Paolo Giancaterino

The accused, C.R., was sentenced after being convicted of 10 counts of abuse against four of his children, including aggravated assault (tattooing), assault with a weapon (knife), assault causing bodily harm, unlawful confinement, and simple assault.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, C.R.'s personal circumstances, and aggravating and mitigating factors, with primary consideration given to denunciation and deterrence as mandated for offences against children.

The Crown sought 6-7 years incarceration, while the defence sought 2-2.5 years.

The court imposed a global sentence of four years incarceration, crediting 35 days for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 3 years and 330 days in a penitentiary.

The sentence was broken down into concurrent and consecutive terms for the various counts.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total time from the charges to the anticipated end of the second trial was 53 months.

The court deducted 10 months of defence delay and 11 months of delay caused by a mistrial, which was deemed an exceptional circumstance.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

A 51-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

His collection was one of the largest and worst ever encountered by the Ottawa Police Service, containing over 28,000 unique images and 1,144 unique videos, with 95% depicting explicit sexual activity including children as young as one year old.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less one day followed by three years' probation, reasoning that probation would ensure the accused received counselling.

The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was inadequate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by giving primary effect to rehabilitation rather than denunciation and general deterrence, which are the paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years imprisonment for sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter over a period of approximately one year beginning when the victim was 12 years old.

The appellant sought leave to appeal and argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately consider his guilty plea, rehabilitative potential, and Aboriginal background under the Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in requiring a causal connection between the appellant's Aboriginal background and the offences, the sentence remained fit given the gravity of the crimes and their devastating impact on the victim.

The defendant pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available.

His devices contained 133,266 images (28,052 unique) and 3,032 videos (1,144 unique) depicting extreme sexual abuse of children as young as one year old.

The court imposed a sentence of two years less a day in custody for possession, followed by three years probation, with a concurrent one-year sentence for making available.

The sentence balanced denunciation and deterrence as paramount objectives under section 718.01 of the Criminal Code against mitigating factors including genuine remorse, psychological assessment indicating low risk of reoffending, and voluntary engagement in treatment.

Robert Martineau pleaded guilty to conspiracy to unlawfully possess/sell unstamped tobacco products and possession of property obtained by crime, related to 384 cases of cigarettes over 15 events.

The Crown sought a two-year custodial sentence, while the defence requested an 18-24 month conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including Martineau's leadership role, lack of remorse, and profit motive, and mitigating factors such as his guilty plea and strict pre-trial release conditions.

Applying principles of denunciation, deterrence, and parity, the court imposed an 18-month incarceration sentence, reduced by 6 months for pre-trial custody (enhanced credit of 2:1) and a further 4 months for the onerous 44-month release conditions, resulting in 8 months remaining incarceration.

No probation was imposed.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault following a stabbing at a house party.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the attacker.

The accused testified and denied stabbing the complainant, but the court rejected his evidence due to significant inconsistencies with his post-arrest statement.

The court found the complainant's testimony credible and corroborated by DNA evidence on the knife and a Facebook message from the accused expressing remorse.

The accused was found guilty on all charges.

Kristopher McLellan and Kyle Mullen were cited for contempt of court after refusing to testify at the second-degree murder trial of Sam Tsega.

Both had previously provided statements to police and, in McLellan's case, testified at his own murder trial, implicating Tsega.

The court found both guilty of contempt.

Considering aggravating factors such as the refusal to testify in a murder trial, the highly probative nature of their evidence, the disruption to the trial, and their criminal records, alongside mitigating factors like no prior contempt, respectful conduct, and the risks associated with being labeled an informant in prison, the court sentenced each to 30 months imprisonment, to be served consecutively to their existing life sentences.

The applicant sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, proposing a new surety and GPS ankle monitoring as new evidence.

The court found the proposed surety lacked credibility and that GPS monitoring was insufficient to mitigate the substantial likelihood of the applicant reoffending.

The application was dismissed as the new evidence did not meet the Palmer test to justify a review of the initial detention order.

The Crown brought an application to admit similar act evidence between two alleged sexual assaults involving different complainants.

The incidents involved sex trade workers who were allegedly lured into a vehicle, threatened with a knife, and sexually assaulted.

The court considered the governing principles from leading authorities on similar fact evidence and assessed whether the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect.

Given the strong DNA evidence, significant factual similarities between the incidents, and lack of evidence of collusion, the court concluded that the evidence had substantial probative value on issues of identity, consent, and use of a weapon.

The Crown’s application to admit the similar act evidence was granted.

The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to two alleged sexual assaults involving different complainants so that each incident would be tried separately.

The accused argued that he intended to testify on one set of counts to advance a consent defence but not on the other, where identity was disputed.

The court considered the factors governing severance, including prejudice to the accused, the factual and legal nexus between the incidents, the potential for similar fact evidence, and the efficiency of a single trial.

Finding extensive similarities between the alleged incidents and a viable similar fact evidence application, the court concluded that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial.

The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that severance was required.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.

Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.

The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery arising out of a home invasion and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the principle of parity, ignoring mitigating factors, overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and placing too much weight on his youth record.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's use of a shotgun, his extensive record, and his lack of remorse.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposing a short period of incarceration, arguing that a different judge had imposed a conditional sentence for similar charges committed before the appellant absconded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.

The sentencing judge properly balanced the appellant's changed circumstances against his criminal record, the nature of the offences, and the fact that he had absconded.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to limit the Crown’s ability to cross‑examine him on his criminal record if he testified.

The defence requested that assault convictions be excluded and robbery convictions be characterized as thefts.

The court reviewed the principles governing the admissibility of prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and the balancing framework from R. v. Corbett.

Given the defence’s extensive reliance on the complainant’s criminal record, the relevance of the accused’s record to credibility, and the need to avoid presenting a distorted picture to the jury, the court declined to edit the record.

The accused’s criminal record was therefore admissible in full, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed the accused's sentence appeal and remitted the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by refusing to permit cross-examination on the complainants' victim impact statements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the summary conviction appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.

Furthermore, the Court found no error by the trial judge, as the accused failed to identify disputable facts in the victim impact statements to justify cross-examination.

The original sentence was restored.

The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on first degree murder and committed them for second degree murder.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.

However, the Court found the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by determining whether the victim was unlawfully confined to the degree required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e), rather than leaving that question to the jury.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 after the complainant's bank accounts were used in a scheme involving counterfeit cheques.

The complainant alleged the accused manipulated her into opening accounts and withdrawing money, while the accused denied any involvement.

Although the trial judge found the complainant credible and disbelieved the accused, the lack of independent confirmatory evidence due to an inadequate police investigation left the court with a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on five gun-related charges.

The trial judge had excluded a seized firearm and a videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the respondent was arbitrarily detained during a pretextual traffic stop contrary to s. 9, and his right to counsel was violated under s. 10(b).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of a pretextual stop was a factual determination not subject to appellate review, and there was no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence under the Grant framework.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 under s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code after soliciting donations for new organizations while previously working as a field agent for a national taxpayer advocacy group.

Donors often assumed the new organizations were affiliated with the prior organization, and the court found that the accused failed to clearly disclose the lack of affiliation, constituting a misrepresentation by non‑disclosure and establishing the actus reus of fraud.

However, the evidence established that the accused genuinely intended to create a legitimate lobbying organization and did not subjectively intend to deceive or deprive donors or the prior organization.

The Crown therefore failed to prove the mens rea of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also found the Crown did not prove that the alleged fraudulent amount exceeded $5,000.