Breana Vandebeek

The appellant was convicted of six counts of fraud over $5,000, one count of uttering a forged document, and one count of personation.

He appealed on two grounds: first, that the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay evidence of a deceased witness under section 715(1) of the Criminal Code, and second, that the trial judge failed to adequately relate the evidence to the individual counts in the jury charge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in admitting the hearsay evidence and that the jury charge, while not ideal, was adequate in the context of the trial as a whole.

The appellant appealed his sentence for manslaughter following a guilty plea in the death of his 53-day-old son.

The appellant raised four grounds of appeal: that the sentencing judge unfairly minimized the mitigating effect of the guilty plea; that the judge unduly relied on the appellant's failure to disclose a head injury to medical personnel; that the judge misapprehended the agreed statement of facts regarding the force used; and that the judge erred in declining to award pre-sentence credit beyond the 1.5:1 ratio for harsh detention conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle and that the sentence was fit.

The applicant sought a declaration that a deceased father's statement, implicating himself in drug importation and exculpating his daughter, was admissible at her trial either as a declaration against penal interest or under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The court denied the application, finding that the statement did not meet the criteria for a declaration against penal interest due to lack of apprehended penal vulnerability and remoteness of consequences.

Furthermore, it lacked sufficient indicia of reliability for the principled exception, given the circumstances of its making, the declarant's criminal record for dishonesty, and absence of corroborating evidence.

A youth appealed his sentencing on charges of unlawful possession of a loaded handgun, unlawful possession of a prohibited weapon (sawed-off shotgun), and breach of recognizance.

The appellant contended that the youth court judge erred by not respecting the joint sentencing submission on allocation of pre-sentence custody, by failing to allow the appellant to speak before sentencing, by imposing a 15-month probationary sentence (which exceeded the statutory maximum of 12 months for the s. 95 offence), and by imposing a 7-year weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal partially allowed the appeal, modifying the probationary sentence on the s. 95 offence to 12 months while upholding the other aspects of the sentence.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder in the shooting death of a drug dealer during a robbery.

The trial judge sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole ineligibility after 16 years.

On appeal, the appellant challenged his conviction on five grounds: (1) the admissibility of expert opinion evidence regarding cellphone usage patterns by drug traffickers; (2) the trial judge's refusal to admit prior out-of-court statements; (3) jury instructions cautioning the jury to consider the appellant's testimony with particular care; (4) jury instructions on eyewitness identification evidence; and (5) the trial judge's failure to properly instruct the jury on the significance of non-identification evidence.

The Court of Appeal found merit in several grounds of appeal, particularly regarding the cellphone evidence, jury instructions on the appellant's alibi testimony, and instructions on eyewitness non-identification evidence.

The court determined that the cumulative effect of these errors was not harmless and warranted a new trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possession of a firearm, cocaine, and drug proceeds, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant possessed a Browning semi-automatic handgun, cocaine, and a scale that were discovered in the snow outside a bedroom window after the appellant fled a police-surveilled apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge should not have inferred that he personally placed these items outside, contending that others could have thrown them or that a young person who also fled could have dropped them.

The Court of Appeal upheld all convictions, finding that the trial judge's inference was reasonable based on the totality of the evidence, including the appellant's clothing capacity, his crouching action near the items, and the lack of opportunity for others to have disposed of them.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, challenging the trial judge's credibility analysis of the complainant's evidence.

The appellant argued that the trial judge impermissibly relied on the concept of memory fragmentation caused by alcohol consumption without expert evidence and that counsel was not given an opportunity to address this finding.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in failing to address the complainant's refusal to provide her cellphone to police to recover deleted text messages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings were open to him based on the evidence and that there was no unfairness in the proceedings.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 490.013(2.1) of the Criminal Code, which mandates lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) for offenders convicted of more than one designated sexual offence.

The appellant argued the provision violated section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of overbreadth and gross disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the provision was neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate.

The court held that conviction of multiple sexual offences is a reasonable proxy for enhanced risk of re-offending, and that the modest impact on liberty is proportionate to the important objective of public safety.

The appellant appealed his conviction on multiple fraud and uttering forged document counts, as well as his sentence.

The trial judge found that the appellant had defrauded multiple complainants of over half a million dollars by providing them with forged Bank of Montreal term investment certificates.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised four grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in amending the information to include additional complainants; (2) the trial judge erred in applying cross-count reasoning; (3) the trial judge erred in refusing an adjournment request; and (4) the trial judge erred in curtailing cross-examination of a witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

Following a guilty plea to robbery with a restricted firearm, assault causing bodily harm, possession of a loaded restricted firearm, pointing a firearm, dangerous driving, and possession of a firearm while prohibited, the applicant was sentenced to six years' imprisonment less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal and bail pending appeal.

The motions judge granted both applications, finding that the applicant had demonstrated a bona fide intention to appeal within the requisite period, that the delay had been adequately explained, and that the proposed appeal raised arguable grounds of merit.

The court found that the applicant would suffer unnecessary hardship if detained pending appeal and that detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of possession of controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking (cocaine, MDMA, and marijuana), possession of a prohibited device, and possession of proceeds of crime.

He was sentenced to five years imprisonment, less credit for pre-disposition custody, resulting in a net sentence of 42 months.

On appeal, the appellant challenged: (1) the trial judge's decision to apply section 653.1 of the Criminal Code to bind the parties by a prior ruling refusing leave to cross-examine the ITO affiant; (2) the correctness of that prior ruling; and (3) the trial judge's rejection of the Charter section 8 challenge to the search warrants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld both the conviction and sentence.

The appellant appealed his conviction on four grounds following a jury trial where he was convicted of failing to stop after an accident, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and attempt to obstruct justice.

The appellant's main defense was that a third party, Derek Rego, was the driver.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding that the trial judge's instructions regarding the third party suspect defense, treatment of the sister's evidence, and comments concerning another witness's evidence were adequate when read as a whole.

The court also found the impaired driving conviction was reasonable based on evidence of alcohol on the appellant's breath, bloodshot eyes, unsteady gait, and erratic driving.

Both the appellant and Crown abandoned their sentence appeals.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and aggravated assault following a violent altercation on a restaurant patio.

He appealed on two grounds, claiming the Crown's closing address was improper and that the trial judge's instruction on self-defence was erroneous.

The Crown's closing address did not misstate the legal test for self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, and any inappropriate comments were adequately corrected by the trial judge.

The trial judge's instruction on self-defence was thorough and proper, correctly identifying the three key elements of the defence without improperly adding proportionality as an additional requirement.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault on three grounds.

The first ground challenged the trial judge's finding that the appellant's Charter s. 10(b) rights were properly advised, arguing the police officer failed to inform him of his right to consult counsel in private.

The Court of Appeal rejected this ground, finding the trial judge properly ensured the appellant understood his rights and made an informed decision to speak without counsel.

The second ground challenged a misstatement regarding drug testing of the complainant, but the Court found this immaterial as the trial judge's finding of incapacity to consent was based on overwhelming evidence of intoxication.

The third ground challenged the trial judge's credibility finding regarding the appellant's fabricated evidence about drinking, but the Court found this finding was open to the trial judge and there were other unimpeachable reasons to reject the appellant's evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, which allegedly occurred on a commercial flight while the complainant was sleeping.

The summary conviction appeal court found that the trial judge erred by failing to adequately address the reliability of the complainant's evidence, improperly discounting the appellant's good character evidence, and engaging in impermissible speculation by taking judicial notice of the aircraft's seat configuration without evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of assaulting his former domestic partner.

At trial, the judge restricted the defence's cross-examination of the complainant regarding her prior sexual history and the duration of the alleged assault, citing section 276 of the Criminal Code and the twin myths.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found that section 276 does not apply to common assault prosecutions and that the trial judge's restrictions materially impaired the appellant's right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against female massage clients at his massage and yoga studio.

He appealed his convictions on multiple grounds, including that the application judge failed to provide reasons for refusing his severance application, that the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence, and that the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's immediate report to police.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial solely on the basis that the application judge's failure to provide reasons for refusing severance frustrated meaningful appellate review, particularly given the intertwined issues of severance and similar fact evidence.

The respondent was arrested for robbery and released on bail.

While on bail, he committed a second offence (procuring sexual services) and was denied bail for that charge.

He was subsequently convicted of the robbery offences and sentenced with credit for pre-trial custody accumulated after his detention on the second offence.

The Crown appealed, arguing that pre-trial custody incurred following a later, unrelated charge could not be credited against the sentence for the earlier robbery offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sections 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code do not limit credit for pre-trial custody only to the offence that directly triggered detention.

Rather, courts must assess whether a sufficient causal link exists between the pre-trial custody and the offence being sentenced, which may encompass custody arising from later charges if those charges contributed to the denial of bail or the offender's decision not to seek bail.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment.

The sole issue at trial was consent.

The complainant testified she did not consent to sexual intercourse that occurred in her dormitory room.

The appellant did not testify but provided a police statement claiming the sexual activity was consensual.

The trial judge found the complainant credible and the appellant's statements unbelievable, convicting him based on the circumstances of the incident and the appellant's pattern of dishonesty.

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence on multiple grounds, all of which were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for sexual assault and assault with a weapon against his ex-partner.

The central issue at trial was credibility, with the appellant claiming consensual sexual activity and the complainant denying consent.

The appeal focused on the trial judge's treatment of text messages between the parties, inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony, and the assessment of the appellant's evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge engaged in illogical reasoning regarding the circumstances of the assault, impermissibly dismissed the appellant's evidence as 'self-serving' without proper basis, and failed to adequately address the complainant's potential motive to fabricate related to family law proceedings.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.