David John Read Milner

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to suspend their Class A commercial driver's licence.

The Registrar suspended the licence based on information from the Ontario Provincial Police indicating that the appellant's road test was tainted by a bribery scheme involving complicit driver examiners.

Although there was no evidence the appellant personally participated in the bribery, the Tribunal found that the tainted testing process was inadequate to assure public safety.

The Tribunal confirmed the Registrar's decision to suspend the licence under s. 47(1)(g) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant appealed the Minister of Transportation's decision to downgrade his Class A(Z) driver's licence to a Class G(Z) licence.

The Minister based the downgrade on an ongoing police investigation into a bribery scheme involving a driving instructor and test examiners, where the appellant's name and licence photo were found in electronic communications.

The Tribunal found that the evidence provided by the police was insufficient to establish that the appellant's road test was corrupted, noting a discrepancy in the dates of the electronic communications.

Given the appellant's clean driving record since obtaining his Class A licence, the Tribunal concluded there was no sufficient reason to downgrade the licence and set aside the Minister's decision.

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to suspend his Class A driver's licence under s. 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Prior to the hearing, the Registrar ended the suspension and downgraded the appellant's licence to Class G(Z).

The Tribunal found that the appeal of the suspension was moot because the suspension was no longer in effect.

The Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion to adjudicate the moot appeal, noting the appellant's intention to file a separate appeal regarding the licence downgrade.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to suspend their Class A driver's licence under section 47(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Following a teleconference hearing, the adjudicator gave oral reasons setting aside the suspension and issued a confidentiality order for certain documents.

The Tribunal ordered the suspension set aside and outlined the process for requesting written reasons.

The appellant brought a motion seeking a stay of the suspension of his Class A driver's licence pending the appeal of the suspension.

The Tribunal applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test.

While finding a serious issue to be tried, the Tribunal concluded the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the stay.

The motion for a stay was denied.

The appellant sought a stay of the suspension of his Class A driver's licence pending his appeal.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay.

The appellant provided no evidence that his financial loss was irrevocable or could not be mitigated by his remaining Class G licence privileges.

The motion for a stay was denied.

The appellant brought a motion seeking a stay of the suspension of his Class A driver's licence pending his appeal.

The Registrar of Motor Vehicles had suspended the licence for 90 days.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the Tribunal found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the appellant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay.

The appellant did not provide sufficient evidence that his financial losses were irrevocable or could not be mitigated.

The motion for a stay was denied.

The appellant appealed a request from the Registrar of Motor Vehicles requiring her to submit a medical report to renew her vision waiver, failing which her driver's licence would be suspended.

The Registrar argued the Licence Appeal Tribunal lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that the request for medical information did not constitute a condition imposed on the licence under s. 32(5)(b)(i) of the Highway Traffic Act, but rather a requirement under the regulations for maintaining a vision waiver.

As there is no statutory right of appeal for decisions granting or renewing vision waivers under s. 32(5)(b)(ii), the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The appellant's driver's licence was suspended for 90 days under the Highway Traffic Act following an impaired driving investigation.

The appellant filed an appeal after the 90-day suspension period had expired.

The Registrar brought a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was not commenced while the suspension was in effect.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, interpreting section 50.1(1) of the Act to mean that a person whose licence 'has been suspended' may appeal, and finding no statutory time limit for commencing such an appeal.

The applicant, a 67-year-old commercial driver, alleged age discrimination after being required to undergo a driver's examination following a speeding ticket, pursuant to O. Reg. 340/94.

The respondent raised a jurisdictional objection, arguing that section 19 of the regulation explicitly states it applies despite the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal agreed, finding that under section 47(2) of the Code, it lacked jurisdiction to address whether the regulation violated the Code or the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant filed an application against the Ministry of Transportation alleging discrimination and reprisal under the Human Rights Code, based on the Ministry's failure to respond to his complaints about a municipality's lack of road maintenance.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal concluded that the Ministry's failure to respond did not constitute discrimination, and there was no evidence of reprisal for claiming or enforcing Code rights.

The applicant, whose Class M motorcycle licence was revoked due to a visual impairment, alleged discrimination because the regulatory waiver program available for Class G licences is not available for Class M licences.

The respondent sought to dismiss the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that section 19 of O.Reg. 340/94 explicitly exempts the visual standards and waiver provisions from the Human Rights Code.

Following established precedent, the Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to look beyond the constitutionally sound exempting provision to examine the impugned regulation itself.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability after the Ministry of Transportation suspended his driver's licence due to a medical report indicating he posed a safety risk.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction to consider the application because section 47(2) of the Human Rights Code and section 19 of the Drivers' Licences Regulation under the Highway Traffic Act explicitly shield the Ministry's medical fitness decisions from Code scrutiny.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of a regulation under the Highway Traffic Act that requires drivers 80 years of age and older to undergo biennial testing to renew their driver's licences.

The applicant argued this requirement discriminated on the basis of age contrary to s. 15 of the Charter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the testing program is individualized, sensitive to the potential problems of aging, and not based on arbitrary or demeaning stereotypes.

The court concluded the regulation does not violate s. 15 of the Charter.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Registrar of Motor Vehicles' decision to indefinitely suspend his driver's licence following his third impaired driving conviction.

The applicant argued that his first conviction, which occurred when he was a youth, could not be used to calculate the suspension under the Highway Traffic Act due to the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

He also argued that the Registrar was estopped from imposing the indefinite suspension because he had previously received an erroneous notice of a three-year suspension and a notice of eligibility for reinstatement.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no conflict between the provincial and federal legislation, and holding that the doctrines of public estoppel and legitimate expectations cannot override the Registrar's mandatory statutory duty to suspend the licence.

The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of disability regarding the suspension of her driver's license for medical reasons and her subsequent efforts to have the suspension lifted.

The respondent argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because section 19 of O. Reg. 340/94 under the Highway Traffic Act exempts medical license suspensions from the Human Rights Code.

The Tribunal held that it had jurisdiction over allegations concerning events prior to January 1, 2011, because the regulatory amendment exempting disability-related decisions only came into effect on that date and could not be applied retroactively.

However, the Tribunal found it lacked jurisdiction over events occurring after January 1, 2011.

The applicant, aged 80, alleged that the mandatory driver testing requirement for individuals aged 80 and over under the Highway Traffic Act discriminated on the basis of age.

The respondent requested dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.

The Tribunal found that section 47(2) of the Human Rights Code and section 19 of Regulation 340/94 explicitly exempt the licensing provisions from the Code.

Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the application for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent requested the dismissal of an age discrimination application regarding driver's licence testing for individuals over 80, arguing it was barred by s. 53(8) of the Human Rights Code.

The respondent claimed that because a similar complaint had been filed by a different person under the old Part IV, the current application was barred.

The Tribunal denied the request, holding that s. 53(8) only prevents the same person from relitigating a previously resolved complaint.

However, the Tribunal directed the applicant to provide written submissions on whether it had jurisdiction to hear the matter, given that the relevant regulation applies despite the Code.

The applicant, an 84-year-old driver, sought to challenge the requirement under O. Reg. 340/94 that drivers over 80 pass an examination every two years, alleging age discrimination.

Section 19 of the regulation, enacted pursuant to s. 47(2) of the Human Rights Code, explicitly exempts these licensing requirements from the Code.

The applicant argued this exemption violated his equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Tribunal held it lacked jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the licensing requirement as a stand-alone issue.

Furthermore, the Tribunal found that the statutory exemption itself did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, as it did not perpetuate disadvantage but merely required such challenges to be brought before the courts under the Charter rather than the Tribunal under the Code.

The application was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of a visual disability after the respondent refused to renew the waiver for his Class D driver's license.

The respondent raised preliminary objections regarding delay and jurisdiction.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing and found that the application was filed more than two years after the respondent's decision not to renew the waiver.

The Tribunal concluded that the applicant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay that would satisfy the good faith requirement under section 34(2) of the Human Rights Code.

The application was dismissed as untimely.