide.”

[180] As Morgan correctly pointed out, it is rare that inspectors are actually appointed for a Summary Administration Bankruptcy or a Consumer Proposal. In most cases there is no Court review of a Consumer Proposal with Court Approval being deemed in most cases, leaving effectively no oversight of the practice of filing in-bankruptcy consumer proposals.

[181] The provisions of s.66.32 read:

66.32(1) Effects of annulment

Unless the court otherwise orders, where a consumer proposal is annulled or deemed annulled, the consumer debtor

(a) may not make another consumer proposal, and

(b) is not entitled to any relief provided by sections 69 to 69.2

until all claims for which proofs of claim were filed and accepted are either paid in full or are extinguished by the operation of subsection 178(2).

[182] So where there is a deemed annulment of a Consumer Proposal, usually for reasons of non-payment, the Consumer Debtor would need leave from the Court to file a second Consumer Proposal.

[183] In those situations the Court would have to be satisfied by evidence provided by the Consumer Debtor that there is a reasonable explanation for the default, and secondly to demonstrate that the second proposal contemplated has a reasonable prospect of being accepted by the creditors.[8].

[184] There does not seem to be a similar statutory restriction in the BIA on a Bankrupt commencing a different form of proceeding by filing a Consumer Proposal.

[185] The Court in Re Cooney [9]determined that on the current wording of s.66.13 of the BIA, prior approval of the existing Trustee in Bankruptcy is not required for a Bankrupt to make a Consumer Proposal, with a different Administrator:

“12 Respectfully, the Trustee overstates the case. Section 66.4 of the Act expressly contemplates a bankrupt making a consumer proposal. Section 66.13 only requires a consumer debtor to obtain the services of a willing administrator, which need not be the Trustee in bankruptcy.

13 Section 71 does not act as an impediment to a bankrupt making a consumer proposal, as s. 66.4(2)(d) serves to re-vest the property from the Trustee in the debtor when the court approves the proposal. Although the bankrupt, with the help of an administrator, drafts the consumer proposal, the bankrupt does not deal with the property that has already vested in the Trustee until the proposal is approved by the court. Thus, it is solely the creditors' and the court's approval that is necessary for a bankrupt making a consumer proposal, not that of the original Trustee.”

[186] For Division 1 Proposals, under s.50(3) for a Bankrupt to file an in-bankruptcy Proposal requires the approval of the inspectors of the Bankruptcy Estate, if they exist, but in every case Court Approval is required after approval by the Creditors.

[187] Morgan argued that s.30(3) of the BIA is instructive in the case of there being no inspectors:

“If no inspectors

(3) If no inspectors are appointed, the trustee may do all or any of the things referred to in subsection (1).”

[188] Unfortunately, the power to approve the filing of a Division 1 or Consumer Proposal is not among the enumerated powers under s.30(1) that a Trustee may do with the approval of the inspectors.

[189] There is no provision of the BIA that I can find that permits the Trustee to substitute as the inspectors for the purposes of s.66.4(2)(a) and s.50(3) of the BIA.

[190] Whether there “should” be such a provision in the BIA to avoid situations such as this one is not within my purview, as was recently cautioned by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cycle Toronto v. Ontario (Attorney General) [10]

[191] The conduct of Trustees and Administrators is within the purview of the OSB, which has an independent ability to issue Directives to provide guidance to Trustees and Administrators with respect to this issue, without necessitating amendment of the BIA or BIA General Rules.

[192] In this situation, there is no evidence before me whether the Administrator contacted and determined from the Trustee if there were Inspectors appointed in the Consumer Proposal that required consent, but it does not appear that was a legal impediment to the filing of the Consumer Proposals, since there were no inspectors of their bankruptcies. The Consumer Debtors on the Statements of Affairs filed in the Consumer Proposals clearly disclosed that they were bankrupts and that Sklar was the Trustee.

[193] However as a general policy, as s.66.4(2)(a) requires inspector approval, in order to fulfill the Administrator’s duty to assist the Consumer Debtor in filing the Consumer Proposal the Administrator must contact the existing Trustee in Bankrupt to determine whether there are inspectors. The Administrator should also determine at that time from the Trustee what the status of the Bankruptcy is, whether there are s.173 facts alleged, and the general state of compliance by the Bankrupt with their duties, as all of those factors are relevant to the Administrator formulating and recommending acceptance of the Consumer Proposal to the Creditors.

Application of the Singh Test to these facts

[194] Factually, Singh differed from this case, as in that case the creditor seeking to annul the Consumer Proposal, was Singh’s father-in-law who had obtained default judgment against Singh in April of 2019, prior to the consumer proposal, in the amount of almost $92,000 and registered writs against Singh. This debt was not declared on the statement of affairs by Singh and his father-in-law was unaware of the consumer proposal.

[195] In this case the Chopra Claim was declared by Maha and Anwar in both their Bankruptcies, and their Consumer Proposals, Chopra participated in numerous meetings of creditors in the Consumer Proposal, then voted in favour of the Amended Consumer Proposals, and did not request Court Review.

[196] It appears that Chopra brought the Annulment Motions in February 2022 once Chopra discovered the Lech Walesa Property transaction during the continuing attempts by Anwar and Maha to set aside the Nadler Judgment in the Civil Courts.

[197] The Singh situation is by far the more common factual “did not disclose” situation than this case, where the issue is not whether the Consumer Debtors continue to be eligible to be Consumer Debtors once the undisclosed debt is added, it is whether the Consumer Debtors should have completed Consumer Proposals annulled as a result of their conduct and failure to provide relevant information to the Trustee and Administrator relating to their property, income and business affairs before, during and after approval of their Consumer Proposals.

Knowledge of the Debtor of the Chopra Claim and Chopra’s knowledge of the consumer proposal:

[198] The BIA imposes duties on the Consumer Debtor to provide materials to the Administrator because the Consumer Debtor is best source of those materials, in particular given the context of the restrictions on fees payable to Administrators and the abbreviated time periods and approval procedures in the Consumer Proposal provisions of the BIA that prevent Administrators from being able to conduct extensive investigations, unlike in Division 1 Proposals that do not have these restrictions.

[199] There is no question that the Administrator was aware of the Chopra Claim.

[200] There is also no question on the evidence that the Administrator was not aware of the transactions involving the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property until those transactions were identified by Chopra in his first Chopra Affidavit in February/March 2022, and then by Maha in her Maha Affidavits in September/October 2022, within the context of these Annulment Motions.

[201] Prior to Chopra bringing the Annulment Motions, the Trustee Sklar was also unaware of the Lech Walesa Property Transaction, and the ownership interest that Sklar had in that property as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha, until deemed Court Approval of her Consumer Proposal revested ownership to Maha.

[202] The OSB was also unaware of the transactions involving the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property until Chopra brought the Annulment Motions.

[203] As a result, until October of 2022 each of Chopra, the Administrator, Sklar and the OSB, as well as the other creditors, were completely unaware of all of the details of the transactions relating to the Lech Walesa Property, the Atrium Mortgage, the Fairview Property and the Fairview Renovation Contract revealed in the Maha Affidavits, well after July of 2021 when the Consumer Proposals were approved by vote by Chopra, and deemed Court Approval occurred.

[204] Chopra had full knowledge of the Consumer Proposals, and the contents of the documents in the Creditors Packages, but it is clear that the information provided at the time of the Meetings of Creditors was not accurate or complete.

[205] Chopra was not aware of the issues relating to the Lech Walesa Property purchase at the time of voting for the Consumer Proposals, as the Administrator was not aware, because there is no evidence Maha advised the Administrator that in the February to July 2021 period Maha was the legal owner of the (then) $973,000 Lech Walesa Property, and had granted the $632,450 Royal Canadian Mortgage to purchase it, while a Bankrupt.

[206] From her own evidence, in her own bank statement from January, 2021, Maha had up to $414,361 in her bank account on January 15, 2021, one month prior to filing her Consumer Proposal, and appears to have withdrawn or made bill payments of $73,400 of those moneys for purposes other than the purchase of the Lech Walesa Property. While a Bankrupt.

[207] The withdrawals of $73,400 in January 2021 made by Maha from her bank account that I have described were more than twice the $34,471 in creditors Maha declared in the Statements of Affairs for both her Bankruptcy and her Consumer Proposal.

[208] With respect to Anwar, as a Consumer Debtor, from the evidence of Maha and submissions made to the Court by Anwar, it is clear that Anwar, during the Consumer Proposal and while the Annulment Motions were pending before the Court, commenced the transaction involving the Fairview Property on behalf of Mr. Mohamad, then secured the Fairview Renovation Contract in June of 2022 for $739,000.20, payable by Maha retaining unspecified funds from the Atrium Mortgage and Mr. Mohamad paying the rest to Anwar by January of 2023.

[209] None of this was disclosed to the Administrator as it occurred, or to the Court at the June 9, 2022 Case Conference, as it was occurring, closing 11 days later.

[210] In a case where the issue was the solvency of the consumer debtor, Proposition de Pilon, 2021 CarswellQue 18300, 94 C.B.R. (6th) 220, 2021 QCCS 4632 (C.S. Que.), (“Pilon”) the decision of Belanger, J.C.S. was summarized as follows in Houlden & Morawetz: § 4:164. Annulment of a Consumer Proposal:

The Superior Court of Québec dismissed an application to annul a consumer proposal. Justice Bélanger held that exercising the discretion of the court under s. 66.3 of the BIA would be contrary to the objectives of speed and efficiency underlying the BIA's mechanisms for consumer proposals as it would allow the creditor to annul the proposal 10 months after its filing for a reason of which she was aware at the time of filing. Justice Bélanger noted that a creditor may rely on s. 66.3(1) in order to request annulment of a proposal by showing that the consumer debtor was not insolvent at the time of its filing. The status of insolvent person is an essential condition for filing a bankruptcy or proposal under the BIA such that a solvent person is not, within the meaning of s. 66.3 of the BIA, entitled to file a proposal. An application must be made by the creditor within a reasonable time. Justice Bélanger held that the court must assess the injustice that may result from the maintenance of a proposal filed by a person when he was not insolvent. A fundamental objective of the consumer proposal mechanisms is to establish an expeditious, efficient, and inexpensive regime for settling the debts of the consumer debtor. Justice Bélanger held that creditors must therefore react promptly to assert their rights when notified of the filing of a consumer proposal; otherwise, they run the risk of being bound by a proposal that they do not consider favourable by the mere expiry of the 45-day period. Justice Bélanger held that the court must find the right balance between the efficiency requirements that underlie consumer proposal mechanisms and the misuse of these mechanisms that can lead to injustice against creditors. This fair balance must be assessed according to the facts of each case. In this case, it did not seem clear that the continuation of the proposal would lead to an injustice towards creditors. The request for annulment of the proposal was dismissed

[211] In this case this Singh factor weighs in favour of annulling the consumer proposals.

The eligibility of the consumer debtors to file consumer proposals;

[212] To be eligible to file a consumer proposal under s.66.11:

“66.11 In this Division,

consumer debtor means an individual who is bankrupt or insolvent and whose aggregate debts, excluding any debts secured by the individual’s principal residence, are not more than $250,000 or any other prescribed amount; ”

[213] At the time of the filing both Maha and Anwar were undischarged Bankrupts, and s.66.11 clearly states that “consumer debtor means an individual who is bankrupt or insolvent” making a distinction between bankrupts, being deemed to be insolvent, and insolvent persons.

[214] The OSB made arguments that the subsequent transactions entered into by Maha and Anwar made them not insolvent, but that is not the actual motion before the Court, and a Court determination would have to be made of the validity of the “oral trust” for Mr. Mohamad that Maha claims to hold the Lech Walesa Property in.

[215] Unlike Singh, the indebtedness of Maha or Anwar as prior bankrupts is determined for the purposes of s.66.11 as being the date of the prior bankruptcy with Sklar of September 10, 2019, as required under s.66.4(2)(c). On that date, none of these transactions had occurred yet and the indebtedness of Maha and Anwar was well below the $250,000 threshold.

[216] At the date of the bankruptcy, the Royal Canadian Mortgage would not close until February 22, 2021 so that debt and the Atrium Mortgage was obtained by Maha on March 3, 2022 would not be counted for that calculation, because the calculation date is the date of Bankruptcy of September 10, 2019 under s.66.4(2)(c).

[217] As a result I must conclude that on the date of Bankruptcy of September 10, 2019 both Maha and Anwar, as bankrupts, were “Consumer Debtors” eligible to make Consumer Proposals.

The amount and nature of the debt;

[218] In this case Chopra is one of the largest creditors, and clearly the most active. But for the purposes of annulling the Consumer Proposals, unlike Singh, his debt was declared and he participated in amending and voting on the Consumer Proposals.

[219] The issue was the correctness of information provided by Maha and Anwar to the Administrator and the Creditors, including Chopra, relied upon by the Administrator to recommend acceptance of the Consumer Proposals and relied on by Chopra and the other creditors to vote in favour of the Consumer Proposals, and the subsequent undisclosed material changes to the finances of the Consumer Debtors.

[220] This Singh factor is not relevant to annulling these Consumer Proposals.

The timing of the application

[221] Similarly, there is no issue that Chopra brought the Annulment Motions expeditiously in February 2022, and continued to pursue them with vigor, after obtaining the Nadler Judgment in November of 2021, once he discovered the transactions involving the Lech Walesa Property.

[222] The delay from February of 2022 when he initially brought the Annulment Motions, to their hearing by me April 2026 is entirely attributable to the appeals by the Consumer Debtors of the Nadler Judgment to the Small Claims Court, the Divisional Court and then the Court of Appeal.

[223] This Singh factor is not relevant in this case, as there was no delay on the part of Chopra.

The interests of the debtor and the creditors

[224] Both Anwar and Maha have fully performed their Consumer Proposals. The terms of the Consumer Proposals were that Maha would pay to the Administrator $9,000 and Anwar would pay $12,000.

[225] There will be a 15% dividend for Anwar’s creditors, and an approximate 22% dividend for Maha’s creditors, once the Administrator determines how to deal with some of the duplicate creditors, and the Chopra Claim.

[226] The annulment of the Consumer Proposals, and the Bankruptcy of Maha and Anwar will be prejudicial to them, as they will be subject to discharge and may have surplus income obligations.

[227] If a Trustee in Bankruptcy is appointed they will have to determine Maha’s legal and beneficial interests in the Lech Walesa Property as well as the Fairview Property, given that at least the deposit on the Fairview Property was paid by Maha out of the Mortgage Advance on the Atrium Mortgage she obtained and is personally liable for.

[228] Maha has also been paying the Atrium Mortgage, so a Trustee will have to determine whether those payments for a property purportedly beneficially owned by Mr. Mohamad, constitutes a resulting trust or other interest in the Lech Walesa Property.

[229] With respect to the Chopra Claim, the Nadler Judgment has been upheld through all of the appeals, including the findings of fraud, likely constituting a s.178(1)(d) and (e) debt that is not discharged by the Consumer Proposals under s.66.28(3). Chopra can obtain his dividends in the Consumer Proposals and then continue to enforce his Nadler Judgment.

[230] Unlike most of these cases, Chopra, because of the nature of the Nadler Judgment, is not impacted to the same degree as the ordinary unsecured creditors, as he will have the ability to continue to collect the Nadler Judgment as a s.178 debt after discharge in the Bankruptcy as well.

[231] The real issue is the unsecured creditors that are not so fortunate. They will be suffering a 85% (Anwar) or 78% (Maha) write-down of their proven claims, in circumstances where many, many, many questions have been raised about the honesty of the Consumer Debtors, and their post-bankruptcy conduct, property acquisitions and undisclosed material changes to their financial circumstances since 2021, when they filed the Consumer Proposals and annulled their Bankruptcies.

[232] Associate Justice Rappos annulled a fully performed consumer proposal in Singh, so full performance is not a bar to annulment in appropriate circumstances.

[233] The real issue is the bargain implicit in the Consumer Proposals that were approved based on undisclosed financial information relating to the Lech Walesa Property purchase, and all of the subsequent transactions entered into by the Consumer Debtors.

[234] The creditors, including Chopra, analyzed these Consumer Proposals on the assumption that the assets and future financial prospects of the Consumer Debtors were as reported to the Administrator and to the Creditors. They clearly were not, and the Consumer Debtors failed to advise of the material changes to their finances during the process for approval of the Consumer Proposals, and afterward.

[235] This Singh factor clearly weighs IN FAVOUR OF annulling the Consumer Proposal.

The integrity and public confidence in the BIA and the process of consumer proposals

[236] The largest issue on these Annulment Motions is that the Consumer Proposal process is dependant on Consumer Debtors providing proper information to the Administrator in formulating the consumer proposal, and determining whether the debtor fits within the definition of a “consumer debtor”, and continuing to provide information on their financial situations.

[237] Under s.66.4 (1) all the provisions of the BIA, in so far as they are applicable, apply, with such modifications as the circumstances require, to consumer proposals.

[238] The following duties under s.158 of the BIA are applicable to these Consumer Debtors:

(b) deliver to the [Administrator] all books, records, documents, writings and papers including, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, title papers, insurance policies and tax records and returns and copies thereof in any way relating to his property or affairs;

(k) aid to the utmost of his power in the realization of his property and the distribution of the proceeds among his creditors;

(n.1) inform the [Administrator] of any material change in the [consumer debtors] financial situation;

(p) until … the administration of the estate completed, keep the [Administrator] advised at all times of his place of residence or address”

[239] As the jurisprudence relating to Consumer Proposals, such as Singh, set out, the intent is to create a more efficient, expeditious procedure that reduces procedural costs and professional fees to maximize recoveries to creditors where the debts are below $250,000. The procedure does so by eliminating much of the oversight by the creditors and the Court.

[240] If the Courts had to be involved in approving all Consumer Proposals, the Court system simply could not provide judicial oversight for an additional 98,000 Court approval proceedings annually, requiring the full panoply of steps and motions that need to be taken and heard to approve and implement a Division 1 Proposal.

[241] The system can only work if Consumer Debtors provide full and complete continuing disclosure to their Administrators.

[242] Courts not acting strictly to deal with lack of disclosure by Consumer Debtors would create the opposite of the cost efficient, expeditious proceeding for dealing with consumer debt, that maximizes recoveries to creditors, and would encourage debtors to understate their debts and assets and limit cooperation with their Administrators.

[243] As I stated in Biskupski[11] regarding the content of the duties of a Bankrupt to cooperate with their Trustee in the context of discharge:

“[148] The statutory wording regarding “all his property” and “the particulars of the Bankrupt’s assets” and “aid to the utmost of his power” and “…do all such acts and things in relation to his property…as may be reasonably required by the trustee” all indicate as statutory intent to impose on bankrupts a high standard in proving that they have fulfilled their duties under the BIA, not merely a factual compliance.

149As stated in Jefferson, the BIA imposes a duty on the Bankrupt to “…actively aid his Trustee or his creditors in mitigating the damage wrought by his assignment.” and not “…remain passive and hope that the financial storm would blow over.”

[244] The OSB correctly submits that that once the consumer proposals were filed, creditors were disadvantaged at the outset of the proposal by Maha’s initial failure to disclose the purchase of the Lech Walesa Property, which closed during the period that meetings of creditors had been held. Had they known creditors likely would have asked for more in the proposal.

[245] But for the approval of the Consumer Proposals, Sklar actually owned Maha’s interest in the Lech Walesa Property that would appreciate approximately $400,000 in the following year when the Atrium Mortgage was used to extract the remaining equity.

[246] If Sklar had remained as Trustee and had registered its interest on title as Trustee in Bankruptcy, the Atrium Mortgage would not have been granted. The equity in the property would have been sufficient to pay Maha’s creditors 10x over, if a Court determined in the interim that she had a beneficial interest in the Lech Walesa Property, in addition to the legal title.

[247] Until deemed Court approval of her Consumer Proposal, Maha had a duty under s.158 of the BIA to reveal to Sklar that she, and therefore Sklar, was the legal owner of her interest in the Lech Walesa Property, having purchased the Property while Bankrupt.

[248] Anwar also had a duty under s.158(n.1) to reveal to the Administrator that 11 months after deemed approval of his Consumer Proposal he had been awarded a contract with Mr. Mohamad that would pay him in excess of $739,000 between June of 2022 and January of 2023, when according to their Income and Expense statement he and Maha were collectively earning $3615 per month, net.

[249] Again, this payment, if it occurred, would have resulted in Anwar having funds to pay his creditors 10x over.

[250] Anwar’s “Kings Construction” business that figures prominently in both the Fairview Renovation Contract and the BMO Claim was not disclosed by Anwar in his Statement of Affairs.

[251] Both Maha and Anwar answered No to the question on the sworn statement of affairs:

“Do you expect to receive any sums of money that are not related to your normal income, or any other property within the next 12 months?”

• Maha already had in her Bank account 30 days prior to signing that statement on February 16, 2021 the $400,000 from Mr. Mohamad, and it appears she was using to those funds for purposes other than making the downpayment on the Lech Walesa Property, including credit card payments for cards she did not declare, and a mysterious $70,000 transfer.

• Maha purchased the Lech Walesa Property and received the advances under the Royal Canadian Mortgage only 6 days after making that sworn statement.

• Maha received advances under the Atrium Mortgage Maha 1 year and 1 month after making that sworn statement, but 2 days after the first Court appearance before me.

• Anwar signed the Fairview Renovation Contract 1 year and 4 months after the Consumer Proposal was filed, but only 11 days after the June 9, 2022 Case Conference before me.

• I also note that if the Lech Walesa Property is tenanted, this is an additional undisclosed revenue source for Maha, and the Administrator may not be aware of the current address of the Consumer Debtors.

• I also note that Maha’s testimony in the Maha Affidavits that the deal with Mr. Mohamad was that she holds the Lech Walesa Property in trust for him, but that she pays the Mortgage on the property from March of 2022, creating a possible resulting Trust interest for Maha, or her Trustee, in that Property.

[252] I do not know if that timing is coincidental, or an attempt to be clever about the 1 year period, but what I found astonishing, and which I repeatedly warned the Consumer Debtors and their counsel about in multiple endorsements, was that notwithstanding the annulment motion brought in March of 2022 and subsequent case conferences before me, Anwar and Maha persisted in engaging in transactions which the Administrator and the Court only subsequently were apprised of.

[253] It appears from the timing in the chronology that certain transactions such as the granting of the Atrium Mortgage, the closing of the Fairview Property Transaction and the granting of Fairview Renovation Contract occurred shortly after the annulment motions were yet again adjourned by me at a Case Conference, at the request of the Consumer Debtors, so that their appeal of the Nadler Judgment could be heard, the “coast being clear”.

[254] I note that on January 4, 2023 the Administrator sent a letter (in Administrator’s April 18, 2024 Supplementary Report) to counsel for the Consumer Debtors requesting inter alia extensive documentation regarding purchase and refinancing of Lech Walesa Property as well as Bank statements, Capital One Mastercard payments and updated statement of income and expenses.

[255] In response to a follow up by the Administrator on March 22, 2024 Wadhwa reaffirmed to the Administrator that response would be made to the Administrator’s January 2023 letter when the appeal of the Nadler Judgment would be completed. The leave to appeal was denied by the Court of Appeal on March 28, 2025. No response was ever provided by the Consumer Debtors or their Counsel to the Administrator in the 3 years and 3 months period ending April of 2026 when the Annulment Motions were heard.

[256] To be absolutely clear, the Consumer Debtors had duties under s.66.4, s.158 and s.198 of the BIA to answer those questions from the Administrator in a timely manner, notwithstanding the pending appeal of the Nadler Judgment.

[257] A useful lens for interpreting the annulment criteria of 66.3(1)(b) “that the consumer proposal cannot continue without injustice” are cases were the Court is determining whether a Division 1 Proposal should be approved when there has been less than exemplary compliance by the Debtor with their obligations to provide full and complete disclosure of their assets and liabilities.

[258] In Re Gunaratnam[12], Osborne, J. (as he then was) accepted the submissions of the OSB that the Proposal should not be approved as a result of the non-cooperation of the Debtor (who was filing an in-bankruptcy Division 1 Proposal):

“[19] It submits that the lack of good faith and the fact that approval of the Amended Proposal would compromise the integrity of the bankruptcy system is illustrated in part by the fact that there is no evidence as to whether or not the Debtor was a dupe or a knowing participant in the fraud committed on the banks who were induced to advance the loans.

20This uncertainty has been exacerbated rather than addressed by the Debtor who has failed to make full disclosure of all books and records including bank accounts, and has failed to provide answers to highly relevant questions, all of which would shed light on the issue of whether or not the Debtor was a dupe or a willing participant in the fraud, as well as on other issues such as the use of the funds

31I accept the position of the OSB. As a result of all of the above, I am not satisfied that the Debtor is acting in good faith or that approval of the Amended Proposal is in the interests of the public at large in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system.

32Given the refusal of the Debtor to answer the questions on his Examination, I am unable to conclude otherwise. Moreover, the questions asked but refused were centrally relevant and in fact fundamental and basic: What caused the vaguely described business losses? What caused those losses particularly when the business of Concept Wrap was never in fact operated? What happened to the proceeds of the loans advanced by RBC and BMO?

33In the absence of satisfactory answers to those questions, I cannot be satisfied, particularly given the chronology of the filings and proposals as set out above, that the integrity of the bankruptcy system is maintained. Nor can I be satisfied given the Debtor’s refusal to answer these questions (whether satisfactorily or not), that he is acting in good faith.”

[259] Again in Re Pacheco [13], Osborne, J. (as he then was) accepted the position of the OSB and refused to approve a Division 1 Proposal (who was filing an in-bankruptcy Division 1 Proposal) due to the non-disclosure by the Debtor:

“[50] I am satisfied that the Bankrupt was not forthright in the disclosure she made in her Statement of Affairs for all of the reasons set out above. Yet, she seeks to terminate this bankruptcy proceeding, and thereby put an end to any further investigation of facts such as are contemplated in section 173 of the BIA, through approval of the Amended Proposal. This, in circumstances where the unsecured debts were accumulated in large part through the utilization of 15 existing credit card accounts to which the Bankrupt added 12 new credit card accounts.

51While I have significant sympathy for a person in the circumstances of the Bankrupt, I am unable to be satisfied that the court has an accurate picture of those circumstances as a result of her non-disclosure. For example, there is absolutely no objective evidence of any kind whatsoever about the material expenditures said to have been incurred as a result of the depression of the Bankrupt’s daughter beyond her unsupported statements that this is what the credit card charges related to.”

[260] The situations of these Consumer Debtors is exactly analogous, in a Consumer Proposal context, of the situations of Gunaratnum and Pacheco. In each case Bankrupts have sought to dispose of their Bankruptcies where the discharges of the Bankrupts had been opposed by their Trustees by filing Division 1 Proposals, or in this case Consumer Proposals.

[261] In the case of these Consumer Debtors, Sklar and the OSB had opposed their discharges due to their non-cooperation with the Trustee.

[262] For Maha the grounds of opposition by the Sklar were:

“The bankrupt has failed to provide any Statements of Income and Expenses, with proof of Income, since October 2019. The Trustee is unable to determine what, if any, surplus income contributions are required. The bankrupt failed to attend the mandatory Second Counselling Session. The bankrupt failed to fulfil her payment requirements to the Trustee. The bankrupt has failed to provide Pre and Post Tax information”

And also under s.199(b) for obtaining credit using false information.

[263] The OSB recommended opposing Maha’s discharge on the following grounds:

The bankrupt’s declarations, during the examination, of income and employment over the last 5 years appear to be problematic in the context of lifestyle, available credit and her credit history as a whole. She clearly stated to the OR that although she has been “unemployed” she did in fact declare employment with Anwar on her application for her BMO Credit Card, asserting “I lied”. The bankrupt provided vague, misleading or contradictory information during the examination. Bankruptcy is a legal process designed to relieve honest but unfortunate debtors of their debts. Missing in this estate are elements of being unfortunate; furthering this challenge are statements devoid of honesty.

[264] For Anwar Sklar’s grounds of opposition were:

“The bankrupt failed to perform the following duties: Deliver all documents relating to his property or affairs

Generally do all such acts and things in relation to his property and the distribution of the proceeds

Section 173 (1) (o) The bankrupt has failed to perform the duties imposed on him under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The bankrupt has failed to provide any Statements of Income and Expenses, with proof of Income. The Trustee is unable to determine what, if any, surplus income contributions are required. The bankrupt failed to attend the mandatory Second Counselling Session. The bankrupt failed to fulfil his payment requirements to the Trustee. The bankrupt has failed to provide Pre and Post Tax information.”

[265] In these circumstances, for both Maha and Anwar, the Court would likely have ordered substantial conditional Orders of discharge requiring remedying all of these deficiencies. But the filing of the Consumer Proposals with a different Administrator, like the Division 1 Proposals in Gunaratnam and Pacheco, eliminated the need for Maha and Anwar to remedy their breaches of their duties in the Bankruptcies that caused Sklar and the OSB to oppose their discharges.

[266] There was no opportunity for the Court to review these Consumer Proposals, and the deemed approval was achieved as a result of the failures of the Consumer Debtors to provide all information that was relevant and required to be provided for the Administrator to determine whether they were eligible to make Consumer Proposals, and for the Creditors, including Chopra, to vote on them with full knowledge of the financial affairs of the Consumer Debtors.

[267] What was worse, they then continued to engage in transactions during their Consumer Proposals that gave them access to financial resources never contemplated in either the Bankruptcies or the Consumer Proposals, and never advised their Administrator of their changed circumstances until Chopra intervened by bringing the Annulment Motions.

[268] And when the Court intervened, they continued to not provide full and complete information to the Court as to transactions they persisted in entering into after the first hearing date before me on March 1, 2022.

[269] And when specifically required by the Administrator to disclose the information required, in direct requests to them, they still failed to provide the information required, notwithstanding the Court having repeatedly advised them to cooperate.

[270] In the factual circumstances that I have detailed at length, and due to the extraordinary behaviour of the Consumer Debtors, like Osborne, J. (as he then was) in Gunaratnam and Pacheco, I accept the submissions of the OSB, and I cannot conclude that the continuation of the Consumer Proposals of Anwar and Maha is in the interests of the public at large in protecting the integrity of the bankruptcy system and I therefore conclude that the Consumer Proposals of Maha and Anwar for the purposes of 66.3(1)(b) “cannot continue without injustice”.

[271] The powers of a Trustee in Bankruptcy are better suited than the powers of the Administrator of a Consumer Proposal in unravelling what the true state of affairs involving Maha and Anwar is, as the Consumer Debtors have ignored the requests for information and documentation made by the Administrator for the last 3 years, and in particular:

• What interest Maha has in the Lech Walesa Property and the Fairview Property;

• How Maha, a Bankrupt and then Consumer Debtor claiming monthly income of $1800 a month, and Mr. Mohamad, an (then) 83 year old retiree, could purchase two properties having a collective value (in 2022) of over $2.9 Million, and apply for and obtain mortgage financing under the Royal Canadian Mortgage, the Atrium Mortgage and the RBC Mortgage in excess of $2.3 million to purchase those properties;

• Whether Anwar and Maha actually received the $739,020 payable by Mr. Mohamad under the Fairview Renovation Contract by January 2023;

• Whether the Lech Walesa Property is tenanted and whether Maha is earning rental income;

• Whether the Fairview Property has been sold, and the disposition of the proceeds;

• Where the Maha and Anwar now live, and what they do.

[272] The perception of the integrity of the bankruptcy system, in the context of the conduct of this Consumer Debtors, clearly weighs IN FAVOUR OF annulling the Consumer Proposals.

Section 4.2 Duty of Good Faith

273The provisions of s.4.2 of the BIA, read:

Good faith

4.2 (1) Any interested person in any proceedings under this Act shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

Good faith — powers of court

(2) If the court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by any interested person, the court may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.

274The jurisprudence provides that the duty of Good Faith applies to Debtors, Creditors and s.4.2 adds that “all interested persons” are subject to the “Good Faith Principle” in proceedings under the BIA.

275Mah, J. in CWB Maxium Financial Inc v 2026998 Alberta Ltd, 14 that the Court is to consider under s.4.2 of the BIA:

“40 As a new provision, there is a dearth of case law to guide its application. However, it is obvious that the debtors and the secured creditors here are interested parties within the meaning of the section and that “with respect to” means invoking and conducting insolvency proceedings under the BIA.”

59 I summarize and conclude on this point as follows:

“• Interested persons in proceedings under the BIA are statutorily required to act in good faith with respect to those proceedings.

• Based on previous caselaw, the statutory requirement of good faith in the insolvency context requires that an interested party not bring or conduct proceedings for an oblique motive or improper purpose.

• Whether dishonesty has occurred in a given case is fact-specific and may, depending on the circumstances, include lies, half-truths, omissions and even silence.

• The conduct of the party alleged to have breached the good faith requirement should be assessed in light of the intent and policy objectives of the BIA.”

276In interpreting the identically worded s.18.6 of the CCAA, Romaine, J. in Bellatrix Exploration Ltd (Re) 15 states:

“105 As noted by Dr. Janis Sarra in “La bonne foi est une considération de base — Requiring Nothing Less than Good Faith in Insolvency Law Proceedings”,

Annual Review of Insolvency Law, eds Janis Sarra & Barbara Romaine, Toronto:

Thomson Reuters Canada, 2014:

The court will find bad faith conduct where a debtor, creditor or their professionals fail to meet the requirements to act candidly, honestly, forthrightly and reasonably in their dealings with one another and the court; where parties act capriciously and arbitrarily; or where they lie or otherwise knowingly mislead each other about matters relating to the insolvency proceedings.”

277Recently my colleague Associate Justice Rappos reviewed the purposes of s.4.2 in the context of prior “good faith” jurisprudence from outside of the BIA. In Re Gregoriou, [16]he states:

“[44] Subsection 4.2(1) of the BIA provides that any interested person in any proceedings under the BIA shall act in good faith with respect to those proceedings. Subsection 4.2(2) provides that if the Court is satisfied that an interested person fails to act in good faith, on application by any interested person, the Court “may make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances” [emphasis added].

45The phrase “good faith” is not defined in the statute.

46Subsection 4.2 was introduced into the BIA in 2019. The purpose of the amendment was to ensure that all parties act honestly, reasonably, and candidly throughout bankruptcy proceedings, the failure of which may be appropriately sanctioned.[6] The amendment was said to “give courts another tool to ensure fairness” in the insolvency process.[7]

47In CWB Maxium Financial Inc. v. 2026998 Alberta Ltd., Justice Mah considered the requirements of the section in the context of the actions of a secured lender and held that

(a) the statutory requirement of good faith in the insolvency context requires that an interested party not bring or conduct proceedings for an oblique motive or improper purpose;

(b) the common law relating to the organizing principle of good faith in contractual performance may be used to inform the good faith requirement in section 4.2; and

(c) conduct of the party alleged to have breached the good faith requirement should be assessed in light of the intent and policy objectives of the BIA.[8]

48Ms. Gregoriou asks that the Court rely on the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Bhasin v. Hrynew[9] (“Bhasin”) in considering the requirement of good faith under section 4.2.

49Bhasin deals with good faith and contractual performance. The Supreme Court determined that parties generally must perform their contractual duties honestly and reasonably and not capriciously or arbitrarily.[10] That parties should conduct contractual performance in an honest, candid, forthright and reasonable manner.[11] The Supreme Court referred to the broad duty of good faith recognized by the Civil Code of Quebec. It noted that the duty includes determining whether conduct is unacceptable according to the standards of reasonable people.[12]”

278For the reasons I have set out above with respect to the integrity of the Bankruptcy system test, as in Gunartnam and Pacheco, and the decision of Registrar Rappos in Gregoriou, I find that the conduct of the Consumer Debtors in failing to provide complete, fulsome, accurate information to the Administrator, the Creditors, and the Court, in both the Bankruptcy and their subsequent Consumer Proposals breached their duties under s.4.2 of the BIA to “act candidly, honestly, forthrightly and reasonably in their dealings with one another and the court” and that this conduct provides additional grounds to annul the Consumer Proposals of Maha and Anwar under the provisions of s.4.2(2) of the BIA.

DISPOSITION

279In the context of the Annulment Motions, on all of the evidence before me, in exercising my discretion as Registrar, in balancing all of the Singh factors as enumerated above, and considering the application of the principles in s.4.2 of the BIA to the conduct of the Consumer Debtors and Chopra, I am satisfied that these Annulment Motions fit under subsection 66.3(1)(b), but not (c) of the BIA, and that this is an appropriate case in which to exercise my discretion to annul the Consumer Proposals of the Consumer Debtors.

Costs:

280As in the leave motion before Associate Justice Jean, and the Appeals of the Nadler Judgment before the Small Claims Court, the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal, Chopra is seeking his costs for the Annulment Motions. He seeks total costs and disbursements of of $5980 for 11 days of preparatory work, attending 6 hearings and preparing materials and responding to the materials filed by the Consumer Debtors, the OSB and the Administrator, from February 2022 to the hearing date of April 23, 2026. The costs submissions do not differentiate on Party and Party and Substantial indemnity scales, but Chopra is self-represented.

281The response of the Consumer Debtors was collectively filed by Wadhwa. The response questions that Chopra lost $500 per day for the days he claims to have dealt with the Annulment Motions, provided no invoice from the lawyers he claims $1300 in costs for, then proceeds to spend 9 of the 19 paragraphs in the Cost Submissions to, yet again, re-fight the substantial findings of the Nadler Judgment, which same arguments have now been rejected all the way to the Court of Appeal. The Consumer Debtors argue that the costs requested by Chopra lack proportionality. The costs submissions also do not contain any bill of costs or other estimate of the fees that they have incurred on these Annulment Motions.

282The Consumer Debtors also argue that “18. Gagan Chopra has not spent even fraction of the costs claimed by him in this matter as he has been self-represented throughout this matter.”

283I note that costs have been awarded against the Consumer Debtors in favour of Chopra by Associate Justice Jean, the Small Claims Court, the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.

284Lemay, J. at the Divisional Court dismissed the Appeal of the Maha and Amir and granted Chopra costs of $4,000 for that appeal, notwithstanding that he was self-represented at that hearing. It also appears that the Appellants agreed to that costs amount, subject to further appeal.

285At the Court of Appeal costs were again granted to Chopra against Maha and Amir, fixed at $5000 by the Court of Appeal for the leave Motion, in writing. Chopra was self represented at that hearing as well.

286Clearly given these two decisions, in this case, a costs award in the range of $4,000 - $5000, notwithstanding Chopra self-represented status, was in the contemplation of the Consumer Debtors.

287As I have noted previously, Chopra and the Consumer Debtors have spent an inordinate amount of time exchanging volleys of materials, requesting relief that this Court cannot grant, refighting the Nadler Judgment, or making submissions that had nothing to do with the actual tests for the Annulment of a Consumer Proposal.

288This is a niche complex area of the law, and Chopra cannot be necessarily expected to understand all of the nuances as a non-lawyer. As I have noted Chopra pointed out the initial issues with the Lech Walesa Transaction, but most of the evidence I have relied on comes from the documentation assembled by the OSB in its Report, the Administrator in its 6 Supplementary Reports and the admissions made in the Maha Affidavits and exhibits attached thereto. Chopra had evidentiary issues with his materials that were never fully resolved.

289The conduct of both Chopra and the Consumer Debtors complicated the hearing of the Annulment Motions.

290Under the relevant general provisions of s.197 the BIA:

197(1) Costs in discretion of court

Subject to this Act and to the General Rules, the costs of and incidental to any proceedings in court under this Act are in the discretion of the court.

197(2) How costs awarded

The court in awarding costs may direct that the costs shall be taxed and paid as between party and party or as between solicitor and client, or the court may fix a sum to be paid in lieu of taxation or of taxed costs, but in the absence of any express direction costs shall follow the event and shall be taxed as between party and party.

291Bankruptcy Courts have interpreted these provisions in exercising their discretion as to costs under s.197 of the BIA by citing jurisprudence generally interpreting the provincial Rules of Civil Procedure.[17] In Ontario the tests applied are from Boucher [18] in interpreting Rule 57.01 of the Ontario Civil Rules.

292Fairness and reasonableness are the overriding principles to be considered by the Court in determining costs: Boucher, Davies v. Clarington (Municipality) 19 and Deonath v. Iqbal, [20] (“Deonath”).

293Generally, costs on a partial indemnity scale should follow the event, and this principle should only be departed from for very good reasons such as findings of misconduct by a party, where there has been a miscarriage in procedure or where there is oppressive or vexatious conduct.[21]

294In order for a Court to make its determination as to costs, Rule 1.04(1) must also be considered, to ensure that the Court makes a just, expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits and under Rule 1.04(1.1) so that costs orders are made which are proportionate to the importance and complexity of the issues and to the amount in dispute in the proceeding between the parties.[22]

295Chopra was successful on the Annulment Motions he initially brought, but only with respect to Annulment of the Consumer Proposals, not all of the other relief he requested, which this Court could not grant. The OSB and the Administrator and Sklar were also of great assistance to the Court in providing the evidence relevant to the Annulment Motions.

296The Consumer Debtors were not successful in any of the relief they requested in assorted responding materials filed, but that were not actual Motions for relief. The only relief they were successful on was my adjourning the hearing of the Annulment Motions pending the completion of the appeals of the Nadler Judgment.

297The issues at stake, as I have written at length, are of great importance to the parties involved, as well as to the practice of Trustees and Administrators filing Consumer Proposals by Bankrupts.

298The issues and the factual background was complex, requiring a Chronology to reveal the nuance of the events and their interrelation.

299The conduct of both Chopra and the Consumer Debtors, by constantly refighting the Nadler Judgment and requesting relief the Court could not grant, had the effect of lengthening the hearing of this proceeding for the purposes of the R.57 tests.

300With respect to proportionality, I note that the joint litigation in this case goes back to 2017, and that the initial award in the Nadler Judgment in favour of Chopra in 2021, prior to interest and costs, was $24,000. All of the subsequent 5 years of civil appellate and Bankruptcy proceedings by the Consumer Debtors has been to try to escape that Nadler Judgment. Proportionality does not favour the Consumer Debtors.

301The underlying conduct of the Consumer Debtors, as I set out at length, could give rise to an award of substantial indemnity costs, but given the conduct of both Chopra and the Consumer Debtors, an award of partial indemnity costs is more appropriate, which is generally 60% of the total legal fees claimed.

302In this case Chopra’s “legal fees” claimed are $4,200 of which 60% is $2,520.

303With respect to the claimed disbursements by Chopra totalling $1780, including $1,300 for legal fees, as the Consumer Debtors in their costs submissions do not have any specificity of their own legal fees for comparison, I will accept those disbursements.

304Given the complexity of the issues and the 4 years from the March 1, 2022 Case Conference, the 4 ensuing case conferences and the full day hearing in April of 2026, if Chopra had counsel, I believe that the costs claimed by Chopra’s counsel could have exceeded the amounts claimed by Chopra for costs, by a factor of 10.

305Considering the factors in s.197 of the BIA, R.57.01, R.1.04(1.1), s.4.2 of the BIA, and the application of the binding jurisprudence I have cited, I have concluded that given:

• the significance of the relief sought on this motion,
• the time spent,
• the issues at stake,
• the complexity of the issues, and
• the conduct of Chopra and the Consumer Debtors

and employing my Registrar's discretion, that the partial indemnity costs payable to Chopra as calculated by me above, are fair reasonable, proportionate and an amount that the respective parties should reasonably have expected to pay in the event they were unsuccessful on the Annulment Motions given the prior costs decisions of the Divisional Court and the Court of Appeal.

306In my view the all-inclusive sum of $ 4,300.00 calculated on a partial indemnity scale, is a fair and reasonable amount that the Consumer Debtors, jointly and severally, could expect to pay for costs in all of the circumstances of the Annulment Motions, and within the reasonable expectations of the parties, payable to Chopra by the Consumer Debtors, within 150 days of the release of this endorsement.

307With respect to MNP, currently the Administrator, soon to be the Trustee in bankruptcy of the Consumer Debtors, its costs can be dealt with in the Bankruptcy Estate and in the Consumer Proposal Estates.

308Neither OSB or Sklar were requesting a costs award.

___________________________

Associate Justice Ilchenko

Registrar in Bankruptcy

Superior Court of Justice

SCHEDULE A

Date

Event or Transaction

Source of Evidence

Legal Status of Debtors

Legal Result

September 22, 2017

Contract to renovate basement signed with Chopra

LeMay, J. Reasons

Not in insolvency proceedings

December 1, 2017

Small Claims Court Claim issued by Chopra

LeMay, J. Reasons

Not in Insolvency Proceedings

January 2018

First Trial and Default Judgment issued

LeMay, J. Reasons

Not in insolvency proceedings

December 27, 2018

Motion to set aside First Trial Order granted and Defendants allowed to file statement of Claim

LeMay, J. Reasons

Not in insolvency proceedings

September 10, 2019

Maha and Anwar (and Amir) assigned into Bankruptcy with Sklar

s.170 Reports of Sklar

Both Bankrupt

All property divisible by creditors assigned to Sklar

October 29-30, 2019

S.161 Examinations conducted by OSB for Maha and Anwar

OSB Report

Both Bankrupt

November 26, 2019

Order of lifting stay of proceedings to enable Small Claims Action to Continue

LeMay, J. Reasons and Tab 9 to Chopra 2022 Application Record

Both Bankrupt

Chopra can proceed with Small Claims Court Action, but enforcement of Judgment stayed

December 2019

Second Trial in Small Claims Court hearing after Defence not filed and second Default Judgment issued

LeMay, J. Reasons

Both Bankrupt

February 5, 2020

Second Motion to set aside second Default Judgment

LeMay, J. Reasons

Both Bankrupt

May 22, 2020

S.170 Reports of Sklar and opposition to Discharge by Sklar for both Maha and Anwar under s.173(a) and (o) (Anwar) and s.173 (a) and (o) and s.199(b) (Maha)

s.170 Reports of Sklar

Both Bankrupt

Maha and Anwer will not receive automatic 9 month discharges and will have to have a discharge hearing

June 10 2020

Anwar executes Business Banking Agreement with BMO for Anwar Hamada o/a Kings Construction Group with overdraft protection

BMO Statement of Claim

Both Bankrupt

Anwar opening business account while Bankrupt and may not have advised BMO he was an undischarged Bankrupt

January 15, 2021

Mr. Mohamad transfers $400,000 to Maha who deposits it to Maha CIBC Account

Tab 9 to Maha Affidavit

Both Bankrupt

Sklar as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha owns legal interest in all funds in account

January 15, 2021

Maha withdraws $3000 in Cash from CIBC account

Tab 9 to Maha Affidavit

Both Bankrupt

Sklar as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha owns legal interest in all funds in account

January 26, 2021

Maha pays $400 to Capital One for credit card debt

Tab 9 to Maha Affidavit

Both Bankrupt

No Capital One Card was declared by Maha on her statement of affairs and under s.158(1.1) and Directive 3 a Bankrupt cannot have or use a credit Card.

Anwar did have a Capital One card declared but Testified in the Anwar s.161 Exam that he had ceased paying that card in 2016

January 28, 2021

Maha signs Agreement of Purchase and Sale to Purchase Lech Walesa Property for $973,000

Tab 2 of Chopra 2022 Application

Both Bankrupt

Sklar as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha owns legal interest in Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Lech Walesa Property

January 29^th, 2021

Maha withdraws $70,000 in Cash from CIBC account leaving balance of $341,398.14 as at end of January 2021

Tab 9 to Maha Affidavit

Both Bankrupt

Sklar as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha owns legal interest in all funds in account

February 3-4 2021

Letter to Maha and Anwar by Trustee regarding outstanding discharge issues and call with Anwar demanding discharge

Report of Trustee

Both Bankrupt

February 16, 2021

Maha and Anwar (and Amir) file consumer Proposals with Administrator

Report of Administrator

Bankruptcies Annulled, both become Consumer Debtors

Sklar as Trustee in Bankruptcy of Maha owns Maha’s interest in Agreement of Purchase and Sale

February 22, 2021

Maha closes purchase of Lech Walesa Property for $973,000

Title Abstract Tab 2 of Chopra 2022 Application

Both Consumer Debtors

Maha interest in Lech Walesa Property not declared on Statement of Affairs as asset by Maha, Sklar is now owner of Maha’s interest in the Lech Walesa Property

February 22, 2021

Maha grants $632,450 Mortgage to Royal Canadian First Mortgage Corporation with estimated remaining equity in Purview search dated February 15 2022 at $648,399

Administrator’s March 1, 2022 Report – Purview Valuation at Tab 3

Both Consumer Debtors

Maha while Consumer Debtor has purchased house and granted Mortgage and has legal title to equity of approx. $648,399, despite Sklar still being legal owner of after-acquired property she had mortgaged.

April 21, May 5, and

May 28

2021

Adjourned Meetings of Creditors of Maha and Anwar Consumer Proposals to allow Chopra and Consumer Debtors to Negotiate terms

April 23, 2026 Report of the Administrator

Both Consumer Debtors

July 8, 2021

Final Meetings of Creditors for Maha and Anwar Consumer Proposals – approved by Chopra Voting letters at 100% of Creditors voting

April 23, 2026 Report of the Administrator

Both Consumer Debtors

Creditor Approval Obtained

July 23, 2021

Deemed Court Approval Date under s.66.22(2) as no Court review requested

Date of actual revesting of assets from Sklar to Consumer Debtors including Lech Walesa Property under s.66.4(2)(d)

November 1, 2021

Nadler Judgment issued in Third Trial where no defence filed and Defendants did not appear

LeMay J. Reasons

Both Consumer Debtors

Fraud Declaration by Nadler, D.J.

February 10, 2022

Chopra prepares Application in Bankruptcy Court asking for injunction for further dealing with Lech Walesa Property and to annul Consumer Proposals

March 1, 2022

First Appearance before Bankruptcy Court on Chopra Application- Chopra asking for injunction on further dealing or mortgaging of Lech Walesa Property- which Bankruptcy Court could not grant- but issues related to Lech Walesa Drive purchase pointed out by me in my endorsement

My March 1 2022 Endorsement

March 3, 2022

Maha grants Mortgage to Atrium Mortgage Investment Corporation for $800,000 secured by Lech Walesa Property

Maha Affidavit – Tab 10

Both Consumer Debtors

May 21, 2022

Anwar signs Agreement of Purchase and Sale to purchase Fairview Property for $1,500,000

Maha Affidavit – Tab 11

Both Consumer Debtors

May 24, 2022

Maha provides $75,000 CIBC Bank Draft to broker as deposit for Fairview Property

Maha Affidavit Tab 13

Both Consumer Debtors

May 29, 2022

Anwar Assigns Agreement of Purchase and Sale to purchase Fairview Property for $1,500,000 to Mr. Mohamad

Maha Affidavit – Tab 12

Both Consumer Debtors

June 9, 2022

Case Conference before me where I order:

“I impressed upon Mr. Wadhwa the legal peril the Consumer Debtors are in now, and asked him to impress upon his clients the further legal peril they will find themselves in

if the 237 Lech Walesa Drive property is in any way dealt with, or encumbered with further charges, prior to the next case conference in this Matter that is to be scheduled before me in August to advise on progress.” And also pointed out that as the breaches of duties. Consumer Debtors did not advise of the further mortgaging of Lech Walesa Property to assist in purchase of Fairview Property by Mr. Mohamad

Both Consumer Debtors

June 20, 2022

Charge registered by Mr. Mohamad on Fairview Property for $1,500,000

Maha Affidavit – Tab 15

Both Consumer Debtors

June 20,2022

Fairview Property sold to Mr. Mohamad

Maha Affidavit – Tab 15

Both Consumer Debtors

June 20, 2022

Mr. Mohamad signs agreement with Anwar on behalf of “Kings Group” to renovate Fairview Property in amount of $739,020 tax included with 60% ($443,412) payable before start of work

Maha Affidavit – Tab 16

Both Consumer Debtors

June 20, 2022

Maha admits that she has “kept the rest amount of the refinance, as deposit, towards the above said renovation

Contract” for the Fairview property, with the permission of Mr.

Mohamad.

Paragraphs 65 and 66 of Maha Affidavit

Both Consumer Debtors

Possible retention from $800,000 refinancing of Lech Walesa Property by Maha of at least $443,412 as deposit and possibly as large as $739,020 on behalf on Anwar

November 29, 2022

Case Conference where materials in answer to Chopra Application admitting to property Transactions filed by Maha

Maha Affidavits sworn September 8 and October 31, 2022

Both Consumer Debtors

Maha admits to multiple possible breaches of her duties under s.158 of the BIA

January 4, 2023

Administrator sends letter to Wadhwa requesting extensive documentation regarding purchase and refinancing of Lech Walesa Property as well as Bank statements, Capital One Mastercard payments and updated statement of income and expenses

Administrator’s April 18, 2024 Supplementary Report

Both Consumer Debtors

Consumer Debtors have duties to the Administrator to answer the questions asked, independent of any dispute with Chopra under the provisions of s.66.4, s.158 and 198 of the BIA just as any Bankrupt

January 15th, 2023

End Contract date when entirety of $739,020 amount payable under the Fairview Renovation Contract is due and payable by Mr. Mohamad to Anwar o/a Kings Construction Group

Exhibit 16 to Maha Affidavit

Both Consumer Debtors

Anwar and/or Maha may have earned $739,020 as Consumer Debtors

April 1, 2023

Balance Due date for $800,000 Atrium Mortgage

Maha Affidavit Tab 10

March 22, 2024

Wadhwa reaffirms to Administrator that response would be made to January 2023 letter when the appeal of the Nadler D.J. Judgment would be completed- no response ever provided

Administrator’s April 18, 2024 Supplementary Report, November 26, 2025 Supplementary Report and April 23, 2026 Supplementary Report

Both Consumer Debtors

Consumer Debtors have duties to the Administrator to answer the questions asked, independent of any dispute with Chopra under the provisions of s.66.4, s.158 and 198 of the BIA just as any Bankrupt

February 1, 2024

Motion to set aside Nadler Judgment refused by Anderson D.J.

LeMay J. Reasons/Anderson D.J. Reasons

Both Consumer Debtors

March 11, 2024

Anwar deposits series of cheques into BMO Account and makes immediate withdrawals through Interac E-transfers, debit card purchases and bill payments leaving overdraft of $17,921

BMO Statement of Claim and Bank and Statement for BMO Business Bank Account #3299-1993-790 in name of “Anwar Hamada operating as Kings Construction Group”

Both Consumer Debtors

Anwar created indebtedness to BMO while Consumer Debtor

March 14, 2024

Anwar makes further deposits of cheques in BMO Business Account and makes immediate withdrawals through Interac E-transfers, debit card purchases and bill payments

BMO Statement of Claim and Bank and Statement for BMO Business Bank Account #3299-1993-790 in name of “Anwar Hamada operating as Kings Construction Group”

Both Consumer Debtors

Anwar borrowed while Consumer Debtor

April 18, 2024

Further Case Conference – Consumer Debtors had missed payments under Proposal- Anwar did not advise Administrator of his Borrowings under BMO Line of Credit

My April 18, 2024 Endorsement

Both Consumer Debtors

August 23, 2024

Anwar BMO Business Account in overdraft by $66,062.76

BMO Statement of Claim

Both Consumer Debtors

Anwar borrowed while Consumer Debtor

October 1, 2024

Amir Consumer Proposal deemed annulled due to non-payment and Amir deemed a Bankrupt with Administrator now Trustee, but as at November 14, 2025 Amir had not fulfilled his duties as a Bankrupt with the Trustee

November 14 Report of Administrator

Amir Bankrupt

Amir in Breach of Duties under s.158 of BIA as at November 2025

November 4, 2024

LeMay J. dismisses appeal in Divisional Court

LeMay J. Reasons

Both Consumer Debtors

January 28, 2025

Action commenced against Anwar by BMO for $66,062.76

BMO Statement of Claim

Both Consumer Debtors

BMO seeking s.178 Declaration against Anwar

February 11, 2025

Process Server attends at Lech Walesa Property to Serve BMO Statement of Claim and is told by Tenants that Anwar is the Landlord but does not live there

BMO Subservice Motion Record- Affidavit of Attempted Service

Both Consumer Debtors

Consumer Debtors have a duty to provide their current address to the Trustee, as well as providing information of any material changes to their financial condition, like earning rental income

March 28, 2025

Court of Appeal refuses Leave to Appeal LeMay, J. decision

Both Consumer Debtors

BMO seeking fraud declaration against Anwar under s.178(1)(e)

November 2025

LinkedIn Page for Anwar states that he is a “Self Employed Real Estate Broker” in “Dubai United Arab Emirates” from September 2024 to November 2025 and also “Chief Executive Officer” of Kings Construction Group

BMO Sub Service Motion Record

Both Consumer Debtors

November 26, 2025

Final Case Conference to schedule hearings- No evidence provided to the Administrator that the Consumer Debtors may no longer live at the Lech Walesa Property and could be earning rental income and that Anwar may be resident or travelling to Dubai and working as a Real Estate Broker there

Nov. 26, 2026 Endorsement

Both Consumer Debtors

March 2026

Both Anwar and Maha Consumer Proposals fully performed

Both Consumer Debtors

March 19, 2026

Substituted Service Order granted by Associate Justice McGraw in BMO Action

Both Consumer Debtors

Possible Default Judgment for non-dischargeable Post-Consumer Proposal debt owing to BMO by Anwar

April 23, 2026

Hearing of Annulment Motions

My April 23, 2026 Endorsement

Both Consumer Debtors

Further Materials to be provided by end of June 2026

12022 ONSC 6679 at 28-36

2Hawamdeh v. Chopra, 2024 ONSC 6074

32024 CarswellOnt 1526, 2024 ONSC 837, 11 C.B.R. (7th) 400, 169 O.R. (3d) 609, 2024 A.C.W.S. 720

4Automotive Finance Corp. v. Davies 2002 CarswellBC 825, 2002 BCSC 509, [2002] B.C.W.L.D. 441, 112 A.C.W.S. (3d) 1015, 33 C.B.R. (4th) 22 (“Automotive Finance”)

5Minister of National Revenue v. Engdahl 1994 CanLII 4773 (SK QB), 1994 CarswellSask 27, 122 Sask. R. 247, 27 C.B.R. (3d) 114 (“Engdahl”)

62019 CarswellQue 3527, 2019 QCCS 5825, 307 A.C.W.S. (3d) 240, 71 C.B.R. (6th) 285, EYB 2019-311307

71993 CarswellBC 547, [1993] B.C.W.L.D. 1188, [1993] B.C.J. No. 854, 19 C.B.R. (3d) 107, 39 A.C.W.S. (3d) 926

8Bartlett, Re 2001 CanLII 62455 (NS SC), 2001 CarswellNS 191, 106 A.C.W.S. (3d) 22, 106 A.C.W.S. (3d) 23, 194 N.S.R. (2d) 192, 25 C.B.R. (4th) 207, 606 A.P.R. 192

92014 CarswellSask 322, 2014 SKQB 133, 20 C.B.R. (6th) 6, 240 A.C.W.S. (3d) 811, 462 Sask. R. 84

102026 ONCA 582

112023 ONSC 1694

122024 ONSC 1693

132024 ONSC 1690

142021 ABQB 137,

152020 CarswellAlta 2545, 2020 ABQB 809, [2020] A.J. No. 1453, [2021]A.W.L.D. 478, [2021] A.W.L.D. 481, [2021] A.W.L.D. 483, [2021] A.W.L.D. 568, 327 A.C.W.S.(3d) 166, 86 C.B.R. (6th) 191

162024 ONSC 5972

17Eastern Ontario District Soccer Association (Re) 2017 CarswellOnt 13201, 2017 ONSC 4932, 283 A.C.W.S. (3d) 696, 51 C.B.R. (6th) 305, Sally Creek Environs Corp., Re 2010 CarswellOnt 2634, 2010 ONCA 312, 188 A.C.W.S. (3d) 344, 261 O.A.C. 199, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 161,

18Boucher v. Public Accountants Council (Ontario) 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), [2004 CarswellOnt 2521 (Ont. C.A.)], 2004 CanLII 14579

19(2009), 2009 ONCA 722, 100 O.R. (3d) 66 (Ont. C.A.)

202017 ONSC 3672 at paras. 20-21)

211318706 Ontario Ltd. v. Niagara (Regional Municipality) (2005), 2005 CanLII 16071 (ON CA), 75 O.R. (3d) 405 (C.A.); 394 Lakeshore Oakville Holdings Inc. v. Misek, 2010 ONSC 7238 at paras. 10, 12-14).

22(Deonath at para. 21).