Breana Vandebeek

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed the appeal of Barrington Grant’s conviction for possession of a loaded firearm.

The appellant had challenged the admissibility of evidence obtained under a warrant, but his application was dismissed at trial.

After his conviction, related proceedings involving the same information to obtain (ITO) resulted in stays due to disclosure issues.

The Crown conceded the appeal in light of these developments and a prior Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Khamo, which quashed a conviction based on the same evidence.

The court set aside the conviction, ordered a new trial, and entered a stay of proceedings.

The decision concerns a "faint hope" application by Timothy Belisle, convicted of first-degree murder, seeking a reduction in his parole ineligibility period after serving 15 years.

The court reviews the legislative history and legal standards for faint hope applications, the applicant’s background, conduct, and rehabilitation efforts, as well as the positions of both parties.

Ultimately, the court finds that Mr. Belisle has not demonstrated a reasonable prospect of success before a jury and dismisses the application.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant, Marvin Gurango, appealed his three-year custodial sentence for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found no error in principle or law in the sentencing judge’s decision, nor was the sentence manifestly unfit.

The court emphasized the importance of denunciation and deterrence for this offence and found the sentence consistent with similar cases.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

On a s. 522 bail application arising from two second-degree murder charges stemming from a double stabbing, the applicant sought release on a strict surety plan with house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The court held that the Crown's circumstantial case was strong on unlawful killing, but the evidentiary record raised significant triable issues on mens rea and supported a viable partial defence of provocation, making manslaughter convictions more likely than murder convictions.

The court found detention was not necessary under the primary or secondary grounds, given the applicant's lack of record, his conduct in the community for over two years before arrest, and the strength of the release plan.

On the tertiary ground, the court held continued detention would undermine, rather than maintain, confidence in the administration of justice because the applicant had already spent substantial time in harsh pretrial custody and was likely in a time-served position for the offences he was most likely to be convicted of.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a handgun under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The handgun was discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest, but police subsequently breached the appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 privacy rights through warrantless entries into his apartment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the breaches cumulatively.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that while the breaches were serious, their impact was minimal as they occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun, and society's interest favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Guled Mohamed, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He raised three grounds: the trial judge erred in finding he lacked standing to challenge the search warrant, erred in inferring guilt from circumstantial evidence, and rendered an unreasonable verdict due to insufficient evidence of his knowledge of the cocaine.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings on standing, the application of circumstantial evidence, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The court clarified that a trial judge is not bound to accept the Crown's theory on standing if the accused presents contradictory evidence, and reiterated the standard for assessing circumstantial evidence and unreasonable verdicts.

The applicant was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder for killing his father.

Prior to sentencing, the applicant brought a constitutional challenge arguing that the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole for 25 years violates sections 12 and 15 of the Charter.

The applicant argued that his long-standing mental disorders and substance-induced psychosis at the time of the offence reduced his moral blameworthiness, making the mandatory sentence grossly disproportionate and discriminatory.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application.

The court held that it was bound by the jury's verdict, which necessarily found that the applicant had the requisite specific intent for first degree murder, representing the highest level of moral culpability.

The court found no violation of section 12, as the sentence is not grossly disproportionate for an offender with such high moral blameworthiness.

The court also found no violation of section 15, as the applicant failed to demonstrate that the mandatory minimum sentence disproportionately impacts persons with mental illness, noting that those who lack criminal responsibility or the requisite intent due to mental illness are not subject to the mandatory sentence.

The appellants, Thulani Chizanga and Shamar Meredith, appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and Mr. Meredith appealed his sentence.

The main issues on appeal included the admissibility of a "Super 8 Video" as prior discreditable conduct evidence, the trial judge's jury instructions on joint enterprise liability, post-offence demeanour evidence, and defence theories, as well as sentencing errors related to aggravating factors and mitigating circumstances.

The majority dismissed all appeals, finding no legal errors in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or sentencing.

A dissenting judge would have allowed the conviction appeals and ordered a new trial, arguing the Super 8 Video was improperly admitted and instructed upon, particularly concerning its probative value for joint enterprise to kill.

The appellant, a young person, appealed convictions for sexually assaulting two complainants.

The appeal raised two grounds: an alleged error in dismissing a severance application and the trial judge's assessment of evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no injustice in the severance ruling and no palpable and overriding error in the evidence assessment.

The appellant, M.G., appealed his convictions for assault, uttering threats, and sexual assault causing bodily harm against his wife, and his three-year prison sentence.

The complainant had recanted her allegations prior to trial and again post-conviction, claiming hallucinations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's credibility assessment, finding no palpable and overriding error in rejecting the recantation and accepting the complainant's earlier testimony.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's use of prior discreditable conduct evidence or in refusing to reopen the trial or declare a mistrial based on the post-conviction recantation.

On sentencing, the court found the three-year penitentiary sentence proportionate, consistent with jurisprudence for sexual assault involving penetration.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, Adam Collier, appealed his conviction for child luring and child pornography offences, and sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's assessment of his credibility, specifically her reliance on omissions in his pre-trial statement to the police and his demeanor during the interview, in light of his Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) diagnosis.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's use of material inconsistencies, including omissions, for credibility assessment.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal and a fresh evidence motion were also dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 25 years, brought a faint hope application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking a reduction in his parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect that a unanimous jury would reduce the period.

While acknowledging the applicant's positive institutional conduct, including education and employment, the court found that the applicant lacked true remorse and insight, minimizing his role in the callous murder over a $30 drug debt.

The court also noted recent concerning institutional misconduct and the fact that the applicant would be deported upon release without Parole Board supervision.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant, Emmanuel Owusu-Ansah, appealed his conviction for second-degree murder and the imposed sentence of life imprisonment with a 22-year parole ineligibility period.

The appeal raised four issues: reasonable apprehension of judicial bias due to repeated interjections, erroneous admission of prior discreditable conduct evidence, incorrect and inadequate jury instruction on provocation, and an unfit sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, upholding the admission of prior conduct evidence as probative of motive and context, affirming the jury instruction on provocation, and deeming the sentence fit given the horrific nature of the murder and the appellant's prior domestic abuse convictions.

The appellant, a 19-year-old first-time offender, was convicted of child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services after responding to an undercover police advertisement.

He appealed his convictions, alleging errors in the jury charge regarding mens rea and arguing he was entrapped by police inducement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury instructions or the entrapment ruling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court admitted fresh evidence of the appellant's recent medical hardships and found the trial judge erred in principle by not considering a conditional sentence, which became legally available due to an intervening change in the law.

The Court struck down the six-month mandatory minimum sentence under s. 286.1(2)(a) of the Criminal Code as grossly disproportionate and substituted a nine-month conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced for possession of a loaded prohibited firearm and unauthorized possession of a firearm while subject to a prohibition order, having been acquitted of attempted murder based on self-defence.

The court considered the offender's lived experiences with anti-Black racism, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions including COVID-19 lockdowns, and his lack of prior firearm convictions.

A total sentence of 40 months was imposed, reduced to 15 months remaining after applying enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions.

The appellants, Gavin MacMillan and Enzo De Jesus Carrasco, appealed their convictions for sexual assault and administering a stupefying substance, and their nine-year sentences.

They argued the trial judge erred in admitting expert evidence, excluding evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity, instructing the jury on consent (specifically regarding orgasms), and demonstrating a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the convictions and sentences.

The court affirmed the trial judge's rulings on expert evidence necessity and impartiality, the proper application of s. 276 of the Criminal Code regarding consent and prior sexual activity, and found no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The sentences were deemed fit and not demonstrably unfit.

The appellant, convicted of sexual assault, appealed on the grounds that the trial judge relied on impermissible stereotypical inferences and ungrounded common-sense assumptions in assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypical reasoning regarding the complainant's willingness to engage in public sexual activity and sexual activity during menstruation, which materially influenced the credibility assessment.

The court emphasized that such reasoning violates the rule against stereotypical inferences and impermissible character reasoning.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered, as the curative proviso could not be applied due to the lack of overwhelming evidence.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of two counts of aggravated assault as a party to a planned shooting in downtown St. Catharines that injured the intended target and five innocent bystanders.

The Crown sought a 15-year sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court rejected the conditional sentence, finding the offender's moral blameworthiness high despite his non-shooter status.

After applying the Bellissimo range, considering mitigating factors, and applying credits for totality, Duncan, and Summers, the court imposed a net sentence of 5 years in a federal penitentiary.