Laura J. Metcalfe

The accused was charged with impaired operation and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the impaired operation count was withdrawn.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging violations of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's right to counsel, including the police officer's failure to properly inform the accused of the police obligation to wait a reasonable time for counsel of choice to call back, failure to wait a reasonable time before contacting duty counsel, failure to facilitate contact with counsel of choice by not searching the internet for alternate numbers, and failure to provide the result of the first breath sample before taking the second.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the accused.

The defendant was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and refusal to provide a breath sample.

The Crown conceded the impaired operation charge.

The defendant challenged the refusal charge on Charter grounds, arguing a violation of his right to counsel under s. 10(b) and seeking exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2).

The court found no Charter breach, concluding that the defendant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to contact counsel of his choice and deliberately delayed the investigative process.

The defendant was convicted of refusal to provide a breath sample.

The accused was charged with 26 offences related to fraudulently obtaining and possessing multiple driver's licences under various aliases.

The Crown's case relied primarily on photo-comparison technology and visual identification from driver's licence photographs and booking hall videotapes to establish that the accused was the same person responsible for obtaining licences under seven different names.

The court found that the identification evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, as no police officer who had investigated or dealt with the accused in connection with prior incidents was able to identify him as the person they had encountered.

The court acquitted the accused of all charges, finding that relying solely on the judge's own visual comparison of photographs and videotapes, without corroborating eyewitness identification, would be manifestly unsafe given the inherent frailties of identification evidence.

The applicant challenged a police search of the Ministry of Transportation (MTO) driver licence database under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The police used facial recognition technology to search the database and identify the applicant as the holder of multiple fraudulently obtained driver's licences.

The applicant argued that the search violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in his photograph and personal information submitted for driver's licence purposes.

The Crown argued that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists in information voluntarily submitted to obtain a driver's licence, which is a regulated privilege.

The court dismissed the applicant's challenge, finding that driver's licence applicants have neither a subjective nor an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the information contained in the MTO database.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and over the legal limit, resisting arrest, and assault with intent to resist arrest, following her arrest at a banquet hall parking lot.

The Crown alleged the accused was found behind the wheel of her vehicle after leaving a Christmas party.

The accused applied for Charter relief alleging breaches of sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Charter.

The trial judge dismissed the Charter applications but acquitted the accused on the impaired and over 80 charges, finding she had rebutted the statutory presumption of care and control and that no realistic risk of danger existed.

The accused was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault by wounding but acquitted of assault with a weapon arising from an incident where she struck her sister-in-law in the face with a glass during an escalated argument.

The appellant appealed on the grounds that the verdicts were inconsistent and unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found that the verdicts were logically inconsistent as a matter of law, since both charges arose from the same conduct and the only contested issue was whether the blow was reflexive or intentional.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction for aggravated assault, and entered an acquittal.