Laura J. Metcalfe

The defendants, Michael and Christian Theriault, were charged with aggravated assault and attempting to obstruct justice following an altercation with Dafonte Miller, which resulted in Miller losing an eye.

The court found that Miller and his friends were "car hopping" and were caught by the Theriaults.

While the initial interaction and struggle were complex, the court found that Michael Theriault committed an unlawful assault when he struck Miller with a metal pipe after Miller was in retreat and seeking help.

The court found Michael Theriault not guilty of aggravated assault but guilty of the lesser included offense of assault.

Christian Theriault was found not guilty on both counts.

The charges of attempting to obstruct justice against both defendants were dismissed due to reasonable doubt regarding intent and the context of their statements to police.

The appellant, a medical student, was convicted of internet child luring after initiating a sexually explicit conversation with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old girl in an adult chat room.

He appealed his conviction, arguing entrapment and a violation of his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the police did not provide an opportunity to commit the offence, as the appellant initiated the contact and escalated the sexual nature of the conversation despite being told the persona was underage.

The court also upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant's right to counsel was not infringed, as he understood his rights and consulted duty counsel.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample.

He appealed, arguing his s. 10(b) Charter rights were breached when police failed to make reasonable efforts to contact his counsel of choice and compelled him to provide a breath sample without clearly advising him of time limits or options to find other private counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the police failed to adequately carry out their implementational duties under s. 10(b) by not checking the lawyer's website for an after-hours number and by not properly informing the appellant of his options.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed a sentence of seven years imposed for four counts of providing immigration advice without a license contrary to s. 91(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and one count of counselling misrepresentation in an immigration application contrary to s. 126 of the IRPA.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in law or principle by the trial judge.

The court upheld the trial judge's decisions regarding denial of enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody due to delay caused by the appellant, reliance on victim impact statements, consideration of future risk, imposition of maximum sentences, consecutive sentencing, and failure to address bail conditions as a mitigating factor.

The applicants, two firefighters charged with fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of the charges to the anticipated end of the trial was 35 months and one week.

After deducting three months of conceded defence delay, the net delay was 32 months and one week, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown argued that additional periods, including a two-month delay for a judicial pre-trial, a two-month adjournment of the preliminary inquiry, and a seven-week judicial reserve period, should be deducted as defence delay or exceptional circumstances.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments, finding that the delays were not caused by the defence and that the Crown failed to take proactive steps to mitigate them.

The court concluded that the delay was unreasonable and granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused was convicted of driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

Following the conviction, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

The core issue was whether the time the trial judge took to deliberate and render a decision should be included in the total delay calculation under the Jordan framework.

The court held that judicial deliberation time should be excluded from the Jordan calculation, and found that the net delay did not exceed the presumptive 18-month ceiling.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the impaired operation count was withdrawn.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's right to counsel, including the police officer's failure to properly inform the accused of the police obligation to wait a reasonable time for counsel of choice to call back, failure to wait a reasonable time before contacting duty counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice by not searching the internet for alternate numbers, and failure to provide the result of the first breath sample before taking the second.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The defendant challenged the refusal charge on Charter grounds, arguing a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found no Charter breach, concluding that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to contact counsel of his choice and deliberately delayed the investigative process.

The defendant was convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample.

The applicant challenged a police search of the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) driver licence database under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The police used facial recognition technology to search the database and identify the applicant as the holder of multiple fraudulently obtained driver's licences.

The applicant argued that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in his photograph and personal information submitted for driver's licence purposes.

The Crown argued that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in information voluntarily submitted to obtain a driver's licence, which is a regulated privilege.

The court dismissed the applicant's challenge, finding that driver's licence applicants have neither a subjective nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in the MTO database.

The accused was charged with 26 offences related to fraudulently obtaining and possessing multiple driver's licences under various aliases.

The Crown's case relied primarily on photo-comparison technology and visual identification from driver's licence photographs and booking hall videotapes to establish that the accused was the same person responsible for obtaining licences under seven different names.

The court found that the identification evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as no police officer who had investigated or dealt with the accused in connection with prior incidents was able to identify him as the person they had encountered.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding that relying solely on the judge's own visual comparison of photographs and videotapes, without corroborating eyewitness identification, would be manifestly unsafe given the inherent frailties of identification evidence.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over the legal limit, resisting arrest, and assault with intent to resist arrest, following her arrest at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused was found behind the wheel of her vehicle after leaving a Christmas party.

The accused applied for Charter relief alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter applications but acquitted the accused on the impaired and over 80 charges, finding she had rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control and that no realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by wounding but acquitted of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where she struck her sister-in-law in the face with a glass during an escalated argument.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdicts were logically inconsistent as a matter of law, since both charges arose from the same conduct and the only contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for aggravated assault, and entered an acquittal.