Adam Little

The appellant was charged with speeding under the Highway Traffic Act.

He requested disclosure of the testing and operating procedures from the user manual for the Genesis Handheld Directional traffic radar device used to measure his vehicle's speed.

The prosecutor refused disclosure, taking the position that user manuals constitute third-party records requiring a third-party production application.

The justice of the peace ordered disclosure.

The prosecutor obtained a certiorari order quashing the disclosure order.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the certiorari order was improper and that the disclosure was required as first-party disclosure under the Stinchcombe regime.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for driving "over 80", where the trial judge excluded breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to ss. 8 and 9 breaches, finding the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest.

The appeal court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion of Charter breaches but determined that the trial judge erred in the s. 24(2) analysis regarding the impact of the breaches, particularly in light of the subsequent Court of Appeal decision in R. v. Jennings.

The appeal court concluded that the liberty deprivation experienced by the respondent was minimal and consistent with routine drinking and driving investigations, thus the breath samples should not have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a conviction entered.

The Crown appealed two summary conviction acquittals for "over 80" offences, arguing that the Ontario Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Soules was wrongly decided and per incuriam, and therefore not binding.

The Superior Court dismissed both appeals, reaffirming the principle of stare decisis and holding that R. v. Soules remains binding authority on lower courts, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in R. v. Roberts.

The court also upheld the trial judge's rejection of the Crown's Section 1 Charter argument, agreeing that a Section 7 breach, triggered by the Crown's attempt to use statutorily compelled statements at trial, is not amenable to Section 1 justification.

The accused was charged with failing to provide a sample of breath into an approved screening device.

The Crown proceeded summarily and the accused pleaded not guilty.

The sole issue was whether the demand for a breath sample was valid, specifically whether it was made "forthwith" as required by law.

The constable delayed approximately five to seven minutes between detecting alcohol on the accused's breath and making the demand, during which time he conducted a records check and reflected on which demand to make.

The court found that the delay was not justified and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the demand was made forthwith.

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with an excess blood alcohol concentration contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

Following a RIDE investigation, the defendant failed an approved screening test and was arrested.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of breath test readings, alleging violations of his section 10(b) Charter right to counsel.

The defendant argued that police violated his right to counsel of choice by presenting a binary option between identified counsel and duty counsel, failing to provide tools to search for counsel, and inappropriately steering him to duty counsel.

The court found no Charter violation and admitted the breath test evidence.

The defendant was found guilty.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for leave to amend their statement of claim to include a bad faith claim against the defendant insurer.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the proposed amendments were not legally tenable and did not disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the test under Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and found that the proposed amendments disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for leave to amend their statement of claim and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.

The applicant, having been convicted of fraud and money laundering, sought to bring a second s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay the day before his scheduled sentencing hearing.

His first application had been dismissed during the trial for failure to perfect.

The court dismissed the second application, finding it was an attempt to delay sentencing, failed to comply with the Practice Direction requiring such applications to be brought 60 days before trial, and was not perfected with the necessary transcripts.

The defendant brought a motion for mistrial based on a reasonable apprehension of bias after observing the trial judge reading from a document marked "Confidential Draft" during final argument.

The defendant argued that the presence of such a document indicated the judge had predetermined the outcome and that the judge's refusal to disclose the document's contents constituted bias.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that trial judges have no obligation to disclose their notes or preliminary rulings to counsel, and that preparing draft reasons prior to or during submissions does not constitute bias provided the judge remains receptive to counsel's arguments.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operation with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop on November 26, 2016.

The Crown called two police officers and filed an expert toxicologist report.

The defence raised multiple Charter violations relating to the roadside breath sample procedure and the right to counsel.

The court found two Charter violations under section 10(b) but admitted the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was convicted of the over 80 charge but acquitted of the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a motor vehicle accident on Highway 400.

A police constable administered an approved screening device (ASD) test which the accused failed, leading to arrest and subsequent breathalyzer tests showing a blood alcohol content well over the legal limit.

The accused challenged the validity of the ASD test on Charter grounds, arguing that the device had not been properly calibrated within the required 15-day interval and that the officer lacked objective grounds for reliance on the test result.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation, excluded the breath test evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, and acquitted the accused.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while blood alcohol content exceeded 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown's case depended entirely on the results of an Approved Screening Device test and subsequent breath samples.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that the officer lacked reasonable grounds to rely on the ASD results because he could not establish the device had been calibrated within the required timeframe, resulting in an unlawful arrest and arbitrary detention.

The court also found a breach of the right to counsel, as the officer failed to inform the accused of his right to search for counsel of choice, controlled all means of contacting counsel, and withheld information that the accused's father had called with a lawyer's name.

The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample after being found asleep in his vehicle on the shoulder of the 401 highway.

The Crown alleged the accused was impaired by alcohol based on observations at the roadside.

The accused testified he pulled over to take a nap due to fatigue and made good faith efforts to provide a breath sample but was unable to do so.

The court found three Charter breaches: loss of rough notes (section 7), failure to advise of reason for detention (section 10(a)), and placement in a cell without considering less restrictive alternatives (section 9).

Under section 24(2), the evidence was admitted.

The court acquitted on impaired driving due to reasonable doubt but convicted on refusing to provide a breath sample, finding the accused intentionally failed to blow into the Intoxilyzer despite multiple opportunities.

The accused was charged with over 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE stop.

The Crown sought to introduce breath sample evidence.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the evidence on Charter grounds, alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached in three respects: (1) the manner of detention in the police cruiser for the roadside screening test was not reasonably necessary; (2) the accused was not adequately facilitated in her right to consult with counsel of her choice, as the police policy effectively channeled her toward duty counsel; and (3) the accused was subjected to an unjustified strip search.

The court excluded the breath sample evidence based on the cumulative effect of these breaches and the serious impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests.

The accused was charged with failing to comply with an approved screening device (ASD) demand under section 254(5) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged the accused was feigning to blow and did not provide a suitable sample despite being given seven opportunities.

The accused brought Charter arguments under sections 8 and 9 to exclude evidence of his refusal.

The court found violations of both sections 8 and 9 but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

On the substantive charge, the court found the accused intentionally failed to provide a suitable sample and convicted him as charged.

The accused was stopped by police ostensibly for speeding and running red lights, but the officer's actual purpose was to investigate impaired driving.

The officer failed to immediately advise the accused of the true reason for the detention, conducted an unjustified pat-down search, and unlawfully detained the accused in the back of a police cruiser before administering a roadside screening device.

Although the officer made reasonable efforts to facilitate contact with counsel of choice, the court found violations of sections 8, 9, and 10(a) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The breath sample evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, and the charge was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle over the legal limit contrary to the Criminal Code of Canada.

The Crown proved the essential elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defence raised three Charter-based issues: two alleged breaches of section 9 (arbitrary detention) relating to placement in the police cruiser and overholding at the station, and one alleged breach of section 8 (unreasonable search and seizure) relating to a pat-down search.

The court found that placing the accused in the cruiser was reasonable and necessary for administering the ASD test.

The pat-down search was found to be unlawful and a breach of section 8, but evidence was not excluded under section 24(2) as the breach was not serious enough.

The court assumed a breach of section 9 regarding overholding for approximately three hours but declined to grant a stay of proceedings.

The accused was found guilty.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and having a blood alcohol content over 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood following a single motor vehicle collision on February 29, 2015.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, 10(a), 10(b), and 11(d), arguing that statements made to police prior to arrest were compelled under the Highway Traffic Act and that he was detained without being informed of his rights.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the accused was not detained during the initial police encounter, which was a preliminary investigation of the accident scene.

The court found the accused's statements were voluntary and not compelled.

The breath samples were properly obtained and admissible.

The court convicted the accused on the impaired driving charge and entered a conditional stay on the over 80 charge.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms based on delay.

The Information was sworn 15 months prior, and this was the third trial date.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the net delay of 15 months fell below the presumptive ceiling of 18 months for the Ontario Court of Justice, the defence had demonstrated both a sustained effort to expedite proceedings and that the case took markedly longer than it should have.

The Crown failed to take reasonable steps to expedite the proceedings, particularly when the assigned Crown was unavailable at the scheduled trial start time, resulting in the trial not being completed as scheduled.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to the respondent for impaired driving and over 80, which was based on a violation of the respondent's s.11(b) Charter right to a trial within a reasonable time.

The trial judge found a total Crown and institutional delay of thirteen months and one week to the end of trial.

The Superior Court, applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan and R. v. Williamson, re-evaluated the periods of delay, correcting several characterizations made by the trial judge regarding Crown, institutional, and inherent delay.

The court found the total institutional/Crown delay to be below the Jordan presumptive ceiling and that no actual or inferred prejudice was established.

Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was arrested for impaired driving and subjected to a strip search at 32 Division without reasonable and probable grounds.

Although both counsel agreed the police violated the defendant's section 8 Charter rights, they disagreed on the appropriate remedy.

The Crown sought a sentence reduction while the defence sought a stay of proceedings.

The court found systemic and ongoing constitutional violations at 32 Division regarding strip searches, with evidence that officers routinely conducted unconstitutional searches while mislabeling them as Level 2 searches.

The court granted a stay of proceedings, finding this was one of the clearest cases warranting such a remedy to preserve the integrity of the justice system.