Angela Ruffo

The appellant was convicted of fraud and theft over $5,000 for operating a large-scale Ponzi scheme that defrauded 41 victims of over $10 million.

He was sentenced to the maximum term of 14 years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by using the appellant's lack of remorse and exercise of his right to trial as an aggravating factor to justify the maximum sentence.

The Court allowed the appeal and varied the sentence to 10 years' imprisonment, maintaining the restitution and fine in lieu of forfeiture orders.

The applicant brought an application under section 35(9) of the Mental Health Act to permit the disclosure of the respondent's psychiatric records for a capacity hearing before the Law Society Tribunal.

The respondent opposed the application, arguing that the records were not essential to the hearing.

The Divisional Court granted the application, finding that the records were highly relevant and important to determining the respondent's capacity to practice law, and that the respondent's privacy interests were diminished due to his membership in a regulated profession.

The three appellants were convicted of second-degree murder following a brutal group attack on the victim, who was beaten and stabbed.

They appealed their convictions on several grounds, including the trial judge's instructions on co-principal liability and the mens rea for murder, evidentiary rulings regarding prior inconsistent statements, and the refusal to give an Oliver instruction for a co-accused.

One appellant also appealed her 12-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions or evidentiary rulings, and upholding the sentence as fit.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of two counts of importing cocaine and one count of conspiracy to import firearms.

The accused orchestrated the importation of eight kilograms of cocaine using couriers and conspired to import 40 to 50 handguns from the United States into Canada.

The court found numerous aggravating factors, including the accused's leadership role, the quantity of drugs and firearms, and a calculated profit motive.

Applying the totality principle, the court imposed a global sentence of 16 years' imprisonment, reduced to 12 years and 10 months after credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest bail.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the 41-month and 19-day delay between his arrest and the jury's verdicts violated his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court calculated the total delay and deducted periods of defence delay, including time before the scheduling of the preliminary inquiry and time resulting from an abandoned Garofoli application.

The court also found that exceptional circumstances, specifically a lack of judicial resources due to illness and a family death, justified a further 7.5-month deduction.

The net delay fell below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the application was dismissed.

The applicant, an airport worker charged with conspiracy to import cocaine, brought an application under ss. 8 and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude evidence obtained through wiretap authorizations and search warrants.

The applicant argued that the affidavits supporting the authorizations and warrants lacked reasonable and probable grounds and investigative necessity.

The court reviewed the authorizations and warrants, applying the Garofoli standard and amplifying the record where necessary.

The court found that the authorizations and warrants were validly issued and supported by sufficient grounds, including intercepted communications, surveillance, and informant information.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for failing to report under a Sex Offender Information Registration Act (SOIRA) order.

At trial, the Crown relied on unauthenticated copies of the original Information and SOIRA order, which the trial judge admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge erred in admitting the documents, as they lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and were not the best evidence available.

Furthermore, the trial judge erred by shifting the burden to the appellant to prove a reasonable excuse without first determining if the Crown had proven the mens rea of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and his indeterminate sentence following guilty pleas to two counts of aggravated sexual assault.

The offences involved failing to disclose his HIV-positive status to two women before having unprotected sex with them, resulting in both women contracting HIV.

The appellant had a lengthy criminal record including convictions for sexual assault causing bodily harm, counselling the murder of a police officer, uttering threats, and possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose.

Both Crown and defence psychiatrists assessed him as having antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits and marijuana dependence disorder, presenting moderate to high risk for sexual and violent recidivism.

The sentencing judge designated him as a dangerous offender and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The Crown conceded two errors: failure to conduct prospective risk assessment at the designation stage and failure to consider Gladue factors.

The appeal was dismissed as there was no reasonable possibility the errors affected the outcome.

Three defendants applied for orders staying criminal proceedings on the grounds that their right to be tried within a constitutionally tolerable time had been breached.

The applicable ceiling for Ontario Court of Justice cases is 18 months.

The Crown argued that when defence delay periods were subtracted, the total delay did not exceed the ceiling.

The court found that two applicants' delay did not exceed the 18-month threshold after deducting defence delay caused by their decision to change counsel.

For the third applicant, although the delay exceeded the Jordan guidelines by nine days, the court found exceptional circumstances existed that rebutted the presumption of unreasonable delay.

All three applications were dismissed.

The defendants brought applications under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to challenge the lawfulness of search warrants executed on three apartment units.

Thanh Nguyen lacked standing to challenge the search of the Sherway location as he had no reasonable expectation of privacy in a unit he was merely permitted to use as a guest.

Catherine Vu and Kevin Tran challenged the search of the Lakeshore location where Vu was the tenant.

The court found the warrant for the Lakeshore location was issued without reasonable grounds to believe evidence would be found there, as the connection between Tran and the residence was insufficient to establish more than occasional guest status.

The search violated section 8 rights.

However, under the R. v. Grant analysis, the evidence was admitted as the police acted in good faith, the state conduct was not improper, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits outweighed the privacy breach.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder in connection with a home invasion robbery in Minden, Ontario.

The appellant and three co-accused drove from Scarborough to commit the robbery, which resulted in the death of Ryan Kennedy.

The appellant struck Kennedy in the jaw with the butt of a pellet gun after Kennedy had already been struck twice on the head with a baseball bat by a co-accused.

The appellant appealed on two grounds: first, that there was insufficient evidence that his blow was a significant contributing cause of death, and second, that a statement by the trial Crown in closing argument caused a miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury's verdict was reasonable and that any improper Crown statement did not materially influence the verdict.

Samuel Kebede brought a Garofoli application to exclude drug evidence, arguing that the search warrant was invalid due to material misrepresentations in the information to obtain (ITO) and insufficient informant information, thereby violating his s. 8 Charter rights.

The court found two minor, good-faith misrepresentations in the ITO that were not material to the justice of the peace's decision to issue the warrant.

The court also determined that the confidential informant tips were sufficiently compelling, corroborated, and credible, despite some weaknesses in credibility and corroboration, especially given the urgency associated with firearms.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed, as the process of obtaining the warrant was not found to be subversive of the prior authorization system.

The appellant was convicted of 21 offences including possession of cannabis, possession for the purpose of trafficking in cannabis, cocaine and ecstasy, possession of proceeds of crime, possession of a prohibited weapon, money laundering, and related offences.

He was sentenced to nine and one-half years imprisonment.

The appellant appealed his convictions on three grounds: the trial judge's refusal to grant an adjournment when counsel was removed on the morning of trial, the trial judge's failure to provide adequate assistance to a self-represented litigant, and the appellant's exclusion from trial in violation of s. 650(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded the appeal and the Court of Appeal allowed it, setting aside the convictions and ordering a new trial based on the trial judge's failure to provide sufficient assistance to the self-represented appellant.

The accused, a youthful first offender, was convicted by a jury of robbery, attempted robbery, use of an imitation firearm, and threatening bodily harm against two sex workers.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two to two and a half years.

The court considered the mandatory minimums for the firearm offences, the vulnerability of the victims, and the accused's strong rehabilitation prospects.

The court declined to give credit for pre-trial bail conditions, finding them not severe enough.

A total sentence of three years was imposed, less 14 days credit for pre-sentence custody, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

Following a jury trial where the accused was found guilty of robbery and related offences, defence counsel received anonymous letters purportedly from a juror raising concerns about the deliberation process and alleged bias.

The accused applied for an inquiry into the jury or a mistrial.

The court dismissed the application, applying the common law rule of jury secrecy and finding that the delay and anonymous nature of the letters made them too unreliable to warrant an inquiry or mistrial.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for two counts of domestic assault.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting evidence of prior discreditable conduct without a voir dire, engaged in impermissible propensity reasoning, and applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the extrinsic evidence was properly admitted as narrative context, the trial judge did not engage in propensity reasoning, and the credibility findings were grounded in the evidence.

Two appellants, Jemaine Phillips and Drai O'Hara-Salmon, appealed their convictions for first-degree murder in connection with the shooting death of Said Hadbai in a parking lot across from Jack's Bar in London, Ontario on December 27, 2011.

Phillips, who fired the fatal shot, was convicted as the principal offender.

O'Hara-Salmon was convicted as a party to the offence under sections 21(1)(b), 21(1)(c), and 21(2) of the Criminal Code.

Phillips raised multiple grounds of appeal concerning the trial judge's instructions on self-defence, the exclusion of expert psychiatric evidence, the failure to leave provocation with the jury, and various other charging issues.

O'Hara-Salmon raised grounds concerning the adequacy of instructions on party liability, the failure to give a W.(D.) instruction, and the reasonableness of the verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's conduct or instructions.

The appellants, Elizabeth Gayle and Fedrick Gayle, appealed their convictions for first degree murder in the death of Tiffany Gayle, a 15-year-old who was beaten to death in their home.

The appellants challenged various evidentiary rulings and jury instructions made at trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's admission of evidence regarding prior discreditable conduct, the baseball bat, or the jury instructions regarding after-the-fact conduct and the modes of participation in the homicide.

During a multi-accused trial for second-degree murder, counsel for one of the co-accused suggested in his closing address that a witness had 'let the truth slip out' in a prior police statement when she mentioned seeing another co-accused with a knife.

The other co-accused brought an application for a mistrial, arguing the address was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, finding that the closing address did not compromise trial fairness and that any potential prejudice could be cured by a strong limiting instruction to the jury regarding the permissible use of prior inconsistent statements.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited firearm (Glock 26 pistol) with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 21 months incarceration; the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest and 200 hours of community service, along with a DNA order and a 15-year s. 109 prohibition.

The court found that while the offence was serious and near the "true crime" end of the s. 95 spectrum, exceptional mitigating factors—including the accused's youth (just 18 years old), first-offender status, genuine remorse, cooperation with police, psychological counselling, and family support—justified a community-based sentence that could still achieve denunciation and general deterrence.