Jonathan Erik Laxer

The plaintiffs moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike portions of a counterclaim alleging defamation arising from a draft statement of claim and covering letter sent by their former solicitor to the defendant’s employer before litigation commenced, arguing the communications were protected by absolute privilege.

The court held that the pleadings did not support a finding that the communications were made to achieve the objects of the litigation and therefore absolute privilege did not apply at the pleadings stage.

However, the court accepted that defending the counterclaim would likely require disclosure of solicitor‑client communications and could prejudice the plaintiffs in the main action.

The court therefore refused to strike the counterclaim but ordered it severed from the main action and directed that it proceed, if pursued, as a separate claim.

After dismissing a municipal defendant’s motion for summary judgment in a procurement dispute, the court addressed the successful plaintiff’s claim for costs.

The plaintiff sought approximately $50,000 on a partial indemnity basis, while the defendant argued that $20,000–$25,000 would be reasonable.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court of Appeal’s guidance that costs must be fair and reasonable to the unsuccessful party, the court reduced several components of the claim.

Reductions were made for the junior counsel’s billing rate, duplication between counsel, and unnecessary expert evidence.

The court fixed costs at $30,000 all-inclusive payable by the defendant.

The defendant municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a procurement dispute arising from a waste haulage contract tender.

The plaintiff carrier alleged its bid was wrongly rejected as non‑compliant despite literal compliance with the tender terms and sought damages for lost profits.

The court held the motion record was inadequate and contained unresolved evidentiary conflicts regarding the interpretation of tender documents, the purpose of amendments to the request for quotation, and the municipality’s handling of clarification opportunities.

The court found that the summary judgment process would not provide a fair and just determination of the dispute.

A full trial was required in the interests of justice.

The applicant, a former NHL referee, brought a motion to vary an order that quashed his affidavit filed in support of an application for judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board decision.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion in part, finding that the motions judge erred in striking portions of the affidavit that went to an essential finding of fact regarding anti-union animus and alleged denials of procedural fairness.

The court reinstated specific paragraphs of the affidavit while upholding the exclusion of the remainder.