Breana Vandebeek

The appellant, Richard Korecki, appealed his convictions for 14 personal injury offences against his former domestic partner, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting evidence of similar acts involving a former domestic partner.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the governing test for similar act evidence, balancing its probative value against its prejudicial effect, and that her conclusion was not unreasonable.

The appeal from sentence was not pursued and was dismissed as abandoned.

The applicant, Gavin MacMillan, sought bail pending appeal after being convicted by a jury of sexual assault and administering a noxious substance, for which he received a nine-year sentence.

The primary ground of appeal was the retrospective application of Bill C-75, which abolished peremptory juror challenges, an issue previously addressed by the Court of Appeal in *R. v. Chouhan*.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous and that the applicant was not a flight risk.

The court granted bail, finding that despite the gravity of the offences, the strength of the appeal (bordering on certainty due to *Chouhan*) and the proposed stringent bail conditions (virtual house arrest) meant that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellant, convicted of second-degree murder, appealed on the ground that the trial judge erred by allowing expert evidence regarding security video footage to go beyond permissible opinion, thereby usurping the jury's function.

The expert provided narrative testimony interpreting the video, which the appellant argued undermined his claims of self-defence and lack of mens rea.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function, limiting the expert to his area of expertise, and provided sufficient cautions to the jury, reminding them of their ultimate responsibility to interpret the video evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of possession of 102 grams of powder cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and sentenced to 18 months' incarceration.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to mitigating factors such as his rehabilitation, bail history, and drug addiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and concluding the sentence was within the fit range.

Sarai Lopez Iglesias, charged with first-degree murder, applied for bail.

The Crown opposed, citing the strength of the case, the gravity of the offence, and concerns on primary and secondary grounds.

The applicant proposed a robust bail plan including house arrest with sureties (her mother and step-father), electronic monitoring, and a substantial pledge.

The court, while acknowledging the strong Crown case and serious nature of the charge, found that the proposed plan, particularly the full-time supervision by the mother, was sufficient to address the concerns on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, and granted bail.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempting to obstruct justice contrary to s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

The conviction arose from allegations that while in custody, the appellant wrote letters to another inmate requesting false evidence concerning prior convictions.

The trial judge convicted the appellant despite the loss of the original letters prior to the re-trial.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge shifted the burden of proof when assessing the evidence of the key witness; (2) the trial judge failed to properly apply Vetrovec principles regarding the credibility of an unsavoury witness; and (3) the trial judge erred in dismissing the stay application based on the prejudice caused by the loss of the original letters.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of human trafficking, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and advertising sexual services for consideration.

The trial judge misdirected the jury on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing these offences.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by: (1) instructing the jury to read the disjunctive conduct elements conjunctively, requiring proof of near-total control over the complainant's movements; (2) failing to distinguish between "direction" and "influence" as different degrees of coercion; and (3) improperly extending the immunity provision for advertising one's own sexual services to those who assist in such advertising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant abandoned his conviction appeal but proceeded with a sentence appeal.

The Crown conceded that a Gladue report, which was not considered at the original sentencing, should be accepted as fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal accepted the Crown's concession and varied the sentence to a global sentence of 7 years less pre-trial custody of 2.5 months.

The Court imposed 6 years for robbery and 1 year concurrent for counts 5 and 6, consecutive to the robbery count, with pre-trial custody applied to reduce the 1-year sentence to a net of 9.5 months.

The Court rejected submissions for a 6-year global sentence and denied credit for house arrest due to bail breaches and absconding.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a child pornography case where the trial judge excluded evidence obtained through a search warrant.

The trial judge found the warrant was invalid because police failed to verify information from the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) report for accuracy, failed to include a disclaimer from the NCMEC report, failed to confirm Microsoft's use of PhotoDNA software, and found the information stale despite only seven to eight months having elapsed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and entered a conviction, finding the trial judge applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring verification for accuracy rather than assessing reasonableness, and erred in substituting her own views for those of the issuing justice.

The appellants were convicted of importing cocaine after returning from vacation in St. Lucia with 1.4 kilograms of cocaine each.

They appealed their convictions on the basis that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof regarding the defence of duress and erroneously required corroboration of the evidence.

The appellants argued duress was the only defence at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge made a misstatement regarding the burden of proof, this was a simple error that did not affect the outcome when the reasons were read as a whole.

The defence failed because the trial judge did not believe the evidence of the testifying appellant and found no reasonable doubt regarding the threats and assaults, and further found that the appellants had a safe avenue of escape once within Canadian jurisdiction.

The appellant was convicted of sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault involving his stepdaughter between the ages of 6 and 11.

On appeal, the appellant raised two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in relying on the consistency of the complainant's allegations to address credibility concerns; and second, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds, finding that the trial judge properly considered the complainant's consistent reporting to multiple authorities over a three-year period as context for assessing the defence's attack on reliability, and that the trial judge's credibility findings were based on corroborating evidence and were open to him on the record.

The appellant was convicted of drug-related offences and appealed on the grounds that the police obtained the drugs through an unconstitutional arrest and search, and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful based on the appellant's possession of marijuana in an open knapsack and a baggie.

The search was incidental to the lawful arrest and conducted reasonably.

Regarding the alleged s. 10(b) breach, the trial judge found insufficient evidence of prejudice and declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no error in the trial judge's findings and concluding that the appellant failed to meet his onus to demonstrate exclusion of evidence was warranted.

The appellant appealed his conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the appellant, that the appellant's section 10(b) Charter right was not violated, and that the appellant's statement made en route to the cell was voluntary.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her sentence of nine months in custody for fraud over $5,000 and attempted fraud under $5,000.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing general deterrence and denunciation while underemphasizing individual deterrence and rehabilitation, which are critical sentencing principles for youthful first offenders.

The court also found error in treating the appellant's decision to proceed to trial as an aggravating factor.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of three subsections of the child luring provision in a police sting operation context: the age presumption under s. 172.1(3), the reasonable steps requirement under s. 172.1(4), and the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 172.1(2)(a).

The majority held that s. 172.1(3) infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter and cannot be saved under s. 1, but that s. 172.1(4) does not infringe s. 7 because it only limits a defence rather than providing an independent pathway to conviction.

Because the trial judge convicted on a legally unsound basis — failure to take reasonable steps — without finding proof beyond a reasonable doubt of actual belief, the conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

The constitutionality of the mandatory minimum was left to the new trial judge.

Karakatsanis J. concurred but would have also declared the mandatory minimum unconstitutional.

Abella J. dissented in part, finding s. 172.1(4) also unconstitutional and that an acquittal should be entered.

In a second-degree murder trial, the Crown sought to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including two knife confrontations with co-tenants and landlord complaints leading to an eviction notice.

The accused conceded the admissibility of a recent knife confrontation with the deceased but opposed other incidents.

The court ruled that an earlier knife incident with other co-tenants (McDonald and Augustine) was inadmissible due to its minimal probative value, stemming from inconsistent witness testimony, and high prejudicial effect, including risks of moral and reasoning prejudice.

Similarly, evidence of general complaints received by the landlord prior to the immediate pre-stabbing events was deemed inadmissible for similar reasons, while evidence related to the immediate pre-stabbing conflict and eviction notice was allowed.

During a trial for second degree murder, the accused brought a Corbett application to prevent the Crown from cross-examining him on his criminal record should he choose to testify.

The accused's record included dated convictions for assault, weapons offences, and property offences.

The court applied the Corbett factors and concluded that the probative value of the convictions was outweighed by their prejudicial effect, particularly given their age and the risk of propensity reasoning.

The application was granted, and the Crown was prohibited from cross-examining the accused on his criminal record.

The appellant appealed his sentence of six years imposed for robbery with a restricted firearm and related offences.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the mandatory five-year minimum sentence under s. 344(1)(a)(i) violates s. 12 of the Charter and should be struck down; (2) that the trial judge erred in failing to give enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody given harsh detention conditions; and (3) that the trial judge erred in principle by failing to adequately weigh the appellant's personal circumstances and the restraint principle applicable to young first offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and attempted murder following a shooting outside an after-hours bar.

The Crown's case relied on surveillance video evidence, detective testimony identifying the appellant through multiple physical characteristics, and DNA evidence.

The appellant raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge's exclusion of expert evidence from a physicist regarding whether a white spot on the surveillance video was a chain and medallion, and (2) the trial judge's failure to leave the partial defence of provocation with the jury.

The Court of Appeal upheld the exclusion of the expert evidence but allowed the appeal on the provocation issue, finding that the evidence satisfied the air of reality threshold for the defence.

The appellant was convicted of pointing a firearm, possession of a firearm contrary to prohibition, possession of a firearm knowingly unauthorized, and operating a motor vehicle disqualified.

He received nine months' incarceration (after credit for pre-trial custody) and three years' probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the convictions on four grounds: inadequate consideration of inconsistencies in complainant evidence, misapprehension of evidence regarding whether the meeting was accidental or pre-arranged, erroneous reliance on precedent regarding firearm possession, and unreasonableness of verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.