Howard Krongold

The appellant, Akada Bruce, appealed his conviction and sentence.

The conviction appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The sentence appeal was resolved by joint submission from counsel, varying the original sentence to a conditional sentence of 583 days, accounting for time served.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference and an indeterminate dangerous offender sentence.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged s. 11(b) Charter breach due to delay in the dangerous offender hearing, and an error in the interpretation and application of s. 752.1 of the Criminal Code regarding assessor designation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no s. 11(b) infringement as it was a transitional case with exceptional circumstances (dangerous offender proceedings and Crown illness).

While the trial judge erred in applying a presumption for the Crown's proposed assessor under s. 752.1, this error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice given the fairness of the proceedings and the overwhelming evidence supporting the dangerous offender designation.

The applicant sought bail pending appeal of a 23-month reformatory sentence for sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish that the appeal had sufficient merit, particularly regarding the availability of a conditional sentence order for sexual assault under the Criminal Code.

The court noted that while Superior Court decisions had found the relevant Criminal Code provision unconstitutional, the Court of Appeal had not yet definitively addressed the issue, creating a legal quagmire for the applicant.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder, raising three grounds: a breach of jury secrecy during a juror inquiry, errors in a s. 8 Charter analysis and subsequent s. 24(2) exclusion of evidence, and errors in excluding hearsay evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's handling of the jury inquiry, upholding the application judge's decision to exclude evidence under the Charter, and affirming the exclusion of hearsay statements due to reliability concerns.

The appellant was convicted of drug and weapon offences.

At trial, his application to exclude evidence based on Charter breaches (ss. 7, 8, 9, 10(b)) was dismissed.

On appeal, the Crown conceded breaches of the appellant's s. 8 (unreasonable search or seizure) and s. 10(b) (right to counsel) Charter rights.

The Court applied the R. v. Grant test to determine if the evidence (crack cocaine) should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Court found the police conduct, including continued questioning after the right to counsel was invoked and using the appellant's silence as a basis for a strip search, constituted serious breaches with significant impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests.

Balancing the Grant factors, the Court concluded that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, and acquittals were entered on all charges.

The appellant, M.M., appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias.

This apprehension arose from an ex parte communication between the trial judge and a justice of the peace who was related to the appellant's ex-spouse and children.

The Court of Appeal found that while the justice of the peace's conduct was a lapse of judgment, the trial judge took appropriate remedial steps by immediately putting the encounter on record, hearing submissions, and explaining his impartiality.

The Court concluded that a reasonable observer would not find the trial judge biased, and therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Marc Leduc, appealed two first-degree murder convictions.

The appeal concerned the trial judge's decision to admit similar act evidence across counts and the jury instructions regarding its use.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the "striking similarity" test for admitting similar act evidence to rebut coincidence, which effectively served to prove identity.

The court also upheld the severance ruling, which was based on the likely success of the similar act application.

Finally, the court dismissed the argument regarding jury instructions, noting that defence counsel at trial had specifically objected to the instruction the appellant now sought on appeal, and that the instruction given was adequate.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a six-month sentence for aggravated assault stemming from a road rage incident.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding the sentencing judge erred by relying on an incomparable precedent, leading to an unduly harsh sentence.

Considering the appellant's troubled background, efforts at rehabilitation, and the trial judge's findings on self-defence factors, the court reduced the sentence to time served, emphasizing that the fact of incarceration, rather than its length, sufficiently achieved deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant, Adrian Daou, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on confessions made by the appellant to police while he was incarcerated and suffering from schizophrenia.

The lead investigator, Det. Monette, testified that he believed the confession was true, providing detailed reasons.

The Court of Appeal found this police opinion evidence inadmissible as it amounted to an opinion on the appellant's guilt and usurped the jury's function.

The trial judge erred by failing to provide a limiting instruction and by reiterating the officer's opinion.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, finding that the inadmissible evidence and lack of caution seriously risked dominating the jury's consideration of the confession's veracity and the appellant's guilt, thus resulting in an unfair trial.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions concerning planning and deliberation and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions were legally sound and appropriately tailored to the jury's questions regarding the timing of planning and deliberation.

The court also affirmed that after-the-fact conduct is admissible circumstantial evidence that can be used to determine intent and distinguish between levels of culpability, including supporting an inference of planning and deliberation, provided proper cautions are given.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

Specifically, the court upheld the trial judge's use of the appellant's general drug trafficking activities (including marijuana) as relevant to his involvement in cocaine trafficking, her holistic consideration of circumstantial evidence for constructive possession, and her rejection of speculative defence theories in the absence of the appellant's testimony.

The appellant appealed convictions for a shooting, arguing misapprehension of evidence, unreasonable verdicts, and that several convictions should be stayed under the rule against multiple convictions (Kienapple).

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's analysis of the evidence or the reasonableness of the verdict regarding identification.

However, the Crown conceded the Kienapple argument, leading to stays of conviction on six of the eleven counts.

This consolidated appeal addressed the admissibility of evidence obtained through a wiretap authorization granted in 2016 for a 2009 murder investigation.

The Court of Appeal found that the authorization was improperly granted due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds, as the affidavit failed to establish a credible-based probability that interceptions would yield evidence of the long-dormant homicide or that other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.

The court emphasized that a generic investigative plan and unsupported inferences of continued association among targets after several years were insufficient.

Consequently, the interceptions constituted a serious breach of Charter s. 8 rights.

Applying the Grant framework, the court upheld the exclusion of the evidence under Charter s. 24(2) due to the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on privacy interests.

The appeals from conviction were allowed, and acquittals were entered, while the appeals from acquittal were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of sexual assault.

The trial judge had found that the complainant communicated consent through her actions and that the absence of a condom did not negate consent.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge made several errors of law.

Specifically, the trial judge improperly conflated the actus reus and mens rea of sexual assault, failed to consider whether the complainant subjectively consented to intercourse without a condom, and failed to assess whether the accused took reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The acquittal was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant, Joshua Bennett, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and assault, and his sentence for sexual assault.

He argued the trial judge relied on stereotypical assumptions about female behavior, failed to apply the Kienapple principle to the assault conviction, and misapprehended evidence regarding the sexual assault sentence.

The court dismissed the appeal against the sexual assault conviction and sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessment or sentencing.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding the assault conviction, staying it under the Kienapple principle as it was part of the same transaction as the sexual assault.

The appellant, S.H., appealed convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The core issue on appeal was whether the trial judge misapplied the second stage of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis regarding reasonable doubt in credibility cases, despite correctly citing the principles.

The Court of Appeal found that, reading the trial judge's reasons as a whole, it could be inferred that the judge rejected the appellant's exculpatory testimony entirely, rendering it incapable of raising a reasonable doubt.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a fraud charge, arguing the trial judge erred in his approach to the mens rea for fraud.

The respondent had lied about progress and used funds for other projects due to cash flow issues, believing he could resolve the situation.

The Court of Appeal reaffirmed that a "sanguine belief" does not negate the mens rea for fraud, which requires subjective knowledge of the prohibited act and the risk of deprivation.

The court found the trial judge erred in law and that the Crown was not advancing a new theory of guilt.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered, as the trial judge's factual findings were insufficient to substitute a conviction.

The appellant, M.D., appealed a conviction for sexual assault.

The primary ground of appeal was that the trial judge erred in law by rejecting the appellant's evidence on the basis that it appeared "tailored" to the Crown's evidence and disclosure.

The Court of Appeal found this constituted a legal error, as it improperly used the appellant's constitutional rights to disclosure and presence at trial as a basis to impugn credibility.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and ordered a new trial, emphasizing that such an error goes to the heart of trial fairness and the right to make full answer and defence.

The appellant, a dangerous offender, appealed an indeterminate sentence imposed for breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO).

The breach involved pursuing a young woman without reporting contact, a behaviour similar to his past criminal harassment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly considered the principles of proportionality and mitigating factors, and reasonably concluded that an indeterminate sentence was necessary for public protection given the appellant's high risk of recidivism and history of non-compliance with treatment.

The court did, however, set aside a victim surcharge in accordance with R. v. Boudreault.

Benham Yaali sought leave to appeal a 13-year sentence for manslaughter, arguing the sentencing judge erred by considering handgun possession as an aggravating factor and by failing to properly account for provocation.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, upholding the sentencing judge's discretion in weighing factors.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed, except for setting aside the victim impact surcharge.