Breana Vandebeek

The appellants were convicted by jury of second-degree murder and aggravated assault arising from a parking lot altercation in which one victim was fatally stabbed and another was wounded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the first appellant's murder conviction was not unreasonable given multiple available routes to liability under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code, and that the second appellant's s. 11(b) application was properly dismissed under the Jordan transitional exception.

The court also rejected challenges to the jury instructions on circumstantial evidence, after-the-fact conduct, manslaughter under s. 21(2), and the Vetrovec caution regarding a mixed witness.

Zachary Barton was convicted by a jury of firearms-related offences.

Police found a semi-automatic handgun during a warrantless search in a common hallway planter, and later ammunition and a bullet-proof vest during a warranted search of his apartment.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in concluding the handgun was not obtained in a manner that infringed his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the handgun was unconstitutionally obtained due to its causal, contextual, and temporal links to the unlawful police conduct.

As the trial judge had not fully determined the validity of the search warrant after excising the unconstitutionally obtained evidence, the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial on all charges.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, as well as his sentence of a suspended sentence and two years' probation.

The charges arose from a prolonged neighbour dispute culminating in the appellant throwing apples at the complainant.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.(D.) test were reasonable.

The appeal against sentence was also dismissed, as a conditional discharge was not in the appellant's best interest given his lack of remorse.

At the Crown's request, the court varied the sentence to include a mandatory 10-year weapons prohibition order under s. 109 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant, Sara Fuller, appealed her convictions on five counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

The appeal challenged the validity of the search warrant that led to the discovery of the drugs, arguing insufficient grounds and staleness of information.

The appellant also raised an issue with the trial judge's reference to her failure to testify.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there were sufficient grounds for the search warrant and that the two-month delay did not render the information stale given the nature of the stolen goods.

The court also concluded that the trial judge's reference to the appellant's failure to testify, while not ideal, did not undermine the conviction as it was intended to demonstrate the absence of alternative reasonable inferences in a circumstantial case.

This is an appeal from conviction and sentence.

The appellant, Muhammad Abbas Jaffer, was convicted of child luring and communicating to obtain sexual services from a minor, stemming from an undercover police operation (Project Raphael).

He appealed on grounds of entrapment, arguing both opportunity-based and inducement-based entrapment, and that his sentence was unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding that the police operation did not constitute entrapment and that the trial judge's sentence was fit, adequately considering aggravating and mitigating factors.

The appellant was convicted of numerous offences, including carjacking and home invasion.

The defence argued the incidents were staged robberies intended to steal money from a third party, not actual robberies of the alleged victims.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's ruling on reply evidence, the reference to co-accused guilty pleas, and the assessment of evidence inconsistencies.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no miscarriage of justice despite a minor error in considering one co-accused's guilty plea.

David Obregon Castro and Sarai Lopez-Iglesias, accused of first-degree murder, applied to deliver an opening address to the jury immediately after the Crown.

The court dismissed the application, affirming that such a request is a matter of judicial discretion, not a constitutional right, and should only be granted in special or unusual circumstances.

The court found no such circumstances present, citing concerns about the defence's ability to commit to evidence not yet determined and the risk of the opening address straying into argument.

The appellant, a photographer, appealed his conviction for multiple counts of invitation to sexual touching and sexually touching two fourteen-year-old clients.

The appeal grounds were that the trial judge misapprehended the defence's position regarding the complainants' alleged motive to fabricate and collusion.

The defence suggested a motive to fabricate arose from the complainants' involvement in an organization assisting sexual abuse victims, and that there was unconscious collusion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had properly confronted and rejected the defence's arguments regarding motive to fabricate and collusion, and that her findings were reasonable.

The appellants, David Brown and Daimian Johnson, appealed their sentences for drug trafficking offences, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient credit for various mitigating factors, including multiple arrests, restrictive bail conditions, and cooperation with authorities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding that the sentencing judge had properly identified and considered the mitigating factors and that the sentences imposed were reasonable and reflected the circumstances.

The moving party, who was convicted of sexual assault and administering a noxious substance, applied to vary his release order to extend his surrender date pending appeal.

The Crown opposed the extension, arguing that following a recent Supreme Court of Canada decision, the moving party could no longer show that his detention was not necessary in the public interest.

The motion judge found that while the proposed grounds of appeal did not appear strong, they surpassed the 'not frivolous' criterion.

Given the moving party's uneventful bail history and the short period required before the appeal could be heard, the motion judge concluded that the public interest in reviewability outweighed the enforceability interest.

The application to extend bail was granted.

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to admit several ante mortem statements made by the deceased under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The statements primarily concerned the accused's anger towards the deceased and the accused allegedly stealing the deceased's apartment keys.

The court applied the framework from Bradshaw and Khelawon to assess substantive reliability, using corroborative evidence where appropriate.

The court admitted the statements made to the deceased's sister, a close friend, the building superintendent, and the property manager, finding them reliable.

However, statements made to the deceased's boyfriend and another friend were excluded due to reliability concerns and unclear declarant identity.

During a trial for first degree murder, the defence applied to exclude utterances made by one co-accused to a friend, arguing they were more prejudicial than probative to the other co-accused.

The Crown also sought to admit text messages extracted from the co-accused's phone.

The court ruled that the utterances were admissible, as their probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and juries are presumed to follow instructions limiting the use of such evidence against a co-accused.

The court also ruled that the text messages were admissible, finding that the Crown had met the modest threshold for authentication under s. 31.1 of the Canada Evidence Act through direct and circumstantial evidence.

In a joint trial for first-degree murder, the applicant co-accused brought a pre-trial motion to adduce evidence of the respondent co-accused's prior discreditable conduct through Crown witnesses.

The applicant sought to introduce this evidence to support a cutthroat defence and explain her state of mind.

The court reviewed various proposed items of evidence, ruling some admissible (such as prior violence towards the applicant and possession of a firearm) and others inadmissible (such as drug use, out-of-court statements, and speculative intimidation) based on relevance and the balancing of probative value against prejudicial effect.

The Crown applied to adduce evidence of prior discreditable conduct against the accused in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included the accused's prior possession of a firearm, threats made against the deceased, and participation in a prior shooting incident.

The court found that the evidence was relevant and material to the issues of identity, animus, and motive.

Applying the framework for prior discreditable conduct, the court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, and ruled the evidence admissible with certain edits.

The appellant was convicted of child luring and making sexually explicit images available to a child following an undercover police sting.

The trial judge relied on the evidentiary presumption of belief in age under s. 172.1(3) of the Criminal Code.

Following the convictions, the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morrison struck down this presumption as unconstitutional.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by applying the pre-Morrison framework and relying on the presumption to establish the appellant's belief in the interlocutor's age.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso, allowed the appeal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault after randomly attacking and raping a stranger walking home at night.

He was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentencing judge misapplied Gladue principles by finding his Indigenous heritage moot due to the severity of the offence, and failed to apply principles of proportionality and restraint.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in his Gladue analysis, the 12-year sentence remained fit given the egregious nature of the random attack and the need to prioritize denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted of three counts of sexual assault against three male patients during relaxation therapy sessions.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting formal admissions made by his counsel in prior disciplinary proceedings, by allowing the similar fact evidence of each complainant to be used across counts, and by failing to properly instruct the jury regarding potential collusion and adverse inferences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disciplinary admissions were properly admitted as admissions against interest, the similar fact evidence was correctly weighed for probative value versus prejudicial effect, and the jury instructions were adequate.

The appellants were convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and conspiracy to import cocaine, based largely on the testimony and eyewitness identification of a co-conspirator who had already been convicted.

On appeal, the appellants argued the verdicts were unreasonable and challenged the trial judge's jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal found the verdicts were not unreasonable but allowed the appeals and ordered new trials due to errors in the jury charge.

Specifically, the trial judge provided an inadequate Vetrovec caution that distracted the jury from the witness's motive to cooperate with police, and gave boilerplate instructions on eyewitness identification that failed to highlight the specific frailties of the witness's evidence.

The appellants were convicted of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking in cocaine following a lengthy police surveillance operation dubbed 'Project Odyssey'.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge erred in his handling of a confidential informant privilege application, in refusing to stay proceedings for alleged police misconduct, and in rendering unreasonable verdicts based on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the in camera, ex parte procedure used for the privilege claim, upholding the trial judge's factual findings regarding police conduct, and concluding the circumstantial evidence overwhelmingly supported the convictions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearm and drug offences and his sentence of 7.5 years.

He argued the trial judge erred in drawing adverse inferences about his knowledge of the contraband found in his vehicle, in assessing police testimony, and in admitting the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter despite a s. 8 breach.

He also sought a sentence reduction due to the Charter breach and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction and sentence appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's reasoning or Charter analysis.

However, the court set aside the $1,600 victim fine surcharge.