Megan Savard

Prior to a jury trial for sexual assault, the defence brought several evidentiary motions.

The defence sought to exclude evidence of the accused's prior sexual communications with a complainant, renew an application for severance of counts, and exclude a PowerPoint presentation prepared by the Crown's expert witness on the neurobiology of trauma.

The court admitted the communications evidence, finding it essential to the narrative and the Crown's similar fact application.

The court dismissed the renewed severance application, concluding the accused's intention to testify did not undermine the viability of the similar fact evidence.

The court permitted the expert to use the PowerPoint presentation with specific modifications to prevent prejudice.

Finally, the court expanded the opening jury instructions to address nonconscious bias and false assumptions regarding consent.

The appellant, C.S., sought bail pending appeal after being convicted of sexual interference, possession of child pornography, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and assault, receiving a six-year sentence.

The appeal challenges both conviction and sentence, primarily arguing that the trial judge failed to adequately consider the appellant's significant intellectual disability when assessing the voluntariness of his police statements, his credibility, and as a mitigating factor in sentencing.

The Crown conceded the public interest and surrender criteria for bail, leaving only the "not frivolous" test.

The Court of Appeal found that the appellant's grounds of appeal, which included the trial judge's discounting of uncontradicted expert evidence regarding the appellant's low IQ and vulnerability to manipulation, were not frivolous.

The court noted that if successful, these arguments could affect the trial outcome or sentence.

Consequently, bail pending appeal was granted.

In a prosecution for sexual assault and sexual interference, the court ruled on several pre-trial applications.

The court permitted a challenge for cause based on pre-trial publicity.

The court excluded proposed evidence from a former bandmate regarding a masturbation video and a statement about degradation, finding the prejudicial effect outweighed the probative value.

The court also excluded similar fact evidence from a prior sexual partner regarding sexual urination.

Finally, the court permitted the Crown to call an expert witness to testify about the basic neurobiology of trauma to dispel myths and stereotypes, but restricted the expert from applying that science specifically to the context of sexual assault.

The appellant, Garrett Gauthier, appealed his convictions for accessing, possessing, making available, and making child pornography.

The appeal raised issues regarding the admissibility and scope of expert evidence on Skype technology, the trial judge's application of the legal test for third-party suspects (allegedly reversing the burden of proof), and misapprehension of evidence concerning Skype syncing and opportunity.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in failing to limit the scope of the expert's testimony regarding Skype, misapplied the third-party suspect framework, and misapprehended evidence, leading to a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed, a new trial was ordered for the accessing, making available, and making child pornography counts, and an acquittal was entered for the possession count due to insufficient admissible evidence of knowledge.

The Crown brought a motion to summarily dismiss the responding parties' application for disclosure under s. 683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The responding parties sought disclosure of alleged out-of-court communications between the trial judge and an FBI handler, which were referenced in a book published by an undercover agent, to support a reasonable apprehension of bias claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the Crown's motion, finding it premature to conclude the bias claim could not succeed, and ordered the Crown to make further inquiries regarding the alleged communications.

The appellant Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal overturned terrorism convictions and ordered a new trial on the basis that the jury was improperly constituted due to a jury selection error.

The trial judge had erred by refusing to exercise his common law discretion to exclude prospective jurors while using rotating triers, instead imposing static triers against the respondents' preferred procedure.

The Supreme Court confirmed the jury was improperly constituted but held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code can apply to cure jury selection errors.

The Court interpreted 'jurisdiction over the class of offence' to refer solely to the statutory jurisdictional capacity of the trial court to try the relevant class of offence, not to whether the jury was properly constituted.

Finding no prejudice to either respondent because the static triers procedure was a Parliament-sanctioned method and was implemented with care and attention, the Court restored the convictions and remitted the remaining grounds of appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession for the purposes of trafficking cocaine and failure to comply with conditions of a recognizance.

The appellant was stopped for a non-functional licence plate light, during which the officer detected the odour of burnt marijuana.

Following the discovery of a small amount of marijuana in a grinder, the appellant was arrested.

A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed 172 grams of cocaine hidden under the hood.

The appellant challenged the legality of the arrest and search on Charter grounds, arguing violations of sections 8 and 10 rights.

The trial judge rejected these arguments and convicted the appellant based on circumstantial evidence of knowledge and control.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the officer's actions reasonable and the search lawful as incident to arrest.

The appellant appealed a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence imposed on March 21, 2012.

The appellant, who suffered from brain damage from meningitis, borderline personality disorder, borderline intellectual functioning, and dysthymia, was self-represented during a complex dangerous offender hearing.

The Court of Appeal found that the proceeding was procedurally unfair due to multiple cumulative deficiencies: the failure to inquire whether the appellant wished to retain counsel despite facing severe jeopardy; the failure to conduct a fitness inquiry despite clear indicia that the appellant may not have been mentally present; the failure of amicus curiae to adequately protect the appellant's interests, including by conceding admissibility of psychiatric records and ultimately advocating in favour of the dangerous offender finding; and the failure to explore meaningful alternatives such as video linking to keep the appellant informed when she was absent from court.

The Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new hearing.

The appellants were convicted of terrorism-related offences including conspiracy to commit murder for the benefit of a terrorist group and participating in terrorist activity.

On appeal, the appellants challenged the jury selection procedure used at trial.

The trial judge erroneously held that he lacked common law discretion to exclude unsworn jurors while using rotating triers to determine challenges for cause, and instead ordered the use of static triers with all jurors excluded.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's error deprived the appellants of their statutory right to rotating triers with unsworn jurors excluded, resulting in an improperly constituted jury.

The curative proviso could not be applied to remedy this fundamental procedural error.

The Crown appealed after the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial for an accused convicted of sexual interference.

The Crown had relied on the complainant's pregnancy as corroborating evidence of the assault, while the application judge had dismissed the accused's s. 276 application to cross-examine the complainant on other possible causes of the pregnancy.

The majority held that both the application judge and the trial judge erred, but applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) on the basis that the cross-examination that actually occurred allowed the defence to adequately test the Crown's evidence.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, holding that the restriction on cross-examination deprived the accused of an entire process of questioning and that the errors were neither minor nor harmless.

The defendant, Ari Da Costa, brought a mistrial application during his jury trial for first-degree murder, arguing that his right to a fair trial was irreparably compromised due to an eleventh-hour change in opinion by a key Crown forensic psychiatrist, Dr. Klassen.

Dr. Klassen, initially a Crown witness who did not support an NCR defence, provisionally changed his diagnosis to schizophrenia after reviewing extensive new records.

The court found that this significant change in expert opinion, coupled with the necessity of a lengthy adjournment to allow Dr. Klassen to finalize his report, would unduly prejudice the defendant by making it impossible for the jury to retain the nuances of the defence expert testimony.

The court granted the mistrial application, emphasizing the paramount importance of a fundamentally fair trial.

The accused, charged with sexual offences, sought access to psychiatric reports about the complainant, which were unsealed exhibits in earlier, unrelated criminal proceedings.

The Ontario Court of Justice denied access, requiring a production application under s. 278.3(1) of the Criminal Code, finding the complainant retained a privacy interest.

The accused applied for certiorari to quash this order.

The Superior Court found that the complainant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the reports, given they were discussed in open court and filed as unsealed exhibits.

The court held that the Dagenais/Mentuck standard for access to court records applied, not the s. 278.1 regime, and granted the certiorari application, ordering the release of the reports to the accused.

This is a youth criminal justice matter involving a defence application regarding the proper procedure for using materials obtained from a parallel civil proceeding.

The defence sought a ruling that counsel was properly in possession of materials the complainant produced in civil litigation and that the section 278 Criminal Code regime did not apply.

The Crown objected to cross-examination questions based on medical records obtained through civil discovery.

The Superior Court had previously found a breach of the deemed undertaking rule when civil counsel provided the materials to defence counsel without prior judicial oversight.

The trial judge determined that the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Shearing applied, permitting the defence to proceed with cross-examination on documents already in its possession, subject to admissibility considerations.

The applicants challenged three Part VI authorizations to intercept private communications, arguing a lack of reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied almost entirely on unproven tipsters, lacked sufficient detail and corroboration, and contained misleading information regarding applicant travel.

The court also found that investigative necessity was not established as other reasonable investigative methods were not adequately explored.

Consequently, the authorizations were deemed invalid, and the intercepted communications were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The person sought in extradition proceedings applied for disclosure of the United States indictment at the committal stage.

The Attorney General argued that disclosure was premature because extradition judges determine committal based solely on the record of the case and the indictment would be disclosed later at the surrender stage.

The court held that while jurisprudence does not require disclosure of the indictment at the committal phase, it does not prohibit it.

Because the indictment was necessary for the person sought to understand the full jeopardy faced in the requesting state and to make informed decisions about consenting to committal, surrender, or waiving extradition under the Extradition Act, withholding it would undermine those statutory rights and violate principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Attorney General was ordered to disclose the indictment with the condition that it not be used to challenge committal.