REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Issue

[1] Ms. Reid-Taylor has brought a motion seeking a final order that she be permitted to relocate to Nova Scotia with the parties’ five-year-old son, G. If allowed to do so, she submits that Mr. Vecchio can parent G.:

i. during the entirety of each summer school break;

ii. during the entirety of each school Christmas break;

iii. during the entirety of each school March/spring break;

iv. each long weekend in the year, on a specific schedule to be arranged, as well as further and other parenting time as can be agreed upon.

[2] Mr. Vecchio asks that Ms. Reid-Taylor's motion be dismissed.

[3] Both parties agree that they should share decision-making authority regarding G. Although both parties made submissions on parenting terms depending on whether the move was allowed, during argument, they also agreed that I need not concern myself with that issue or any other related issue such as child support. They seek a determination of the relocation issue and will then attempt to resolve any other outstanding issues or return to court.

[4] Ms. Reid-Taylor acknowledges in her factum that:

It is undeniable that this is a difficult case on the facts. Neither party denies that the other party is a loving and capable parent. Neither party denies that significant ongoing contact between G. and the other parent is in G.'s best interests.

The Background

[5] Much of the background is not in dispute. To both counsel’s credit, this motion was argued based on affidavits without viva voce evidence or cross-examinations. I am satisfied that I have sufficient evidence to make my determinations.

[6] Ms. Reid-Taylor presently resides in Guelph, Ontario. She is 30 years old. Mr. Vecchio also lives in Guelph. He is 40 years old. The parties have one child together, G., aged five, born January 4, 2018.

[7] The parties moved in together in December of 2017, when Ms. Reid-Taylor was approximately eight months pregnant with G.

[8] The parties separated in or about July of 2018, but both continued to reside separate and apart in Ms. Reid-Taylor’s home for the purpose of coparenting G. On August 1, 2019, the parties separated on a full and final basis, after a brief attempt to reconcile in or about February of 2019. At the time of separation, G. remained in the home and Mr. Vecchio moved out.

[9] Ms. Reid-Taylor has since re-partnered and is now married to Mr. Bakker. They have one child together, one year old R., born October 6, 2022. R. and G. have resided together since R.'s birth.

[10] Mr. Vecchio does not have any other children. He is presently in a relationship that has lasted about a year, although the couple have known each other for about four years.

[11] Since approximately March 2020, G. has been cared for four days a week by Ms. Reid-Taylor, and three days a week by Mr. Vecchio on the following schedule:

(a) G. is in Mr. Vecchio's care each week from Sunday at 9:00 a.m. until Wednesday at 9:00 a.m.; G. is in Ms. Reid-Taylor's care each week from Wednesday at 3:00 p.m. until Sunday at 9:00 a.m. If there is an emergency at school during the day on Wednesday, Ms. Reid-Taylor is responsible for G.'s care;

(b) During the summer months of July and August, G. is in Mr. Vecchio's care from Saturday afternoon to Tuesday morning.

[12] Both parties have a background in farming. Ms. Reid-Taylor has long aspired to live rurally and operate a small-scale farming business. The parties met in their agricultural education program, worked on farms together, and often discussed Ms. Reid-Taylor‘s future plans. Mr. Vecchio had previously shared this aspiration.

[13] Ms. Reid-Taylor says that she and Mr. Bakker have struggled to afford life in Ontario, particularly with the birth of their second child. They have purchased an 18-acre farm property in Nova Scotia with a four-bedroom farmhouse on it. They have sold their home in Guelph. They provided Mr. Vecchio with notice under the relevant legislation and Mr. Vecchio has served his notice disputing their plan.

Authorities

[14] The Children's Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.12 (the “CLRA”) confirms at s.24 that in making a parenting order or contact order with respect to a child, the court shall only take into account the best interests of the child.

[15] In determining the best interests of a child, the court shall consider all factors related to the circumstances of the child, and, in doing so, shall give primary consideration to the child’s physical, emotional, and psychological safety, security and well-being (CLRA, s.24(2)).

[16] Factors related to the circumstances of a child include: (CLRA, s.24(3))

(a) the child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability;

(b) the nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life;

(c) each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent;

(d) the history of care of the child;

(e) the child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained;

(f) the child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing, and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage;

(g) any plans for the child’s care;

(h) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child;

(i) the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child;

(j) any family violence and its impact on, among other things,

(i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and

(ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child; and

(k) any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.

[17] In determining whether to authorize the relocation of a child, the court must take into account the best interests of the child in accordance with the above as well as (CLRA, s.39.4(3)),

(a) the reasons for the relocation;

(b) the impact of the relocation on the child;

(c) the amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child, and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons;

(d) whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement;

(e) the existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside;

(f) the reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses; and

(g) whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time or is an applicant for a parenting order with respect to the child has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

[18] In determining whether to authorize a relocation of the child, the court shall not consider whether, if the child’s relocation were to be prohibited, the person who intends to relocate the child would relocate without the child or not relocate.

[19] Both counsel have given me a large number of cases; I have read and considered them. However, any case with such a multi-factored analysis will have a different result depending on the number of relevant factors and the weight to be given to those factors. I have not found any one of the cases to be a determinative decision in this case.

Analysis

Burden of Proof

[20] The parties disagree on the onus of proof to make the determination. The parties are not married; the Divorce Act does not apply. However, s.39.4(5) through (7) of the Ontario Children’s Law Reform Act sets out that the onus will shift depending on the circumstances before the plan to move.

[21] If the parties substantially comply with an order or agreement that provides that a child spend substantially equal time in the care of each party, the party who intends to relocate the child has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in the best interests of the child.

[22] However, if the parties substantially comply with an order or agreement that provides that a child spend the vast majority of time in the care of the party who intends to relocate the child, the party opposing the relocation has the burden of proving that the relocation would not be in the best interests of the child.

[23] In any other case, the parties have the burden of proving whether the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

[24] Ms. Reid-Taylor submits that since the parties do not have a formal court order or agreement in place, both parties bear an equal burden in proving that the relocation in question is in G.’s best interests.

[25] Mr. Vecchio says that Ms. Reid-Taylor has the burden of proving that the relocation is in the child's best interests. He submits that the “agreement” stated in the legislation should include the shared parenting schedule agreed upon by the parties, even if not in writing.

[26] In her evidence, Ms. Reid-Taylor says that although they “decided to discontinue [their] romantic relationship in or about July, 2018. [They] became amicable co-parents at that time.” She describes the present arrangement, saying that “we generally share care of G., though G. has consistently been in my care somewhat more than in Alexander's care, since we stopped living in the same home.” As set out above, the present four/three schedule has been in place since 2020.

[27] In Tariq v. Khan, 2022 ONSC 1167, Justice Ricchetti stated (paras. 73-74):

Had the legislators wanted to limit the application of the subsection to situations where there existed "written agreements" on the primary care (or vast majority) of the child's care, they could have easily done so. There is no limitation or constraints as to what type of "agreements" are caught by this subsection.

It makes no sense that, where there has been a de facto agreement that a child spends the vast majority of their parenting time in the care of one parent, even if existing for years, that parent would not benefit from the reverse onus in this subsection.

[28] Similarly, in J.L. v. D. L., 2021 ONSC 4997, 59 R.F.L. (8th) 47, at para. 63, Himel J. said: "Many parents follow schedules that they never put down in writing. That does not, in and of itself, negate the existence of an agreement."

[29] Although both of those cases were dealing with the Divorce Act, the legislative wording is the same as the CLRA. On the admitted facts, G. spent “substantially equal time in the care of each party” and not “the vast majority of time in the care of” Ms. Reid-Taylor. Therefore, I find that Ms. Reid-Taylor has the burden of proving that the relocation would be in G.’s best interests.

[30] That said, the onus does not play into my considerations. The factors are not closely balanced, and the evidence is not much disputed. Even if the onus of proof were on both parties, on all of the evidence, the motion should be dismissed.

Best Interests

[31] There is, of course, some overlap in the considerations of the best interests of the child and whether a relocation would be in the child’s best interests. I will consider all of those factors as follows.

[32] Factors related to the best interests of the child include,

The child’s needs, given the child’s age and stage of development, such as the child’s need for stability.

[33] There is no suggestion that G. is anything other than a happy, healthy, loved child that is excelling in school and has no apparent medical or emotional difficulties.

[34] That factor does not weigh one way or the other.

The nature and strength of the child’s relationship with each parent, each of the child’s siblings and grandparents and any other person who plays an important role in the child’s life.

[35] The evidence is clear that G. has a good relationship with his sister and all other members of both families. If there was a relocation by Ms. Reid-Taylor, all but her, Mr. Bakker and R. will reside in the Guelph area. While the other members of his extended family may not play “an important role” in G.’s life, I am sure that he is all the better for their involvement and losing those connections will not be a benefit to him.

[36] That factor weighs against the relocation.

Each parent’s willingness to support the development and maintenance of the child’s relationship with the other parent.

[37] Both parents allege that they are willing to support the child’s relationship with the other parent. The evidence confirms that Ms. Reid-Taylor alleges that Mr. Vecchio, of late, has not been so co-operative, but I will deal with that below. For now, this factor does not assist either party.

The history of care of the child.

[38] As I have already said, Ms. Reid-Taylor confirms that the parties “decided to discontinue [their] romantic relationship in or about July, 2018. [They] became amicable co-parents at that time.” She describes the present arrangement, saying that “we generally share care of G., though G. has consistently been in my care somewhat more than in Alexander's care, since we stopped living in the same home.” As set out above, the present four/three schedule has been in place since 2020.

[39] Although the parties dispute some of the lesser details of their parenting of G., the bulk of the evidence shows that they are doing astonishingly well at co-parenting. Both parties agree that, regardless of my ruling in this matter, they shall continue to share decision-making authority regarding G.

[40] G.’s doctor is in Guelph. To date, he has no doctor in Nova Scotia and the hospital is slightly more than a half hour away. He appears to have some illness as any child of that age might.

[41] This factor does not weigh much in the analysis as it supports both cases.

The child’s views and preferences, giving due weight to the child’s age and maturity, unless they cannot be ascertained.

[42] The parties agree that the views and preferences of five-year-old G. cannot be ascertained, nor would they be of benefit in this analysis.

The child’s cultural, linguistic, religious and spiritual upbringing, and heritage, including Indigenous upbringing and heritage.

[43] The parties agree that this factor does not weigh into this analysis.

Any plans for the child’s care.

[44] This is obviously the most significant factor in this case. Ms. Reid-Taylor submits the following in her factum:

Her parenting plan for G. and his sister R. is stable and well thought out. Her plan to relocate substantially improves her family's financial situation, given this fact. It will allow her to be a stay-at-home parent to the children in the short term and gradually work to establish a farming business in the long run, supported by her husband.

[45] I cannot find that Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan is a reasonable plan for G.’s best interests. I do not find that it is a stable or well thought out plan.

[46] There is no doubt that Ms. Reid-Taylor has qualifications to support her plan. She has a Certificate in Sustainable Agriculture from Sanford Fleming College. She has experience working in the farming sector, having worked two summers on an organic berry farm in Nova Scotia, and volunteering on various mixed farms and homesteads in exchange for room and board. During the year that she was at Fleming College, she participated in a five-month farming apprenticeship. Afterward, Ms. Reid-Taylor spent eighteen months managing a large pasture livestock operation in Campbellford, Ontario which included raising livestock. She has experience working on a horse farm, on a commercial dairy farm and working at the Large Animal Hospital and a mixed farm at Ontario Veterinary College. She described her personal experience maintaining a backyard garden where she mainly grows vegetables.

[47] Ms. Reid-Taylor says that the new farming property is suitable for a variety of farming operations. Farms in the area produce various products such as corn, hay, wheat, and various vegetables. Her long-term plan is to set up a farm that raises organic livestock.

[48] Ms. Reid-Taylor says that she and Mr. Bakker have struggled to afford life in Ontario, particularly with the birth of their second child.

[49] Ms. Reid-Taylor's parenting plan is to be a full-time stay at home parent. Over time, she intends to establish and build a farming business on the property. In other parts of her evidence, she submits that she plans for the family to become largely self-sufficient, and halve grocery costs, within six to twelve months of relocation.

[50] Ms. Reid-Taylor sets out her proposed budget and plan for her new career taking care of both children while slowly building her farm enterprise. In my view, that budget is of little assistance to support her plan.

[51] Mr. Vecchio’s partner, Ms. Buck, has given her opinion on the viability of Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan. In the circumstances of this record, I cannot rely upon that opinion evidence to ground my decision. There was no request for a voir dire on Ms. Buck’s qualifications to provide opinion evidence and Ms. Reid-Taylor objected to that evidence. In any event, much of what Ms. Buck sets out is obvious from a review of the materials filed by Ms. Reid-Taylor.

[52] Ms. Reid-Taylor’s detailed plan refers to “anticipating” a lot of calculations. Because, she has not had a chance to put her plan into work, I do not fault Ms. Reid-Taylor for that description; however, it shows how uncertain the plan is.

[53] The barn on the property needs repair and the fencing needs completing. The farm may require a tractor. Ms. Reid-Taylor suggests that fencing will cost $10,000, yet only $30 per month is budgeted for repairs and maintenance. Another unrealistic cost is that only $10 a month is budgeted for clothing for a family of four.

[54] Ms. Reid-Taylor’s materials do not set out what her Guelph house sold for or the purchase price of the Nova Scotia property. I have only the listing price of the Nova Scotia property in the amount of $399,900. Ms. Reid-Taylor’s financial statement shows that she valued her Guelph home at $650,000 against which she has approximately $395,000 in debt. Ms. Reid-Taylor has $5,000 in savings. I have no information of the financial circumstances of Mr. Bakker. All told, Ms. Reid-Taylor’s finances and budget leaves no space for error or unexpected problems.

[55] In response, Ms. Reid-Taylor says that “I am not looking to be a financially viable operation. [Mr. Bakker’s] income will support us and cover all of our bills.” However, Mr. Bakker is not employed in Nova Scotia, and I have no information of his financial position.

[56] Mr. Bakker is employed in Ontario and expects to be employed in Nova Scotia; however, the fact remains that when the couple leaves for Nova Scotia, they will have no income. They hope and expect to do well, but there is no plan in place if all does not go as wished.

[57] Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan does not consider any expenses for the considerable transportation costs for parenting time. It appears that she believes that Mr. Vecchio should incur all of them. That is unreasonable. She has family in the Guelph area and plans to be a stay-at-home mother. I appreciate that Ms. Reid-Taylor has an infant to care for, but it is not clear why she would not propose being the transporting parent for at least part of the time.

[58] Although it is true that Ms. Reid-Taylor seeks an order to share travel expenses with Mr. Vecchio, her plan as set out in her materials is to have no income to share.

[59] Ms. Reid-Taylor suggests that a round trip air fare would average $200. I doubt that the cost is so low; however, if it is, those costs will, like all else, rise in the immediate future. That suggested cost also does not include costs for land transportation, meals, and accommodation. Either Ms. Reid-Taylor is being disingenuous (which hurts her case), or she is unable to properly consider expenses (which also hurts her case).

[60] Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan does not take into consideration weather or transport delays when G. visits his father.

[61] In reply, Mr. Vecchio’s plan attempts to maintain G.’s usual pattern of life to the extent that he can without Ms. Reid-Taylor’s assistance. It may not be perfect, as pointed out by Ms. Reid-Taylor, but I am confident that he can manage if he is left to care for G. on his own.

[62] I find that Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan is not in the best interests of G. That plan weighs against the relocation.

The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to care for and meet the needs of the child.

[63] Both parties acknowledge that they are able and willing caregivers. Here, I consider their ability as a financial test rather than one of emotional ability.

[64] Both parents were employed until Ms. Reid-Taylor went on maternity leave. Ms. Reid-Taylor states that from 2020, Mr. Vecchio repeatedly changed careers and career plans. This is contested. Mr. Vecchio says that he has had the same employer for three years, slowly climbing up the employment ladder. He does, however, acknowledge previously maintaining additional side employment.

[65] In my view, Mr. Vecchio is now employed and has been so for three years. There is nothing to suggest that he will not remain employed. His Financial Statement sets out that he is living within his means.

[66] Ms. Reid-Taylor’s present employment is unclear, and it may be that she is on maternity benefits. Ms. Reid-Taylor compares her budget for Ontario and Nova Scotia. That comparison suggests that she can return to work in Ontario. She does not want to return to work, but I am unsure on this record if she cannot return to work. Her spouse is employed at present.

[67] Given the uncertainty of the record, I will take it that Ms. Reid-Taylor is unemployed, and her husband plans to be unemployed with hopes of re-employment in Nova Scotia.

[68] On a financial basis alone, it appears that G. would be better off in the care of Mr. Vecchio.

The ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and co-operate, in particular with one another, on matters affecting the child.

[69] Ms. Reid-Taylor says that although there is no Order or written agreement between them, “[w]e have always arranged this as between ourselves.”

[70] Since her notice to Mr. Vecchio that she wished to move to Nova Scotia, Ms. Reid-Taylor submits that Mr. Vecchio has not been as co-operative as in the past. She describes anger and outbursts from Mr. Vecchio that he does not deny.

[71] I see this recent behaviour by Mr. Vecchio as unfortunate but not unreasonable or concerning. I am not surprised that he would be upset by this turn of events. The uncertain outcome of this motion would make matters worse for all parties. Given the long and positive history between the two, I find that it is highly likely that Mr. Vecchio’s behaviour will return to the usual.

[72] I take comfort in that view by the fact that counsel submit that they will likely be able to work out the balance of the issues once this determination is made.

[73] Ms. Reid-Taylor has offered to have Mr. Vecchio move to Nova Scotia with her to co-parent on her property. That tells me that she believes that they can co-parent even under exceptional circumstances.

[74] I find that the parties can communicate and co-operate with one another on matters affecting the child wherever they or the child may reside.

Any family violence and its impact on, among other things, (i) the ability and willingness of any person who engaged in the family violence to care for and meet the needs of the child, and (ii) the appropriateness of making an order that would require persons in respect of whom the order would apply to co-operate on issues affecting the child.

[75] Family violence is not alleged towards either household.

Any civil or criminal proceeding, order, condition, or measure that is relevant to the safety, security, and well-being of the child.

[76] The parties agree that this factor is not in play in this fact situation.

The reasons for the relocation

[77] Ms. Reid-Taylor submits that the transition from Ontario to Nova Scotia will significantly improve her financial situation. She says that given the two young children in her care, continuing to reside in Ontario will leave her struggling to make ends meet. She says that she was faced with the choice of working and paying for two children to attend childcare or staying home and foregoing her income. Her employment in Guelph at the Ontario Veterinary College was physically and emotionally taxing on her, materially impacting her ability to be present as a parent to her children.

[78] Ms. Reid-Taylor takes the position that relocation to Nova Scotia will allow her to dedicate her time and efforts to caring for both children on a full-time basis as a stay-at-home parent. It will eliminate the need for before- and after-school care costs for the children. It will allow her the opportunity to gradually set up and grow a sustainable farming business on the property, advancing the goal of her education and training.

[79] Ms. Reid Taylor is convinced that “[t]he children's quality of life will substantially improve. The children will thrive, immersed in nature, and sustained from home-grown foods.”

[80] As set out above, I am not convinced of the strength of Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan. Even if I were, this is not a case where there is a draw to the new location such as a new relationship, a new job, or a return to family. Here, there is only Ms. Reid-Taylor’s wish to move, as she words it, to pursue her dream.

[81] Ms. Reid-Taylor relies upon Chief v. Ackesrviller, 2023 ONSC 4243 where Tobin J., in allowing a move on substantially different grounds than we have here, said at para. 107 that “an improvement in the mother’s emotional, and financial circumstances can only benefit the child and therefore be in the child’s best interests.” Here, I do not know what the financial circumstances will be in Nova Scotia. To that end, the entirety of that paragraph shows that all factors matter:

What makes the move most compelling at this time is related to the mother’s career development. She has secured an advantageous articling position that will provide her with more remuneration and potential for employment in the future than she was offered in London. If not permitted to move, then this opportunity in Calgary will be lost and her economic and financial prospects become less certain. And, as I stated earlier, an improvement in the mother's emotional, and financial circumstances can only benefit the child and therefore be in the child's best interests.

The impact of the relocation on the child.

[82] If the relocation is allowed, G. will be able to reside with his mother, stepfather, and sister as he does now. Any other benefits are aspirational and not certain or stable. By moving to Nova Scotia, G. and the family will be in uncertain circumstances for a lengthy period, even if Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan is successful in the long term.

[83] Ms. Reid-Taylor deposes that G. has not yet established significant ties to the Guelph community at his young age. However, G. will effectively be taken from his father and all other members of his extended family on both sides of his parentage. There are no family members in Nova Scotia.

[84] Mr. Vecchio has provided an affidavit from his mother, G.’s grandmother, who confirms the relationship that G. has with his extended family in and around Guelph. Ms. Reid-Taylor has filed an affidavit from her father. He supports her plan; however, that affidavit shows that he has a good relationship with G. and a workable relationship with Mr. Vecchio. The loss of those connections will have a significant impact on G if he is allowed to leave to Nova Scotia.

The amount of time spent with the child by each person who has parenting time and the level of involvement in the child’s life of each of those persons.

[85] I agree with Mr. Vecchio that despite the number of days or hours to count, from G.'s frame of reference, both parents act as primary parents. Historically, G. has had two homes in which he lives. The move will drastically reduce the amount of time he spends with his father and that will not be in his best interests.

Whether the person who intends to relocate the child has complied with any applicable notice requirement under section 39.3 and any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award and agreement.

[86] As set out above, the parties have complied with this provision of the Act.

The existence of an order, family arbitration award or agreement that specifies the geographic area in which the child is to reside.

[87] While there is an agreement in place, it does not relate to the geographic area in which the child is to reside.

The reasonableness of the proposal of the person who intends to relocate the child to vary the exercise of decision-making responsibility, parenting time or contact, taking into consideration, among other things, the location of the new residence and the travel expenses.

[88] Although I am not asked to determine parenting times if the move is allowed or not, Ms. Reid-Taylor’s proposed parenting plan is unrealistic. She suggests that G. can be with his father during the entirety of each summer school break, the entirety of each school Christmas break, and the entirety of each school March/spring break. She also says that it would be reasonable that G. or Mr. Vecchio travel each long weekend in the year, on a specific schedule to be arranged, as well as further and other parenting time as can be agreed upon.

[89] This schedule would mean that G. would be away from his sister, schoolmates, family, and home, immediately after and before school started. It would mean that he would never be “home” when Santa Claus arrived. He would, instead, in his own perception, be with loving strangers for those periods of time. He will almost certainly rebel in the very early stages of this plan. If all goes well over the summer months, he may rebel about returning to Nova Scotia. That turmoil will not be in his best interests. It is concerning that Ms. Reid-Taylor does not acknowledge that.

[90] As set out above, it appears that Ms. Reid-Taylor is of the view that Mr. Vecchio should pay the time and cost of transporting G. without contribution from her.

[91] Ms. Reid-Taylor objects to Mr. Vecchio’s plan. She states that he has historically told her that he is not able to primarily care for G. Mr. Vecchio disputes this and indicates that he has such a plan; however, Ms. Reid-Taylor says that his plan is not sufficiently specific. I do not accept this concern.

[92] First, Ms. Reid-Taylor’s plan leaves G. with his father for extended periods of time; she must not be concerned about his parenting during that time.

[93] Second, Mr. Vecchio has not generated the present circumstance. He and his family have put together a plan that shows commitment to care for G. if Ms. Reid-Taylor leaves the province and G. remains in Mr. Vecchio’s care.

[94] Ms. Reid-Taylor finds fault in Mr. Vecchio’s participation in G.’s care in the past. However, she notes that he “has become more actively involved in G.'s education and has engaged in email communications with G.'s teachers and administrators on a more frequent basis.”

[95] No doubt, Mr. Vecchio will have to be more involved as a single parent than he has in the past, but there is nothing in the evidence that suggests that G. is in any peril in the care of Mr. Vecchio.

Whether each person who has decision-making responsibility or parenting time has complied with their obligations under any applicable Act, regulation, order, family arbitration award or agreement, and the likelihood of future compliance.

[96] There are no allegations that the parties have failed to comply with any orders.

Decision

[97] I am not to consider that list as a checklist and count the score. Rather, I am to consider the situation holistically and focus only on the best interests of the child. See generally: Tabbert v. Walker, 2022 ONSC 4651; Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22; Tass v. Jackson, 2023 ONSC 6564, at para. 54.

[98] Considering all of those factors, I cannot find that it is in G’s best interests to move to Nova Scotia.

[99] For those reasons, Ms. Reid-Taylor’s motion is dismissed.

Costs

[100] If costs cannot be agreed upon, Mr. Vecchio shall provide his costs submissions within the next 15 days. Ms. Reid-Taylor shall provide her response within 15 days thereafter.

[101] Each submission shall be no more than three pages, not including any Bills of Costs or Offers to Settle. No reply submission will be accepted unless I request it. If I have not received any submissions within the time frames set out above, I will assume that the parties have resolved the issue and I make no order as to costs.

[102] Neither party need to include the authorities upon which they rely so long as they are found online, and the relevant paragraph references are included.

[103] Any costs submissions shall be forwarded to my office in Guelph by electronic transfer to teresa.pearson@ontario.ca or by mail to Guelph Superior Courthouse, 74 Woolwich St., Guelph, N1H 3T9.

Justice G. D. Lemon

Released: December 27, 2023

COURT FILE NO.: FS-23-00000301-0000 (Guelph)

DATE: 2023 12 27

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

Violet Elise Reid-Taylor

Applicant

– and –

Alexander Michael Vecchio

Respondent

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

Justice G.D. Lemon

Released: December 27, 2023

Reid-Taylor v Vecchio, 2023 ONSC 7159

Case Summary

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

The Issue

The Background

Authorities

Analysis

Decision

Costs

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 2

Legal Tests 1

Legislation 2