Adam Little

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the defendant on an "Over 80" charge.

The trial judge had acquitted the defendant due to defects in the certificate of a qualified technician (lack of signature, inverted digits) which diminished its probative value, and alternatively, excluded the certificate under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to a s. 10(b) right to counsel infringement.

The appeal court dismissed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge's assessment of the certificate's evidentiary weight was not procedurally unfair to the Crown, as the judge assessed weight, not admissibility, at the end of the trial.

The court affirmed that errors in certificate preparation affect weight, not admissibility, and can constitute "evidence to the contrary" under the Interpretation Act.

The respondent was charged with speeding.

A justice of the peace ordered the prosecutor to disclose the entire user manual for the speed measuring radar device used by the police officer.

The Ontario Provincial Police brought an application for certiorari to quash the disclosure order, arguing a third party records hearing was required.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the justice of the peace erred by not making a specific finding that the manual was first party disclosure, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the entire manual (except for one section on legal requirements) was obviously relevant and constituted first party disclosure.

The appellant was convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm and refusing to provide a urine sample after his car rolled backward and pinned a police officer.

At the station, he consulted duty counsel.

A drug recognition expert then demanded a drug evaluation and subsequently a urine sample.

The appellant's request for a second consultation with counsel was denied.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel was not breached, as the demands were foreseeable investigative procedures that did not constitute a change in circumstances or new jeopardy requiring a second consultation.

The conviction and sentence were upheld, save for the victim surcharge.

The accused, Yunlong Li, sought to reopen his trial after being convicted of impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The application was brought to introduce new evidence, including his own testimony and a new toxicology report, to support a bolus drinking defence.

The court applied the Palmer test for fresh evidence, which requires considering due diligence, relevance, credibility, and potential impact on the trial result, along with whether the application attempts to reverse a tactical decision.

The court found that the proposed evidence, particularly the new toxicology report, was based on an inaccurate assumption and would not have altered the conviction.

The application was dismissed, emphasizing that reopening a trial after conviction is reserved for rare and exceptional circumstances.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale fraud obtained through the Government of Canada’s Small Business Financing Program.

The conviction appeals challenged the trial judge's summary dismissal of three s. 11(b) Charter motions for unreasonable delay, arguing that the judge erred by not addressing the merits due to non-compliance with deadlines.

The sentence appeals contested the length of imprisonment and a restitution order for one appellant, and the imposition of a custodial sentence for another.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction and sentence appeals, affirming the trial judge's proactive case management and the fitness of the sentences.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" and impaired driving on November 3, 2017.

The trial was scheduled to commence on October 21, 2019, resulting in a total delay of 23 months and 19 days.

The accused brought a motion to stay the charges pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing that the delay exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown argued that approximately 9 months of delay should be attributed to the defence, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court found that 3 months of delay was attributable to the defence, resulting in a net delay of 20 months and 20 days, which exceeded the presumptive ceiling.

The charges were stayed.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time contrary to section 11(b).

The accused was charged with impaired driving on May 8, 2019, and was scheduled for trial on October 3-4, 2019, resulting in approximately 17 months of delay.

Applying the Jordan framework, the court found that although the delay was concerning and disappointing, it did not constitute constitutionally intolerable delay.

The application for a stay was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol content contrary to s. 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence argued that the accused's Charter rights under ss. 7, 8, and 9 were violated and sought exclusion of the Intoxilyzer results.

The court conducted a blended voir dire to determine whether the arresting officer was required to wait 15 minutes before administering the approved screening device due to the possibility of residual mouth alcohol, and whether the accused was required to speak to duty counsel when he had initially declined.

The court found no Charter violations and admitted the breath technician's certificate, finding the accused guilty as charged.

In a medical malpractice action, the defendant brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiffs' expert epidemiologist, Dr. Michael Freeman.

The court granted the motion, finding that Dr. Freeman lacked specialized knowledge in the specific medical areas (metabolics and neurology) relevant to the causation question.

His "comparative risk" methodology was deemed outside the mainstream study of epidemiology for specific causation, and his reports indicated a lack of objectivity by primarily critiquing other experts rather than offering independent analysis within his own expertise.

The court also noted that his proposed evidence was not necessary, as the plaintiffs' other expert covered the same points.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC.

A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana.

The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable.

On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court.

The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion at the outset of trial to strike the plaintiffs' jury notice.

The defendant argued that the complex scientific evidence relating to the minor plaintiff's rare metabolic disorder and the issue of causation made the case unsuitable for a jury.

Applying the principles from Kempf v. Nguyen, the court declined to strike the jury notice prior to trial, opting instead for the preferred 'wait and see' approach.

The motion was dismissed with leave to renew after the evidence is completed.

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for driving "over 80", where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8 and 9 breaches, finding the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion of Charter breaches but determined that the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis regarding the impact of the breaches, particularly in light of the subsequent Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Jennings.

The appeal court concluded that the liberty deprivation experienced by the respondent was minimal and consistent with routine drinking and driving investigations, thus the breath samples should not have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The Crown appealed two summary conviction acquittals for "over 80" offences, arguing that the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Soules was wrongly decided and per incuriam, and therefore not binding.

The Superior Court dismissed both appeals, reaffirming the principle of stare decisis and holding that R. v. Soules remains binding authority on lower courts, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Roberts.

The court also upheld the trial judge's rejection of the Crown's Section 1 Charter argument, agreeing that a Section 7 breach, triggered by the Crown's attempt to use statutorily compelled statements at trial, is not amenable to Section 1 justification.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The sole issue was whether the demand for a breath sample was valid, specifically whether it was made "forthwith" as required by law.

The constable delayed approximately five to seven minutes between detecting alcohol on the accused's breath and making the demand, during which time he conducted a records check and reflected on which demand to make.

The court found that the delay was not justified and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the demand was made forthwith.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE investigation, the defendant failed an approved screening test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test readings, alleging violations of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The defendant argued that police violated his right to counsel of choice by presenting a binary option between identified counsel and duty counsel, failing to provide tools to search for counsel, and inappropriately steering him to duty counsel.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to include a bad faith claim against the defendant insurer.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments were not legally tenable and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the test under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the proposed amendments disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their statement of claim and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and money laundering, sought to bring a second s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay the day before his scheduled sentencing hearing.

His first application had been dismissed during the trial for failure to perfect.

The court dismissed the second application, finding it was an attempt to delay sentencing, failed to comply with the Practice Direction requiring such applications to be brought 60 days before trial, and was not perfected with the necessary transcripts.

The defendant brought a motion for mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after observing the trial judge reading from a document marked "Confidential Draft" during final argument.

The defendant argued that the presence of such a document indicated the judge had predetermined the outcome and that the judge's refusal to disclose the document's contents constituted bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that trial judges have no obligation to disclose their notes or preliminary rulings to counsel, and that preparing draft reasons prior to or during submissions does not constitute bias provided the judge remains receptive to counsel's arguments.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on November 26, 2016.

The Crown called two police officers and filed an expert toxicologist report.

The defence raised multiple Charter violations relating to the roadside breath sample procedure and the right to counsel.

The court found two Charter violations under section 10(b) but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.