R. v. Zhou, 2026 ONSC 1191

CITATION: R. v. Zhou, 2026 ONSC 1191

NEWMARKET COURT FILE NO.: CR-22-91107967-0000

DATE: 20260227

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

HIS MAJESTY THE KING

– and –

HAOJU ZHOU

Defendant

COUNSEL:

Sean Doyle and David Parke, for the Crown

Paul Aubin, for the Defendant

HEARD: January 16 and February 11, 2026

REASONS FOR SENTENCE

REGIONAL SENIOR JUSTICE EDWARDS

Overview

1On October 27, 2025, I released my Reasons (found at 2025 ONSC 6043) wherein Mr. Zhou was found guilty on one count of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing death and one count of dangerous driving causing death.

2On September 14, 2022, Mr. Zhou at approximately 6:00 a.m. was driving his father's Porsche Cayenne SUV with a blood alcohol content that was analysed to have contained 80 mg of alcohol in one hundred milliliters of blood. Mr. Zhou had a G2 licence which precluded him from having any alcohol in his system. Mr. Zhou lost control of his vehicle and struck an off-duty police officer, Travis Gillespie, driving in the opposite direction. Mr. Zhou was convicted of impaired operation causing death contrary to s. 320.14(13) of the Criminal Code of Canada (the Code) and one count of dangerous driving causing death contrary to s. 320.13(3) of the Code. The Crown seeks a sentence of seven years in the penitentiary. Mr. Aubin suggests that an appropriate sentence is in the range of four years. These are my reasons for sentence.

The Circumstances of Mr. Zhou

3At the time of the collision Mr. Zhou was a student studying at York University on an International Student’s Visa. He was 23 years of age at the time of the collision and is currently 27 years old. He is a citizen of the People's Republic of China. He has no prior criminal record, nor does he have any traffic violations under the Highway Traffic Act (the HTA). In addition to having a G2 licence Mr. Zhou had been warned by his father about drinking and driving.

The Victim impact Statements

4As part of the sentencing process the court heard from a number of family members of Travis Gillespie. Katrina Gillespie was married to Mr. Gillespie for six years. As noted in her victim impact statement Mr. Gillespie was killed during “a period of pause in their relationship”. Despite the pause in their relationship her victim impact statement leaves little doubt of the importance that Mr. Gillespie played in her life and the impact that his death continues to have on her.

5Melinda Laporte and Mr. Gillespie were childhood friends who turned their friendship into love after 25 years of friendship. In the summer of 2022, they discovered they were expecting a baby. Sadly, as Ms. Laporte noted in her statement “it was not our time”. It was their hope to have a baby but as she so eloquently put it in her statement the death of Mr. Travis robbed her of this opportunity. It is beyond any doubt that the death of Mr. Gillespie has brought untold grief to Ms. Laporte.

6Mr. Gillespie’s mother along with his father and his brothers, all spoke from the heart about the tragic and totally unnecessary loss of their son and brother. Putting into words what the loss of a loved one means must be an incredibly difficult task. All of the family members, friends, and colleagues who submitted victim impact statements did so eloquently and made abundantly clear what a fine person, friend, family member, and police officer Mr. Gillespie had been during the 38 years that he was alive.

The Aggravating And Mitigating Factors

7The mitigating factors in this case are clear. While Mr. Zhou is not a young offender, he was relatively young at the time of the tragic collision with Mr. Gillespie. He has no prior criminal record and no HTA record. While Mr. Zhou did not plead guilty, having reviewed his statement and having listened to him speak during the course of sentencing submissions, I have no doubt that Mr. Zhou has real remorse for what he did on September 14, 2022.

8The aggravating factors in this case are also clear. Mr. Zhou was driving his father's Porsche with a G2 licence which precluded him from driving with any alcohol in his system. Counsel for Mr. Zhou argues that the fact that he was driving with a G2 licence should not be treated as an aggravating factor because the HTA would only impose a fine if he had been drinking with alcohol in his system. The issue as to whether or not driving with alcohol in his system contrary to the G2 licensing requirements should be considered an aggravating factor, was the subject of further submissions between counsel after the initial submissions date. I will deal with this later in my reasons.

The Principles Of Sentencing

9The principles of sentencing are well-known. They are set out in s. 718.2 of the Code. It is well understood that the principles of sentencing are intended for the protection of society and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and a safe society to be achieved by the denunciation of unlawful conduct; deterrence both general and specific; and the separation of an offender from society were necessary. Another important principle of sentencing is of course rehabilitation and reparation for harm done to victims and/or the community as well as the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and an acknowledgement of the harm done.

10It is also well understood that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence as well as the degree of responsibility of the offender. The court must take into account both aggravating and mitigating circumstances as required by section 718.2 of the Code. As well, a sentence to be imposed must be one which is similar to those that are imposed on like offenders in similar circumstances.

11It has been said many times by different judges that the determination of a fit sentence is not a purely mathematical calculation but is a fact-specific exercise. The court must take into account the gravity of the events, the offender’s degree of responsibility and the specific circumstances of the case together with the circumstances of the offender in determining an appropriate sentence – See R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, at paras 58 and 143.

12As it relates specifically to the sentencing of offenders convicted of driving offences the Code was amended in 2018 with the passing of Bill C-46. The preamble to Bill C-46 reflects an expression by Parliament of its concern that dangerous driving and impaired driving have injured or killed thousands of people in Canada everywhere, every year. Parliament has made it clear that dangerous driving and impaired driving is unacceptable and must be deterred. Section 320.12 of the Code states:

320.12 It is recognized and declared that

(a) operating a conveyance is a privilege that is subject to certain limits in the interests of public safety that include licensing, the observance of rules and sobriety;

(b) the protection of society is well served by deterring persons from operating conveyances dangerously or while their ability to operate them is impaired by alcohol or a drug, because that conduct poses a threat to the life, health and safety of Canadians; (emphasis added)

13It is important to note that the gravity of an offence involving someone convicted of dangerous driving causing death or impaired driving causing death is liable on conviction to imprisonment for life which clearly signifies the objective gravity of the offence as being extremely high.

The G2 Licensing Status As An Aggravating Factor

14The operation of a motor vehicle in contravention of the licensing conditions attached to a particular operator’s licence is now recognized as a statutorily aggravating factor pursuant to s. 320.22(g) of the Code which reads as follows:

320.22 A court imposing a sentence for an offence under any of sections 320.13 to 320.18 shall consider, in addition to any other aggravating circumstances, the following:

(g) the offender was not permitted, under a federal or provincial Act, to operate the conveyance. (emphasis added)

15The circumstances of a G2 licence issued in Ontario makes clear that the holder of such licence must have zero blood-alcohol content and no cannabis in their system while driving. The application of this restriction falls within the provisions of s. 320.22(g) of the Code set forth above. As such Mr. Zhou’s licence only permitted him to drive a motor vehicle if he had no alcohol in his system. If he had alcohol in his system, he was not licenced to drive a motor vehicle.

16Mr. Aubin argues the G2 licence restriction overlaps with the mens rea of the underlying offences of impaired driving causing death. As such it would be inappropriate to consider the G2 licence restriction as an aggravating factor. Mr. Doyle agrees that the court cannot consider as an aggravating the fact that someone was killed as this is part of the underlying offence and as such Mr. Zhou cannot be punished twice.

17There are a number of cases where the courts have taken into account the status of an offender’s driver’s licence in the context of determining an appropriate sentence. In R. v. Currie, 2018 ONCA 218, at paras 15 to 16, the Ontario Court of Appeal found, “no error in principle” where the sentencing judge in a dangerous driving causing bodily harm case determined that the offender’s “status as a novice driver who should not have been driving with alcohol or drugs in his body, and the catastrophic consequences of the accident demanded a significant sentence.” In R. v. Ferns, 2019 O.J. 2654, a 26-year-old offender had been convicted of dangerous operation causing death. The offender was a G2 licenced driver. Kelly J. observed at para 32 that the offender should not have had any alcohol in his system while driving and further noted that:

The fact that Mr. Ferns drove in a dangerous manner at a time he held a G2 license shows a lack of appreciation for the fact that driving is a privilege.

18In a more recent decision R. v. Al Jalmoud, 2025 ONSC 1607, Justice I.R. Smith convicted the accused of two counts of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing death and one count of dangerous operation of a conveyance causing bodily harm. At para 75 Smith J. noted:

[75] I also regard it as aggravating that Mr. Al Jalmoud did not have a licence that allowed him to drive without an experienced driver as a passenger and that he knew that doing so was wrong. As I noted above, similar circumstances in Boutros were referred to as “somewhat aggravating.” In this case, I would not characterize this failing in that way. In my view, the failure of Mr. Al Jalmoud to have had a proper licence at the time of the dangerous driving was a fully aggravating factor which the Code now requires judges to consider as such (s. 320.22(g)). …

19In R. v. Davis Locke, [2020] O.J. No 107 at para 96 Tetley J. addressed the moral blameworthiness of the accused where he had chosen to drive in circumstances where he knew he had consumed alcohol and had little sleep. As well Tetley J. took into account as an aggravating factor the fact the accused was a novice driver, driving with a G2 licence. A sentence of 6 years was imposed on a plea of guilty to a charge of impaired driving causing death.

20I am satisfied from my review of the case law that this court can and should take into account the fact that Mr. Zhou chose to drive his car knowing that he had consumed alcohol and knowing that his licence was a G2. The fact he knew he only had a G2 licence should have been a warning to him that he should not drive his car. Parliament has specifically directed the court in imposing sentence in cases like Mr. Zhou that if an offender was not permitted to drive at the time of the offence this is an aggravating factor. Mr. Zhou was not permitted to drive with alcohol in his system. It follows he was not permitted to drive. This is an aggravating factor.

Analysis

21Mr. Zhou came to Canada as an International Student to study at York University. There is nothing to suggest that Mr. Zhou was anything but a law-abiding young man. But like so many other drivers he made a terrible mistake. By getting behind the wheel of a motor vehicle when he was intoxicated, Mr. Zhou went from being a law-abiding person to someone now facing a potential sentence of life in prison. Law-abiding people regrettably commit drinking and driving offences every day in this country. Those same law-abiding people then add to the carnage on our roads. It is for this reason our courts have consistently emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the primary factors to be considered when sentencing an offender for impaired driving or dangerous driving causing death - see R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at paras 5, 73-75.

22The sentencing of a youthful offender who comes before the court with no prior criminal record now convicted of a driving offence where death and alcohol are involved requires the court to balance general deterrence and denunciation with the principles of restraint and rehabilitation. However, in R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 SCR 1089, the Supreme Court of Canada at para 73 and 74 makes it abundantly clear that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing principles guiding the sentencing court for offences involving impaired driving causing death. The comments of Wagner J. at para 73 of his reasons in Lacasse are worth repeating:

[73] While it is true that the objectives of deterrence and denunciation apply in most cases, they are particularly relevant to offences that might be committed by ordinarily law‑abiding people. It is such people, more than chronic offenders, who will be sensitive to harsh sentences. Impaired driving offences are an obvious example of this type of offence, as this Court noted in Proulx:

… dangerous driving and impaired driving may be offences for which harsh sentences plausibly provide general deterrence. These crimes are often committed by otherwise law‑abiding persons, with good employment records and families. Arguably, such persons are the ones most likely to be deterred by the threat of severe penalties… (citations omitted)

23A few years after the Supreme Court released its reasons in Lacasse the Court of Appeal in R. v. Altiman, 2019 ONCA 511 again emphasized at para 48 that the sentencing principles of deterrence and denunciation are particularly relevant to impaired driving offences.

24In his reasons in Altiman, Brown J.A. did an extensive review of the appellate jurisprudence as it relates to sentencing in cases involving impaired driving causing death. After his review Brown J.A. summarized the jurisprudence as follows:

[70] This review of the case law leads me to conclude that, since the turn of the decade, in this province sentences for impaired driving causing death typically have fallen in the four to six-year range, unless the offender has a prior criminal or driving offence record. Where he does, lengthier sentences have been imposed, ranging from seven and one-half to twelve years. In Lacasse, a case coming out of Quebec, the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of six and one-half years for impaired driving causing the death of two passengers, even though the offender had been convicted three times for speeding: at para. 80.

[71] While these have been the lengths of sentences imposed in practice by Ontario courts over the past decade, it remains the case that this court has not defined a formal range for such sentences in light of the infinite variety of circumstances in which the offence can be committed: Junkert, at para. 40.

[72] That said, I would observe at this point that the 10-year sentence imposed on Mr. Altiman corresponds in length to sentences previously imposed on offenders who had a criminal or driving offence record, which Mr. Altiman did not have.

25Ultimately, in Altiman, Brown J.A. reduced the trial judge's sentence of 10 years to a sentence of seven years imprisonment largely because a 10-year sentence was more reflective of the jurisprudence arising in situations where an offender had a prior criminal or driving offence record. In summary, Brown J.A. stated para 108:

[108] The 10-year custodial sentence imposed on Mr. Altiman by the sentencing judge represents a substantial and marked departure from the sentences customarily imposed in this province for similar offenders committing similar crimes. That is the case even taking into account both the fact that Mr. Altiman killed two people and seriously injured two others, as well as the primary role played by the principles of denunciation and deterrence in cases of impaired driving causing death. As such, the sentence is demonstrably unfit.

26Parliament has sent a clear message to the public and to the courts that driving is not a right – it is a privilege. It is a privilege that brings with it certain benefits and obligations. One of those obligations is to drive with the safety of others in mind. One of the clearest of obligations is not to drink and drive. Parliament has signaled that those who chose to drive while impaired will face significant penitentiary sentences.

27The relatively young age of Mr. Zhou remains a factor that this court must consider in imposing sentence. However, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Perry, 2025 ONCA 241 at paras 9-11, suggests that a sentencing court dealing with a youthful offender convicted of dangerous driving may attach less weight to the youthful age as a mitigating factor. Specifically, in reflecting on the sentencing principles Lauwers J.A. stated as follows:

[9] In determining any sentence, and in accordance with the principle of restraint as codified in ss. 718.2(d) and (e) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, the court must consider all sanctions apart from incarceration and, where it must be imposed, the duration should be as short as possible and tailored to the offender’s individual circumstances: R. v. Batisse, 2009 ONCA 114, 93 O.R. (3d) 643, at paras. 32-35. The principle of restraint also directs courts, when sentencing a youthful offender for a first offence, not to prioritize denunciation and deterrence over rehabilitation: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110, at para. 31.

[10] The principles of denunciation and deterrence, however, are “particularly relevant to dangerous driving offences that are often committed by first-time offenders and otherwise law-abiding citizens”: R. v. Frickey, 2017 ONCA 1024, 22 M.V.R. (7th) 184, at para. 4; R. v. Augustine, 2019 ONCA 119, at para. 11. As this court stated in R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487, 294 O.A.C. 261, at paras. 48-49, “[a] motor vehicle can, in a moment of recklessness, be transformed into an object capable of destroying lives” and, accordingly, the licence to drive is a privilege that comes with immense responsibility.

[11] In motor vehicle accidents, the court may attach less weight to certain mitigating factors such as youth: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 79. Because of the dire consequences of a fatal accident, significant weight is given to the sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation.

28In my reasons in R. v. Dance, 2025 ONSC 6220 at para 34, I summarized my review of the jurisprudence as follows:

The appellate decisions referenced above, would seem to support three basic propositions. The first is that drunk driving has been recognized now for a long time as a criminal act deserving of a penitentiary sentence. The second proposition gleaned from these cases is that there has been a trend towards more significant penitentiary sentences for cases involving drunk driving and death. The third proposition is that while no actual range for a penitentiary sentence has been established for drinking and driving offences involving death, a de facto range appears to have been developing of between six to 10 years. Where on the spectrum the sentence will fall will depend on a number of factors. Among those factors will be the accused’s prior criminal record for impaired driving offences; the accused’s HTA driving record, and the number of persons killed and or injured.

29Mr. Zhou was a relatively young man with relatively little driving experience. This is in part reflected by the fact he had a G2 licence. His father had warned him not to drink and drive. He knew his licence precluded him from drinking with any alcohol in his body. Yet Mr. Zhou chose to do what he knew was wrong. His decision to drink and drive resulted in a totally needless and avoidable tragedy. There is nothing this court can say or do that can possibly begin to undo the loss that Mr. Gillespie’s family, friends and police colleagues must endure on a daily basis. What this court can do is impose a sentence that sends as strong a message as possible that denunciation and deterrence will guide the court in the sentence to be imposed. With these principles in mind the sentence of this court is one of 6 years in the penitentiary.

Driving Prohibition

30While the length of the licence suspension to be imposed on Mr. Zhou might be academic as there is some suggestion he may be deported back to China upon the expiry of his sentence, this court nonetheless has to determine the driving prohibition to be imposed on Mr. Zhou. The Crown seeks a driving prohibition of 15 years as of todays date. Mr. Aubin suggests the driving prohibition should be one of 5 years commencing at the end of his sentence.

31The factors this court should consider in imposing a driving prohibition are set forth in R. v. Bakai, [2010] O.J. No 6076. At para 43 Durno J. summarized the factors as follows:

43 While not exhaustive, the following factors appear to influence the length of the prohibition:

The circumstances of the offence, including the blood alcohol level, the degree of impairment, the manner of driving and the number of victims. With regards to the number of victims it is not intended, and I agree with Mr. Doyle, that the number of victims should be used as a multiplier, but it is an important aggravating factor. When looking at the cases involving fatalities, there are only, I believe in the cases that I have now been referred to or looked at, two involving two individuals dying. Those are facts to be kept in mind when examining the other cases, that many of the others also involved serious bodily harm to one or more individuals.

Whether the offender has entered a plea of guilty and if so, was it an early plea?

Whether the offender has a previous Criminal Code record. If so, were the records for breaching court orders or administrative suspensions?

Whether the offender has a previous HTA record of convictions or other entries.

An important consideration in a case referred to counsel today, whether the offender has been diagnosed or clearly has an alcohol consumption problem, and if so, what if any steps have been taken to address the abuse? There is no evidence here to suggest that this individual has such a problem.

The offender's age.

In some of the cases, the occupation and in particular the impact of the prohibition on that employment.

Whether the offender was prohibited from driving as a term of bail. R. v. Pelicore, [1997] O.J. No. 226 (C.A.)

The length of the jail term, if any is imposed, is also taken into consideration in terms of assessing the length of the driving prohibition.

The Court of Appeal has also found whether or not the offender voluntarily stopped driving is a factor. R. v. Iafrate, [1999] O.J. No. 1789 (C.A.)

It may also be a factor whether or not public transit is available to the individual.

32The factors reflected in Bakai that reflect a longer licence suspension are the fact that Mr. Zhou drove while he was impaired and caused the death of an unsuspecting innocent oncoming driver. On the mitigating side of things Mr. Zhou has no prior HTA record nor any prior criminal record. Mr. Zhou is relatively young. Balancing all of the factors suggested by Durno J. in Bakai I am of the view that the appropriate licence suspension would be one of 10 years from today’s date.

Pre-Trial Custody and Downes Credit

33Counsel have agreed that the appropriate credits for pre-trial custody; as well as the appropriate Downes and Marshall credits are as follows:

Downes credit: 5 months

Marshall credit: 30 days

Time Served (total): 10.5 months

The total credits are 16.5 months leaving a remaining sentence of 55.5 months or 4.625 years.

EDWARDS, R.S.J.

Released: February 27, 2026

NOTE: As noted in court, on the record, this written Ruling is to be considered the official version and takes precedence over the oral reasons read into the record. If there are any discrepancies between the oral and written versions it is the official written Ruling that is to be relied upon.