Riad Khayyam Tallim

The defendant was charged with sexually assaulting and sexually touching a 13-year-old complainant on December 16, 2009, contrary to sections 151 and 271(1) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant, who was in a relationship with the complainant's mother, denied any physical contact with the complainant.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and accepted her account of the sexual assault.

The defendant's evidence was rejected as unreliable, particularly regarding the timing of when the complainant's mother would arrive home and his explanation for the complainant's emotional distress.

The court found the defendant guilty on both counts.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for assault against his spouse following a trial involving only the complainant and the accused as witnesses.

The appeal argued that the trial judge misapplied the credibility framework from R. v. W. (D.), misapprehended the accused’s evidence, and improperly shifted the burden of proof.

The reviewing court found that the trial judge accepted the complainant’s evidence and treated portions of the accused’s testimony as an acknowledgment of assault without fully considering whether the accused’s evidence, taken as a whole, could raise a reasonable doubt.

This approach effectively turned the case into a credibility contest and curtailed a proper W. (D.) analysis.

The conviction and accompanying DNA order were quashed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for dangerous driving and failing to stop for police.

At trial, the defence argued non-insane automatism and challenged the admissibility of roadside utterances on the basis that the accused lacked an operating mind due to a severe panic attack.

The trial judge admitted the utterances after a voir dire, noting the absence of medical or psychiatric evidence, and later relied on those statements in rejecting the automatism defence and convicting the accused.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge should have granted an adjournment to permit a forensic psychiatrist to testify on the voir dire regarding the accused’s mental state.

The appellate court found that such evidence might have raised a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and potentially affected the outcome of the trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample contrary to the Criminal Code.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 10(b) claim relating to the right to counsel and in finding that the appellant refused to provide a breath sample.

The appeal court held that the trial judge’s reasons did not sufficiently explain the basis for concluding that the appellant made an unequivocal refusal, which is required for conviction.

On the evidence, the court could not identify a clear refusal prior to the charge.

The conviction was therefore set aside and a new trial ordered before a different judge.

The appellant appealed his conviction for criminal harassment under s. 264 of the Criminal Code and the sentence of a suspended sentence with three years probation.

He advanced numerous grounds of appeal, including improper questioning during trial, inadequate disclosure, misapprehension of evidence, judicial bias, and errors in law.

The court held that the impugned questioning was relevant to the defence of lawful authority and that no disclosure issue affecting the fairness of the trial was established.

Although a minor factual error was identified in the trial judge’s description of an earlier altercation, it was not material and did not affect the verdict.

The court found no reasonable apprehension of bias, no error in law, and concluded the conviction and sentence were reasonable.