Lorna Lynn Bolton

The applicant sought release pending the determination of his appeal from convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon.

As this was a subsequent application for release, he was required to demonstrate a material change in circumstances.

The applicant argued that a newly obtained decision tree provided to the jury was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the decision tree was merely a deliberation aid and the jury charge properly explained the essential elements, meaning there was no material change in circumstances to justify a fresh look at release.

The applicant, convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, applied for the appointment of state-funded counsel for his appeal under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code after being denied Legal Aid.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to meet his burden of proving a lack of financial means.

The applicant had not been transparent in disclosing his financial circumstances to Legal Aid and had allowed a property to be foreclosed upon by a friend without contesting the proceedings, raising questions about his financial affairs.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences, as well as his 14-year sentence.

The convictions arose from a home invasion where the victim was shot in the chest.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in his treatment of a Vetrovec witness, in admitting a gun under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

He also argued the sentence violated the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the witness or the s. 24(2) analysis, and rejected the fresh evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the shooting was a cold-blooded assault resulting in near-fatal injuries.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the summary conviction appeal court, arguing that the judge erred in inferring an agreement under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code to regularize proceedings instituted beyond the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding that the judge had an adequate evidentiary foundation to infer the agreement.

The court held that the correctness of this conclusion raised a question of mixed fact and law, which cannot be appealed under s. 839(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference, arguing that his statements to police were involuntary and that his right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated.

The appellant contended that police failed to facilitate his right to counsel of choice, failed to offer a second consultation when new allegations of child abuse were raised, and improperly induced a confession by suggesting consensual sex with a minor was not a crime.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no Charter breaches and upholding the trial judge's ruling that the confession was voluntary.

The appellants, who were convicted of first degree murder and sentenced as adults, brought an application for directions to have their sentence appeal heard prior to and separate from their conviction appeal.

They argued that the delay in hearing the conviction appeal would negatively impact their ability to participate in an Intensive Rehabilitative Custody and Supervision program if their sentence appeal was successful.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding that the exceptional circumstances and potential prejudice to the appellants constituted compelling reasons to bifurcate the appeals.

The appellant, a high school teacher, was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault against a 14-year-old student.

He appealed his convictions, arguing primarily that the trial judge erred by permitting the Crown to call a vice-principal as a reply witness to rebut the appellant's testimony regarding a conversation between them.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the reply evidence did not breach the rule against case-splitting because the Crown could not have reasonably anticipated the appellant's testimony.

The court also dismissed arguments regarding inadmissible hearsay and inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing her detention.

She argued she was entitled to an absolute discharge as she only posed a risk of minimal harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition was reasonable and supported by the evidence, though it encouraged the Board to explore community integration at her upcoming annual review.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 15 years after shooting a bystander outside a tavern.

He appealed his conviction, arguing improper Crown cross-examination and errors in the trial judge's instructions on intent and provocation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's charge or the Crown's conduct.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, and the period of parole ineligibility was reduced to 12 years, as the trial judge failed to give adequate weight to the appellant's lack of criminal record and potential for rehabilitation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery and kidnapping and was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by treating his alleged involvement in planning the offences as an aggravating factor, despite it not being proven by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal agreed, noting the appellant was outside the store when the offences were initiated.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was reduced to six years concurrent, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the evidence supported the Board's conclusion that the appellant posed a significant risk to public safety.

The Court also found the Board's decision to detain the appellant on a secure unit rather than a general unit or via a hybrid order was reasonable given concerns about her risk of going AWOL and assaultive behaviour.

Youth criminal appeal from convictions for historical sexual offences following a trial under youth legislation.

The appellant argued the trial judge gave inadequate reasons, reversed the onus, applied an improper standard to defence evidence, and improperly relied on cross-count similar fact reasoning.

The court held the reasons, read functionally and contextually, were sufficient; the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and did not reverse the burden of proof.

The court further held that, had the issue been squarely raised, the complainants' evidence would inevitably have been admissible across counts given the striking similarities and independent disclosure.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant appealed his global sentence of 6 years net (8 years total) for 32 convictions, including break and enter, dangerous driving, and possession of stolen property.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his mental illness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no causal link between his illness and his criminal conduct, and no evidence that a lengthy sentence would have a severe negative effect on him.

A corrigendum was later issued to correct an error regarding the sentence for breach of probation.

The appellant appealed a 14-year sentence imposed following guilty pleas to a series of violent offences against eight victims.

The sentence was based on a joint submission.

The appellant argued the sentence was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record, the viciousness of the assaults, attempts to obstruct justice, and the fact that the trial judge was bound to accept the joint submission unless it was contrary to the public interest.

The court found the sentence fit.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual exploitation and was sentenced to 30 months' imprisonment.

On appeal, he adduced fresh evidence that he was subject to a deportation order and had lost his right to appeal it because his sentence was two years or more.

The Court of Appeal found that while the original sentence was not unfit, the certainty of deportation to a country where he had no ties, combined with his rehabilitation and the fact he had nearly completed his sentence, justified reducing the sentence to two years less a day to preserve his right to appeal the deportation.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on charges of robbery, assault with a weapon, and uttering death threats.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding certain medical evidence due to alleged non-disclosure, refusing to allow the Crown to admit the accused's statement to police, and failing to correct improper comments made by defence counsel during the jury address.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred in excluding the medical evidence and defence counsel made improper comments regarding wrongful convictions and the Crown's integrity, these errors did not render the trial unfair or necessarily affect the verdict.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a youth sentence but conceded the appeal was moot as it was no longer seeking a custodial disposition.

The Court of Appeal declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal, finding it was largely fact-driven and not an exceptional case.

The appeal was dismissed for mootness.

The appellant appealed her sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily injury and failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's six-year sentence for dangerous driving exceeded the Crown's requested maximum of five years and fell outside the acceptable range.

The appeal was allowed, reducing the dangerous driving sentence to four years (for a global sentence of five years) and the driving prohibition from sixteen years to eleven years.

The appellant appealed his convictions for uttering threats and assault, as well as his sentence of two years' imprisonment.

He argued the conviction for uttering threats was unreasonable because his father, the target of the threats, testified he was not afraid.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, noting other witnesses testified the appellant was loud, upset, and had been drinking, and the trial judge found the father was minimizing his evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was not unfit given the appellant's history and criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to seven years and one month imprisonment.

He appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on self-defence under s. 34(2) of the Criminal Code, the interplay of self-induced intoxication, the application of W.(D.) principles to his police statements, and the exclusion of evidence regarding the deceased's prior argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was fit given the vicious and unrelenting nature of the attack.