Judie Im

The applicant filed an application under section 34 of the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing by teleconference to determine if the application should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving notice.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.

The court determined costs following a motion concerning whether a proceeding could continue as a representative action under Rule 12.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Success on the underlying motion was divided: the moving party succeeded on the central issue that the action could proceed as a representative proceeding meeting the test analogous to certification under the Class Proceedings Act, but the responding parties succeeded on issues including that only individual union members, not the union itself, could act as representative plaintiffs and that particulars were required for a negligent misrepresentation claim.

Applying the factors in Rule 57, including relative success, complexity, and conduct of the parties, the court concluded that the moving party was overall more successful.

The court awarded reduced partial indemnity costs reflecting divided success and certain pleading deficiencies.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application under s. 16 of the Public Officers Act, which alleged that the Human Rights Tribunal was biased.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no foundation in the record to conclude that the Tribunal as a whole was disqualified by interest from acting.

The Court also clarified that previous correspondence and scheduling comments did not direct the appellant to institute the application or halt his human rights complaint.

The applicant sought judicial review for a declaration that the Ministry of Transportation unreasonably withheld a clearance letter for a subdivision development.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, noting that the Ministry was still actively reviewing the engineering drawings.

The Court further held that the appropriate forum to address difficulties in implementing draft plan approval conditions is the Ontario Municipal Board, which retained jurisdiction over the matter.

The parties advised the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario that they had reached a settlement of all outstanding issues.

The Tribunal ordered that the proceeding be terminated.

The appellant municipality was successful on appeal and sought costs for the proceedings before the application judge and the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs to the appellant on a party and party basis.

Ontario was ordered to pay the costs of the application ($50,000), factum motion ($2,000), and appeal ($35,000).

Lac Seul First Nation and Northern Nishnawbe Education Council were ordered to pay the costs of the stay motion ($6,000).

No costs were awarded for or against Canada.

The appellant, a former Justice of the Peace, appealed the dismissal of his Small Claims Court action against a Ministry employee.

The appellant sought reimbursement for legal expenses incurred defending sexual assault charges, claiming judicial immunity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the action was an abuse of process, frivolous, vexatious, and barred by the limitation period, as the cause of action arose in 1999 when he first sought reimbursement.

The appellant municipality appealed a declaration that it was responsible for maintaining two roads leading to a First Nation reserve and an education centre following a municipal restructuring order.

The application judge had found the roads became municipal highways through statutory dedication under the Municipal Act and common law dedication by conduct.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Municipal Act provisions relied upon explicitly excluded provincial roads under Crown control.

Furthermore, the common law doctrine of dedication and acceptance could not apply because the public already enjoyed a statutory right of passage under the Public Lands Act, and the province had failed to use the available statutory mechanisms to transfer the roads.

The applicant failed to dial in to a scheduled summary hearing teleconference.

After waiting half an hour past the scheduled start time, the adjudicator dismissed the application as abandoned, in accordance with the Tribunal's standard practice for non-attendance.

The Ministry of Correctional Services and a non-party intervenor requested a publication ban on portions of an investigation report and minutes of settlement produced in the proceeding, citing privacy and the integrity of confidential settlements.

The Tribunal denied the requests, finding insufficient evidence to override the strong public interest in open hearings and the need for transparent decision-making.

However, the Tribunal granted a request to redact the home addresses of Ministry personnel from the exhibits due to safety concerns.

Following the release of reasons for judgment, the parties submitted written costs submissions.

The respondent consented to an award of costs in favour of the appellant Board in the amount of $10,000, inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The Crown appellants did not seek costs.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs in the agreed amount.

The plaintiff commenced two identical actions for malicious prosecution and negligent investigation against the police and the Crown.

Both actions were dismissed by the registrar as abandoned due to delay.

Almost two years later, the plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal orders under Rule 37.14.

The master dismissed the motion, finding inordinate delay and deemed prejudice to the defendants due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal and reinstated the second action.

The Court of Appeal allowed the defendants' appeal and restored the master's order, holding that the master did not err in finding that the expiry of a limitation period gives rise to presumptive prejudice, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The applicant, a person with a disability, filed human rights applications against the City of Toronto and the Province of Ontario, alleging that the Ontario Building Code and the City's building permit and planning processes failed to mandate sufficient accessibility standards (specifically power door openers) in his new condominium.

The respondents brought a preliminary request to dismiss the applications for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the applications, finding that it lacks jurisdiction to strike down or amend legislation such as the Ontario Building Code, and that the City's actions in issuing permits and entering into planning agreements were too remote and did not constitute discriminatory actions under the Human Rights Code.

The appellants appealed a decision rejecting their request for a declaration that an access road was a public highway and that the Township was responsible for its maintenance and repair.

The appellants argued that the road's dedication by Ontario and assumption by the Township were apparent from surrounding circumstances, including negotiations and expenditures.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's findings that there was no actual dedication by Ontario and no clear and unequivocal assumption by the Township, as the Township had sought work permits and was compensated by Ontario for maintenance.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant school board sought judicial review of a decision by the Child and Family Services Review Board that quashed the expulsion of a student for off-school marijuana use.

The Tribunal had found insufficient evidence of a nexus between the student's off-school activities and the school climate.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the moot application, determined the standard of review was reasonableness, and upheld the Tribunal's decision, finding it reasonable and correct in its interpretation of the Education Act.

The appellant appealed a decision by the Director's Delegate cancelling its Certificate of Revival under the Business Corporations Act.

The Delegate found the certificate invalid because the mandatory consent of the Minister of Finance was not attached to the Articles of Revival.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Delegate's decision was reasonable and that the appellant was afforded procedural fairness.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding the validity of a sworn information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide whether extrinsic evidence was admissible because the material in the information itself established the year it was sworn, proving the limitation period had not expired.

The information was not a nullity.

The employer appealed an Officer's Order requiring it to pay termination pay to an employee who was terminated after taking a one-week vacation without explicit approval.

The employer argued the employee abandoned his job and was guilty of wilful misconduct under s. 57(10)(c) of the Employment Standards Act.

The Board found that while the employee was foolhardy to leave without confirming approval, his actions did not amount to serious, intentional misconduct.

The employer's conclusion that the employee abandoned his job was unreasonable given they knew he had requested vacation.

The appeal was dismissed and the Order to Pay was affirmed.

The applicant employer sought a review of an Order to Pay issued by an Employment Standards Officer.

The parties resolved part of the matter through minutes of settlement prior to the hearing.

At the hearing, the parties entered into discussions with the assistance of a Labour Relations Officer and resolved the remaining issues.

The Board ordered the disbursement of funds held in trust in accordance with the settlement and terminated the matter.

The applicant salon sought review of an Order to Pay issued by an Employment Standards Officer, which found that a former hair stylist was entitled to minimum wage for hours worked, including time spent waiting for customers, rather than just her commission.

The employer argued the claimant spent significant time on personal errands and treatments.

The Board found the employer failed to provide evidence supporting these allegations and affirmed that waiting time is deemed work performed under Regulation 325.

The application was dismissed and the Order to Pay was affirmed.