Court File and Parties
Court File No.: 22-003-A Date: 2025-10-29 Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Between: His Majesty the King – and – Gurvinder Singh and Gurpreet Singh Offenders
Counsel: Louise Tansey and Tim Wightman for the Crown Antonio Cabral and Luc Trempe for the Offenders
Heard: June 4, July 17 and 25, 2025
Reasons for Sentence
Roger J.
Introduction
[1] Following a five-week trial, a jury convicted the offenders of one count of fraud over $5,000 and one count of uttering a forged document. Their convictions arose from the fraudulent mandatory entry-level training that each offered to students seeking a Class A driver's licence.
Positions of the Crown and Defence
[2] The Crown seeks a sentence of imprisonment of five years for each offender - four years for fraud over $5,000, and one-year consecutive for uttering a forged document. It also seeks an ancillary order for DNA and an order of forfeiture of three trucks owned by Gurpreet Singh.
[3] The Crown provided a casebook referencing over 17 cases and provided written submissions. They argue that a penitentiary sentence is the norm in cases of large-scale fraud, and that the range in such cases is at least three to five years.
[4] The offenders argue that this is not a large-scale fraud. Alternatively, they argue that the circumstances of this case, including proportionality and parity of sentences, warrant departing from the range. They say that a fit sentence for each of the offenders is a conditional sentence of 12 to 18 months.
Circumstances of the Offences
[5] In 2017, Ontario legislated mandatory entry-level training ("MELT") for residents of Ontario seeking to obtain a Class A licence. A Class A licence is the licence required to drive large commercial trucks.
[6] An important goal of MELT is to increase safety for road users. MELT strives to increase safety by implementing minimum entry-level standards which commercial truck drivers must meet before they can attempt their Class A licence road test. MELT includes a minimum of instructional hours offered by qualified instructors teaching specific standardized skills deemed required by the Commercial Truck Driver Training Standard (Class A) of the Ontario Ministry of Transportation ("MTO") to safely drive large commercial trucks. MELT may be offered by registered private career colleges.
[7] Once a commercial truck driver candidate successfully completes MELT, proof of MELT may be uploaded by an authorized person on the MTO's database. This confirms that the commercial truck driver candidate completed MELT and is eligible to schedule his or her Class A licence road test with the MTO. Without proof of MELT uploaded on the MTO's database, a commercial truck driver candidate cannot schedule his or her Class A road test.
[8] The offenders, between January 2019 and May 2021, each:
Occasionally paid an interpreter, Hanifa Khokhar, to facilitate some of their respective students to cheat on their Class A knowledge tests. Ms. Khokhar suggested some of the answers during her interpretation services.
Operated a truck driver school (not registered as a private career college nor authorized to offer MELT) that fraudulently did not offer its students the minimum training required to satisfy the MELT standards. Instead, each of the offenders, at his respective truck driver school, obtained payment from its commercial truck driver candidates or students yet offered only basic truck driver training that did not comply with the MELT course standards. Each of the offenders then circumvented the MELT certification process by paying for unlawful access to the MTO's database to falsify their students' MELT completion. Each paid Charanjit Deol and her husband, who operated a registered private career college authorized to offer MELT, to access the MTO's database and upload information which falsely confirmed that the offenders' respective commercial truck driver candidates or students had completed the MELT.
[9] The offenders generally charged their students between $4,000 and $5,000 for the truck driver training that they offered. This is slightly less than what was charged for MELT training by approved or registered private career colleges. Although the number of students defrauded by the offenders of proper MELT training might be slightly more or less, a conservative estimate, based on the evidence of fraudulent MELT uploads, puts it in the range of about 45 – 50 students per offender. This evidence indicates that Gurvinder Singh had about 45 students and that Gurpreet Singh had about 47 students.
[10] The offenders' students were of South Asian ethnicity, largely new immigrants. The language spoken during training was mostly Punjabi.
[11] Unlike some other frauds, the offenders did not abandon their students once funds were paid, nor did they fail to offer training or services. Rather, the offenders each operated a truck driver school that offered some commercial truck driver training to its students. They supplied trucks, trailers, instructors (frequently unqualified), and offered some commercial truck driver training which, however, did not meet the MELT standards. With the assistance of Charanjit Deol and her husband, they falsified MELT completion on the MTO's database, which allowed them to schedule their students' Class A road test with the MTO. They accompanied their students through the MTO's process until most passed their Class A licence, despite their students not having met the MELT course standards.
[12] Unlike some other frauds, most of the students who testified in this trial were satisfied with the training and services that they received from the offenders. Some were thankful for the services they received and for their truck driver career.
[13] Although the conduct of the offenders is serious and posed serious risks to road users, thankfully, there is no evidence of physical or bodily injury arising from the offenders' fraud. Moreover, despite the risks posed by licenced Class A drivers driving commercial trucks without having completed the MELT, there is no evidence that the Class A licence of any of the offenders' students was revoked or made subject to additional MELT training or related conditions. Similarly, there is no evidence why such measures were not put in place by the relevant authorities.
[14] As might be apparent from the above-described involvement of others, originally four additional co-accused were also charged on this indictment with one count of fraud over $5,000 and of uttering a forged document. However, prior to this trial, all four additional co-accused plead guilty to fraud and were sentenced by another judge of this Court.
[15] With regards to the fraudulent interpretation services, the offenders approached and occasionally used the interpretation services of Ms. Khokhar, paying her about $200 to $400 per student who passed their MTO's Class A knowledge test. Ms. Khokhar was a difficult witness. She testified that she did not earn much from her improper interpretation. None of the students who testified in this trial received interpretation services from Ms. Khokhar. From Ms. Khokhar's varying evidence about the number of involved students and from the admissions made in this trial, the offenders paid the Khokhars less than $34,000, and likely in the range of about $20,000 for the improper interpretation services of Ms. Khokhar.
[16] With regards to the fraudulent MELT uploads, Ms. Charanjit Deol testified that the offenders approached her and her husband, offering to pay them money for fraudulent MTO MELT uploads. She said that the offenders paid them between $1,200 and $1,800 per students for the false information that she and her husband uploaded on the MTO's database, fraudulently confirming that the offenders' students had satisfied the MELT. Ms. Deol was a difficult witness. However, the evidence indicates that the Deols received about $68,000 from Gurvinder Singh and about $80,000 from Gurpreet Singh for their fraudulent MELT uploads.
[17] Prior to this trial, each of the Deols and the Khokhars plead guilty to fraud over $5,000 and the remaining charge of uttering a forged document was withdrawn.
[18] Hanifa Khokhar received a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by 12 months probation for her fraudulent interpretation services. Her husband, who assisted her and was responsible for collecting the money, received a conditional sentence of 18 months followed by 12 months probation.
[19] Charanjit Deol, who uploaded false information on the MTO's database fraudulently confirming that the offenders' students had complied with MELT, received a 12-month conditional discharge, and her husband, who owned the private career college and allowed the fraudulent uploads on the MTO's database, received a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by 12 months probation.
Circumstances of the Offenders
[20] Neither of the offenders testified and a pre-sentence report was not prepared.
[21] Gurvinder Singh is 69 years old. He is married, his wife works, and the couple has three adult children. Mr. Singh works for a transport company as a commercial truck driver. He immigrated to Canada from India in 2002 and is a Canadian citizen.
[22] Gurpreet Singh is 37 years old. Mr. Singh immigrated to Canada as a student. He is married, his wife does not work, and the couple has a seven-year-old son. His parents live with them. He owns and operates a delivery company and is the only source of income of his family.
[23] Neither offender has a criminal record.
[24] Some additional information about the offenders was gathered from the evidence. Despite being defrauded of the MELT that they paid for, most of the students who testified in this trial said that they were satisfied with the training, services, and availability of the offenders. Some indicated that they received the services that they paid for, and one indicated, in relation to Gurpreet Singh, that Gurpreet was generous with his time and that "Gurpreet taught us everything, he brought us from zero to hero".
[25] Although the offenders did all these things for financial gain, greed as their sole motive is contradicted by some of the evidence. That their actions were not only driven by greed is supported by the evidence of the students that the offenders, although misguided, tried to help their students. For example, the offenders each charged slightly less than legitimate schools and taught some truck driver skills to their students. They taught primarily in their students' first language, Punjabi, scheduled their students' Class A road test with the MTO, accompanied their students to their road test, and offered, when required, make-up or additional driving lessons, frequently at no additional charge. That greed was not their primary driver is also indirectly supported by the evidence of the under-cover officer, although the evidence of this officer only relates to Gurvinder Singh. The under-cover officer testified that when he first approached Gurvinder Singh for truck driver lessons, Mr. Singh initially encouraged him to attend a "Canadian school" because, as Mr. Singh told him, his English was good enough. The officer testified that because a "Canadian school" would be more expensive, he was nonetheless accepted as a student. As well, although very late in the timeline of events, there is evidence that Gurvinder Singh unsuccessfully tried to register a truck driver school as a recognized private career college, and that both offenders provided some truck driver teaching and were both experienced truck drivers.
Impact on the Victims and Community
[26] The offenders' conduct impacted the truck driver students and the community.
[27] The truck driver students were mostly new immigrants, of South Asian origin, seeking truck driver training to obtain their Class A licence and thereby obtain better employment as drivers of large commercial trucks. They were tricked and deceived by the offenders into paying for substandard truck driver training. Nonetheless, most of the truck driver students who testified successfully obtained a Class A licence, gained truck driver employment, and most testified that they appreciated the training that they received from the offenders.
[28] One of the eight students who testified filed a victim impact statement. He indicated that he felt tricked and deceived by the offenders' pretending to offer a professional service. Although he received the same substandard truck driver teaching as other students, he did not pass his Class A licence. He indicated that he lost his $4,500 payment.
[29] The community was impacted in many ways. Substandard training leaves truck driver students ill-prepared, could lead to dangerous situations, and jeopardizes road safety. This puts the public at risk. It also negatively impacts the reputation of truck drivers, of MELT training, and of the MTO, and undermines the integrity of the trucking industry. A victim impact statement was delivered by a representative of the MTO, a superintendent of Career Colleges, and by the president of the Canadian Trucking Alliance and Ontario Trucking Association. All mentioned the risks that large commercial trucks pose on our roads and how safety and training are essential to reduce those risks, stating that inexperienced and inadequately trained drivers are more likely to be involved in accidents.
Legal Parameters
[30] Fraud over $5,000 is subject to imprisonment not exceeding fourteen years, and uttering a forged document is subject to imprisonment not exceeding ten years.
[31] The ancillary orders sought by the Crown, DNA and forfeiture, are available if the relevant statutory conditions are met.
[32] Kienapple is not applicable to the circumstances of this case. Kienapple provides that where the same transaction gives rise to two or more offences with substantially the same elements and an accused is found guilty of more than one of those offences, that accused should be convicted of only the most serious of the offences. This is designed to protect against undue exercise by the Crown of its power to prosecute and punish by seeking multiple convictions for the same events. In this case, while there is a close factual nexus between the offences of fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document, different acts support each of these offences. Moreover, the legal nexus is missing between them as fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document have different elements: R. v. Dwyer, 2013 ONCA 34, 296 C.C.C. (3d) 193, at para. 6; R. v. Watson, 2017 ONCA 346, at para. 13.
[33] Section 718.3(4) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, requires that a sentencing judge consider the availability of a consecutive sentence. The Crown seeks consecutive sentences for these offences while the offenders argue that the sentences should be concurrent.
[34] Generally, sentences for offences that occur at separate occasions will be served consecutively and sentences for offences that arise out of the same transaction will be served concurrently. However, even where an offender's offences arise out of the same incident, a consecutive sentence may be appropriate where the gravamen of the offences are different (e.g., protecting different societal interests, or constituting invasions of different legally protected interests) and the resulting consecutive sentence is not unduly long or harsh and does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender: R. v. Mascarenhas (2002), 60 O.R. (3d) 465 (C.A.); R. v. Gillis, 2009 ONCA 312, 248 O.A.C. 1; R. v. Berezowsky; R. v. Dua, [1999] O.J. No. 5068 (S.C.); and R. v. M. (C.A.), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, at para. 42.
[35] Here, both the offences of fraud over $5,000 and uttering a forged document were directed at circumventing the requirements of the MELT and ensuring that the offenders' truck driver students could nonetheless register for and take the MTO's Class A licence road test. The two offences involved the same victims. They achieved the same result, that of allowing improperly trained truck drivers to attempt their Class A licence. They created the same risks.
[36] As such, although they involved different facts and steps, the two offences are related to the same transaction, or stated differently, to the same fraudulent scheme, that of circumventing the MELT.
[37] Moreover, both offences involved the invasion of the same legally protected interests, and, although they involved different steps, one offence required the other to achieve its result. Indeed, both offences were essential to the offenders' stratagem of circumventing the MELT. Committing one without the other would have been unsuccessful and a wasted effort as the truck driver students could not have registered for their MTO Class A road test without the uttering offence and, conversely, would have been incapable of attempting the Class A road test without the fraudulent truck driver training that was offered by the offenders.
[38] The factual situation of this case is different from those in R. v. Booker, 2024 ONCA 181, where the events of these same offences were disconnected. As such, the facts of this case are more aligned with those in R. v. Bhatti, 2016 ONCA 769, R. v. Kelly, and R. v. Kassam, 2017 ONSC 74, where the offences of fraud and uttering a forged document arose from the same overall fraud scheme. In those latter cases, the sentencing judge imposed a sentence for uttering a forged document concurrent to the sentence for fraud: Bhatti, at para 1; Kelly, at para 34; and Kassam, at para 37.
[39] For these reasons, I will impose concurrent sentences.
Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
[40] The magnitude, complexity, duration, number of victims, and degree of planning involved in the offences is aggravating. This was an elaborate scheme by the offenders. It involved close to 50 truck driver students each and lasted over two years. The offences impacted the community and the truck driver students. The truck driver students were robbed of the proper training they had paid for, and their lack of proper training created an additional risk to the welfare of road users, impacting the community and the reputation of truck drivers.
[41] The offenders were respected in their community, and most of the students were referred to them by acquaintances such that in committing these offences, the offenders took advantage of the high regard in which they were held in their community and took advantage of new immigrants. Moreover, although neither operated a private career college, in committing these offences, the offenders did not comply with the requirements normally applicable to commercial truck driver training or truck driver schools.
[42] The above are, in the circumstances of this case, aggravating factors.
[43] However, the offenders do not have a criminal record, which is mitigating. They work and are socially engaged, which is positive but not mitigating because those same circumstances contributed to the offenders' ability to commit these offences: s. 380.1(2) of the Criminal Code. That they offered some truck driver training and accompanied their truck driver students throughout the process, as described at paragraph 25 above, are as well mitigating circumstances.
General Principles
[44] Imposing a just sentence is a delicate, fact specific, balancing exercise.
[45] The fundamental principle of sentencing is that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and to the degree of responsibility of the offender. In other words, the gravity of the crime must be assessed together with the responsibility or blameworthiness of the offender. When assessing this, the sentencing judge must pay attention not only to the crime but also to the offender's conduct. Proportionality requires that offenders be held accountable for their actions through a sentence that reflects the gravity of the offence they committed and that is based on the offender's moral culpability and associated need to punish the offender sufficiently but no more than is necessary. Proportionality is focused on retribution which restrains punishment to properly reflect the moral culpability of the offender: Kent Roach, Criminal Law, 8th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc., 2022), at pp. 536, 545-47.
[46] Proportionality is determined on an individual basis, looking at the offender and at the offences that he or she committed, and by comparison with sentences imposed for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. Both individualization and parity of sentences must be assessed for a sentence to be proportionate: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at paras. 12, 44, and 53.
[47] The fundamental purpose of sentencing and the general principles to be applied are set out in s. 718 of the Criminal Code. These include protecting society and contributing, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful, and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives:
(a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by the unlawful conduct;
(b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences;
(c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;
(d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders;
(e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and
(f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community.
[48] In cases involving fraud, the court gives primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct, ensuring that the sentence is proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
[49] Sentences must not be unduly harsh and should be similar to sentences imposed on offenders who committed similar offences in similar circumstances. A court that imposes a sentence must take into consideration the following principles outlined in s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code:
(a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing,
- (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim,
(b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances;
(c) …;
(d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and
(e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders[...].
[50] The Criminal Code, at s. 380.1(1), provides additional aggravating circumstances that a court shall consider when sentencing for fraud, including:
(a) the magnitude, complexity, duration or degree of planning of the fraud committed was significant;
(c) the offence involved a large number of victims;
(c.1) the offence had a significant impact on the victims given their personal circumstances including their age, health and financial situation;
(d) in committing the offence, the offender took advantage of the high regard in which the offender was held in the community;
(e) the offender did not comply with a licensing requirement, or professional standard, that is normally applicable to the activity or conduct that forms the subject-matter of the offence;
[51] As well, as required by s. 380.1(2) of the Criminal Code, when a court imposes a sentence for an offence of fraud, it shall not consider as mitigating circumstances the offender's employment, employment skills or status or reputation in the community if those circumstances were relevant to, contributed to, or were used in the commission of the offence.
[52] Although not directly applicable, given my decision to impose concurrent sentences, the principle of totality requires a court "that sentences an offender to consecutive sentences to ensure that the total sentence does not exceed the offender's overall culpability": R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 157. The totality of the sentence must be fair and reasonable. Suggested sentence ranges or suggested sentence starting points are helpful to sentencing judges but may be departed from where required considering individualized circumstances, relevant sentencing objectives, or the principle of proportionality: R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 46 at paras. 40 – 46.
[53] Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that restorative sentencing purposes should also be considered. Moreover, if the appropriate range of sentences includes a term of imprisonment of less than two years, the court may consider that the sentence be served in the community if the offence is not punishable by a minimum term of imprisonment, is not one of the listed prohibited offences, and if the court is satisfied that this would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code: s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code; R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 61, at paras. 18 – 20 and 59 – 90.
[54] A conditional sentence is a form of imprisonment which is served in the community in accordance with conditions that the sentencing judge deems required. Those conditions may be onerous, and conditions such as house arrest or strict curfews are the norm. A breach of any condition may result in the offender completing the remainder of his or her sentence in jail: Proulx, at paras. 21, 24 – 27, 39.
[55] Although more lenient than a jail term of equivalent duration, a conditional sentence may be onerous, "particularly in circumstances where the offender is forced to take responsibility for his or her actions and make reparations to both the victim and the community, all the while living in the community under tight controls." Unlike jail or prison, a conditional sentence is not subject to reduction through parole "because the offender is never actually incarcerated and he or she does not need to be reintegrated into society.": see Proulx, at paras. 41 – 43. It is designed for those who would otherwise be in jail, but who may be able to serve their sentence in the community under tight controls.
[56] As such, a conditional sentence blends elements of custodial and non-custodial sentences. It is a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. It is also capable of achieving the principles of rehabilitation, reparation to the victim and community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender: Proulx, at para. 22.
Analysis
Forfeiture
[57] The Crown seeks, against Gurpreet Singh, a forfeiture order under s. 490.1 of the Criminal Code of three Volvo trucks (the tractor portion, not the trailers), having a combined market value in the range of about $100,000. These three commercial trucks are owned by Gurpreet Singh and the Crown argues that the evidence establishes that they were used in the commission of the offence of fraud.
[58] Section 490.1 of the Criminal Code provides that property may be forfeited if the court is satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that "offence-related property is related to the commission of the offence". Section 2 of the Criminal Code defines "offence-related property" to mean any property, within or outside Canada, (a) by means or in respect of which an indictable offence is committed, (b) that is used in any manner in connection with the commission of such an offence, or (c) that is intended to be used for committing such an offence.
[59] The Court of Appeal for Ontario has defined "offence-related property" broadly as property used in any manner in connection with the commission of an indictable offence. The section is aimed at the means, devices or instrumentalities used to commit offences: R. v. Trac, 2013 ONCA 246, 115 O.R. (3d) 424, at para. 90.
[60] While forfeiture is prima facie mandatory when the Crown meets the legal threshold, under section 490.41(3) of the Criminal Code, judges nevertheless retain discretion to decline forfeiture when forfeiture would be disproportionate to the nature and gravity of the offence, the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence and the criminal record, if any, of the offender.
[61] The three trucks in issue are owned by Gurpreet Singh, either directly or by a company owned by Mr. Singh, and there is no lien on any. The evidence of a now retired Ontario Provincial Police officer, previously involved in the investigation of this matter, establishes that these three trucks were used by Gurpreet Singh's truck driver school, in relation to the commission of the offence of fraud. The offender's arguments that the trucks were not used in connection with the offence of fraud, whether because their use is somehow indirect or because the trucks have nothing to do with the inadequacy of the training that was offered, are devoid of merit as they miss the point that the fraud committed by Mr. Singh could not have occurred without the trucks.
[62] When assessing proportionality, Mr. Singh does not have a criminal record. However, there is no question that he committed serious offences. He defrauded his students of proper MELT training, and he put the public at risk by allowing his improperly trained drivers to fraudulently obtain a Class A licence and thereby operate large commercial vehicles on our roads and highways despite being improperly trained. The offences occurred over approximately two years and, as they relate to Gurpreet Singh, involved about 47 students paying Mr. Singh between $4,000 and $5,000 for their inadequate training, while the market value of his three trucks is in the range of about $100,000.
[63] The offender argues that forfeiture would be disproportionate, including because the trucks' involvement is indirect, because there is no or little economic hardship as most students obtained their Class A licence, and because it would be disproportionate to forfeit what allowed some of the training to occur. Again, some of these arguments miss the point that the fraud could not have occurred without the trucks. Moreover, the offender's arguments appear to overemphasize the personal or financial circumstances of the offender.
[64] When I assess all relevant factors, I am not satisfied that the impact of an order of forfeiture of these three trucks would be disproportionate. A forfeiture order will therefore issue.
[65] Forfeiture and sentencing have distinct purposes and consequences. Forfeiture should not be consolidated with sentencing from a totality perspective as it could lead to lower terms for offenders with property available for forfeiture: R. v. Craig, 2009 SCC 23, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 762, at paras. 34 – 35.
Sentence
[66] Turning now to what constitutes a just and fit sentence for each of the offenders.
[67] The primary considerations in such cases of fraud are general deterrence and denunciation. The offenders took advantage of their position, and over slightly more than two years profited from their elaborate scheme to circumvent the MELT. They each defrauded about 50 truck driver students of proper MELT training. They put the public at risk and negatively impacted the reputation of the MTO, truck drivers, and of their industry.
[68] Nonetheless, this case is different from the many cases relied upon by the Crown in support of its sentencing position.
[69] This is not a case involving devastating consequences for its victims. Although sentences in the range suggested by the Crown are not exclusively reserved for fraud involving significant losses or fraud having devastating consequences on their victims (see R. v. Khachatourov, 2014 ONCA 464, 313 C.C.C. (3d) 94, at para. 39; R. v. Davatgar-Jafarpour, 2019 ONCA 353, 146 O.R. (3d) 206, at para. 42), most of the many cases relied upon by the Crown, including these two cases, involved larger frauds and more important financial deprivation.
[70] In this case, most of the truck driver students who testified passed their Class A licence. Some obtained employment driving trucks. Although all were defrauded of proper MELT training, most were appreciative of the offenders' services and thankful for the truck driving skills learned from the offenders.
[71] Moreover, contradicting the Crown's arguments that the offenders created significant risks for the public, none of the offenders' truck driver students who passed his or her Class A licence had that licence suspended or put under any form of condition pending additional training or certification.
[72] As well, although the offenders' moral blameworthiness is high and includes greed, awareness of their wrongdoing, and repetition on many victims over a long period, their moral blameworthiness is nuanced and attenuated by the facts of this case described at paragraph 25 above. Although the offenders' actions were criminal and misguided, the offenders nonetheless offered some truck driver training, accompanied their students until most passed their Class A licence, and most of the truck driver students who testified appreciated the services received from the offender that they dealt with. In other words, the offenders seemed to take an interest in the well-being of their students apart from simply making a profit.
[73] These mitigating circumstances attenuate the moral blameworthiness of the offenders and distinguish this case from those relied upon by the Crown.
[74] As such, the facts of this case do not constitute a large-scale fraud case or, alternatively, are sufficiently different from large-scale fraud cases to warrant a sentence outside the range generally appropriate for such cases of three to five years of penitentiary, or possibly more given Parliament's decision to increase the maximum sentence for fraud from 10 to 14 years.
[75] As indicated above, a just and fit sentence must be proportionate not only to the gravity of the offence but also to the moral blameworthiness of the offender: Parranto, at para. 40. Both must be assessed: R. v. Proulx, at paras. 80 – 83; Criminal Code, s. 718.1. Although the offences and many of the circumstances of this case are grave, including for example the degree of planning, number of affected students, and the duration or length of time over which the fraud was perpetuated, the moral blameworthiness of each of the offenders is diminished by the offenders' conduct towards each of their students (some of which is described at para. 25 above) and by the fact that they did not seek to further themselves financially by knowingly depriving their victims of their own financial security. This supports departing from the Crown's suggested range.
[76] Moreover, although each and every case has its particularities and differences, I find the circumstances of this case more comparable to some of the cases relied upon by the offenders, including: R. v. Sharma, 2019 ONCA 274; R. v. Henn, 2022 ONCA 768, 164 O.R. (3d) 589; R. v. Bunn, 2000 SCC 9, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 183; R. v. Moulton, 2001 SKCA 121, 160 C.C.C. (3d) 407; R. c. Alain; and Charrière c. R., 2021 QCCA 1338. In each of these cases, two years less a day was found to have been a fit sentence. All involved serious offences. For example, Sharma involved 37 tax returns, covered four years, resulted in potential losses of federal tax revenue of $488,178.37, and benefited the respondent in the amount of $96,946. Henn involved an account manager defrauding her former employer, a small business, in 73 individual transactions, between 2013 and 2016, of $45,222.26. In all these cases, the court found that a conditional sentence was a fit sentence. On that point, when assessing between a custodial or a conditional sentence, I note as well that the facts of this case do not involve a "devastating" impact on its victims as they did in R. v. Duell, 2024 ONSC 6952, at paras. 50 – 55 and R. v. Reid, 2021 ONCJ 149, at para. 4.
[77] A conditional sentence is not available unless all the requirements of s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code are met. When I assess the circumstances of this case, I find that all the requirements of s. 742.1 are met. First, when I assess the length of an appropriate sentence of incarceration, I find that the circumstances of this case and the cases cited above both support that a sentence of incarceration of two years less a day, is within the appropriate range. Fraud is not one of the prohibited offences and neither offender would endanger the safety of their community because I am satisfied that these criminal proceedings and the sentence I am about to impose will sufficiently curb any risk of recidivism. Both offenders are in stable relationships, work, and contribute to their family and to society. Neither pose a risk to the safety of their community, including a risk of reoffending, and both have demonstrated that they can abide by conditions. Both accepted responsibility for their actions when they briefly addressed the Court during sentencing submissions. Moreover, as explained below, in the circumstances of this case a conditional sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code.
[78] General deterrence is a fundamental purpose of sentencing for a fraud conviction. However, a conditional sentence can be appropriate even where deterrence and denunciation are paramount considerations, particularly when onerous and punitive conditions are imposed: Henn, at para. 27; R. v. Wells, 2000 SCC 10, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207, at para. 35; and Proulx, at paras. 41 and 107. The offenders are respected in their community. One was referred to as "uncle", a sign of respect. Consequently, this is one of those cases where "the shame of encountering members of the community may make it even more difficult for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community than in prison": Proulx, at para. 105. Community service will add to this as it will force some interaction with the community. Community service will also address other fundamental purposes of sentencing.
[79] Reparations for harm done to victims or to the community, promotion of a sense of responsibility, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community are other fundamental purposes which may be addressed by a conditional sentence assorted with additional conditions of community service. As such, a conditional sentence may provide some measure of reparation, achieve a sense of responsibility in the offenders, and promote their engagement in pro-social activities.
[80] Moreover, this is a first offence for each of the offenders and the principle of restraint articulated in ss. 718.2 (d) and (e), together with the other mitigating circumstances of this case, militate in favour of a conditional sentence. A conditional sentence can achieve both punitive and restorative objectives, and in the circumstances of this case, incorporating a condition of community service would be well suited to achieving these objectives.
[81] As well, in addition to individualization, a fit and just sentence must account for the principle of parity in sentencing. This is provided at s. 718.2 (b) of the Criminal Code, which provides that "a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances". The parity principle is intended "to preserve fairness by avoiding disparate sentences where similar facts relating to the offence and offender would suggest like sentences": R. v. Beauchamp, 2015 ONCA 260, 326 C.C.C. (3d) 280, at para. 276; R. v. Pearce, 2021 ONCA 239, 71 C.R. (7th) 328, at para. 17. This does not mean that equal or identical sentences are required for similar offenders or similar offences as this would be impossible given the principle of individual sentencing, and comparable circumstances are rarely identical. Rather, the rule against unreasonable disparity in sentencing requires understandable sentences, when examined together: Beauchamp, at para. 277; Pearce at para. 17.
[82] The offenders argue that the sentence sought by the Crown would create a substantial and marked disparity in sentence between similar co-accused offenders who have committed similar crimes. The Crown argues that the offenders instigated this fraud, recruited the Khokhars and the Deols, and that the circumstances of their offences are not comparable to those of the Khokhars and Deols.
[83] For reasons that follow I find that parity in sentencing also support my conclusion that a conditional sentence is, in the circumstances of this case, a better sanction than incarceration.
[84] I find the circumstances of the Khokhars not comparable. The Khokhars' role was limited to some fraudulent interpretation. However, I find that the circumstances of the Deols are comparable.
[85] There is no question that the planning of the fraud was perpetrated by the offenders. The offenders masterminded the fraud, recruited the Deols, and took advantage of the high regard in which they were held in their community, while the Deols were behind the scenes operators. On the other hand, the Deols were an integral part in the offenders' scheme. Without the Deols, there would have been no fraud as the false information that the Deols uploaded on the MTO's database was essential to the offenders fraudulently confirming that their truck driver students had complied with MELT. Moreover, in committing their fraud, the Deols did not comply with a licencing requirement applicable to their private career college, an aggravating factor for the Deols which heightens their moral blameworthiness. On that topic, greed was more of a motivating factor for the Deols who, unlike the offenders, provided little by way of services and therefore incurred almost no additional overhead in relation to the amounts received for their fraud.
[86] Ms. Deol, who testified in this trial, described how she uploaded false information on the MTO's database, fraudulently confirming that the offenders' truck driver students had complied with MELT. She received a 12-month conditional discharge, and her husband, who owned the private career college and allowed the fraudulent uploads on the MTO's database, received a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by 12 months probation. It was not argued, and I do not question that these were appropriate sentences. When I examine the circumstances of this case and compare them to what I know of the Deols, imposing a five-year penitentiary sentence on the offenders, as sought by the Crown, would create an unreasonable disparity with the sentences imposed on the Deols that would not be "understandable" in the words of the Court of Appeal in Beauchamp, at para. 277.
[87] I acknowledge that Mr. Deol received a two-year conditional sentence and probation after pleading guilty to his involvement in the fraudulent scheme, thereby benefiting from this mitigating factor. In contrast, the offenders are not entitled to any such mitigation. However, as I understand it, the terms of Mr. Deol's conditional sentence were less restrictive than what I am imposing on the offenders, which is house arrest for the complete duration of the order. Moreover, while Mr. Deol appeared to be motivated primarily by greed, the offenders, although misguided, endeavored to assist the victims. Finally, I note that when deciding between penitentiary or reformatory sentences, or between conditional sentences and custodial ones, the stakes can shift significantly. For this reason, at times, a broad range of conduct may nonetheless result in the same disposition, simply because the next available step feels disproportionately severe. I am satisfied of that on the facts before me.
[88] For all these reasons, a conditional sentence with strict conditions, including house arrest for the duration of the order, together with community services, is a better sanction than incarceration. To properly address required denunciation and deterrence, house arrest shall be for the duration of the order, the longest possible term, without any lessening of that condition over time. The range and decreasing conditions of house arrest suggested by the offenders would not, in these circumstances, sufficiently address the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
[89] Probation is not required and would serve no purpose in the circumstances of this case. Probation usually focuses on rehabilitation, protection of society, and reintegration into the community, none of which are required for these offenders following their conditional sentence.
Conclusion
[90] Each of the offenders is sentenced on each of counts number 1 and 2 of the indictment, to a conditional sentence of two years less one day, to be served concurrently, and each of the offenders shall be subject to the conditions outlined below.
[91] For the duration of their conditional sentences, the following mandatory conditions shall apply to each of the offenders:
Keep the peace and be of good behavior;
Appear before the Court when required to do so by the Court;
Report to a conditional sentence supervisor ("supervisor") within 2 working days after the making of the conditional sentence order, and thereafter when required by the supervisor and in the manner directed by the supervisor;
Remain in the province of Ontario or Quebec unless written permission to go elsewhere is obtained in advance from the Court or their supervisor, and is on their person or available for inspection upon request of any peace officer; and
Notify the Court or their supervisor in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly notify their supervisor of any change of employment or occupation.
[92] Moreover, for the duration of their respective conditional sentences, each of the offenders shall remain in their residence, including its grounds, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, except:
(a) On Saturdays from 2 to 5 p.m. to obtain the necessities of life, and only on the first Sunday of each month from 2 to 5 p.m. for religious services, with proof of same to be provided upon request of their supervisor or of any peace officer;
(b) While traveling directly to and from, or while at work or at their ordered community services, provided their work schedule or community services schedule is provided in advance to their supervisor, is approved by their supervisor, and their supervisor's written approval outlining their work schedule and community services schedule is readily available for production upon request of any peace officer;
(c) For any medical emergency involving them or an immediate member of their immediate family, with proof of said emergency to be provided upon request of their supervisor or of any peace officer within 10 days of said request;
(d) As approved in writing in advance by their supervisor provided that their supervisor's written approval is readily available for production upon request; and
(e) While reporting to their supervisor in person, provided they travel directly to and from those appointments and have on their person or available for production upon request of any peace officer written proof of those appointments and of their date, time, and location.
[93] During the conditional sentence order, each of the offenders shall perform 200 hours of community services as shall be arranged by their supervisor. Each shall provide proof of satisfactory completion of these community services to their supervisor. Each shall have on his person a copy of his approved schedule of community services readily available for inspection upon request by their supervisor or any peace officer.
[94] In addition, for the duration of their conditional sentence, each of the offenders shall have no contact, directly or indirectly, with any of Hanifa Khokhar, Mohamed Khokhar, Charanjit Deol, and Jagjeet Deol, and neither may offer or participate in any truck driver training or truck driver teaching.
[95] Moreover, for the duration of their conditional sentences, each of the offenders:
Shall possess no weapons as defined by the Criminal Code.
Shall attend any assessments, counseling or treatment as ordered by their supervisor.
Shall sign any release or waiver of information as directed by their supervisor to provide access to assessments, counseling or treatment information required by their supervisor.
Shall provide proof in writing to their supervisor that any assessment, treatment or counselling the offender has been directed to attend and complete has been completed.
[96] During the conditional sentence order, each of the offenders shall present themselves at the door of their residence for any supervisor or peace officer who attends for the purposes of confirming their compliance with the house arrest condition of this conditional sentence.
[97] In addition, at all times, each of the offenders must carry a copy of the conditional sentence order, its conditions, and any relevant work or community services schedule and permission on their person, including a copy of any amendments, and provide a copy for inspection to their supervisor or any peace officer who makes such a demand.
[98] An ancillary order for DNA is made for each of the offenders. This order was not opposed, and I am satisfied that making such an order is in the best interests of the administration of justice given the nature of the offences and the minimally intrusive nature of the order: R. v. F. (P.R.) (2001), 57 O.R. (3d) 475 (C.A.).
[99] Finally, the order of forfeiture to His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, sought by the Crown against Gurpreet Singh may issue for the following offence related property:
2015 Black Volvo VIN# 4V4NC9KJ1FN174697, Model VNL
2011 White Volvo VIN# 4V4MC9EH8BN528827, Model VNL
2016 White Volvo VIN# 4V4NC9EH1GN934458, Model VNL
Roger J.
Released: October 29, 2025

