Megan Savard

In a youth criminal prosecution, the defence obtained medical records relating to the complainant through a parallel civil proceeding and sought to use them for impeachment during cross‑examination.

The Crown objected and argued the defence must bring a production application under ss. 278.1–278.9 of the Criminal Code because the materials were improperly disclosed following a breach of the civil deemed undertaking rule.

The court held that the s. 278 regime governs compelled production of records not already in the possession of the accused.

Applying the Supreme Court’s decision in Shearing, the court found the defence’s existing possession of the documents meant the statutory production scheme did not apply.

Questions regarding admissibility and privacy interests would instead be addressed in the ordinary evidentiary analysis at trial.

This is a youth criminal justice matter involving a defence application regarding the proper procedure for using materials obtained from a parallel civil proceeding.

The defence sought a ruling that counsel was properly in possession of materials the complainant produced in civil litigation and that the section 278 Criminal Code regime did not apply.

The Crown objected to cross-examination questions based on medical records obtained through civil discovery.

The Superior Court had previously found a breach of the deemed undertaking rule when civil counsel provided the materials to defence counsel without prior judicial oversight.

The trial judge determined that the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Shearing applied, permitting the defence to proceed with cross-examination on documents already in its possession, subject to admissibility considerations.

The applicants challenged three Part VI authorizations to intercept private communications, arguing a lack of reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied almost entirely on unproven tipsters, lacked sufficient detail and corroboration, and contained misleading information regarding applicant travel.

The court also found that investigative necessity was not established as other reasonable investigative methods were not adequately explored.

Consequently, the authorizations were deemed invalid, and the intercepted communications were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant, aged 21, engaged in a sexual relationship with a 15-year-old complainant.

He was convicted of sexual touching and sexual assault, as the age difference precluded the defence of consent under s. 150.1 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding s. 150.1 violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal court set aside the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that s. 150.1 is not overbroad and does not violate s. 7 of the Charter, as its purpose is to protect children from sexual contact with adults due to inherent power imbalances.

The appeal was dismissed.

The person sought in extradition proceedings applied for disclosure of the United States indictment at the committal stage.

The Attorney General argued that disclosure was premature because extradition judges determine committal based solely on the record of the case and the indictment would be disclosed later at the surrender stage.

The court held that while jurisprudence does not require disclosure of the indictment at the committal phase, it does not prohibit it.

Because the indictment was necessary for the person sought to understand the full jeopardy faced in the requesting state and to make informed decisions about consenting to committal, surrender, or waiving extradition under the Extradition Act, withholding it would undermine those statutory rights and violate principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Attorney General was ordered to disclose the indictment with the condition that it not be used to challenge committal.

The appellant appealed two first degree murder convictions arising from a motel room shooting, arguing that the principal eyewitness identification evidence should have been excluded, that defence expert evidence on identification frailties should have been admitted, and that the jury charge on identification was inadequate.

The court held that the eyewitness evidence was fully testable through the adversarial process and did not create the kind of prejudice that would justify exclusion.

The court declined to revisit existing authority limiting general expert evidence on the frailties of eyewitness identification and upheld the trial judge’s conclusion that the proposed opinion evidence was unnecessary.

Reading the charge as a whole, the court found the jury was adequately cautioned about the dangers of identification evidence, including the limits of witness confidence, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, a real estate agent and his co-accused, were convicted of conspiracy to produce marijuana and related offences.

During the trial, the trial judge interrupted the Crown's cross-examination of the real estate agent to ask if he knew what perjury was and suggested his counsel advise him on its consequences.

The appellants appealed, arguing this intervention created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge's comments indicated he had prejudged the accused's credibility before hearing all evidence, fatally compromising the fairness of the trial for both accused.

The appeals were allowed and new trials ordered.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing that the trial judge erred in principle by rejecting a joint submission on sentence.

The trial judge had added an additional year of driving prohibition and community service, stating the joint submission was 'getting close' to being contrary to the public interest.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge applied the incorrect legal test and failed to properly consider the factors underlying the joint submission, including forfeited money, triable issues, and full restitution.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to reflect the joint submission of 35 days custody (after pre-trial credit) and a one-year driving prohibition.