Andrew Steven Faith

The plaintiff discovered significant structural defects and Building Code violations in his cottage years after purchasing it, rendering it unsafe to occupy.

He claimed coverage under his title insurance policy with the defendant.

The court, applying the Court of Appeal's framework in MacDonald v. Chicago Title, found that the structural defects flowed directly from the inadequacy of the building permit and inspection process, rendering the title unmarketable.

The court held that the loss fell within the covered title risks and was not caught by the policy's exclusions for governmental power or actual knowledge.

Partial judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of coverage, with damages bifurcated to a subsequent trial.

The respondent, an insider of a reporting issuer, admitted to engaging in a course of conduct that created a misleading appearance of trading activity and failing to file insider reports.

Staff of the Commission and the respondent jointly submitted a Settlement Agreement for approval.

The Panel approved the settlement, finding it to be in the public interest, and imposed sanctions including a $10,000 administrative penalty, $5,000 in costs, and various trading and director/officer bans.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review concerning the approval of a wind farm project, the successful respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $163,961.25.

The applicants opposed the costs and sought their own costs, arguing the case involved novel heritage issues and public interest.

The court rejected claims of misconduct from both sides that would justify extraordinary costs.

Acknowledging the public interest and novelty of the heritage issues, the majority reduced the costs award and ordered the applicants to pay $75,000 to the successful respondent.

A dissenting judge would have ordered no costs, emphasizing the importance of public participation in judicial review of government decisions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and ammunition offences, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence seized during a search of a farmhouse.

The appellant argued that the use of tear gas during the execution of the search warrant constituted an unauthorized search in breach of section 8 of the Charter, and alternatively, that the manner of execution was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the use of tear gas was not a "search" within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, as it was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining personal information but rather to safely flush out occupants.

The court also found that the search was executed in a reasonable manner given the circumstances known to police at the time.

The applicant, an almost 80-year-old woman suffering from severe osteoarthritis and intolerable pain, sought a court declaration to confirm her eligibility for medical assistance in dying (MAID) under s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, specifically that her natural death was "reasonably foreseeable." Two physicians had assessed her as eligible, but one declined to proceed due to fear of criminal charges given conflicting medical opinions on "reasonable foreseeability." The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario opposed the declaration, arguing it was unnecessary, interfered with prosecutorial discretion, and that MAID eligibility was for medical professionals, not courts.

The court found the application misconceived as a constitutional challenge but recognized a live controversy regarding statutory interpretation.

The court declined to grant a declaration of eligibility or immunity but issued an interpretative declaration that, based on the evidence, the applicant's natural death was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of the Criminal Code, aiming to clarify the statute for medical practitioners without interfering with prosecutorial discretion.

The plaintiff exporter claimed under an accounts receivable insurance policy issued by the defendant for unpaid shipments and demurrage charges.

The defendant indemnified the plaintiff for completely unpaid shipments but denied coverage for partially paid and unreleased shipments, relying on an exclusion clause for changed payment terms and a dispute clause.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the exclusion clause did not apply as there was no agreement to change payment terms.

However, the court held the dispute clause applied because there were tenable disputes between the plaintiff and the buyer regarding the partially paid and unreleased shipments.

The court also found the defendant was not estopped from relying on the dispute clause and that the policy explicitly excluded demurrage.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 42 months for fraud, arguing it was excessive and had uncontemplated negative immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not excessive for a major and serious fraud.

The Court also declined to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid immigration consequences, citing Parliament's intent regarding serious crimes committed by immigrants.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether his arrest and detention were arbitrary beyond non-compliance with section 495(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court found no basis in the record to conclude the officer's conduct was arbitrary, noting the appellant was found lying on a median beside a busy roadway and volunteered that he possessed marihuana.

The province issued a renewable energy approval to the respondent for a wind turbine project, which included the use of an unopened municipal road allowance.

The appellant city, opposing the project, passed a resolution refusing any request to use the road.

The Divisional Court quashed the resolution, finding it frustrated the legislative purpose of the provincial approval and was made in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the city's appeal, confirming that the renewable energy approval was a positive entitlement and the city's resolution conflicted with it under section 14 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court also upheld the finding of bad faith.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.

The applicant sought judicial authorization for physician-assisted death during the interim constitutional exemption regime established by Carter.

The court held that the evidentiary record established all five Carter criteria, including adult capacity, a grievous and irremediable medical condition, intolerable suffering, absence of acceptable alleviating treatment, and clear consent.

The court further held that a court-authorized physician-assisted death in these circumstances did not trigger the notification provisions in s. 10(1) of the Coroners Act.

The application and ancillary declaratory relief were granted.

The applicant, an 80-year-old man with advanced-stage aggressive lymphoma, brought a preliminary motion for confidentiality orders in his application for physician-assisted death under the Carter framework.

He sought orders allowing him, his family, and his physicians to proceed anonymously, a publication ban on identifying information, and a sealing order for the application record, proposing to file a redacted version for the public.

The media respondents opposed the anonymity of the physicians and requested a 'counsel's eyes only' review of the unredacted record.

The court granted the motion, finding that the applicant's proposal struck the appropriate balance between the open court principle and the need to protect the privacy and dignity of the applicant, as well as the public interest in not deterring physicians from participating in such applications.

In CCAA proceedings involving a payday lending enterprise, class members in Ontario consumer class actions moved for approval of three settlement agreements forming part of a broader global resolution of litigation involving the debtor companies, their directors and officers, and related parties.

The settlements resolved certain class claims and partially resolved a third‑party lender claim, providing more than $10 million in recovery with potential participation in future litigation proceeds.

The court applied established settlement approval factors including likelihood of success, litigation risks, counsel recommendations, absence of objections, and arm’s‑length negotiations.

The court concluded that the settlements were fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class and the restructuring process.

The applicant obtained a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) to construct industrial wind turbines.

The respondent municipality, an 'unwilling host' to wind projects, passed a resolution refusing the applicant access to a municipal road necessary for the project.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court quashed the resolution, finding that it frustrated the purpose of the provincially-issued REA and was passed in bad faith for the improper purpose of stopping the project rather than legitimately regulating roadways.

The municipality was ordered to consider the applicant's road use and permit applications in good faith.

The appellant appealed sentence solely on the basis of the credit granted for one year of pretrial detention.

The court held that the trial judge erred by requiring something 'exceptional' before granting enhanced credit, contrary to the framework in Summers.

Given the appellant's likely eligibility for early release, compliance on bail, good behaviour in custody, and lack of delay, enhanced credit of 1.5 to 1 was warranted.

The sentence was reduced from 30 months to a net custodial sentence of 12 months, with the two-year probation term remaining.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action had been struck from the trial list due to the inaction of her first lawyer, and a subsequent motion to restore it was delayed by her second lawyer, who concealed his neglect from her.

On appeal, the Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence detailing the second lawyer's neglect.

The court found the Master made reversible errors by inferring intentional delay without considering the appellant's instructions to her lawyers, and by presuming prejudice due to the expiry of a limitation period.

Applying the conjunctive test from Nissar, the court held the appellant had an acceptable explanation for the delay (solicitor negligence) and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the action restored to the trial list.

Following summary judgment dismissing two civil actions related to a proposed wind project, the successful defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to alleged novelty of the legal issues, broader public importance, assistance to future litigants, alleged reliance on unsworn materials, and the plaintiffs’ financial hardship.

The court rejected these submissions, holding that the claims were premature and unsupported by the evidentiary record, and that none of the factors justified departing from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The court emphasized that unsuccessful litigants cannot avoid costs merely because their claims may generate guidance for future cases.

Costs were awarded as claimed by the defendants.

The plaintiff's action was struck from the trial list and subsequently dismissed by a Master due to the inaction of her former counsel.

The plaintiff's second lawyer failed to advise her of the dismissal or her right to appeal.

Upon retaining new counsel, the plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal of the Master's order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the delay was attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel and that extending the time would not prejudice the defendants, in accordance with the principle that matters should be determined on their merits.