Judicial Screening Decision on s. 745.6 Application

Court File No.: CR-24-101952-00MO
Date: 2025-06-17
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between:
His Majesty the King – and – Ronald Cyr

Applicant Counsel: Breana Vandebeek and Alexandra Youssef
Respondent Counsel: Eric Taylor
Heard: In writing

Before: R.B. Reid

Introduction

[1] On April 30, 2012, Mr. Ronald Cyr, together with two co-accused, was convicted of first-degree murder after a trial before Walters J., sitting with a jury, and was sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole for 25 years. His appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal was dismissed on April 3, 2017 (R. v. Zvolensky et al., 2017 ONCA 273), and his application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed on May 10, 2018.

[2] Mr. Cyr has applied for an order reducing the number of years before he becomes eligible for parole pursuant to section 745.6 of the Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46 (the “Code”) in this “faint hope” application. The Crown opposes the order requested.

[3] Mr. Cyr was arrested on August 9, 2009, and held in custody pending his trial. As a result, he became eligible to bring this application on August 9, 2024. Subject to a jury verdict on this application shortening the statutory period of 25 years, he will be eligible for parole on August 9, 2034.

[4] I was designated to preside over this application by the Associate Chief Justice of the Superior Court exercising authority delegated to her by the Chief Justice of the Superior Court pursuant to section 745.61 of the Code.

[5] Mr. Cyr has filed an application record, supplemental application record and written submissions. The Crown has responded with written submissions. The parties agreed that no report was required from the Correctional Service of Canada at this stage of the application. Based on my review of the written materials filed, I am satisfied that the threshold test has been met such that a jury should be empaneled to hear Mr. Cyr’s application.

The Facts of the Offence

[6] The facts of the offence as well as the respective positions of Mr. Cyr and his co-accused at trial were summarized by the Ontario Court of Appeal at paras. 1–12 of its decision in Zvolensky:

[1] Nadia Gehl was shot and killed at about 8:45 a.m. on February 2, 2009 as she walked from her home to a bus stop to go to work. About six months later, her husband, Ronald Cyr, was arrested and charged with her murder. Nashat Qahwash and Zdenek "Dennis" Zvolensky were arrested a few hours later. The Crown alleged that Cyr arranged for Zvolensky to kill his wife and that Zvolensky enlisted Qahwash to help him.

[2] Zvolensky and Cyr were close friends, as were Zvolensky and Qahwash.

[3] Gehl's work hours were irregular. Cyr called her in the morning on February 2 to make sure she was up to go to work. The night before, he sent a text message to Zvolensky, saying, "Can you play ball on tue. The game is at 8:40." The captain of Cyr's basketball team testified that there was no game scheduled for that night. The Crown's theory was that this was a coded message triggering the killing. Zvolensky did not reply to this message, but there were immediate text messages between Zvolensky and Qahwash.

[4] The gun used for the killing was found hidden in Qahwash's basement, some six months after the killing. A bag containing ammunition had his fingerprints on it. Zvolensky's DNA was on the gun. Text messages discussing the purchase of a gun were exchanged between Zvolensky and Qahwash in the days before Gehl was shot.

[5] Cyr told an undercover officer how he had arranged the murder. Zvolensky made statements from which a jury could infer that he was also part of the plan. Qahwash also made some statements from which a jury could infer he was part of the plan.

[6] Cyr had a motive to kill his wife. He was having an affair with a co-worker at the law firm where he worked as a paralegal. There was life insurance. He emptied his bank account just before the gun was purchased.

[7] All three appellants testified. Each blamed another. Cyr testified that he lied to the undercover officer when he said he participated in the killing of his wife because Zvolensky was blackmailing him. Cyr said that Zvolensky told him Zvolensky killed Gehl, had the gun and would make sure police connected the gun to Cyr, unless Cyr provided funds to invest in a canoeing business.

[8] Zvolensky denied any such blackmail. He said he unwittingly participated in the murder by agreeing to wait for Qahwash in his car on a street close to where the killing took place. He said he thought he was helping Qahwash with a robbery. On the morning of February 2, 2009, Zvolensky arrived at Qahwash's home just before 8:00 a.m. He said Qahwash told him to park in a neighbourhood near the home where Gehl and Cyr lived together. He did so. Qahwash arrived in his own car and got into Zvolensky's car. Qahwash gave Zvolensky the gun and told him to take it to his home in Oakville.

[9] Qahwash testified that Zvolensky gave him $1,700 to buy the gun used in the killing about a week before the shooting. Qahwash said Zvolensky wanted to use the gun to rob drug dealers. He purchased the gun on the morning of January 31, 2009. He said that he and Zvolensky both went to test fire the gun on the evening of February 1. He loaded both magazines and Zvolensky fired the shots.

[10] Qahwash testified that, on the morning of the murder, Zvolensky came to his home and picked up the gun. Zvolensky told Qahwash to meet him in Oakville later that day. They met in Oakville, ran a few errands and then returned to Zvolensky's house. Qahwash said that Zvolensky then told him that he just shot Gehl, at Cyr's request, in return for future life insurance payments. Qahwash said he asked Zvolensky if he used the gun Qahwash had just bought. The next day, Qahwash sent a text to Zvolensky. He was worried he had left fingerprints on the gun. Qahwash said he unwittingly helped Zvolensky kill Gehl by giving him the gun.

[11] On their own evidence, Qahwash and Zvolensky were together, with the gun, close to the time of the killing.

[7] Mr. Cyr and his two co-accused were convicted of first-degree murder based on having committed a planned and deliberate killing.

The Law

[8] In February 2009 when Mr. Cyr committed the offence, the judicial screening mechanism for applications under s. 745.6 provided that the matter could be referred to a jury only if the applicant had shown, on a balance of probabilities, that there was a “reasonable prospect” of convincing a unanimous jury that the period of parole ineligibility would be reduced.

[9] On December 2, 2011, amendments to the Code came into effect such that the application would only be referred to a jury if the screening judge was satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there was a “substantial likelihood of success”. At the same time, the possibility of faint hope hearings was eliminated for offenders who committed murder after December 1, 2011.

[10] In R. v. Liu, 2022 ONCA 460, the Ontario Court of Appeal considered an application under section 745.6 which involved a conviction for first-degree murder on December 7, 2002, arising from an offence on February 29, 2000. The court held that the 2011 amendments to the faint hope regime did not apply to the applicant and, at para. 7, that “the reasonable prospect” of success threshold applied to s. 745.6 applications brought by offenders who committed murder between January 9, 1997 and December 2, 2011 rather than the “substantial likelihood” test. On that authority, I will consider this application according to the “reasonable prospect” standard.

[11] As directed by s. 745.61(1) of the Code, the criteria to be used in this judicial screening step in the application is the same as that which a jury must consider, set out in s. 745.63(1)(a)-(e), namely:

• the character of the applicant;
• the applicant’s conduct while serving the sentence;
• the nature of the offence for which the applicant was convicted;
• any information provided by a victim at the time of the imposition of the sentence or at the time of this hearing under this section; and
• any other matters that the judge considers relevant in the circumstances.

[12] I accept the methodology expressed by Durno J. in R. v. Morrisson, 2016 ONSC 5036 at paras. 36, and 38–41 as to the task at hand (other than his reference to the substantial likelihood test):

[36] Conducting the screening, the judge considers the above noted factors [in s. 745.61(1)] as would an empaneled jury if leave were granted. As with the jury, all of the factors must be considered. There is no “score card” that gives each factor equal weight. Each application is a fact-specific determination. One or more factors may be decisive one way or the other. Different factors will receive different weight depending on all of the circumstances and evidence.

[38] Once all of the evidence has been examined, the screening judge performs a limited weighing of the evidence in an attempt to forecast the outcome of the application if it was heard by a jury. R. v. Dulay, 2009 ABCA 12, para 5. In doing so, first, it must be kept in mind that the primary focus of the hearing is to “call attention to changes which have occurred in the applicant’s situation that might justify imposing a less harsh penalty”: Sweitlinski, [1992] 3 S.C.R. 481 at para. 12. The jury’s verdict, in effect, is an assessment of the offender’s progress: Jenkins, 2014 ONSC 3223 at para. 17.

[39] Second, when conducting the assessment, it is important to keep in mind that in order to reduce the period of ineligibility, the applicant must satisfy all jurors. Their verdict to reduce the ineligibility period must be unanimous. Accordingly, the test is whether on the material of this application, the applicant has satisfied me on a balance of probabilities that there is a substantial likelihood a jury would unanimously reduce his ineligibility period.

[40] Third, the mandated sentence for first-degree murder is life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years. The applicant must show that his or her current situation justifies a departure from the normal legislated sentence: R. v. Gayle, [2013] O.J. No. 4124 (S.C.J.) at para. 30.

[41] Fourth, having been convicted, the applicant no longer enjoys the benefit of the presumption of innocence with the burden of proof on the Crown. He had to provide all the available evidence that would support his application at the time of the threshold screening.

[13] In R. v. Dell, 2018 ONCA 674, para 20, Doherty J.A. confirmed the interpretation by previous authorities that the judicial screening function constituted a relatively low bar intended to prevent applications being brought before a jury that had no realistic chance of success, and that its purpose was twofold:

First, to save friends and relatives of the victims of the murders the needless pain and anguish of going through a “faint hope” hearing before a jury when the applicant had no realistic chance of success. Second, the screening process was intended to avoid wasting jurors’ time and judicial resources on hopeless applications.

[14] Pomerance J. (as she then was) in R. v. Al-Shammari, 2022 ONSC 4113, paras 12-13, interpreted the “reasonable prospect” test as follows:

[12] [The statutory language] asks whether it is reasonable to expect that a jury might reduce the parole ineligibility period. This need not be the only rational or reasonable outcome available on the record. If it falls within a range of reasonable outcomes, it qualifies as a reasonable prospect of success. Where an offender can point to rehabilitative progress, remorse, maturation, and a commitment to pursuing a pro-social lifestyle, those factors will weigh in favour of a jury hearing.

[13] To be clear, the screening judge is not predicting what a jury will actually do. That requires a level of prescience that no judge can claim: see R. v. Jenkins, 2014 ONSC 3223, quoted with approval in Dell. More accurately, the screening judge is assessing whether a jury could grant clemency, based on the evidence of rehabilitation.

Character of the Applicant

[15] Mr. Cyr is currently 46 years of age. He was 31 years of age at the time of the offence.

[16] He is presently incarcerated at Beaver Creek Institution.

[17] Aside from his conviction on this offence, he has no criminal record. He was born and raised in Kitchener, Ontario and had an unremarkable upbringing in a home consisting of his two parents and one brother. His mother died in 2011.

[18] Mr. Cyr has maintained close relationships with his family including cousins, nephews and nieces and is regularly visited by his father and uncle, both of whom have written supportive letters and indicated their willingness to continue to provide support to him upon his eventual release.

[19] Those closest to him consider that he has worked hard during the period of incarceration to change his life in order to become a better person. He has shown remorse and is described as kind and thoughtful.

[20] Mr. Rick Sauvé is an in-reach worker at the Beaver Creek institution where Mr. Cyr is presently incarcerated. He describes Mr. Cyr as “always respectful, insightful and often an asset in the work” performed by Mr. Sauvé. He confirms that Mr. Cyr has avoided involvement in the criminal subculture at the institution.

[21] The institutional employment records for Mr. Cyr acknowledge his ability to form and maintain interpersonal relationships with correctional staff, work supervisors and fellow inmates. Likewise, in his Offender Pay Reviews, his success at maintaining interpersonal relationships is identified. He is spoken of highly by his supervisor in the canteen at Beaver Creek where he was the canteen operator from 2019 to 2023. He is said to have had a great work ethic, excellent communication skills with staff and other inmates, as well as the ability to troubleshoot problems and to seek help and feedback when needed. He is described as being very motivated, honest and reliable.

Applicant’s Conduct While Serving the Sentence

[22] Mr. Cyr deposes in this application that he has tried his best to improve himself while incarcerated. He says he has worked hard to follow his Correctional Plan.

[23] He has made efforts to maintain consistent employment and applied for positions to help him develop new skills and to play leadership roles. He has received positive evaluations as an employee, demonstrating motivation and responsibility.

[24] Mr. Cyr has enrolled in courses offered by St. Lawrence College, including introduction to woodworking and other micro-credential courses and he has taken courses relating to workplace safety.

Nature of the Offence

[25] As noted, Mr. Cyr was convicted for first-degree murder based on planning and deliberation in the death of his spouse, Ms. Nadia Gehl. She was shot by a co-accused of Mr. Cyr on her way to work in what the Ontario Court of Appeal at para. 176 called “an execution-style killing” that occurred in broad daylight, close to a bus stop on a busy street. The theory of the Crown was that Mr. Cyr orchestrated the killing to be performed by the others, motivated by the fact that he was having a romantic affair with a secretary in the firm at which he worked as a paralegal.

[26] Prior to Mr. Cyr’s arrest and after the death of Ms. Gehl, he came into contact with an undercover officer who said he was considering arrangements to have his wife murdered. Mr. Cyr counselled the officer as to the factors he should consider to put that plan into effect. Mr. Cyr boasted about his ability to mastermind a plan to kill.

Information from Victim(s)

[27] No victim impact statements were filed at the time of Mr. Cyr’s sentencing nor was any information provided by the victim’s family following notification of this application.

Other Factors

[28] In 2011, Mr. Cyr converted to Judaism and spent the years between 2017 and 2022 attending one-on-one counselling sessions with a chaplain at the institution. He attends Shabbat every Friday.

[29] According to Mr. Cyr, the teachings and values of Judaism have guided him in his journey of self-improvement and personal growth. He believes that his spiritual connection and the related counselling have helped him increase self-confidence, emotional regulation and enabled him to ask for help when needed.

Positions of the Parties

[30] The applicant submits that during the period of his incarceration, he has developed as a person and demonstrated his dedication to self-improvement. He has taken advantage of the programming offered at the various institutions in which he has been held, including voluntary rehabilitative programs where he has developed skills and tools that have helped him address risk factors. He has been consistently employed and involved in activities in the institutions and has remained incident- and charge-free for many years, demonstrating positive, prosocial behaviour.

[31] Further, the applicant submits that through personal reflection and institutional programming, he has developed insight into the impact of the offence and expresses significant remorse for what he has done. He also has the support of his family members and members of the community. In light of his character, institutional conduct, remorse, reintegration potential, and community support, a reduction in the 25-year parole ineligibility period is appropriate.

[32] The Crown acknowledges that Mr. Cyr has conducted himself appropriately while serving his sentence and appears to have shown remorse and insight into the harm that he caused the victim’s family; that he has support from his family, and that his most recent psychological risk assessment on June 6, 2024 suggests that he is in the low range for general recidivism and in the low range for violent recidivism. However, the Crown notes the potential risk to any intimate partners.

[33] The Crown focuses its objection to the application on the facts of the offence and refers to the description of the event by the Court of Appeal to which I have referred. The Crown notes that the offence affected the community so deeply that a change of venue was warranted. The applicant planned the murder of his wife for his own selfish purposes, inspired in part by his infidelity. The Crown also references the applicant’s contact with the undercover officer as part of the matrix of facts that surrounded the offence.

Analysis

[34] I have examined the statutory factors to determine whether there is a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury could reduce the statutory minimum period of parole eligibility.

[35] In the circumstances of this case, there is an absence of information from victims, so that factor is not significant to this analysis.

[36] The evidence indicates that the applicant’s conduct during his incarceration has been exemplary, with virtually no transgressions over the last 15 years, and strong support shown from supervisory personnel. That information is new: it obviously would not have been available at the time of the applicant’s sentencing. Likewise, the applicant’s psychological risk assessments show that he poses a low risk to the public for both general and violent recidivism.

[37] Of greater significance is the evidence that the applicant appears to have accepted with insight the harm that he caused to the victim’s family and others, and he has shown remorse for his actions. Both his own affidavit and the material filed from relatives and the institution employees attest to those aspects of his character which, again, would not have been available at the time of sentencing. The adoption by the applicant of the teachings and values of Judaism is another aspect of the change in his character to which the materials attest.

[38] The nature of the offence must always be a factor weighing against the reasonable prospect of success. First-degree murder is an exceptionally serious transgression. It is difficult to consider gradations in the facts of such cases which would minimize the offender’s blameworthiness or moral culpability. In this case, the applicant was not the actual killer, but was instrumental in arranging for the murder. He appeared to have boasted about his effective planning to an undercover officer after the fact. In that he planned and orchestrated the event, those facts can be juxtaposed against his submissions about changes in his character made over the course of his incarceration which point away from a return to his previous lack of moral compass.

[39] As the Supreme Court of Canada observed in R. v. Sweitlinski (noted above in Morrisson) at para. 12, the application seeks to have a jury re-examine the statutorily imposed parole ineligibility period in view of new information that could not have been known initially.

[40] As has been noted, at this threshold screening stage, it is not the court’s role to determine whether a jury would unanimously decide to reduce the period of parole ineligibility. Based on an application of the statutory factors to the facts contained in the application, I find that on a balance of probabilities, there is a reasonable prospect that a jury could decide to do so.

Conclusion

[41] For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the applicant has shown, on a balance of probabilities, that there is a “reasonable prospect” that the application will succeed, and therefore that a jury should be empaneled to hear the application pursuant to the provisions of s. 745.61(5) of the Code.

Released: June 17, 2025