Adam Little

The Crown appealed an Ontario Court of Justice decision quashing an information charging refusal to provide a roadside breath sample and impaired driving on the basis that a justice of the peace had not confirmed process under s. 508 of the Criminal Code for a replacement information.

The Superior Court held that confirmation of process was unnecessary for the duplicate refusal count because s. 523(1.1) applies where a new information charges the same offence as an earlier information for which process was already confirmed.

The court further held that even if there had been a defect in process, such defects do not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction once the accused appears and attorns.

Preferring the line of authority exemplified by R. v. Oliveira over R. v. Gougeon, the court concluded that deficiencies in process do not invalidate the information or bar prosecution.

The order quashing the information was set aside and a new trial directed.

The Crown sought leave to appeal a decision affirming a stay of proceedings for a speeding charge due to a violation of the respondent's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal granted leave, finding that the proposed appeal raised serious and important questions of law regarding the appropriate guidelines for intake and institutional delay in the prosecution of Part I Provincial Offences Act offences.

The appellant was convicted of refusing to provide a breath sample after she unequivocally refused a roadside demand.

She appealed, arguing the demand was invalid because the police officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) with him and there was no evidence one could be made available 'forthwith'.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the offence under s. 254(5) of the Criminal Code is complete upon an outright refusal to a valid demand.

The Crown is not required to prove that an ASD was present or could have been made available forthwith when the accused has already categorically refused to comply.

The deceased suffered life-threatening injuries in a tobogganing accident.

A physician requested an air ambulance, but the Medical Air Transport Centre advised of a two-hour delay, leading to the deceased being transported by land ambulance and subsequently dying.

The appellants sued the Province of Ontario in negligence, alleging it failed to follow its own policy to divert a nearby air ambulance carrying a non-urgent patient.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding no private law duty of care.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable a duty of care existed based on the specific interaction and the government's alleged failure to follow its established operational policy.

The respondents were charged with provincial offences and failed to respond to their offence notices.

The justice of the peace quashed the certificates of offence under s. 9(1) of the Provincial Offences Act because the set fines indicated were incorrect.

The appellant sought mandamus to compel convictions, which the application judge dismissed, holding the proper route was an appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that an incorrect set fine renders a certificate incomplete and irregular on its face, requiring it to be quashed.

The Court also held that the proper route to challenge such a decision is by prerogative remedy under s. 140, not by appeal.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his personal injury action following a jury trial.

The jury found the appellant sustained no injuries in a motor vehicle accident, despite the trial judge ruling that the appellant met the statutory threshold.

The appellant argued that defence counsel's closing address, which improperly focused on the appellant's immigrant status and speculated on how he would use a damages award, was inflammatory and prejudiced the jury.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the comments were irrelevant, offensive, and likely swayed the jury based on improper considerations, and that the trial judge's correcting instruction was inadequate.