Angela Ruffo

The appellant appealed a 42-month sentence imposed for a series of serious offences committed over a two-hour period while intoxicated, which included an altercation with a taxi driver and dangerous driving.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge erred by imposing five consecutive sentences and that the total sentence was too harsh.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences for offences implicating separate legal interests, and concluding the sentence was not unduly harsh given the appellant's lengthy criminal record and the seriousness of the offences, noting the sentencing judge properly considered Gladue factors.

The appellant appealed a conviction for impaired operation under s.253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code involving the operation of a Davinci Scout e‑bike, and also appealed the sentence of six months’ imprisonment, probation, and a lengthy driving prohibition.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s credibility findings under the W.(D.) framework and argued that an e‑bike was not a “motor vehicle” within the meaning of s.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that a device capable of propulsion by non‑muscular power qualifies as a motor vehicle for purposes of the offence, regardless of whether it could also be propelled by muscular power.

The court found no error in the trial judge’s application of the W.(D.) analysis or factual findings and determined the sentence was fit given the offender’s extensive impaired‑driving record.

Both the conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant appealed convictions for marijuana possession and resisting arrest on the basis that, as a self-represented accused, he did not receive the minimum judicial assistance necessary to ensure a fair trial.

The court held that the trial judge's failures regarding inquiries about counsel and disclosure, explanation of trial procedure and offence elements, attention to potential Charter issues, and gatekeeping on opinion evidence cumulatively rendered the trial unfair.

Applying appellate principles governing unrepresented accused, the court found a miscarriage of justice and allowed the conviction appeal.

A new trial was ordered, and the sentence appeal was treated as moot because the sentence had already been served.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related kidnapping and robbery.

At trial, two key Crown witnesses recanted their prior statements inculpating the appellants.

The trial judge admitted the prior inconsistent statements for the truth of their contents under the K.G.B. framework but refused to allow defence counsel to cross-examine one of the witnesses on her statement after it was admitted.

The trial judge also admitted the entire transcript of a co-accused's guilty plea proceedings.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by denying the defence the right to cross-examine the witness on her prior statement and by admitting the guilty plea proceedings where cross-examination was limited by solicitor-client privilege and the statement contained inadmissible hearsay.

The appellant sought leave to appeal sentence following convictions for multiple sexual assaults against a child in respect of whom he occupied a position of trust and authority.

He argued the sentencing judge selected the wrong sentencing range because the assaults did not involve penetration and that a three-year penitentiary term should have been imposed.

The court held that, whether the starting point was three years or five years, the five-year sentence disclosed no error in principle, fell within the applicable range, and was not manifestly unfit given repeated assaults, grooming behaviour, exploitation of vulnerability, and trust-based abuse.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision, arguing that the court below erred in its assessment of credibility and the risk of witness tainting.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding that the appeal did not raise a question of law requiring clarification and that the arguments were not sufficiently strong to warrant a second appeal.

The Crown sought estreatment and forfeiture of a $30,000 recognizance after the accused breached a house arrest condition by leaving his residence without a surety.

The accused had been released on bail with two sureties and strict conditions addressing substance abuse risks.

One surety temporarily delegated supervisory responsibilities to the other while leaving on vacation, without seeking a formal bail variation.

The court held that sureties cannot unilaterally delegate or restructure bail supervision and must seek formal variation where circumstances change.

Partial forfeiture was ordered against the accused and both sureties, balancing the importance of maintaining the “pull of bail” with the relatively limited harm caused by the brief breach.

The appellant appealed a judgment dismissing his application for certiorari to set aside a committal order following a preliminary inquiry.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence of identification and the type of plant.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error, as there was some evidence connecting the appellant to the property and the 9,000 marijuana plants, including his admitted ownership and the testimony of a police officer.

The appeal was dismissed.