Angela Ruffo

Samuel Kebede brought a Garofoli application to exclude drug evidence, arguing that the search warrant was invalid due to material misrepresentations in the information to obtain (ITO) and insufficient informant information, thereby violating his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found two minor, good-faith misrepresentations in the ITO that were not material to the justice of the peace's decision to issue the warrant.

The court also determined that the confidential informant tips were sufficiently compelling, corroborated, and credible, despite some weaknesses in credibility and corroboration, especially given the urgency associated with firearms.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as the process of obtaining the warrant was not found to be subversive of the prior authorization system.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The accused, a youthful first offender, was convicted by a jury of robbery, attempted robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and threatening bodily harm against two sex workers.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two to two and a half years.

The court considered the mandatory minimums for the firearm offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the accused's strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court declined to give credit for pre-trial bail conditions, finding them not severe enough.

A total sentence of three years was imposed, less 14 days credit for pre-sentence custody, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

Following a jury trial where the accused was found guilty of robbery and related offences, defence counsel received anonymous letters purportedly from a juror raising concerns about the deliberation process and alleged bias.

The accused applied for an inquiry into the jury or a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, applying the common law rule of jury secrecy and finding that the delay and anonymous nature of the letters made them too unreliable to warrant an inquiry or mistrial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of domestic assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct without a voir dire, engaged in impermissible propensity reasoning, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted as narrative context, the trial judge did not engage in propensity reasoning, and the credibility findings were grounded in the evidence.

Two appellants, Jemaine Phillips and Drai O'Hara-Salmon, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Said Hadbai in a parking lot across from Jack's Bar in London, Ontario on December 27, 2011.

Phillips, who fired the fatal shot, was convicted as the principal offender.

O'Hara-Salmon was convicted as a party to the offence under sections 21(1)(b), 21(1)(c), and 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

Phillips raised multiple grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's instructions on self-defence, the exclusion of expert psychiatric evidence, the failure to leave provocation with the jury, and various other charging issues.

O'Hara-Salmon raised grounds concerning the adequacy of instructions on party liability, the failure to give a W.(D.) instruction, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's conduct or instructions.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited firearm (Glock 26 pistol) with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 21 months incarceration; the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest and 200 hours of community service, along with a DNA order and a 15-year s. 109 prohibition.

The court found that while the offence was serious and near the "true crime" end of the s. 95 spectrum, exceptional mitigating factors—including the accused's youth (just 18 years old), first-offender status, genuine remorse, cooperation with police, psychological counselling, and family support—justified a community-based sentence that could still achieve denunciation and general deterrence.

The Crown sought estreatment and forfeiture of a $30,000 recognizance after the accused breached a house arrest condition by leaving his residence without a surety.

The accused had been released on bail with two sureties and strict conditions addressing substance abuse risks.

One surety temporarily delegated supervisory responsibilities to the other while leaving on vacation, without seeking a formal bail variation.

The court held that sureties cannot unilaterally delegate or restructure bail supervision and must seek formal variation where circumstances change.

Partial forfeiture was ordered against the accused and both sureties, balancing the importance of maintaining the “pull of bail” with the relatively limited harm caused by the brief breach.