Craig A. Parry

The accused, a neurologist practising in an urgent neurology clinic, faced 48 remaining counts of sexual assault arising from allegedly inappropriate medical examinations of female patients over a lengthy period.

After a very long trial, the court held that the prosecution failed to prove that the impugned touching was objectively sexual in nature, failed to prove that the accused used medical examinations as a fraudulent ruse to gain sexual access to patients' bodies, and failed to displace the reasonable alternative inference that the examinations were carried out for medical purposes.

The court admitted the Crown's expert neurology evidence and the cross-count similar fact evidence, but assigned the expert's opinion little or no weight on key issues because of scope problems, inconsistencies, anecdotal foundations, and situational bias, and found the similar fact evidence ultimately incapable of carrying the Crown's burden.

The court repeatedly found complainant evidence unreliable or tainted by media and CPSO publicity, accepted the accused's evidence that he proposed, explained, and performed the examinations in accordance with his training and standard methods, and concluded that the proven examinations were medical examinations to which the patients consented.

All 48 remaining counts resulted in acquittals.

The defendant, Rijah Martin, was charged with failing to comply with a roadside breath demand under s. 320.15 of the Criminal Code and a Highway Traffic Act offence.

She pleaded guilty to the HTA charge and not guilty to the Criminal Code charge, asserting a reasonable excuse due to an anxiety attack.

The court rejected her defence, finding her testimony untruthful and her failure to provide a breath sample deliberate.

The court also clarified the burden of proof for a reasonable excuse defence, holding that following the repeal of s. 794(2) of the Criminal Code, the accused only bears an evidentiary burden to establish an 'air of reality,' after which the Crown must disprove it beyond a reasonable doubt, consistent with Charter values.

Thomas Dyer was sentenced for uttering threats against the Prime Minister at a campaign event.

The court emphasized the seriousness of threatening a high-ranking elected official and the anti-democratic nature of such conduct, highlighting the need for denunciation and deterrence.

While acknowledging the accused's traumatic brain injury, subsequent rehabilitation, and family responsibilities as mitigating factors, the court found the Crown's proposed fine and probation too lenient.

A 60-day conditional sentence was imposed, along with 12 months of probation including 100 hours of community service, and a DNA order.

The court declined a new weapons prohibition due to an existing lifetime ban.

The accused, Brian Foreman, faced charges of impaired driving and "80 Plus" after crashing his car.

He brought a Charter application to exclude breath samples and observations of alcohol odour, alleging violations of his rights against arbitrary detention, unreasonable search and seizure, and right to counsel.

The court found that while reasonable grounds for arrest and breath demand existed, the police officer failed to immediately inform the accused of his right to counsel and delayed facilitating access to counsel.

Despite the minimal impact on the accused's rights, the seriousness of the police misconduct, particularly the officer's dishonesty in testimony and persistent ignorance of constitutional obligations, led the court to exclude the breath samples and related observations under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

With the exclusion of this key evidence, the Crown lacked sufficient proof, leading to acquittals on both charges.

The accused, Michael Meinzinger, pleaded guilty to careless storage of a firearm and possessing a loaded restricted handgun.

The offences occurred during a severe mental health crisis where he expressed suicidal ideations and a desire for "suicide by police" via text messages and photographs of a handgun.

Police apprehended him under the Mental Health Act.

The court found a causal link between his transient mental health crisis and the offending conduct, which attenuated his moral blameworthiness.

Despite the seriousness of the offences, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, along with concurrent probation orders for 12 months, a lifetime weapons prohibition, and a DNA order, emphasizing rehabilitation over strict denunciation given the unique circumstances.

Sentencing for sexual interference following a guilty plea by a youthful first offender who engaged in repeated sexual intercourse with a 14-year-old over approximately six and a half months.

The court treated denunciation and general deterrence as primary, applying the Supreme Court's guidance on child sexual abuse sentencing while also giving substantial weight to remorse, guilty plea, lack of record, strong rehabilitation prospects, and youthfulness.

Although the case involved profound harm to the complainant and repeated exploitative conduct, the court concluded that a 15-month custodial sentence, rather than a penitentiary term or conditional sentence, was proportionate.

A conditional sentence was rejected as insufficient to meet denunciation and deterrence in the circumstances.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant after a social gathering.

The accused admitted to intentional sexual intercourse but claimed the complainant consented and initiated the encounter.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding his post-incident conduct—including an apology left on the complainant's voicemail and his unquestioning compliance with being ejected from the home—inconsistent with his claim of a consensual encounter.

The court admitted the complainant's immediate post-incident declarations under the res gestae doctrine and accepted her evidence that she verbally and physically resisted the accused.

The accused was found guilty.

The Crown applied for an adult sentence for a young person, M.B., who was found guilty of numerous serious offences, including a targeted shooting and subsequent firearm and drug offences.

The court considered the two-part test under section 72 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act: whether the Crown rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and whether a youth sentence would be insufficient for accountability.

The court found that M.B.'s actions, while serious, did not demonstrate adult maturity or sophistication, citing his background as a refugee, cognitive challenges, susceptibility to negative peer influence, and amateurish conduct during the offences.

The court also noted M.B.'s significant progress and rehabilitation while in custody.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness, and the application for an adult sentence was dismissed, with the court concluding that a maximum youth sentence could adequately hold M.B. accountable.

The accused, Ranveer Singh, was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant's evidence regarding lack of consent and the precise nature of the touching raised credibility and reliability concerns due to inconsistencies between her stated feelings/motives and actions, and contradictory factual accounts.

The accused claimed the complainant consented through her conduct, which he perceived as sexual advances.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove the absence of consent beyond a reasonable doubt, and also failed to disprove the accused's honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The accused was acquitted.

A young person was tried on charges arising from two separate incidents: a mass shooting at a Subway restaurant in Waterloo on April 19, 2019, where approximately 35 shots were fired into a crowded establishment, and a series of offences committed on May 16, 2019, including dangerous driving, fleeing police, and possession of a loaded firearm with serial number removed.

The Crown's case relied entirely on circumstantial evidence, particularly video surveillance footage, cell phone records, GPS data, and physical evidence recovered from the scene.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts based on overwhelming circumstantial evidence establishing identity as one of the shooters and connecting him to the May 16 incident through a clear chain of evidence.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit.

The accused conceded her impairment, her elevated blood alcohol content, and that she was driving, but claimed she did not voluntarily consume the alcohol necessary to exceed the legal limit, asserting instead that a companion had spiked her drink with an unknown drug, rendering her unconscious and incapable of making conscious decisions about drinking and driving.

The court rejected the accused's characterization of the defence as a mens rea issue and determined it was an actus reus issue involving a claim of involuntary conduct akin to automatism.

The court found the accused bore the burden of proving involuntary conduct on a balance of probabilities and failed to meet this burden.

The court rejected the accused's claim of amnesia as not credible and found no evidentiary foundation for the claim of drug-induced impairment.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of his detention.

In an addendum to a previous ruling, the court reconsidered its conclusion regarding arbitrary detention under section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that although the officer was a trespasser at the point of detention, rendering the detention unlawful and thus arbitrary, the evidence would not be excluded under section 24(2) as admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The trial proceeded.

Constable Travis Buckle was charged with assault causing bodily harm after attempting to arrest Dale Delaney on outstanding warrants at Victoria Hospital's emergency department.

During the arrest, Delaney landed face-first on the floor, suffering serious facial injuries.

The Crown argued the arrest was unlawful due to failure to announce the reason for arrest, and alternatively that excessive force was used.

The court found the arrest was lawful, the officer reasonably believed Delaney was attempting to flee, and the force used was justified under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The officer was acquitted.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging that a police officer violated his section 8 rights (freedom from unreasonable search and seizure) by attending at his front door and entering his home foyer without a warrant, and his section 9 rights (freedom from arbitrary detention) by demanding his driver's licence, vehicle registration, and insurance while inside the home.

The court found that the officer's attendance at the door for the purpose of gathering evidence exceeded the implied invitation doctrine, and that the officer's entry into the foyer was unlawful.

However, the court admitted the evidence obtained during the breach under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that exclusion would not be necessary to preserve the repute of the administration of justice.

The accused were charged with various offences after police and a child protection worker conducted a warrantless search of their basement dwelling and garage.

The worker entered the home to conduct a child protection inspection, and the police assisted to ensure safety.

The court found that the worker lacked statutory or common law authority to conduct a warrantless home inspection, and the police entry was therefore also unlawful.

The search violated the accused's section 8 Charter rights.

The subsequent search warrant, based on observations from the unlawful entry, was also invalid.

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter due to the egregious nature of the worker's conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests.

Both accused were acquitted.

The accused was charged with an Over 80 offence following a RIDE program stop.

The accused alleged that the arresting officer steered him towards duty counsel after arrest, thereby breaching his constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel of choice.

The Crown conceded that steering occurred but argued it did not constitute a breach.

The court found that the officer's imprecise and careless communications misled the accused about the scope of his right to counsel of choice.

The officer failed to provide reasonable opportunities to contact alternative counsel and failed to adequately respond to the accused's expressed dissatisfaction with duty counsel.

The court found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter and excluded the breath test evidence, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit.

The accused raised four issues: three Charter violations by the arresting officer (failure to form requisite suspicion, failure to make ASD demand forthwith, and failure to inform of right to counsel immediately upon arrest) and one issue regarding identity (whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver).

The court rejected all Charter challenges and found the accused was the driver based on compelling eyewitness identification evidence.

The court convicted the accused.

The accused was charged with assault following an incident on March 10, 2018, at the home of the complainant.

The complainant answered the door to a stranger who claimed to be visiting a friend.

After several brief encounters, the lights went out and the complainant was attacked.

The two main issues were whether the Crown proved the accused was the assailant and whether the physical contact was intentional or accidental.

The court found that the complainant's account could only be interpreted as an intentional assault, ruling out accident.

The court also found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the assailant based on the complainant's identification evidence, corroborated by circumstantial evidence including a taxi driver's near-contemporaneous observations and the accused's statements in the taxi.

The accused was charged with impaired driving, driving with blood alcohol content exceeding the legal limit, assault, and marijuana possession arising from an incident on July 24, 2017.

The accused admitted to driving while impaired but raised the defence of necessity, claiming she fled a dangerous situation.

The court found that the accused was attacked by the complainant and subsequently threatened by others at the scene, and that she had no reasonable legal alternative but to drive away.

The court accepted the defence of necessity and acquitted the accused of the driving offences.

The court also found that the accused acted in self-defence against the complainant and acquitted her of the assault charge.

The accused was found guilty of possessing a small amount of marijuana but acquitted of possessing a larger quantity due to reasonable doubt.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The Crown relied on breath samples analyzed by an Intoxilyzer 8000C.

The central issue was whether the Crown could rely on the statutory presumption of accuracy under the newly enacted section 320.31(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court interpreted the new provision, concluding that the Crown must prove the actual concentration of the alcohol standard used in the calibration check and that it was certified by an analyst.

Because the Crown failed to tender the Certificate of Analyst or prove the concentration of the standard solution, the presumption of accuracy did not apply.

Without the presumption, the Crown could not prove the accused's blood alcohol concentration beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.