David Parke

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He raised six grounds of appeal, including challenges to the admission of hearsay evidence regarding the breathalyzer's calibration, the application of the repealed presumption of identity, the reasonableness of the delay in taking breath samples, the officer's grounds for arrest, and the Crown's failure to disclose the analyst's certificate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed all grounds, finding no errors in the trial judge's application of the law or assessment of the evidence.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after his vehicle drifted into oncoming traffic, resulting in a fatal collision.

The Crown argued the accused was awake but inattentive for 14 seconds.

The defence argued there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep at the wheel without prior warning.

The court found that the driving was objectively dangerous, but there was a reasonable possibility the accused fell asleep and had no reason to foresee the risk of falling asleep.

The accused was acquitted.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug.

The trial judge had delivered a brief oral acquittal and later provided comprehensive written reasons after inviting further submissions on a new appellate decision.

The parties agreed that under R. v. Teskey, the appellate court could not consider the written reasons, and under R. v. Sheppard, the oral reasons were insufficient for appellate review.

The summary conviction appeal court accepted the joint submission, set aside the acquittal, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

He argued that his statements to the police at the scene of a single-vehicle collision were compelled under the Highway Traffic Act, and therefore the officer's observation of the smell of alcohol should have been excluded under the Charter.

The summary conviction appeal judge upheld the trial judge's finding that the officer detected the smell of alcohol independently of the compelled statements, specifically when the appellant was isolated in the police cruiser.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level exceeding 80 mg/100 mL.

He argued that his breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable', that the Crown could not rely on the repealed 'presumption of identity' provision, and that his s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was violated when he was denied a second call to his own lawyer after speaking with duty counsel.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the breath tests were conducted within a reasonable time, that the presumption of identity continued to apply to pre-amendment offences, and that the appellant's dissatisfaction with duty counsel did not trigger a right to a second consultation.

The offender pleaded guilty to operating a motor vehicle with methamphetamine causing death, operating while prohibited, and failing to comply with bail.

He crossed the center line and caused a fatal head-on collision.

The court weighed the severe aggravating factors, including his prior impaired driving record and driving prohibitions, against mitigating factors such as his guilty plea and remorse.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment, reduced by 60 days for COVID-19 collateral consequences, and granted 1347 days of pre-sentence custody credit, leaving a remnant of 2 years and 53 days to serve.

A 12-year driving prohibition was also ordered.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction sentence where the trial judge granted a conditional discharge for impaired driving, finding the mandatory minimum sentence violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The Crown also sought to introduce fresh evidence of the respondent's subsequent impaired driving conviction.

The Superior Court dismissed the fresh evidence application but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge made several errors in principle, including failing to prioritize deterrence and denunciation, mischaracterizing the circumstances as mitigating, and ignoring statutory aggravating factors.

The court varied the sentence to the mandatory minimum of a $1,000 fine and a 12-month driving prohibition, declining to rule on the s. 12 Charter issue.

The accused, charged with impaired driving causing death, brought a Charter s. 8 application to exclude blood alcohol evidence obtained via a search warrant.

The accused argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained misleading statements and that the police unlawfully seized his blood by placing a seal on a vial at the hospital before obtaining the warrant.

The court conducted a sub-facial review of the ITO, excised minor errors, and found the amplified record still provided reasonable grounds to issue the warrant.

The court also held, following appellate precedent, that placing a seal on a blood vial taken for medical purposes and left in the hospital's control did not constitute an unreasonable seizure.

The application was dismissed.

In a trial for impaired driving causing death, the defence brought a Charter application to exclude breathalyzer results, arguing the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device demand.

The Crown sought to rely on the accused's statements at the crash scene to establish the officer's grounds.

The defence argued these statements were statutorily compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and inadmissible under section 7 of the Charter.

The court found the accused did not speak to police out of a sense of statutory compulsion, but rather to assist with the injured and manage his own situation.

The statements were ruled admissible on the voir dire.

The accused, a transport truck driver, was charged with four counts of dangerous driving causing death and nine counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm after colliding with multiple vehicles in a construction zone on Highway 401.

The Crown proved the actus reus, showing the accused failed to slow down despite clear signage and stopped traffic.

The defence argued the accused experienced a 'micro-sleep' due to undiagnosed sleep apnea and chronic renal disease, negating the mens rea.

The court rejected the expert evidence of a micro-sleep, finding the accused's prolonged inattention and failure to brake constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with possession of a restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code after police executed a search warrant at a residence and located a handgun and ammunition in the accused’s bedroom closet.

The accused denied knowledge or control of the firearm and testified that numerous family members had access to the room in a crowded household.

Evidence showed that the search warrant was obtained following a social media post by the accused’s brother displaying a firearm.

The court found the accused’s testimony credible and accepted that multiple occupants could freely enter the room.

The evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knowingly possessed the firearm or ammunition.