Breana Vandebeek

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including two knife confrontations with co-tenants and landlord complaints leading to an eviction notice.

The accused conceded the admissibility of a recent knife confrontation with the deceased but opposed other incidents.

The court ruled that an earlier knife incident with other co-tenants (McDonald and Augustine) was inadmissible due to its minimal probative value, stemming from inconsistent witness testimony, and high prejudicial effect, including risks of moral and reasoning prejudice.

Similarly, evidence of general complaints received by the landlord prior to the immediate pre-stabbing events was deemed inadmissible for similar reasons, while evidence related to the immediate pre-stabbing conflict and eviction notice was allowed.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to prevent the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record should he choose to testify.

The accused's record included dated convictions for assault, weapons offences, and property offences.

The court applied the Corbett factors and concluded that the probative value of the convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, particularly given their age and the risk of propensity reasoning.

The application was granted, and the Crown was prohibited from cross-examining the accused on his criminal record.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years imposed for robbery with a restricted firearm and related offences.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the mandatory five-year minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a)(i) violates s. 12 of the Charter and should be struck down; (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to give enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody given harsh detention conditions; and (3) that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's personal circumstances and the restraint principle applicable to young first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting outside an after-hours bar.

The Crown's case relied on surveillance video evidence, detective testimony identifying the appellant through multiple physical characteristics, and DNA evidence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge's exclusion of expert evidence from a physicist regarding whether a white spot on the surveillance video was a chain and medallion, and (2) the trial judge's failure to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence but allowed the appeal on the provocation issue, finding that the evidence satisfied the air of reality threshold for the defence.

The appellant was convicted of pointing a firearm, possession of a firearm contrary to prohibition, possession of a firearm knowingly unauthorized, and operating a motor vehicle disqualified.

He received nine months' incarceration (after credit for pre-trial custody) and three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: inadequate consideration of inconsistencies in complainant evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding whether the meeting was accidental or pre-arranged, erroneous reliance on precedent regarding firearm possession, and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter following a guilty plea in the death of his 53-day-old son.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that the sentencing judge unfairly minimized the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; that the judge unduly relied on the appellant's failure to disclose a head injury to medical personnel; that the judge misapprehended the agreed statement of facts regarding the force used; and that the judge erred in declining to award pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio for harsh detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The applicant sought a declaration that a deceased father's statement, implicating himself in drug importation and exculpating his daughter, was admissible at her trial either as a declaration against penal interest or under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court denied the application, finding that the statement did not meet the criteria for a declaration against penal interest due to lack of apprehended penal vulnerability and remoteness of consequences.

Furthermore, it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the principled exception, given the circumstances of its making, the declarant's criminal record for dishonesty, and absence of corroborating evidence.

A youth appealed his sentencing on charges of unlawful possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon (sawed-off shotgun), and breach of recognizance.

The appellant contended that the youth court judge erred by not respecting the joint sentencing submission on allocation of pre-sentence custody, by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing, by imposing a 15-month probationary sentence (which exceeded the statutory maximum of 12 months for the s. 95 offence), and by imposing a 7-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal, modifying the probationary sentence on the s. 95 offence to 12 months while upholding the other aspects of the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer during a robbery.

The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility after 16 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on five grounds: (1) the admissibility of expert opinion evidence regarding cellphone usage patterns by drug traffickers; (2) the trial judge's refusal to admit prior out-of-court statements; (3) jury instructions cautioning the jury to consider the appellant's testimony with particular care; (4) jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence; and (5) the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the significance of non-identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found merit in several grounds of appeal, particularly regarding the cellphone evidence, jury instructions on the appellant's alibi testimony, and instructions on eyewitness non-identification evidence.

The court determined that the cumulative effect of these errors was not harmless and warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, cocaine, and drug proceeds, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant possessed a Browning semi-automatic handgun, cocaine, and a scale that were discovered in the snow outside a bedroom window after the appellant fled a police-surveilled apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have inferred that he personally placed these items outside, contending that others could have thrown them or that a young person who also fled could have dropped them.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding that the trial judge's inference was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's clothing capacity, his crouching action near the items, and the lack of opportunity for others to have disposed of them.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple fraud and uttering forged document counts, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant had defrauded multiple complainants of over half a million dollars by providing them with forged Bank of Montreal term investment certificates.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in amending the information to include additional complainants; (2) the trial judge erred in applying cross-count reasoning; (3) the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment request; and (4) the trial judge erred in curtailing cross-examination of a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

Following a guilty plea to robbery with a restricted firearm, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, pointing a firearm, dangerous driving, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, the applicant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and bail pending appeal.

The motions judge granted both applications, finding that the applicant had demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the requisite period, that the delay had been adequately explained, and that the proposed appeal raised arguable grounds of merit.

The court found that the applicant would suffer unnecessary hardship if detained pending appeal and that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana), possession of a prohibited device, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, less credit for pre-disposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 42 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged: (1) the trial judge's decision to apply section 653.1 of the Criminal Code to bind the parties by a prior ruling refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant; (2) the correctness of that prior ruling; and (3) the trial judge's rejection of the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.