Brian Kolenda

This decision addresses the costs of a previously dismissed motion brought by Kunicyn.

Industrial Alliance Securities Inc. (IAS) and Lise Douville, as successful respondents to the motion, sought substantial indemnity costs due to Kunicyn's unproven serious allegations of conspiracy and fraud against them and their counsel.

The court found that such allegations warranted increased costs and awarded substantial indemnity costs, adjusted for proportionality.

IAS was awarded $35,000 and Douville $25,000, to be paid by Kunicyn.

The plaintiff in a certified class action concerning Mercedes-Benz BlueTEC diesel vehicles moved for further directions regarding the schedule for a partial summary judgment motion on liability issues.

The court had previously set a one-year timeline for this motion and directed immediate discovery.

Despite the defendants' resistance, alleging an "artificially accelerated" discovery schedule without providing supporting evidence, the court reaffirmed its earlier directions.

The judge emphasized the importance of expeditious determination in class actions and the case management judge's role in setting timelines, confirming the summary judgment motion for December 2019 and setting discovery completion by mid-November 2019. interesting_citations_summary: > This decision underscores the broad authority of a class action case management judge to manage proceedings, including setting firm schedules for summary judgment motions and discovery, as supported by *ALS Society v Windsor*.

It highlights that such motions on liability issues are often the pivotal "merits" hearing in complex product liability class actions.

The court also clarifies that parties challenging judicial directions on timelines must provide evidentiary support for their assertions, rather than mere resistance. final_judgement: > The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on liability issues was confirmed to proceed the week of December 16, 2019.

Counsel were directed to continue "meet and confer" discussions to ensure all relevant discovery is completed by mid-November 2019.

The defendants could re-attend for further directions if insurmountable difficulties arose.

Costs submissions were invited if parties could not agree. winning_degree_applicant: 1 winning_degree_respondent: 5 judge_bias_applicant: 3 judge_bias_respondent: 3 year: 2019 decision_number: 1591 file_number: "CV-16-550271-CP" source: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2019/2019onsc1591/2019onsc1591.html" cited_cases: legislation: - title: "Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6, s. 12" url: "https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/92c06#s12" case_law: - title: "Kalra v. Mercedes Benz, 2017 ONSC 3795" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3795/2017onsc3795.html" - title: "Trillium v. General Motors of Canada et al, 2012 ONSC 5960" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc5960/2012onsc5960.html" - title: "Fehr v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2014 ONSC 2183" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc2183/2014onsc2183.html" - title: "ALS Society v Windsor, 2015 ONCA 572" url: "https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2015/2015onca572/2015onca572.html" keywords: - Class action - Motion for directions - Summary judgment - Discovery schedule - Case management - Product liability - Mercedes-Benz - BlueTEC diesel - Emission control areas_of_law: - Civil Procedure - Class Actions --- # Court File and Parties **COURT FILE NO.:** CV-16-550271-CP **DATE:** 20190315 **SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE – ONTARIO** **RE:** YOGESH KALRA, Plaintiff / Moving Party **AND:** MERCEDES BENZ CANADA INC., DAIMLER AG, MERCEDES BENZ USA LLC and MERCEDES BENZ FINANCIAL SERVICES CANADA CORPORATION, Defendants / Responding Parties Proceeding under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 **BEFORE:** Justice Edward P. Belobaba **COUNSEL:** Peter Griffin, Brian Kolenda, Kirk Baert and James Sayce for the Plaintiff Steven Rosenhek, Vera Toppings and Kimberly Potter for the Defendants **HEARD:** In writing ## Motion for Directions [1] The plaintiff moves for further directions in this class action.

The action was certified as a class proceeding in June 2017.

See [Kalra v. Mercedes Benz, 2017 ONSC 3795](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3795/2017onsc3795.html). [2] The focus of the class action is the Mercedes-Benz line of BlueTEC diesel automobiles.

The allegation is that the BlueTEC vehicles contain a defect or a “defeat device” that turns off the emission control system when the ambient air temperature drops below 10 degrees Celsius (50 degrees Fahrenheit).

If this is true, this means that the defendants’ BlueTEC vehicles are emitting high (and illegal) levels of nitrogen oxide pollution for the majority of time that they are being driven on Canadian roads.

See [Kalra v. Mercedes Benz, 2017 ONSC 3795, at para. 2](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2017/2017onsc3795/2017onsc3795.html#par2).

The defendants deny any such defeat device and look forward to the adjudication of the certified common issues. [3] In February 2018, the defendants advised that they would be bringing a motion for partial summary judgment dismissing the claim as against three of the four defendants (i.e. the off-shore and financial services defendants) and dismissing three of the 14 certified common issues.

However, no further material was delivered in this regard. [4] In December 2018 the plaintiff delivered a draft partial summary judgment motion for the adjudication of the 10 of the 14 certified common issues that deal with liability. [5] At a case conference in December 2018, having resumed my role as case management judge, I directed that the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion be heard in one year’s time, specifically the week of December 16, 2019.

I also directed that the discovery process should commence immediately and if there were any disagreements in the ongoing “meet and confer” discussions about the timing or content of the discovery plan, counsel could re-attend before me. [6] At a case conference in January, 2019 I reminded counsel by way of a further direction that “the requisite discoveries needed to be completed in sufficient time so as not to disturb the December 16, 2019 motion date.” [7] I made these directions to ensure the “fair and expeditious determination” of the class action before me.

This is in accordance with [Section 12 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6](https://www.ontario.ca/laws/statute/92c06#s12).

In my experience as a class action judge, the real “merits” hearing in a document-heavy, product liability case such as this, is the partial summary judgment motion for the adjudication of the liability issues.

The liability issues are at the heart of the class action.

If the plaintiff fails on liability that ends the matter; if the plaintiff prevails on liability and the action is not settled, the aggregate or individual damages issues can then be addressed under ss. 24 or 25 of the CPA.

I have found that the liability issues can almost always be adjudicated summarily. [8] Given that it is the defendant in these document-heavy cases that typically holds a disproportionate amount of the evidence, I directed that some measure of discovery begin immediately.

The directed discovery must obviously be limited to productions and questions that are relevant to the issues on the summary judgment motion, that is, to the ten liability issues.

See [Trillium v. General Motors of Canada et al, 2012 ONSC 5960, at paras. 15-16](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2012/2012onsc5960/2012onsc5960.html); [Fehr v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2014 ONSC 2183, at para. 54](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2014/2014onsc2183/2014onsc2183.html). [9] The direction that the summary judgment motion be heard in December, 2019 reflected my experience that this was generally more than enough time for the completion of the discovery task.

It was also based on the fact that that the defendants did not suggest otherwise or offer any evidence to the contrary. [10] The Court of Appeal made clear in [ALS Society v Windsor, 2015 ONCA 572](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2015/2015onca572/2015onca572.html) that the directions made thus far are the kinds of directions that fall squarely within the job-description of the class action case management judge: The case management judge is entitled to give directions as to when certain steps should be accomplished and as to what motions may be brought, and when.

The case management judge may prohibit motions from being brought before certain steps have been accomplished and may make orders as to the sequencing of motions.

The case management judge is also entitled to determine the order in which some issues are addressed.

He or she is entitled, but not required, to determine whether some issues are amenable to summary judgment and to schedule the proceedings accordingly.

See [ALS Society v Windsor, 2015 ONCA 572, at para. 71](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/onca/doc/2015/2015onca572/2015onca572.html#par71). [11] The defendants, however, continue to offer a level of resistance that, frankly, is difficult to understand.

They say that the one-year time post for the plaintiff’s summary judgment motion unjustifiably imposes “an artificially accelerated or abbreviated discovery schedule.” They say this even though they have provided no evidence in support of this assertion.

Absent such evidence (which may still be tendered by the defendants provided this is done on a timely basis) I can only re-affirm my earlier Direction, albeit revised as follows: ## Direction (i) The plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the liability issues shall proceed as scheduled the week of December 16, 2019; (ii) Counsel shall continue their “meet and confer” discussions about the delivery schedule in the discovery plan in good faith and in an effort to ensure that all relevant discovery is completed by the middle of November, 2019 so that the scheduled hearing date of December 16, 2019 is not compromised; (iii) If the defendants encounter any insurmountable difficulties in adhering to the time-posts set out herein, they may re-attend before me for further directions; (iv) If the parties cannot agree on an appropriate costs award for this motion in writing, I would be pleased to receive brief written submissions – from the plaintiff within 14 days and from the defendants within 14 days thereafter. --- Justice Edward P. Belobaba Date: March 15, 2019

The court addressed costs and interest following a prior judgment on share valuation.

Due to mixed results and the inherent unpredictability of share valuation, the court ordered each party to bear their own costs, including expert fees.

On the issue of interest, the court determined that the discretion to award interest to dissenting shareholders under the Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) was not curtailed by the corporation's ability to pay.

Prejudgment interest was awarded at the prescribed rate of 0.8% from the date of the statutory offer (May 11, 2017) to the date of the judgment, with postjudgment interest thereafter, on the determined share values for the dissenting shareholders.

The plaintiff, Shawn Panacci, brought a motion to certify a class action against Volkswagen and Audi entities concerning an alleged widespread defect in the timing chain mechanism of EA888-type engines in vehicles sold or leased in Canada between 2007 and 2012.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, breach of warranty, unjust enrichment, and waiver of tort, claiming the defect posed a risk of catastrophic engine failure and personal injury.

The court granted certification, finding that the requirements under the Class Proceedings Act were met, including identifiable class, preferable procedure, and suitable representative plaintiff.

However, only three of the six proposed common issues were certified: duty of care and breach of duty of care, breach of express and implied warranties, and the availability of punitive damages.

Claims related to unjust enrichment, waiver of tort (due to lack of predicate liability finding), and aggregate damages (due to need for individualized assessments) were not certified as common issues.

An appeal from a trial judgment in which the trial judge found that an employee, who held the position of Assistant Vice President of Campus Services and Building Operations, had misappropriated nearly one million dollars from York University through various fraudulent schemes between 2007 and 2009.

The employee was terminated without cause and paid a severance package of $696,166 with mutual releases after vehemently denying any wrongdoing.

York subsequently discovered the full extent of the misconduct and sued to rescind the severance agreement and recover the stolen funds.

The trial judge found that the employee had fraudulently misrepresented his innocence and that the claim was not barred by the limitations period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant company sought to fix the fair market value of common shares held by dissenting shareholders who opposed amendments to create convertible preferred shares.

The court rejected the applicant's liquidation approach to valuation, instead valuing the company as an ongoing concern using the discounted cash flow (DCF) method.

The court determined that a three-month time delay in the commencement of projected cash flows was appropriate, balancing the company's straightened financial circumstances with its ongoing viability.

The "en bloc" fair market value was fixed at $12,300,000, resulting in a per share value of $0.304.

The Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) brought a motion to quash an appeal and an application for judicial review filed by the respondent regarding an interlocutory evidentiary ruling.

The respondent had sought to exclude evidence based on solicitor-client privilege, which the OSC hearing panel dismissed.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding that section 9(1) of the Securities Act only permits appeals of final decisions.

The court also quashed the application for judicial review on the basis of prematurity, holding that the case did not present exceptional circumstances warranting interference in an ongoing administrative proceeding.

In a certified class action regarding emissions defeat devices, the parties disagreed on the scheduling of a partial summary judgment motion by the foreign defendants.

The plaintiff sought to delay the motion until after full discoveries, while the defendants sought an early determination to avoid the burden of full production.

The case management judge ordered that the motion proceed prior to discoveries, but directed that the foreign defendants provide expansive disclosure for the motion, which would subsequently form part of the discovery record.

The respondent brought a motion to adjourn the hearing on the merits pending his appeal to the Divisional Court regarding a dismissed motion for a stay based on solicitor-client privilege.

Staff opposed the adjournment, citing its pending motion to quash the appeal.

The Commission found that proceeding with the hearing would not significantly expedite the matter, as the majority of the hearing would occur in September regardless of the outcome of Staff's motion.

The motion to adjourn was granted, and the hearing was rescheduled to September.

The respondent requested that the Commission's reasons dismissing his motion on solicitor-client privilege be kept confidential from the public, arguing that publication would render the claimed privilege moot in the event of an appeal.

The Commission dismissed the request, finding that the open court principle applies and the respondent failed to establish any prejudice, as the reasons did not describe evidence that could fairly be considered legal advice.

The respondent, Benedict Cheng, brought a motion claiming solicitor-client privilege over certain evidence, including memos written by the company's Chief Operating Officer (COO), who was also a licensed lawyer.

The respondent argued that the COO acted as the company's Chief Legal Officer and provided personal legal advice.

The Ontario Securities Commission dismissed the motion, finding that the COO's role was operational, not legal, and that no solicitor-client relationship existed between the COO and the respondent or the company.

Consequently, the communications were not protected by solicitor-client privilege.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission issued a Statement of Allegations against the respondents.

Prior to the hearing on the merits, the respondent brought a motion asserting solicitor-client privilege over certain evidence.

Staff brought a cross-motion to defer the privilege issue to the merits hearing, arguing prematurity and questioning whether a non-merits panel had jurisdiction to make pre-hearing evidentiary rulings.

The Commission held that it has jurisdiction to determine pre-hearing evidentiary issues, including privilege, and that doing so promotes efficiency.

Applying the Mega-C factors, the Commission concluded the privilege motion was discrete, necessary for a fair hearing, and not premature.

Staff's cross-motion was dismissed and the privilege motion was ordered to proceed.

The defendant and plaintiff by counterclaim brought a motion to compel answers to questions refused by the plaintiff and defendants by counterclaim during examinations for discovery.

The underlying action involved the termination of an investment advisor and allegations of false information provided to a regulatory body.

The Master reviewed the refused questions, ordering answers to a few relevant questions while upholding refusals based on relevance, solicitor-client privilege, and overbreadth for the majority.

York University sought security for costs of an appeal brought by Michael Markicevic, who was found at trial to have defrauded York of over $1.8 million and made fraudulent conveyances of property.

Markicevic appealed on two grounds: the validity of a mutual release signed upon his termination and whether York's claims were statute-barred.

The motion judge ordered security for costs of $75,000 under Rule 61.06(1)(c), finding that while the appeal was not frivolous and vexatious, the unchallenged findings of fraud and asset dissipation constituted compelling "other good reason" to order security despite Markicevic's impecuniosity.

Following a trial where the plaintiff university successfully proved that the defendants engaged in fraudulent activities and breached their fiduciary duties, the parties could not agree on costs.

The court awarded the plaintiff full indemnity costs against the primary defendants who orchestrated the fraud, and partial indemnity costs against the defendants involved only in fraudulent conveyances.

No costs were awarded for earlier motions due to divided success.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from a dismissed motion to stay an action.

The defendants, as moving parties, sought to stay the action, but their motion was dismissed with costs to the plaintiff.

The parties failed to agree on the scale and quantum of costs.

The court found the plaintiff's pre-motion offer to settle the motion was reasonable and should have been accepted, while the defendants' post-motion offer was not severable and included extraneous terms.

Consequently, the court awarded the plaintiff costs fixed at $17,800, calculated on a blended partial and substantial indemnity basis.

The defendants moved to stay an action brought by the plaintiff in Ontario, arguing that Ontario lacked jurisdiction simpliciter or was not the convenient forum, proposing Andorra as the appropriate venue.

The dispute concerned entitlement to €400,000 held in escrow under an Escrow Agreement, which contained a non-exclusive choice of law and forum selection clause in favour of Ontario.

The court found the essential nature of the lawsuit was rooted in the Escrow Agreement, which dictated Ontario law and forum.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding no exceptional circumstances to disregard the forum selection clause and that Ontario was the more convenient forum.

The moving party corporation sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion to set aside or stay an interim payment order requiring it to advance legal fees to a former officer facing criminal charges in the United States.

The moving party argued that a recent jury verdict of guilty in the US constituted sufficient evidence of mala fides to overcome the indemnification obligation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, as the US verdict had not yet been entered as a final judgment and the risk of non-repayment did not constitute irreparable harm.

The plaintiff university brought an action against its former Assistant Vice-President and Director of Maintenance, alleging they orchestrated multiple fraudulent schemes, including false invoicing, kickbacks, and using university resources for personal residence improvements.

The court found the defendants liable for fraud and breach of fiduciary duty, ordering them to pay damages.

The court also voided the transfer of the primary defendant's properties to his family members as fraudulent conveyances and rescinded his severance agreement due to material non-disclosure of his fraudulent activities.

Following a successful appeal setting aside a series of ex parte 'investigative receivership' orders, the successful appellants sought costs against both the original applicant and the court-appointed receiver.

The Court of Appeal held that both were liable for costs.

The applicant was liable on a partial indemnity scale because he initiated and supported the proceedings.

The receiver was held personally liable for costs on a substantial indemnity scale because it acted as a 'real litigator' and pursued an impermissibly overreaching roving receivership, losing its objectivity as an officer of the court.

The Court also clarified that substantial indemnity costs are calculated as 1.5 times partial indemnity costs under Rule 1.03, rather than as a percentage of full indemnity costs.