Andrew Benjamin Cappell

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store.

The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions.

After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated.

The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was sentenced to a 90-day intermittent sentence for assault causing bodily harm, and two concurrent 18-month conditional sentences for uttering a death threat and pointing a firearm.

The Court of Appeal held the intermittent sentence was legal but had to be served on consecutive days.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that a conditional sentence is not a 'sentence of imprisonment' within the meaning of s. 732(1) of the Criminal Code, and therefore does not render an intermittent sentence illegal or require it to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in denying an adjournment request, exhibited bias, and failed to properly guide him while he was self-represented.

He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, no apprehension of bias, and no prejudice resulting from the trial judge's guidance or counsel's performance.

The sentence was also upheld as fit.

The Crown appealed the total sentence of seven years and a $250,000 restitution order imposed on the respondent for his involvement in a $2.7 million armoured car theft and subsequent cocaine trafficking offences committed while on bail.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by imposing an inadequate sentence for the drug offences and by failing to explain the totality reduction and the low restitution amount.

The appeal was allowed, the total sentence was increased to nine years, and the restitution order was increased to $1 million.

The appellant appealed his convictions for breaching three Canadian court orders (firearms prohibition, probation, and recognizance) after purchasing an assault rifle in Michigan.

He argued that the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the possession occurred outside Canada, and that a procedural error during arraignment vitiated the conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the failure to read the full charge at arraignment caused no prejudice and that Canadian courts have jurisdiction to enforce their own orders even when the breaching conduct occurs abroad.

The young person appealed their convictions for robbery and related offences.

The trial judge had recognized that the eyewitness identification evidence was insufficient on its own and relied on the similarity of signatures on credit card slips as confirmatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that this reliance constituted a misapprehension of the evidence, as the early morning slips were not tendered and the expert report stated there were insufficient comparable features.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault causing bodily harm, uttering a threat, and pointing a firearm against his intimate partner, as well as his sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting and using evidence of discreditable conduct, and in finding a pellet gun was a firearm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the discreditable conduct evidence was properly admitted as narrative and the pellet gun met the definition of a firearm.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, with the Court noting that under s. 732(3) of the Criminal Code, the imposition of a conditional sentence alongside an intermittent sentence causes the intermittent sentence to be served on consecutive days.

The appellant was convicted of driving 'over 80'.

At the time of his arrest, he demanded to speak only to his specific counsel of choice.

When the police could not reach that lawyer after an hour, the appellant refused offers to contact another lawyer.

The trial judge found no s. 10(b) Charter breach because the appellant failed to exercise reasonable diligence in exercising his right to counsel.

The summary conviction appeal judge and the Court of Appeal upheld this finding, dismissing the appeal.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability.

The summary conviction appeal court quashed the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge had drawn an impermissible adverse inference against the accused's right to silence.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the appeal court justice misinterpreted the trial judge's reasons, which, when read in context, permissibly inferred that the accused and his wife manipulated the complainant into fabricating evidence.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the sentencing judge's refusal to accept counsel's suggested sentencing range, noting the appellant's horrendous criminal record and the fact that a substantial part of the property was never recovered.

The appeal was dismissed.

The young person pleaded guilty to two counts of dangerous driving causing death and received a disposition including a ten-year driving prohibition.

On appeal, the young person argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on general deterrence and sought a reduction of the prohibition to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disposition fit and supported by the principles of proportionality, meaningful consequences, and protection of the public under section 38 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to report a change of address.

The Court of Appeal held that spending weekends at a girlfriend's house while keeping personal effects at his mother's house did not constitute a change of address.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about how to weigh reasonable doubt against the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The trial judge instructed the jury to first decide what they believed, then find the facts, and finally apply the reasonable doubt standard to those facts.

The Court of Appeal held that this instruction misstated the law as set out in R. v. W.(D.), because it failed to explain that the jury must acquit if they are unable to decide whom to believe, and that reasonable doubt applies to the totality of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed from an order of the Superior Court of Justice dismissing an application for certiorari to quash an order committing the appellant to stand trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the reasons of the Superior Court judge and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his 15-month sentence for breach of recognizance and other offences.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments regarding pre-sentence custody credit and the acceptable range of sentence, but found the sentencing judge erred in principle by failing to consider mitigating factors, including the appellant's substance abuse problem and expressions of remorse.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 12 months' incarceration.

The appellant, a 20-year-old first offender, pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death after towing a friend on roller blades alongside her car, resulting in his death.

She was initially sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge erred in principle by ruling out a conditional sentence ab initio due to aggravating factors and by failing to prioritize rehabilitation for a youthful first offender.

The appeal was allowed, and an 18-month conditional sentence with 240 hours of community service was substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's handling of a difficult situation would have led the jury to conclude his lawyer no longer believed in him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge handled the situation appropriately with a firm and fair instruction to the jury.

The court rejected the appellant's submission as speculative and contrary to the presumption that jurors follow a trial judge's directions.

The Crown appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment and one year of probation imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of a young complainant.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence woefully inadequate given the circumstances, including the respondent's persistence despite the complainant's resistance and vulnerability.

The court granted leave to appeal and increased the sentence to two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.