Andrew Steven Faith

This decision addresses the costs of a motion for a publication ban and sealing order in an appeal concerning child vaccination.

The mother, who brought the original motion, sought costs, arguing the father's publicizing of the case necessitated the motion and increased her expenses.

The father argued for no costs or costs payable to him, asserting he protected the children's identity and consented to much of the relief.

The court found that while the mother achieved some confidentiality protections, she did not obtain all the relief sought (e.g., sealing the file).

The court concluded that the motion would have been necessary regardless of the father's actions due to the open court principle and the need to notify media.

Therefore, the father's behaviour did not cause or increase the mother's costs, and no costs were ordered for the motion.

The appellant, FCT Insurance Company Ltd., appealed a trial judgment that found FCT responsible for losses sustained by the respondent, John Breen, arising from structural defects in a cottage property for which he had obtained title insurance.

The trial judge found that the defects rendered the title unmarketable and fell within the coverage of the title insurance policy, relying on the principles established in MacDonald v. Chicago Title Insurance Company of Canada.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying MacDonald to the facts of this case.

The court distinguished this case on two fundamental grounds: first, Mr. Breen was on notice at the time of purchase of potential problems with the building permit process; and second, even if a final inspection had been conducted, it would not have revealed the hidden construction defects.

The court concluded that the situation involved unmarketability of the land rather than the title, and that title insurance is designed to protect against defects that would be revealed by off-title searches, not hidden defects.

The appeal was allowed and the claim dismissed.

The children's mother (L.K.) brought a motion for a publication ban, file initialization, and sealing of the court file in an appeal concerning the vaccination status of the parties' children.

The court applied the Dagenais/Mentuck test, finding a serious risk of harm and stigmatization to the children if their identities were revealed.

A tailored publication ban was ordered, prohibiting the publication of identifying information for the children (names, dates of birth, addresses, schools, genders, images, voices, and most health information, except their unvaccinated status) and the parties (names, voices, images).

The court also ordered that the title of proceedings and public documents use initials only, and that future publications not link to non-compliant prior reports.

The request to seal the court file and retroactively amend existing publications was dismissed due to lack of evidentiary basis and practical unenforceability, respectively.

The respondent mother brought a motion for a publication ban in a family law appeal concerning the vaccination of the parties' children.

The mother sought an interim publication ban and sealing order pending the hearing of the motion.

The court found that the mother had not provided proper notice to the media under the Practice Direction because she used initials instead of the parties' names.

The court granted an interim publication ban to preserve the mother's ability to argue for the children's privacy interests at the full hearing, and directed her to provide proper notice to the media using the parties' names.

The plaintiffs brought an action in defamation against the defendant, a former union member, for publishing numerous derogatory posts and videos online.

The plaintiffs moved for summary judgment, and the defendant brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that an anti-SLAPP motion can be heard concurrently with a summary judgment motion.

The court dismissed the anti-SLAPP motion, finding that while the expression related to a matter of public interest, the harm suffered by the plaintiffs outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, finding the posts defamatory and malicious, and awarded a permanent injunction and costs.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential School Settlement Agreement appealed two directions issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge.

The first direction prohibited the appellant from participating in three appeals and ordered him to withdraw his facta, finding him insubordinate and in defiance of the supervising courts.

The second direction rescinded the first and appointed an amicus curiae to bring a Request for Direction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and set aside both directions, finding that the appellant was owed procedural fairness and natural justice, which were not afforded.

The court also found the second direction violated the principle of functus officio.

The court held that any future proceedings regarding the appellant's conduct must follow the mandated Request for Direction process and be conducted by a different supervising judge.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The Chief Adjudicator of the Independent Assessment Process under the Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement appealed a direction issued by the Eastern Administrative Judge that rescinded an earlier direction prohibiting the Chief Adjudicator's participation in three appeals.

The Chief Adjudicator sought a stay of the second direction pending appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, the functus officio principle, and the propriety of the RFD process.

The court found that allowing parallel proceedings could result in irreparable harm through inconsistent results and damage to the administration of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in her jury charge by failing to sufficiently caution the jury that items linking the appellant to a particular address were relevant only to his relationship with the vehicle's passenger and did not directly support his identification as the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions clearly identified the relevance of the evidence and that the jury was sufficiently instructed on identification and circumstantial evidence.

The appellant also appealed his sentence, but as he had served the custodial portion, that issue was moot.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff discovered significant structural defects and Building Code violations in his cottage years after purchasing it, rendering it unsafe to occupy.

He claimed coverage under his title insurance policy with the defendant.

The court, applying the Court of Appeal's framework in MacDonald v. Chicago Title, found that the structural defects flowed directly from the inadequacy of the building permit and inspection process, rendering the title unmarketable.

The court held that the loss fell within the covered title risks and was not caught by the policy's exclusions for governmental power or actual knowledge.

Partial judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff on the issue of coverage, with damages bifurcated to a subsequent trial.

The Law Society sought judicial review of a disclosure order made by the Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division during an interlocutory suspension proceeding.

By the time the judicial review was heard, the Law Society had complied with the disclosure order and the interlocutory suspension had been imposed, rendering the disclosure issue moot.

The Divisional Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding that the matter should have proceeded through the Tribunal's internal appeal process and that the Tribunal should be allowed time for its jurisprudence to evolve.

Following the dismissal of an application for judicial review concerning the approval of a wind farm project, the successful respondent sought substantial indemnity costs of $163,961.25.

The applicants opposed the costs and sought their own costs, arguing the case involved novel heritage issues and public interest.

The court rejected claims of misconduct from both sides that would justify extraordinary costs.

Acknowledging the public interest and novelty of the heritage issues, the majority reduced the costs award and ordered the applicants to pay $75,000 to the successful respondent.

A dissenting judge would have ordered no costs, emphasizing the importance of public participation in judicial review of government decisions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and ammunition offences, challenging the trial judge's admission of evidence seized during a search of a farmhouse.

The appellant argued that the use of tear gas during the execution of the search warrant constituted an unauthorized search in breach of section 8 of the Charter, and alternatively, that the manner of execution was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the use of tear gas was not a "search" within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, as it was not conducted for the purpose of obtaining personal information but rather to safely flush out occupants.

The court also found that the search was executed in a reasonable manner given the circumstances known to police at the time.

The applicant, an almost 80-year-old woman suffering from severe osteoarthritis and intolerable pain, sought a court declaration to confirm her eligibility for medical assistance in dying (MAID) under s. 241.2(2)(d) of the Criminal Code, specifically that her natural death was "reasonably foreseeable." Two physicians had assessed her as eligible, but one declined to proceed due to fear of criminal charges given conflicting medical opinions on "reasonable foreseeability." The Attorneys General of Canada and Ontario opposed the declaration, arguing it was unnecessary, interfered with prosecutorial discretion, and that MAID eligibility was for medical professionals, not courts.

The court found the application misconceived as a constitutional challenge but recognized a live controversy regarding statutory interpretation.

The court declined to grant a declaration of eligibility or immunity but issued an interpretative declaration that, based on the evidence, the applicant's natural death was reasonably foreseeable within the meaning of the Criminal Code, aiming to clarify the statute for medical practitioners without interfering with prosecutorial discretion.

The plaintiff exporter claimed under an accounts receivable insurance policy issued by the defendant for unpaid shipments and demurrage charges.

The defendant indemnified the plaintiff for completely unpaid shipments but denied coverage for partially paid and unreleased shipments, relying on an exclusion clause for changed payment terms and a dispute clause.

On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found the exclusion clause did not apply as there was no agreement to change payment terms.

However, the court held the dispute clause applied because there were tenable disputes between the plaintiff and the buyer regarding the partially paid and unreleased shipments.

The court also found the defendant was not estopped from relying on the dispute clause and that the policy explicitly excluded demurrage.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 42 months for fraud, arguing it was excessive and had uncontemplated negative immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was not excessive for a major and serious fraud.

The Court also declined to artificially reduce the sentence to avoid immigration consequences, citing Parliament's intent regarding serious crimes committed by immigrants.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider whether his arrest and detention were arbitrary beyond non-compliance with section 495(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Court found no basis in the record to conclude the officer's conduct was arbitrary, noting the appellant was found lying on a median beside a busy roadway and volunteered that he possessed marihuana.

The province issued a renewable energy approval to the respondent for a wind turbine project, which included the use of an unopened municipal road allowance.

The appellant city, opposing the project, passed a resolution refusing any request to use the road.

The Divisional Court quashed the resolution, finding it frustrated the legislative purpose of the provincial approval and was made in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the city's appeal, confirming that the renewable energy approval was a positive entitlement and the city's resolution conflicted with it under section 14 of the Municipal Act, 2001.

The Court also upheld the finding of bad faith.

O.P., suffering from end-stage glioblastoma, applied for a declaration that his planned physician-assisted death was permitted by law under the criteria established in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5.

The applicant argued that court authorization was not legally required but sought a declaratory order for practical reasons due to healthcare providers' concerns about civil, criminal, or disciplinary liability, and issues with the Coroners Act.

The court rejected the premise that physician-assisted death was permissible without court order pending federal legislation, asserting that judicial authorization remained a constitutional remedy under s. 24(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 to ensure the rule of law and safeguard vulnerable persons.

The court ultimately granted an authorization order for physician-assisted death, finding that O.P. met all the Carter criteria, and provided ancillary relief regarding the Coroners Act and Family Law Act.

M.N., suffering from terminal cancer with a prognosis of less than six months, sought a court order declaring that she met the criteria for a physician-assisted death under the constitutional exemption granted in Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 4.

She also sought a declaration that her physician-assisted death would not require physicians to notify the coroner under the Coroners Act.

The court found M.N. to be a competent adult with a grievous and irremediable medical condition causing enduring and intolerable suffering, and that she clearly consented to the termination of her life.

The application was granted, allowing M.N. to proceed with physician-assisted death and exempting involved healthcare providers from certain Criminal Code provisions and coroner notification requirements.