Andrew Steven Faith

The applicant sought judicial authorization for physician-assisted death during the interim constitutional exemption regime established by Carter.

The court held that the evidentiary record established all five Carter criteria, including adult capacity, a grievous and irremediable medical condition, intolerable suffering, absence of acceptable alleviating treatment, and clear consent.

The court further held that a court-authorized physician-assisted death in these circumstances did not trigger the notification provisions in s. 10(1) of the Coroners Act.

The application and ancillary declaratory relief were granted.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.

In CCAA proceedings involving a payday lending enterprise, class members in Ontario consumer class actions moved for approval of three settlement agreements forming part of a broader global resolution of litigation involving the debtor companies, their directors and officers, and related parties.

The settlements resolved certain class claims and partially resolved a third‑party lender claim, providing more than $10 million in recovery with potential participation in future litigation proceeds.

The court applied established settlement approval factors including likelihood of success, litigation risks, counsel recommendations, absence of objections, and arm’s‑length negotiations.

The court concluded that the settlements were fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class and the restructuring process.

The applicant obtained a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) to construct industrial wind turbines.

The respondent municipality, an 'unwilling host' to wind projects, passed a resolution refusing the applicant access to a municipal road necessary for the project.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court quashed the resolution, finding that it frustrated the purpose of the provincially-issued REA and was passed in bad faith for the improper purpose of stopping the project rather than legitimately regulating roadways.

The municipality was ordered to consider the applicant's road use and permit applications in good faith.

The appellant appealed sentence solely on the basis of the credit granted for one year of pretrial detention.

The court held that the trial judge erred by requiring something 'exceptional' before granting enhanced credit, contrary to the framework in Summers.

Given the appellant's likely eligibility for early release, compliance on bail, good behaviour in custody, and lack of delay, enhanced credit of 1.5 to 1 was warranted.

The sentence was reduced from 30 months to a net custodial sentence of 12 months, with the two-year probation term remaining.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action had been struck from the trial list due to the inaction of her first lawyer, and a subsequent motion to restore it was delayed by her second lawyer, who concealed his neglect from her.

On appeal, the Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence detailing the second lawyer's neglect.

The court found the Master made reversible errors by inferring intentional delay without considering the appellant's instructions to her lawyers, and by presuming prejudice due to the expiry of a limitation period.

Applying the conjunctive test from Nissar, the court held the appellant had an acceptable explanation for the delay (solicitor negligence) and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the action restored to the trial list.

Following summary judgment dismissing two civil actions related to a proposed wind project, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged novelty of the legal issues, broader public importance, assistance to future litigants, alleged reliance on unsworn materials, and the plaintiffs’ financial hardship.

The court rejected these submissions, holding that the claims were premature and unsupported by the evidentiary record, and that none of the factors justified departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The court emphasized that unsuccessful litigants cannot avoid costs merely because their claims may generate guidance for future cases.

Costs were awarded as claimed by the defendants.

The plaintiff's action was struck from the trial list and subsequently dismissed by a Master due to the inaction of her former counsel.

The plaintiff's second lawyer failed to advise her of the dismissal or her right to appeal.

Upon retaining new counsel, the plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal of the Master's order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the delay was attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel and that extending the time would not prejudice the defendants, in accordance with the principle that matters should be determined on their merits.

Neighbouring landowners brought actions seeking damages and injunctive relief arising from a proposed wind turbine development, alleging negligence, nuisance, trespass, and strict liability based on anticipated noise, health impacts, and property value loss.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claims on the basis that the project had not yet received regulatory approval and had not been constructed.

The court held that the claims were premature because the alleged harms were speculative and no actionable tort had yet occurred.

Pure economic loss arising from public concern about a proposed development was not compensable absent proof of tortious conduct.

The plaintiffs also failed to meet the threshold for a quia timet injunction because there was no high probability that the alleged harms would occur given the ongoing regulatory approval process.