Gregory A. Campbell

The appellant sought to overturn a custody and access order on the basis of alleged reasonable apprehension of bias, failure to consider the child's best interests, and findings said to be contrary to the evidence.

Applying the appellate standard of deference to factual findings and the objective test for bias, the court held that the trial judge's numerous interventions reflected an active case-management style rather than prejudgment or partiality.

The court found ample evidence supporting the custody and access determination and no palpable and overriding error, misapprehension of evidence, or ignored evidence.

The appeal from the trial judgment was dismissed and the respondent was awarded costs of that part of the appeal, while the separate costs appeal was left open for further submissions.

The Crown sought to introduce an out-of-court audio-recorded statement made by the deceased victim to police approximately two days after an alleged assault.

The victim died of unrelated causes approximately three months after making the statement.

The Crown relied on the principled exception to the hearsay rule to admit the statement as evidence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the statement met the threshold reliability requirement.

The court found that the victim's capacity to recall events accurately was compromised due to his poor health, medical condition, alcohol consumption, and marijuana use.

The victim's account was disjointed and inconsistent regarding when and where he was struck.

The court also noted significant discrepancies between the victim's account and his mother's corroborating statement.

The court concluded that the circumstances surrounding the taking of the statement did not provide sufficient guarantees of trustworthiness and that the absence of cross-examination could not be adequately substituted.

The motion was dismissed and the statement was ruled inadmissible.

This was a family law costs endorsement following a motion concerning the newborn child's habitual residence and return to Ontario.

The court held that the applicant had been entirely successful on an all-or-nothing motion and found the respondent's unilateral removal of the child to Newfoundland was precipitous, unilateral and unreasonable.

Applying the family costs framework, the court also considered the respondent's apparent limited means and the potential effect of a costs order on the child's care.

Costs of $6000 inclusive were awarded to the applicant, but in the cause.

The applicant father brought a motion concerning jurisdiction and the habitual residence of an infant after the respondent mother unilaterally removed the child from Ontario to Newfoundland and Labrador.

The court considered s.22 of the Children’s Law Reform Act and authorities addressing whether a parent can change a child’s habitual residence without the other parent’s consent.

The court rejected the respondent’s claim that the relocation had been planned and found the removal was unilateral and without consent or acquiescence.

Applying the principle that a parent cannot unilaterally alter a child’s habitual residence, the court held the child remained habitually resident in Ontario.

Jurisdiction was accepted and the respondent was ordered to return the child to Ontario pending further proceedings.

The applicants brought two motions: one to vacate a longstanding non‑dissipation order secured against their property and another seeking an extension of time and leave to appeal an interlocutory mistrial order declaring a mistrial after thirteen days of trial.

The court considered the test under Rule 62.02 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the mistrial decision raised serious and important issues regarding whether trial length and scheduling constraints could justify terminating a trial.

The court granted both the extension of time and leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal open to serious debate and of significance to the administration of justice.

The court also vacated the non‑dissipation order, concluding that the evidentiary basis for the order had been discredited and that there was no ongoing risk of asset dissipation warranting such security.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence challenged the admissibility of breath samples on the grounds that they were not obtained as soon as practicable, contrary to s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code and breaching the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found a breach occurred due to unexplained delays totalling approximately one hour between the demand and the first breath sample.

However, the evidence was admitted under s. 24(2) of the Charter as the breach was not serious state conduct, the intrusion was minimal, and the public interest in prosecuting impaired driving was significant.

On the merits, the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's blood alcohol content exceeded the legal limit at the time of driving.

Following a lengthy family law trial involving disputes over custody and equalization, the court addressed outstanding costs issues.

The court found that neither party was entirely successful at trial and that both parties engaged in unreasonable conduct that prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

As a result, neither party was awarded costs of the trial itself.

However, the respondent was ordered to pay $8,000 relating to a specific phase of the litigation arising from earlier proceedings, reflecting responsibility for certain decisions that generated additional costs.

The amount was ordered payable by set-off against the respondent’s spousal support entitlement.

Following a successful family law appeal and motion for further evidence, the court considered the appropriate costs award.

The respondent did not participate in the costs submissions, leaving the court to assess costs without information about her financial circumstances.

Applying Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules and relevant appellate jurisprudence, the court held that the successful party was presumptively entitled to costs but rejected a claim for full recovery or indemnity costs based on alleged bad faith.

The court declined to overturn the trial judge’s original costs order but rescinded any unpaid balance owing by the applicant due to changed parenting circumstances.

A reasonable and proportionate costs award of $12,000 plus disbursements of $4,379.96 was ordered, payable by the respondent at $300 per month.

Following extensive family litigation concerning custody and related relief, the applicant brought a motion seeking costs personally against opposing counsel and their law firm under Family Law Rule 24(9), alleging their litigation conduct unnecessarily caused costs to be incurred.

The court reviewed the lawyers’ conduct, including commencing proceedings in the wrong jurisdiction, failing to properly serve court orders, bringing urgent motions on short notice, filing repetitive affidavits, and making inaccurate representations to the court.

Applying the principles governing personal cost awards against lawyers, including the caution articulated in Young v. Young, the court concluded that the conduct of counsel and their firm unnecessarily caused costs to be incurred and warranted censure.

The court held that Family Law Rule 24(9) adequately addressed the circumstances and that the conduct constituted “fault” resulting in wasted costs.

Personal costs orders were imposed against the firm and two lawyers for amounts reflecting only the unnecessary costs directly attributable to their conduct.

The appellant father appealed a trial decision that allowed the respondent mother to relocate with their child to Casselman, Ontario.

The trial judge had relied on the mother's assurances that she would facilitate extensive access.

The appeal court found that the mother had completely obstructed the father's access and marginalized him from the child's life, constituting a material change in circumstances.

The appeal was allowed, and the child was ordered to be returned to the Waterloo Region immediately, with primary care transferring to the father if the mother chose not to return.

Following dismissal of a motion to set aside a prior order, the successful party sought recovery of legal costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The court considered the Rule 24(11) factors and the costs consequences of an unaccepted Rule 18 offer to settle.

The moving party had pursued relief despite ongoing non‑compliance with financial disclosure obligations and ignored an early settlement offer.

The court found the litigation conduct unreasonable and ordered full recovery of the costs claimed.

Seventy‑five percent of the costs were characterized as relating to child support issues and were therefore enforceable by the Director of the Family Responsibility Office under the Family Law Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996.

Following a motion concerning interim spousal support, child support, and a procedural motion to strike portions of an affidavit, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party succeeded on the principal issue of spousal support and had made a reasonable offer to settle that exceeded the ultimate result obtained at the hearing.

The responding party succeeded only on the procedural motion to strike.

Applying Rule 24 and the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, the court reduced the requested costs but recognized the moving party’s substantial success and the responding party’s refusal to accept a reasonable settlement offer.

Following several complex family law motions concerning support issues, the court was required to determine the appropriate costs award.

The applicant sought $45,000 plus additional preparation costs, asserting complete success and unreasonable conduct by the respondent.

The respondent argued the applicant achieved only partial success and that significant reductions to child and spousal support constituted substantial success for him.

Applying the flexible approach to costs under r. 24 of the Family Law Rules and emphasizing proportionality and reasonable expectations, the court found the applicant was mostly successful but that the amount claimed was excessive.

The court awarded $15,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, enforceable through the Family Responsibility Office as expenses related to support.

During family law proceedings, the responding party brought an oral motion seeking directions regarding outstanding undertakings, refusals, and questions taken under advisement arising from questioning under oath.

The court considered thirteen disputed requests for production and further questioning.

Several requests were denied where no undertaking had been given, where the documents were not in the moving party’s control, or where the request was overly broad or irrelevant to the issues in dispute.

Limited additional disclosure was ordered for certain financial documents, including bank statements and credit accounts, and in one instance the responding party was directed to request documents from a government ministry.

The court also permitted limited re‑attendance for further questioning in relation to some ordered disclosures.

The parties separated in 2005 and have three children whose living arrangements shifted between the parents over several years.

The father, who formed a new blended family, failed to pay court-ordered support and accumulated arrears.

The parties attempted to settle the ongoing and retroactive support issues by agreeing to waive child support in exchange for fixed spousal support, but the agreement resulted in adverse tax consequences for the mother.

The court set aside the settlement regarding child support, finding it cannot be bargained away, and ordered retroactive and ongoing child and spousal support based on the parties' actual incomes and the Guidelines.

The father's arrears were converted into a monetary judgment enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

In a family law trial, the court addressed outstanding issues including the calculation of the equalization payment, entitlement to child tax benefits, and costs.

The applicant argued that the respondent's valuation-day debt should be reduced based on hindsight evidence of a post-separation consumer proposal.

The court rejected this argument, holding that hindsight evidence cannot be used to alter the actual value of a debt at the date of separation.

The court also found the respondent was the primary caregiver for the first year post-separation and entitled to full child tax benefits for that period.

The respondent was highly successful on the property issues and was awarded costs of $30,000 plus HST.

The applicant Children's Aid Society appealed a trial judge's order granting access to three children who had been made Crown wards.

The Society argued the trial judge erred in finding that access would not impair the children's future opportunities for adoption and by creating an access structure that contravened the Child and Family Services Act.

The appeal court agreed, finding that the access order had deterred the only potential adoptive family, thereby impairing adoption opportunities.

The court also held that the trial judge exceeded her authority by creating a unique access reduction process that conflicted with the legislated scheme.

The appeal was granted and the access order was rescinded.

A mother appealed a summary judgment decision in child protection proceedings that found her child in need of protection and granted sole custody to the maternal grandparents.

The appellate court held that the motion judge relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay evidence, made unsupported credibility findings, and misapprehended key facts regarding the circumstances of the child's apprehension.

The court found the child had been voluntarily placed with grandparents prior to the Society’s involvement and was not in the mother’s care at the time of apprehension, undermining the protection finding.

The protection application was therefore ill-founded.

The order granting custody to the grandparents was set aside and the Society’s protection application dismissed.

Following several family law motions concerning disclosure, access, and recognition of a foreign custody order, the court addressed the issue of costs under Rule 24 of the Family Law Rules.

The applicant sought full indemnity costs of over $31,000 for all work performed during the litigation.

The court found the respondent’s litigation conduct unreasonable, including failure to comply with disclosure orders and maintaining untenable positions until the hearing, which forced unnecessary preparation by the applicant.

However, the court also found the applicant’s counsel’s bill excessive in parts, particularly repeated charges for reviewing communications.

Applying a flexible and proportional approach to costs, the court fixed a fair and reasonable award recognizing the applicant’s success.

The parties separated after a 17-year marriage.

Both parties operated cash-based businesses and failed to declare significant income to the CRA.

The court imputed incomes to both parties for the purpose of calculating child and spousal support, rejecting the husband's expert report due to his failure to disclose the cash business.

The court also determined the value of various contested assets and date of marriage deductions for the equalization of net family property, finding the husband's uncorroborated evidence unreliable.