56 total
Bail review adjourned to assess accused’s access to disclosure in custody.
The accused applied for bail review while facing robbery and manslaughter charges.
He argued that material changes in circumstances justified reconsideration of prior detention orders, including restricted access to disclosure in custody, new DNA evidence concerning a co‑accused, and an enhanced release plan involving substantial cash deposits, sureties, and potential electronic monitoring.
The court held that the proposed release plan was largely unchanged and that the new DNA evidence relating to the co‑accused was not materially relevant to the accused’s circumstances.
However, the court found the evidence concerning the accused’s limited access to disclosure in detention troubling and potentially relevant to the balancing of interests on the tertiary ground.
The bail review was adjourned to permit correctional authorities to address disclosure access issues before a final determination.
Severance denied where strong similarities supported possible similar fact evidence.
The accused applied under s. 591(3) of the Criminal Code to sever counts relating to two alleged sexual assaults involving different complainants so that each incident would be tried separately.
The accused argued that he intended to testify on one set of counts to advance a consent defence but not on the other, where identity was disputed.
The court considered the factors governing severance, including prejudice to the accused, the factual and legal nexus between the incidents, the potential for similar fact evidence, and the efficiency of a single trial.
Finding extensive similarities between the alleged incidents and a viable similar fact evidence application, the court concluded that the interests of justice favoured a joint trial.
The accused failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that severance was required.
Sentence appeal dismissed; trial judge's 2.8-month increase over Crown's position did not require notice.
The appellant appealed his sentence of 15.8 months on the ground that the trial judge exceeded the Crown's position of 13 to 14 months without providing notice.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 2.8-month increase was not significant enough to require notice as a matter of fairness.
Furthermore, the sentence was fit given the appellant's multiple convictions for impaired driving, breaches of court orders, and history of domestic violence.
Sentence appeal dismissed; seven-year term for home invasion robbery upheld as fit.
The appellant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit robbery and robbery arising out of a home invasion and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.
On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by failing to apply the principle of parity, ignoring mitigating factors, overemphasizing denunciation and deterrence, and placing too much weight on his youth record.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the sentence was fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's use of a shotgun, his extensive record, and his lack of remorse.
Sentence appeal dismissed; short period of incarceration upheld despite conditional sentence on similar charges.
The appellant appealed a sentence imposing a short period of incarceration, arguing that a different judge had imposed a conditional sentence for similar charges committed before the appellant absconded.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle.
The sentencing judge properly balanced the appellant's changed circumstances against his criminal record, the nature of the offences, and the fact that he had absconded.
Court refuses to edit accused’s criminal record on Corbett application.
The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to limit the Crown’s ability to cross‑examine him on his criminal record if he testified.
The defence requested that assault convictions be excluded and robbery convictions be characterized as thefts.
The court reviewed the principles governing the admissibility of prior convictions under s. 12(1) of the Canada Evidence Act and the balancing framework from R. v. Corbett.
Given the defence’s extensive reliance on the complainant’s criminal record, the relevance of the accused’s record to credibility, and the need to avoid presenting a distorted picture to the jury, the court declined to edit the record.
The accused’s criminal record was therefore admissible in full, subject to limiting instructions to the jury.
Crown appeal allowed; summary conviction appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to remit for fresh sentencing hearing.
The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that allowed the accused's sentence appeal and remitted the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.
The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by refusing to permit cross-examination on the complainants' victim impact statements.
The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the summary conviction appeal judge lacked jurisdiction to remit the matter for a fresh sentencing hearing.
Furthermore, the Court found no error by the trial judge, as the accused failed to identify disputable facts in the victim impact statements to justify cross-examination.
The original sentence was restored.
Preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by weighing evidence of forcible confinement for first degree murder.
The Crown appealed the dismissal of its application for certiorari and mandamus after a preliminary inquiry judge discharged the respondents on first degree murder and committed them for second degree murder.
The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that there was no evidence of planning and deliberation.
However, the Court found the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded his jurisdiction by determining whether the victim was unlawfully confined to the degree required for constructive first degree murder under s. 231(5)(e), rather than leaving that question to the jury.
The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the preliminary inquiry judge.
Accused acquitted of fraud due to reasonable doubt stemming from inadequate police investigation.
The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 after the complainant's bank accounts were used in a scheme involving counterfeit cheques.
The complainant alleged the accused manipulated her into opening accounts and withdrawing money, while the accused denied any involvement.
Although the trial judge found the complainant credible and disbelieved the accused, the lack of independent confirmatory evidence due to an inadequate police investigation left the court with a reasonable doubt.
The accused was acquitted.
Crown appeal of acquittal dismissed; trial judge's finding of pretextual traffic stop and arbitrary detention upheld.
The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on five gun-related charges.
The trial judge had excluded a seized firearm and a videotaped statement under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding the respondent was arbitrarily detained during a pretextual traffic stop contrary to s. 9, and his right to counsel was violated under s. 10(b).
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding of a pretextual stop was a factual determination not subject to appellate review, and there was no basis to interfere with the exclusion of evidence under the Grant framework.
Fraud charge fails where nondisclosure proved but intent to defraud not established.
The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 under s. 380(1) of the Criminal Code after soliciting donations for new organizations while previously working as a field agent for a national taxpayer advocacy group.
Donors often assumed the new organizations were affiliated with the prior organization, and the court found that the accused failed to clearly disclose the lack of affiliation, constituting a misrepresentation by non‑disclosure and establishing the actus reus of fraud.
However, the evidence established that the accused genuinely intended to create a legitimate lobbying organization and did not subjectively intend to deceive or deprive donors or the prior organization.
The Crown therefore failed to prove the mens rea of fraud beyond a reasonable doubt.
The court also found the Crown did not prove that the alleged fraudulent amount exceeded $5,000.
Drug‑addicted bank robber receives short custody plus lengthy probation to support rehabilitation.
Following a jury conviction for three bank robberies committed within a short period, the court determined a fit sentence balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.
The offender committed the robberies while addicted to drugs and had made significant rehabilitative progress while residing at a structured addiction recovery program pending trial.
The court credited extensive pre‑sentence custody, including time spent under restrictive conditions at the rehabilitation facility.
Applying the principles of proportionality and totality, the court concluded that a lengthy penitentiary term would undermine the offender’s rehabilitation prospects.
A custodial sentence followed by the maximum probationary period at the recovery program was imposed.
Similar fact evidence admitted across three robbery counts to prove identity.
The Crown brought an application seeking admission of similar fact evidence across three robbery counts in a jury trial to establish identity.
The robberies occurred within eleven days at three banks located within one kilometre of each other and involved similar methods, including handwritten notes containing distinctive phrases such as “no ink”, brief interactions with tellers, and similar clothing and demeanour.
The court applied the two‑stage similar fact evidence test, finding a high degree of similarity rendering coincidence objectively improbable.
Evidence linking the accused to the acts included DNA found on clothing recovered after the third robbery and anticipated identification evidence from surveillance video.
The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect and permitted the jury to consider the evidence on each count when determining guilt on the others.
Summary judgment granted dismissing false imprisonment claim due to statutory immunity for enforcing court orders.
The respondent sued the Attorney General of Canada for false imprisonment after being held in custody at a federal penitentiary pursuant to an order to produce.
The appellant moved for summary judgment, arguing it was protected by statutory immunity, but the motion judge dismissed the motion.
On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and granted summary judgment, holding that correctional authorities are immune from civil liability under section 142 of the Courts of Justice Act and section 8 of the Public Authorities Protection Act when acting in good faith in accordance with a court order.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge correctly found presumption of resulting trust rebutted for joint bank account.
The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding the ownership of $9,000 in a joint bank account held by the deceased and his niece, the respondent.
The trial judge found that the deceased intended to gift the balance of the account to the respondent through survivorship, thereby rebutting the presumption of resulting trust.
The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and concluding that the correct legal test was applied.
Police discipline appeal dismissed; officer had reasonable and probable grounds for warrantless arrest.
The appellant appealed a hearing officer's decision finding a police officer not guilty of unlawful or unnecessary exercise of authority under the Police Services Act.
The officer had arrested a 17-year-old student without a warrant based on information from a confidential informant about a drug transaction.
The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services dismissed the appeal, finding that the hearing officer correctly applied the Storrey test for warrantless arrests and the Debot test for confidential informants.
The Commission held that the officer had both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest, and the hearing officer's decision was not void of evidentiary foundation.