Patrick Joseph Ducharme

This corrigendum amends a prior ruling dated February 13, 2017, in a criminal proceeding.

It specifically corrects paragraph 23, which detailed trial scheduling and counsel availability for a s. 11(b) Charter application, and paragraph 71 ix., which addressed the calculation of institutional delay attributable to the preliminary hearing judge's reserved decision.

The applicants, Stephen Jurkus and Leslie Lonsbary, sought a stay of proceedings under sections 11(b) and 24(1) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay in bringing their criminal matter to trial.

Applying the framework from R. v. Jordan, the court calculated the total delay at 1,178 days (39.3 months), exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling for Superior Court cases.

After subtracting defence-caused delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonableness by establishing exceptional circumstances or case complexity.

The court also found the delay unreasonable under the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering factors such as prolonged disclosure, institutional delays, the Crown's joint prosecution decision, and significant prejudice to the accused.

The applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of impaired driving and exceeding the breathalyzer limit.

The trial judge had acquitted the respondent, finding that impairment was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that breath samples were not taken within the two-hour period mandated by the Criminal Code, as the exact time of the accident could not be established.

The Crown argued the trial judge failed to consider witness evidence of impairment, erred in not convicting on the included offence of care and control, and failed to apply the presumption of identity.

The appeal court dismissed all grounds, upholding the trial judge's findings on witness credibility, rejecting the attempt to change the particulars of the offence to a later time of care and control, and affirming the proper application of reasonable doubt arising from a lack of evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit following a motor vehicle collision on February 8, 2009.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing readings of 174 and 175 mg/100 mL of blood, along with observations of impairment by police officers and a civilian witness.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath testing instrument, arguing that inadequate maintenance and an unknown number of calibration checks prior to testing raised reasonable doubt.

The defence also presented expert evidence suggesting the accused's alcohol consumption was inconsistent with the breath test results.

The court found the breath testing instrument was functioning and operated properly at the time of testing and rejected the defence arguments regarding maintenance and calibration checks.

The court also found the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by alcohol based on the totality of evidence, including the failure to stop at a stop sign, observations of impairment, and the reliable breath test results.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing readings of 147 mg and 139 mg per 100 mL of blood.

The defence challenged the reliability of the breath testing instrument based on lack of annual maintenance since August 2010 and an unexplained fifth calibration check.

The defence also argued that symptoms of impairment observed at the scene could be attributed to the accused being awakened from sleep and the effects of bright police lights.

The court found that the Crown had satisfied its burden on both counts, rejecting the defence arguments regarding instrument reliability and finding sufficient evidence of impairment.

Multiple accused charged with operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg/100 mL brought disclosure applications seeking approximately 75 items related to breath testing devices and procedures.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing the requested items were either third-party records or clearly irrelevant.

The court determined that the requested maintenance logs, calibration records, and other technical documentation not already provided constituted third-party records under the O'Connor regime rather than first-party records under Stinchcombe.

The applicants failed to establish that the requested items were likely relevant to their cases, as they provided no evidentiary foundation linking the requested materials to potential malfunctioning or improper operation of the specific instruments used in their breath tests.

All disclosure applications were dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired operation and "over 80" and brought a disclosure application regarding the over 80 charge.

The application sought extensive disclosure particulars related to the Intoxilyzer 8000-C breath testing device, including maintenance records, technician qualifications, inspection logs, and operational protocols.

The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. St.-Onge Lamoureux and the Canadian Society of Forensic Science Alcohol Test Committee recommendations.

The court granted partial disclosure, ordering production of inspection and maintenance logs, manufacturer directives and policies, DAVTECH checklists, and particulars regarding alcohol standard usage, while denying other requests as either irrelevant or speculative.

At a preliminary inquiry, the accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death, impaired operation causing bodily harm, and related offences under the Criminal Code involving blood alcohol levels exceeding the legal limit.

The defence conceded impairment and excess blood alcohol but challenged causation, arguing the Crown failed to establish the accused's conduct was a significant contributing factor to the death and injuries.

The court applied the test for committal and the causation standard from R. v. Smithers, finding sufficient evidence that the accused's impairment was a contributing cause more than de minimis.

The court committed the accused to trial on all counts as charged, except on two counts where committal was ordered on lesser included offences.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on breath test results showing 250 and 259 milligrams.

The defence challenged the reliability of the test results, arguing operator error occurred when the breath technician failed to observe the mandatory 15-minute waiting period after the accused used an inhaler.

The court found that although the technician deviated from recommended procedures, the deviation did not affect the reliability of the results.

The two test samples were in close agreement, the slope detector did not invalidate the sample, and the evidence did not support that the inhaler contained alcohol.

The court rejected the accused's credibility regarding the type of inhaler used and found the Crown proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving a motor vehicle on Highway 401 while performing a stunt, specifically driving at a rate of speed greater than 50 kilometres per hour over the posted speed limit, contrary to Section 172(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant raised two main grounds of appeal: that the verdict was unreasonable and unsupported by evidence, and that the Justice of the Peace failed to properly apply the W.D. test to credibility assessment.

The appellate court upheld the conviction, finding that the evidence was sufficient to support the findings regarding both identity and speed, and that the trial judge properly considered credibility and applied the appropriate legal standards.

The Crown sought leave to call reply evidence from a former federal drug prosecutor regarding general expectations of the federal Crown concerning the preparation of police Crown briefs, disclosure obligations, and the handling of confidential informants.

The proposed evidence was intended to rebut defence testimony suggesting disclosure had been made in accordance with Department of Justice policy.

The court held the evidence remained only marginally relevant because no evidentiary link connected those general expectations to the accused police officers or their training.

Given its limited probative value and the risk that calling a sitting Superior Court judge as a witness would unduly influence the jury, the court found the potential prejudice outweighed the minimal probative value.

The application to introduce the reply evidence was therefore refused.

In a criminal trial involving allegations of assault, theft, perjury, and conspiracy to obstruct justice by police officers, the Crown sought to introduce Toronto Police Service directives and evidence of standard police practices.

The defence objected on grounds including irrelevance, prejudice, and hearsay.

The court held that the directives and expert evidence regarding general police norms were admissible because they provided context for assessing the accused officers’ conduct and state of mind, particularly regarding omissions in memo books, handling of seized property, disclosure practices, and use of informants.

However, testimony about how particular directives were implemented at a specific police division without personal knowledge was excluded as hearsay.

Selected directives and limited expert evidence were admitted subject to these constraints.

Media organizations sought permission to use electronic devices to transmit information from inside the courtroom and to make audio recordings during a criminal jury trial.

The court considered s. 136 of the Courts of Justice Act and an applicable practice direction permitting unobtrusive audio recording by journalists solely to supplement handwritten notes.

The court authorized such audio recordings and permitted journalists to transmit information from inside the courtroom, provided proceedings were not disrupted.

The court also established a procedure governing media access to large volumes of documentary exhibits, requiring undertakings preventing publication until a judicial determination confirmed sufficient evidence to place the document before the jury.

A publication restriction was ordered for specified personal identifying information contained in documentary materials.