Court File and Parties
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO
RE: 1995636 Ontario Inc. o/a 2B Developments and Lisa Bailey, Plaintiffs
AND
5010729 Ontario Inc. c.o.b. as Astute Capital Group, Astute Group of Companies, Astute Capital and Ashley Shewchuk, Defendants
AND BETWEEN
5010729 Ontario Inc. and Ashley Shewchuk, Plaintiffs by Counterclaim
AND
1995636 Ontario Inc. o/a 2B Developments, Lisa Bailey and Lindsay Michelle Blair, Defendants by Counterclaim
BEFORE: Justice M. Labrosse
COUNSEL: Niklas Holmerg and Jonathan Goode, for the Plaintiffs/Defendants by Counterclaim Leah Mangano and Martin Black, for the Defendants/Plaintiffs by Counterclaim
HEARD: April 10, 2026
ENDORSEMENT
Summary
1On October 24, 2025, the Plaintiffs brought this motion pursuant to Rules 5.02 and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to amend the Statement of Claim to add Martin Z. Black (counsel for the Defendants), Annwyl Shewchuk, and Edward Shewchuk (the parents of the Defendant Ashley Shewchuk) (the “Proposed Defendants”) as parties to the action and to plead that certain funds received by them were trust funds and to make allegations of breach of trust against the Proposed Defendants (the “draft Amended Statement of Claim”).
2On December 3, 2025, the Plaintiffs brought a further motion, a production motion, for an Order striking the Statement of Defence, and in the alternative, compelling the production of bank records and the complete transaction history for the corporate defendant’s primary bank account. In January 2026, the Plaintiffs received the required disclosure in the format requested. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have withdrawn the production motion but they seek the costs of the motion on a substantial indemnity basis. At the same time, as a result of the withdrawal of the production motion, the Defendants claim costs thrown away for the production motion that was premature and should never have been brought because the Plaintiffs already had internet banking records for the account in question and had all the necessary information.
3For the reasons set out herein, the motion by the Plaintiffs to amend and add the Proposed Defendants is denied and the request for costs payable to the Plaintiffs is granted. The amendment to the Statement of Claim and in particular the loss of the Defendants’ counsel of choice will cause non-compensable prejudice to the Defendants in these circumstances which cannot be compensated for by an adjournment or an order for costs. As for the request for costs arising from the production motion, the Plaintiffs are entitled to costs thrown away for a motion properly brought as a result of the inaction/delay of the Defendants to produce the complete set of bank records previously ordered by the court. The issue remains as to the proper amount of those costs.
Factual Background
4These motions form part of a series of disputes relating to certain development and financing agreements involving residential housing development projects.
5The Statement of Claim in CV-22-88932 alleges that the Plaintiff 2B Developments agreed to provide project management and site supervision services for the construction of a residential housing development on Philip St. in the Town of Smith Falls. 2B Developments claims damages against the Defendants in the amount of $469,716.90 and the Plaintiff Bailey claims damages as against the Defendants in the amount of $404,777.90 (the “Main Action”).
6Also part of the Main Action, on or about February 25, 2022, the Defendant 5010729 Ontario Inc. c.o.b. as Astute Capital sold its interest in the Philip St. property and the Plaintiffs claimed that the proceeds of sale are impressed with a trust in favour of the Plaintiffs pursuant to the Construction Act. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have sought an accounting and tracing of the proceeds of sale in the Main Action.
7The Defendants filed a Defence and Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs on May 18, 2022. The Counterclaim seeks damages of $1,000,000 for breaches of trust, fraud and various other relief related to the Phillip St. project.
8The Plaintiffs commenced the Main Action on April 4, 2022. On that same date, the Plaintiffs also started a construction lien action in relation to a property in Lanark County known as the Lanark Project (the “Lanark Action”). On August 21, 2024, the Trial Judge in the Lanark Action released his decision dismissing the action by 2B Developments, awarding damages in the amount of $325,375 to the Defendants 5010729 Ontario Inc. and making credibility findings against the Defendant by Counterclaim and unfavourable findings against the Plaintiff Bailey.
9That decision was upheld by the Divisional Court and the Plaintiffs have now obtained leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
10On April 22, 2022, another action was commenced, this time by Lindsay Michelle Blair and one Dennis Michael O’Connor against 5010729 Ontario Inc., Ashley Shewchuk, Edward Shewchuk, and four other defendants (the “O’Connor Action”). The action against the four other defendants was later dismissed.
112B Developments commenced another action on March 7, 2024 (the “Chambers Action”), against 5010729 Ontario Inc., Ashley Shewchuk and Amber Stratton for an alleged breach of contract or alternatively for civil conspiracy in relation to another planned development project on Chambers Street. 5010729 and Ashley Shewchuk counterclaimed for conversion, fraud and other causes of action.
12Mr. Black has acted as the sole counsel for 5010729, Ashley Shewchuk, Edward Shewchuk and Amber Stratton in all of the aforementioned proceedings since their commencement.
13Discoveries in the Main Action were commenced in October 2023 but were adjourned due to new evidence then recently discovered by Ashley Shewchuk, and to allow the Defendants to bring a motion to amend their Defence and Counterclaim. Then, there was an order for the O’Connor Action and the Chambers Action to be transferred from Perth to Ottawa, therefore, the O’Connor Action, the Chambers Action and this Philip Action could be case managed by this Court, and tried by another trial judge, one after the other.
14Over the past 2½ years, affidavits of documents were exchanged in the three actions, consisting of many thousands of pages. In September 2025, Lisa Bailey, Lindsay Blair, Ashley Shewchuk and Dennis O’Connor were examined for discovery in the three actions, over a total of four days, and many undertakings were given by all of the witnesses.
15The Plaintiffs in the Main Action now seek to amend their Statement of Claim. The draft Amended Statement of Claim alleges that the Plaintiffs became aware in September 2025 that in February 2022, the Proposed Defendants each received funds from the corporate bank account of 5010729 which were proceeds from the sale of the Philip St. property and which constituted trust funds pursuant to the Construction Act. The Plaintiffs plead that the Proposed Defendants each committed a breach of trust through their knowing receipt of the proceeds of sale from the Philip St. property.
16On October 24, 2025, the Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Motion which included the draft Amended Statement of Claim in the Main Action. Following the service of the Notice of Motion, the Plaintiffs claim that Mr. Black raised for the first time, a limitations defence to the alleged knowing of the breach of trust claim. As a result, the Plaintiffs issued a fresh Statement of Claim on November 6, 2025, bearing Court File No. CV-25-101853, to preserve their rights (the “Trust Claim”). Within the Trust Claim, all of the same claims are made as they propose to make in the draft Amended Statement of Claim.
17The Trust Claim was stayed by this court pending the hearing of this motion.
18In response to the motion for the Amended Statement of Claim, the Proposed Defendants have provided affidavit evidence of the desire for the Proposed Defendants to continue to be represented by Mr. Black. While the Plaintiffs challenged that evidence, it is not really disputed. The Shewchuks were present during the motion and they did not disagree with that evidence.
19The evidence is that over the years, the Shewchuk’s personally or through their related companies, other than 5010729, have paid legal fees to Mr. Black in excess of $250,000. Mr. Black’s representation of the Shewchuks and their related companies has been long-standing and intertwined in a number of business relationships.
20Prior to bringing the production motion, the Plaintiffs advised Mr. Black that they did not consider the web-based banking statements as being a proper response to the court’s order to produce a complete transaction history of 5010729’s primary bank account. This transaction history was eventually provided on January 23, 2026, after the production motion was served and filed. Both parties seek their costs in relation to the production motion.
Applicable Law
Addition of a Party
21Rule 5.04(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits the Court to add a party to an action unless prejudice would result that cannot be compensated by costs or an adjournment. The determination of whether to add a party remains a discretionary one: see 1734934 Ontario Inc. v. Tortoise Restaurant Group Inc., 2022 ONCA 528 at para. 11.
22The criteria for adding a party to an action were set out by the Court in Plante v. Industrial Alliance Life Insurance Co., 2003 CanLII 64295 (ON SC), 2003, 66 O.R. (3d) 74 at para. 27:
a. The proposed amendments must meet all of the criteria under rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure;
b. The addition of a party should “arise out of the same transaction or occurrence”, should have a question of law or fact in common, or should promote the convenient administration of justice;
c. The addition of a party should not unduly delay or complicate a hearing or cause undue prejudice to the other party; and
d. The addition of a party will not be permitted if it is shown to be an abuse of process.
Amendments to Pleadings
23Rule 26.01 deals with amendments to pleadings and reads as follows:
On motion at any stage of an action the court shall grant leave to amend a pleading on such terms as are just, unless prejudice would result that could not be compensated for by costs or an adjournment.
24The law regarding leave to amend motions is well developed and the general principles were summarized in 1588444 Ontario Ltd. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co. 2017 ONCA 42 at p. 25.:
− The rule requires the court to grant leave to amend unless the responding party would suffer non-compensable prejudice; the amended pleadings are scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court's process; or the pleading discloses no reasonable cause of action;
− The amendment may be permitted at any stage of the action;
− There must be a causal connection between the non-compensable prejudice and the amendment. In other words, the prejudice must flow from the amendments and not from some other source;
− The non-compensable prejudice may be actual prejudice, i.e., evidence that the responding party has lost an opportunity in the litigation that cannot be compensated as a consequence of the amendment. Where such prejudice is alleged, specific details must be provided;
− At some point, the delay in seeking an amendment will be so lengthy, and the justification so inadequate, that prejudice to the responding party will be presumed;
− The onus to prove actual prejudice lies with the responding party.
− The onus to rebut presumed prejudice lies with the moving party.
(internal citations omitted)
25Litigants are entitled to their choice of counsel. However, the removal of a lawyer is not automatic in circumstances where there is a risk of conflict and where alternatives are available. As such, Courts should be hesitant to prevent a party from exercising their right to counsel. Where possible, such a decision should be deferred until it is necessary: see Royal Bank of Canada v. Bouzios, 2019 ONSC 3625 at para. 10.
26At the same time, there is no dispute that the right to counsel is not absolute and that no counsel is irreplaceable. The interests of justice will normally prevail and this is determined on a case-by-case basis.
Analysis
Addition of the Proposed Defendants and Amendment to the Pleading
27This motion not only focuses on the issue of the non-compensable prejudice but also on the interests of justice. The parties have spent much time to try to influence the bona fides nature of the other party’s position and they have failed to convince me that these numerous accusations back and forth should have any persuasive effect on this decision but they have still been considered. I highlight the following with a few conclusory statements:
a. I am not persuaded by the argument that the Plaintiffs present this motion with unclean hands. While the conclusions of the trial judge in the Lanark action speak for themselves, it has not been shown that the Plaintiffs have improper motive in the motion to add the Proposed Defendants. The status of the funds, resulting from the sale of the Philip St. property are pleaded in the Main Action and the allegation that they are trust funds and that a tracing is required are part of the Main Action. The issue of the status of the sale proceeds is a legitimate issue that requires adjudication.
b. There is no dispute that Mr. Black received funds from the company to pay legal fees in this ongoing dispute that is surely very costly and for which a significant amount of legal fees have been incurred by both parties. A determination must be made to know if he received trust funds. I am of the view that the requested amendment is not brought with the ulterior motive of requiring Mr. Black to be removed as counsel for the Defendants. That fact is a consequence of the motion which targets someone who may have received trust funds.
c. I draw no inference on the advance notice given to the Proposed Defendant that the sale proceeds were trust funds, and the failure of the Proposed Defendants to have paid the funds into trust. There is clearly a dispute as to the status of those proceeds of sale and the Proposed Defendants have made a decision to live by the results of this motion, as opposed to taking the safe option of simply paying the funds into trust. I do not, however, make any negative inference against the Proposed Defendants who received the funds which were disputed to be trust funds.
d. I draw no conclusions as to which potential defendants the Plaintiffs have chosen to name in the draft Amended Statement of Claim. It is not for me to determine if other individuals may be liable in respect of the trust funds, and also if those other potential defendants ought to have been named as defendants in the draft Amended Statement of Claim or the Trust Claim. These are litigation choices made by the Plaintiffs and from my perspective they do not reflect potential bad faith in failing to name all potential defendants. There is no doubt that the issues of delay and complexity of the proceedings may have been enhanced by adding parties who were not already involved either directly or indirectly in the Main Action.
28The focus of my decision acknowledges a statement made by the Plaintiffs’ counsel: this is a simple motion with extraordinary consequences. The loss of one’s counsel of choice is not a consequence that should be minimized or otherwise overlooked. While the right to counsel is potentially viewed differently in other areas of the law, such as criminal law, the circumstances of this case raise that factor to a significant level while understanding that the right to counsel is not absolute.
29There is a multiplicity of proceedings that have been commenced which originate from the business relationships of the various related parties. The one person who appears to have been involved at all levels of the litigation is Mr. Black. I am of the view that Mr Black’s litigation knowledge of the proceedings is exceptional and also very important to the Defendants’ proper defence and prosecution of the Counterclaim.
30While I appreciate that Mr. Black would remain a party to the litigation as a co-defendant in the Main Action, it is clearly not the same as having him continue his role as counsel and be able to continue to advise the Defendants. As a co-defendant, his interest may not always align with those of the other defendants.
31In addition, I consider the challenge of instructing new counsel who becomes involved in this proceeding, at roughly the halfway stage, after the pleadings have been completed (subject to this motion), document production is also complete and the parties are partly through examinations for discovery. In the context of Mr. Black’s role in this litigation and his far-reaching knowledge of the dealings between the parties, the prejudice to the Defendants of having to start over with new counsel and lose the benefit of Mr. Black’s litigation knowledge is a prejudice that cannot be compensated either by way of an adjournment or by costs. This is due to the complex and intertwined nature of the litigation. In this case, delay may allow new counsel to try to get up to speed but delay will also bring prejudice to this litigation that has already been ongoing for some time. It will complicate the pleadings as to the number of parties and the potential number of counsel who must become involved. It will likely require that the parties start over with examinations for discovery and will further complicate the trial. On this last point, the issues raised in the Trust Claim clearly overlap with the Main Action. This is understandable as the goal was to protect against a limitation defence. They are the logical extension to the issues in the Main Action. However, the Trust Claim is contingent on the findings in the Main Action.
32I am not able to imagine any type of relief that would have the effect of placing the Defendants back in the position they are in today following the removal of Mr. Black. I am clearly influenced by the fact that the Trust Claim is available to deal with the result in the Main Action without having to disrupt the course of the Main Action. The removal of Mr. Black as counsel will also impact the other actions. To have Mr. Black removed as counsel at this stage will impact those other proceedings, although those other proceedings do not play a significant part of this decision. What is more relevant is Mr. Black’s knowledge of this litigation in the context of all those other business transactions. There is no doubt that the issue of delay will certainly be felt across the board.
33In this case, the prejudice to the Defendants flows from the proposed amendment to add Mr. Black as a party. The loss of the opportunity to have Mr. Black and his extensive litigation knowledge remain as counsel is clearly causally connected to the proposed amendment. The knowledge that Mr. Black has accumulated through years of hard-fought litigation is not easily replaced. It is not only the knowledge from this action, but from the others listed above. It would be deeply prejudicial to the Defendants to lose the benefit of that knowledge, which they have paid for in time and money. The interests of justice calls for the court to explore other options.
34The court must also consider the overall question of delay that simply bringing in the Shewchuks into this litigation will cause. Until there is a finding that the funds were trust funds and that payment is not available from the existing Defendants, the Schewchuks have no role in this litigation. In large part, the same can be said of Mr. Black. His role as a defendant does not exist until such time as the funds are declared trust funds and a judgment is not paid by the Defendants.
35In balancing the interests of the parties, it is clear that the addition of the Proposed Defendants will cause delay in the action, require a return to the pleadings stage and the appointment of counsel for Mr. Black and for Mr. and Mrs. Shewchuk along with new counsel for the other Defendants. It is unclear if the same lawyer can act for all defendants.
36It is within the consideration of delay to the action that I consider the circumstances of the amendments, being to obtain a determination of the breach of trust. In that vein, it is relevant that the Main Action, as presently pleaded, is already seeking findings that the funds received by the Defendants from the sale of the Philips St. property were trust funds and the claim already seeks an order that the Plaintiffs are entitled to trace the monies that were paid out by the Defendants. The Main Action can proceed to adjudication without the participation of the Proposed Defendants.
37When I consider what will be left to decide in the subsequent Trust Action, if it proceeds after this action, those issues will be limited. It is likely that the Main Action as pleaded may end up determining all or almost all of the issues to decide in the Trust Action.
38The refusal of the amendments in favour of allowing the Trust Action to simply proceed after this Main Action will cause limited prejudice to the Plaintiffs. I disagree that it will unnecessarily prolong the litigation and I do not agree that it will add to the overall costs of the litigation. It is the addition of the Proposed Defendants, the return to the pleadings stage and the need for new counsel that will cause the most delay and increase in costs.
39At this point, the Main Action can proceed to deal with the bulk of the issues including the determination of the status of the proceeds of sale as trust funds. If the Trust Action is separate from the Main Action, this remains unaffected. While the purpose of the Trust Action may have been to counter a limitation defence, it now serves the dual purpose of preserving the Plaintiffs’ rights against the Proposed Defendants. Depending on the result in the Main Action, the Trust Action may be mute.
40While the plaintiffs have argued that the loss of counsel is not the type of prejudice that is viewed as non-compensable, in this case, I disagree. The notion of non-compensable prejudice has been interpreted as being when a party loses an opportunity in the litigation. I cannot see how the loss of Mr. Black as counsel for the Defendants and for the Schewchucks would not be a loss of opportunity given the complicated and intertwined litigation history of these matters. There is also non-compensable prejudice which includes unnecessary delay to the Main Action if the amendment is allowed. In addition, the Trust Action is preserving the Plaintiffs’ rights against the Proposed Defendants and the Main Action will already be dealing with the question of determining if these are trust funds. In this case, the interests of justice fall in favour of the Defendants to allow Mr. Black to remain as counsel for the Defendants and have the Main Action proceed to adjudication as this may address much of the dispute between the parties. The interest of justice is to have the Main Action proceed to adjudication to determine the status of the funds from the sale of the Philips St. project.
41The Trust Action can easily proceed promptly after the Main Action with some effective case management. To allow the Trust Action to proceed after the Main Action will allow for the most expeditious adjudication of the matter. It may not even be necessary to have a trial on the Trust Action. The liability of the Proposed Defendants is contingent on the necessary findings being made in the Main Action to establish that they were trust funds. Further, the parties could agree that the findings in the Main Action will be binding on the Trust Action.
42Finally, if the Plaintiffs want to lift the stay of the Trust Action and proceed with the documentary production and discoveries in the Trust Action, that option can be explored. It was proposed by Mr. Black as a possible solution to ensure that there is as little delay as possible in proceeding with the Trust Action after adjudication of the Main Action. That issue was not fully explored before me. I shall remain seized of that issue if the parties cannot otherwise agree.
43It is noteworthy that no party argued if the amendment concerning the Schewchuks should be allowed on its own. If this is an alternate remedy sought by the Plaintiffs, the parties may seek to re-attend to address that point or they may otherwise agree.
44Accordingly, the motion to amend and add the Proposed Defendants is dismissed.
Claim for costs from withdrawn production motion
45Turning now to the Plaintiffs’ claim for costs from the withdrawn production motion, the analysis begins with the original Order for production made by this court on April 11, 2025. There, it was ordered that the Defendants shall, within 30 days, produce unredacted, and complete copies of the documents listed in Schedule B. Schedule B then refers to a complete and unredacted copy of the transaction history of account number 5215.
46The Plaintiffs claim that a complete and accurate copy of the transaction history in question was not delivered until January 23, 2026. By that date, the Defendant returned to the bank to get the full “Financial Enquiry” that had previously been produced in part, and the Plaintiffs then withdrew the production motion.
47The Defendants claim that the full copy of the bank records in question was provided to the Plaintiffs on August 5, 2025. It is important to note that the deficient productions that were ordered related to a transaction history produced by TD Bank being a document titled “Financial Enquiry.” The document produced on August 5, 2025 is a web-based document that the Defendants claim includes all of the transactions relating to that bank account. However, it is clear that it is a web-based document likely generated by the account holder from an application and not a printout generated by TD Bank.
48I am unable to determine if all of the transactions which form part of the web-based document are identical to the full transaction history provided on January 23, 2026. In addition, it is not up to the Defendants to be searching through this document to determine if it is identical to the incomplete Financial Enquiry produced by TD Bank.
49The order made on April 11, 2025 required the Defendants to produce unredacted and complete copies of the documents listed in Schedule B. That required a complete transaction history for account 5215 and the starting point for that document was the original production which was in the form of a Financial Enquiry produced by TD Bank. That document had missing pages and was incomplete, but was in a format produced by TD Bank. When looking at the web-based document produced in August 2025, that document appears to come from an application through the account holder and it would then have been left to the Plaintiffs to review that document, line by line, to ensure consistency with the incomplete Financial Enquiry that was previously provided.
50The Plaintiffs would then have been left to question if the missing pages that were now part of the web-based document were complete and unaltered. It was not for the Plaintiffs to have to do this, and in my view, the production of the complete document as ordered required that it be done in the same format as the Financial Enquiry originally produced.
51It is also important to note that the Defendants were put on notice that the Plaintiffs were not accepting the web-based document and that they required the transaction history to be produced in the same format as the incomplete TD Bank Financial Enquiry originally given. While the Plaintiffs could have gone line by line to make sure that the web-based document was the same as the original format, it could not do so with the missing pages. As such, it was not unreasonable to require the complete transaction history to be provided in the same format as the Financial Enquiry obtained from TD Bank.
52Clearly, that format of the document was available had the Plaintiffs gone to the bank and sought it directly from TD Bank at the outset rather than simply printing out a web-based document that does not come directly from a bank printout. The Defendants chose to ignore the Plaintiff’s requests. Accordingly, I am of the view that the Plaintiffs incurred unnecessary costs in having to bring a motion for the proper production of the incomplete banking records, and that the Defendants are liable to reimburse the Plaintiffs for a portion of those costs.
53When looking at the amount of cost claimed by the Plaintiffs for the production motion, they have provided a Cost Outline which sets out the total cost requested at the substantial indemnity rate being $8257.19. The corresponding rate at the partial indemnity rate is $5504.80.
54When I consider the cost outline provided, I note that four different lawyers worked on the production motion, being a motion to enforce a production order. It was a simple motion. Further, I am of the view that the time spent was high. In addition, rates being charged are not rates that are comparable to the rates typically charged in Ottawa. In my view, these rates should be subject to a downward adjustment when considering the difference in rates between Ottawa and Toronto. Finally, when considering the scale of cost, I am of the view that the default is partial indemnity. In this case, the court would have to find grounds pursuant to Rule 57 that would warrant a higher scale of cost. Specifically, I am of the view that there is not either bad faith or unreasonable conduct that would warrant a higher scale of costs. No other basis was suggested for an award of substantial indemnity costs. The proper scale of cost is partial indemnity.
55The Court of Appeal in Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario 2004 CanLII 14579 articulated the principles that govern costs assessments. The overall objective is to fix an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular circumstances of the case, rather than an amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant: see Boucher at para 26.
56As stated, a downward adjustment from the Cost Outline is required from the standard partial indemnity amount. In this case of costs thrown away, I am of the view that the proper amount of cost thrown away from the production motion on a partial indemnity basis should be $4,000.00 inclusive of taxes and disbursement.
Conclusion
57For the reasons set out herein, the Plaintiffs’ motion to amend the Statement of Claim and to add the Proposed Defendants is dismissed. I will remain seized of the lifting of the stay for the Trust Action as required if a party seeks to have it proceed through the discovery stage. Finally, with respect to the cost thrown away from the production motion, the Defendants shall pay cost to the Plaintiffs fixed in the amount of $4000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements and payable within 30 days.
Costs
58The parties are encouraged to resolve the costs for these motions. If they do not agree, they may submit written cost submissions within thirty (30) days of this decision, with a right of reply within (15) fifteen days. Costs submissions to be a maximum of four pages plus attachments.
Justice M. Labrosse
Date: June 26, 2026
CITATION: 1995636 Ontario Inc. et al v. 5010729 Ontario Inc. et al, 2026 ONSC 3723
COURT FILE NO.: CV-22-88932
DATE: 2026/06/26
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
RE: 1995636 Ontario Inc. o/a 2B Developments and Lisa Bailey, Plaintiffs
AND
5010729 Ontario Inc. c.o.b. as Astute Capital Group, Astute Group of Companies, Astute Capital and Ashley Shewchuk, Defendants
AND BETWEEN
5010729 Ontario Inc. and Ashley Shewchuk, Plaintiffs by Counterclaim
AND
1995636 Ontario Inc. o/a 2B Developments, Lisa Bailey and Lindsay Michelle Blair, Defendants by Counterclaim
BEFORE: Justice M. Labrosse
COUNSEL: Jonathan Goode and Niklas Holmerg, for the Plaintiffs Leah Mangano and Martin Black, for the Defendants
ENDORSEMENT
Justice M. Labrosse
Released: June 26, 2026