Frederick Simon Hawa

The estate brought an application for possession of a condominium in which the deceased's common-law partner continued to reside after her death.

The common-law partner brought a cross-application for dependant's support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The court found that the deceased's 2006 will was not a mutual will and thus did not bar the support claim.

The court ordered the partner to vacate the condominium as he had no legal right to remain, but found him to be a dependant entitled to support.

The court ordered a lump sum for arrears of living expenses and ongoing periodic support of $3,300 per month for his lifetime.

This motion concerned the approval of the Trustee in Bankruptcy's final statement of receipts and disbursements in the bankruptcy of Ametra Dave.

A creditor, Linda Zaplotinsky, objected to the Trustee's and its legal counsel's fees and disbursements, alleging mismanagement, ill-timed legal proceedings, and unnecessary costs.

The court found that while the Trustee's administration of assets was reasonable, the fees related to an unsuccessful property sale motion were not.

Consequently, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the Trustee's fees by $10,000 and its counsel's fees by $9,123.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' professional negligence action as statute-barred, the successful defendant sought $15,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court exercised its discretion under section 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 to deny costs to the successful defendant.

The court found that awarding costs would not advance the purposes of costs rules and would merely add insult to the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs due to the defendant's negligent and unprofessional conduct.

The defendant lawyer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' professional negligence action as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs retained the defendant in 2011, but the defendant failed to advance the action, leading to its administrative dismissal in 2012.

The plaintiffs discovered the defendant's negligence by the summer of 2016 but delayed commencing an action until November 2019, partly to pursue a Law Society complaint.

The court held that the limitation period began to run in the summer of 2016 when the plaintiffs had a plausible inference of liability, and that pursuing a regulatory complaint did not suspend the limitation period.

The motion was granted and the action dismissed.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims against the respondents.

The central issue was whether the appellant was the sole or majority shareholder of John Bordynuik Inc. of Delaware and therefore entitled to bring claims on behalf of or as an assignee of that company.

The motion judge found that the respondent John Bordynuik was not obliged to give up his shares in the Delaware Company when he purchased his majority interest in JBI Inc. of Nevada.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings, accepting her interpretation of the documentary evidence, including an email and share ledger, over the appellant's interpretation of a Settlement Agreement.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes.

Following the setting aside of an ex parte Mareva injunction previously granted in favour of the plaintiff, the defendant sought costs.

The court considered whether substantial indemnity costs were appropriate due to alleged nondisclosure in obtaining the injunction.

While the court acknowledged concerns about incomplete disclosure, it concluded the conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible or egregious behaviour required to justify substantial indemnity costs.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and relevant jurisprudence, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendant.

Costs were fixed at $28,000 plus HST and disbursements, payable in any event of the cause following trial or other disposition.

The defendant moved to set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction that had frozen his assets pending trial.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to make full and frank disclosure of material facts when obtaining the injunction, including the existence of a prior written settlement agreement that could be dispositive of the claim and other misleading statements regarding the defendant’s financial circumstances.

Applying the principles governing Mareva injunctions and Rule 39.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found the nondisclosure sufficient to rescind the order.

The court also declined to grant a fresh injunction, finding the plaintiff had not established a prima facie case or a genuine risk of dissipation of assets.

The defendant’s motion was granted and the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action following a jury's assessment of his damages at zero.

He argued that the trial judge's comment that the case was 'quite hopeless', made in the absence of the jury, and her refusal to accommodate the scheduling of his medical witnesses created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias and concluding that the trial judge's scheduling decisions were reasonable given counsel's failure to subpoena the witnesses.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident while driving a tractor-trailer and applied for statutory accident benefits.

The insurer argued the applicant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits and thus precluded from receiving accident benefits under section 59 of the Schedule.

In a preliminary issue hearing, the arbitrator found that the applicant had not elected to bring a tort action, meaning the exception under subsection 59(2) was unavailable.

The arbitrator declined to determine whether the applicant was entitled to workers' compensation benefits under subsection 59(1), finding that the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal had exclusive jurisdiction over that issue, and adjourned the entitlement hearing to allow an application to the Tribunal.

The appeal concerned whether guarantors could rely on an improvident sale defence despite guarantee language permitting the secured creditor to deal with securities as it saw fit.

The court held that clauses purporting to eliminate guarantors' rights must be clearly worded, and ambiguous broad-form guarantee language is construed against the drafting creditor.

In light of the creditor's conceded improvident sale and the requirement under Part V of the Personal Property Security Act that the secured assets be disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner as against the principal debtor, the guarantors were not barred from advancing the defence.

The summary judgment against the guarantors was set aside and the bank's motion was dismissed.