Louise Tansey

The Crown sought to admit hearsay statements of a deported witness, Omar Ahmed, and his prior transcript testimony in a re-trial for first-degree murder.

The Respondent objected on grounds of necessity and reliability.

The court found that while necessity was met due to Ahmed's deportation, threshold reliability was not established due to his criminal background, inconsistencies in prior testimony, and the Respondent's lack of full opportunity to cross-examine him in a fair trial setting.

The court also exercised its residual discretion to exclude the evidence to protect the Respondent's constitutional right to a fair trial, given the prior conviction was overturned due to a miscarriage of justice.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude 104 private communications intercepted under six wiretap authorizations, arguing violations of section 8 and 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant alleged that the affiant failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure in the Information to Obtain (ITO) for the first authorization, leading to invalidity of all subsequent authorizations.

The court reviewed the ITO for probable cause and investigative necessity, finding that despite some errors and omissions by the affiant, they were not intentional or grossly negligent and did not seriously distort the assessment of witness credibility.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had a sufficient basis to grant the authorizations, as probable cause and investigative necessity were established.

The motion to exclude the wiretap evidence was dismissed.

The Applicant, charged with first-degree murder, sought to exclude call detail records obtained via search warrants, arguing violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Applicant contended that the Informations to Obtain (ITOs) contained inaccuracies, lacked reasonable grounds to believe the records would afford evidence, and that police failed to file Reports to Justice as required by s. 489.1 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while there were minor inaccuracies in the ITOs, they were made in good faith and, once excised, sufficient grounds remained for the warrants.

The court also found that the police's failure to file Reports to Justice constituted a s. 8 Charter breach but, following established jurisprudence, determined that this technical breach did not warrant the exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, especially given the serious nature of the charge.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to threatening to cause death and breach of probation.

She brought constitutional challenges to section 737 of the Criminal Code (the victim surcharge provision), arguing it violated her Charter rights under sections 7 and 15.

The court found a prima facie violation of section 15 (equality rights) on the basis that the mandatory victim surcharge has a discriminatory impact on mentally disabled persons who are disproportionately poor.

The court rejected section 7 challenges based on arbitrariness and overbreadth, finding the provision does not violate liberty or security of the person in a manner contrary to fundamental justice.

During a first-degree murder trial, the court issued written reasons for three oral evidentiary rulings.

First, evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct was admitted as its probative value in assessing the reliability of his confession outweighed its prejudicial effect.

Second, a spontaneous inculpatory utterance made by the accused to special constables while being transported was ruled voluntary and admissible.

Third, the defence was permitted to call a psychiatrist and psychologist as non-expert witnesses to testify about the accused's demeanour and pre-confession statements, but they were restricted from providing a diagnosis or testifying about post-confession statements.

The Crown appealed two summary conviction decisions declining to impose the mandatory victim surcharge after relying on an earlier Ontario Court of Justice decision finding the provision unconstitutional.

The appeal turned on whether the Ontario Court of Justice could effectively apply that prior ruling without giving the Crown meaningful opportunity to make submissions on the constitutional issue.

The court held that although formal notice need not be required in every recurring case, the Crown must still receive sufficient opportunity to argue the validity of the legislation.

Because that procedural fairness requirement was not met, the waivers were set aside and the matters were remitted for a proper hearing.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory victim surcharge (SAC) imposed under section 737 of the Criminal Code, arguing it violated his rights under sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the SAC constitutes a punishment rather than an ancillary order.

Applying the test for cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, the court determined that imposing a $700 surcharge on an impoverished, mentally ill, and substance-dependent offender with a monthly income of approximately $136 would be grossly disproportionate and incompatible with human dignity.

The court declared section 737(1) of the Criminal Code to be of no force or effect under section 52 of the Charter.

A 26-year-old Inuit street person with severe alcohol and drug addiction was convicted of nine offences including assault, mischief, and breaching court orders.

He faced a mandatory victim surcharge of $900 ($100 per offence) under section 737 of the Criminal Code.

Living on social assistance with a monthly income of $250, the accused challenged the constitutionality of the victim surcharge provision, arguing it violated section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as cruel and unusual punishment.

The court found that the victim surcharge constitutes punishment and that imposing it on an indigent offender in these circumstances would be grossly disproportionate, both as applied to the accused and in reasonable hypothetical cases.

The court declared section 737 of no force or effect.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of assault, threatening death, intimidation, and criminal harassment against his wife and five children over a 24-year marriage.

The court found the accused guilty of assaulting his wife on two occasions and his eldest son on one occasion, rejecting the defence of reasonable correction under section 43 of the Criminal Code for the use of a toy bat.

The accused was also found guilty of criminally harassing his wife and two of his younger sons due to his controlling behaviour, emotional abuse, and use of a leather belt for discipline.

The accused was acquitted of the remaining charges, including threatening death and intimidation, due to reasonable doubt regarding his intent and lawful authority.