Thurston v. Lu, 1993 CanLII 16453

Thurston v. Lu

1993-11-03

Ontario Board of Inquiry

Leslie Thurston Complainant

v.

Cheng Ching Lu and Su Chen Lu Respondents

Date of Complaint: August 9, 1989

Date of Decision: November 3, 1993

Before: Ontario Board of Inquiry, W. Gunther Plaut

Comm. Decision No.: 560

Appearances by: Sharon Ffolkes-Abrahams, Counsel for the Commission Leslie Thurston, on her own behalf Cheng Ching Lu and Su Chen Lu, on their own behalf Tiang Yu Go, Interpreter

HOUSING ACCOMMODATION — FAMILY STATUS — rental accommodation denied to parent — INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES — definition of "family status"

Summary: The Board of Inquiry finds that Chang Ching Lu and Su Chen Lu discriminated against Leslie Thurston on the basis of her family status when they refused to rent an apartment to her because she has a child.

In March 1989 the respondents advertised an apartment for rent, describing it as suitable for one lady. Ms. Thurston responded to the ad and went to see the apartment, taking her three-year-old child with her. Ms. Lu refused to rent the apartment to her because she did not want a child living there. Though Ms. Lu subsequently offered to rent the aparatment to Ms. Thurston on the condition that Ms. Thurston would pay an additional seventy dollars per month for utilities, the Board of Inquiry finds that the initial refusal violated the Code and was not remedied.

The Board of Inquiry orders the respondents to pay Ms. Thurston $2,000 as compensation for the disappointment and embarassment she suffered.

Cases Cited

Booker v. Floriri Village Investments Inc. (1989), 1989 CanLII 9077 (ON HRT), 11 C.H.R.R. D/44 (Ont. Bd.Inq.): 41

Fakhoury v. Las Brisas Ltd. (1987), 1987 CanLII 8549 (ON HRT), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4028 (Ont. Bd.Inq.): 41

Moxon v. Samax Investments Ltd. (1984), 1984 CanLII 5077 (MB HRC), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2835 (Man. Bd.Adj.): 42

Westbury v. Trump Investments Ltd. (1992), 1992 CanLII 14257 (BC HRT), 17 C.H.R.R. D/516 (B.C.C.H.R.): 41

Legislation Cited

Ontario

Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19

s. 2(1): 22, 32, 39

s. 9: 22, 32

s. 10(1): 33

s. 21(1): 34

BACKGROUND

1In March 1989, Ms. Thurston ("complainant") saw a notice in a Toronto store which advertised an apartment for rent. It read as follows (Exhibit 12):

BASEMENT APRTMENT FOR RENT BLOOR-CHRISTIE SUBWAY, RENO BRIGHT, LRG., CLEAN BSMNT. APT., OWN ENTRY, BUILT-IN SHELVES, 4 PCS. BATH, FRIDGE, STOVE, RUG, UTIL INCL. $ 520/MONTH, REFERENCES, SUITS ONE LADY NON-SMOKER, NO PETS.

2Complainant telephoned on March 27 and spoke to Ms. Lu ("respondent"), apparently the (or an) owner,¹ and was asked several questions, among them whether she smoked or had pets. She answered, "No."

3She was also asked whether the apartment was just for her, and she answered that she was a single woman. They made an appointment for the next day, so that Ms. Thurston could see the apartment, located at 287 Clinton Ave., Toronto.

4Complainant arrived, bringing her three-year old boy with her.

An argument ensued between the two women regarding the presence of the child and the fact that Ms. Thurston was not "one lady," as the ad had required. The upshot was that complainant was refused the apartment.

5At least one other telephone call took place between the two, but Ms. Lu persisted in her refusal to rent the apartment to Ms. Thurston.

6After contacting the Ontario Human Rights Commission (the "Commission") Ms. Lu relented in her refusal and offered the apartment to Ms. Thurston for herself and the child for $520 plus $70/month for electrical utilities ("hydro"). But Ms. Thurston was not willing to accept the increase and eventually, on August 9, launched a complaint with the Commission.

THE HEARINGS

7It should be noted that I found it necessary to be highly flexible in the conduct of these hearings. There were two reasons:

(1) Respondents had no counsel. They had gone to the Legal Aid clinic and had been advised that fees would probably be between $600 and $1,000, and they decided that this was more than they could afford.

8The absence of counsel on the side of any respondent raises serious questions about equitable hearings, for rarely are such respondents capable of cross-examining witnesses or even presenting their own cases logically — while counsel for the Commission not only are schooled in these matters but also are conversant with the Human Rights Code [R.S.O. 1990, c. H-19] (the "Code") and the jurisprudence based upon it. A board of inquiry may try to even the scales of justice through questions and clarification, but that is never enough to achieve the desired balance. In the instant case, there was also a moderate linguistic gap between the parties, and the repeated need to have matters interpreted prevented straightforward procedures.

9(2) The respondents were unacquainted with the nature of the proceedings and told the Board that they had learned only a few days before what a "hearing" was. They had not responded to letters from the Commission and had not been present for the initial teleconference on February 25, 1993. (In fact, there was no certainty that they would appear for the hearing, and the possibility existed that the Board would be faced with a motion from the Commission to proceed in their absence.)

10Therefore, I constantly explained the nature and requirements of the proceedings. I informed respondents of their rights as well as the duties of the Board and its power to either dismiss the complaint or rule it to be justified. I tried to have the respondents understand that, in the latter case, I could award damages or, if appropriate, order measures in order to assure that the Code would be complied with.

11All of this caused me to adjust the proceedings somewhat. While this departed from the orderliness of customary hearings, it appeared necessary to me in order to ensure that the respondents were given an opportunity to present their side of the case.

12I should add that, had I become convinced at any time that this was not possible, I was prepared to adjourn the hearings in order [to] make alternate arrangements. However, this proved to be unnecessary. Not only was the interpreter well trained and competent, the respondents had lived in Canada for many years and were reasonably fluent in English and generally able to follow the proceedings. Ms. Lu especially (who carried the case for herself and her husband) spoke good English, and only when she became excited or when she could not understand some testimony or other matters, did she require an interpreter or my intervention. I am satisfied that she adequately conveyed her case to me. She made her points with clarity and considerable passion, and produced excellently executed drawings of the rental facility in question (Exhibit 16), as well as photographs.

THE TESTIMONY

13In the following I will summarize the testimony rendered, but not in the order it was given (for, as set out above, it was not always given consecutively).

1. Michael Harris — Officer of the Commission

14He was assigned to the case on December 1991, that is, more than two years after the incident that had given rise to the complaint. He submitted notes by the previously assigned staff person (Exhibit 3), which recorded that a number of efforts had been made to contact the respondents — telephone calls, letters, notes left at their door — but had failed. Several mailings via Priority Post were returned unclaimed to the Commission, but one regularly addressed letter was not returned, which led the witness to conclude that this letter had in fact arrived.

15Among the communications was the advice that a board of inquiry had been requested and appointed, and also that a teleconference had been scheduled by the Board. (As noted above, the respondents did not participate in that conference.) The witness continued his attempts to contact them, but to no avail. He saw them for the first time at the hearings, and their presence was the consequence of having been served by the Boards of Inquiry office.

2. Ms. Thurston — Complainant

16When she responded to the ad by calling the respondent Ms. Thurston had not revealed that she had a son living with her. She had not been asked the question and did not want to be turned away forthwith. She even contemplated renting the apartment and then appearing with her son, but thought the better of it.

She made an appointment for the next day and found 287 Clinton to be a family home. Ms. Lu greeted her at the door.

17Upon learning that Jeremy was Ms. Thurston's son and lived with her, Ms. Lu told her at once that this would prevent her from obtaining the facility. The respondent would not have children in her home, for the noise they would make would disturb her sons who needed quiet for their studies.

18When Ms. Thurston pointed out that such refusal was against the law, Ms. Lu responded that she was aware of it but stood by her refusal. The witness pointed out that she would complain to the Commission, whereupon Ms. Lu told her, "Go ahead."

Later on, the witness phoned the respondent to see whether she could change her mind, but was refused again. They had no direct contact thereafter.

19Ms. Thurston then related her experiences with apartment hunting, and how she eventually ended up in a basement flat, located at 270 Aldrydge, where she stayed for thirteen months. She paid $625/month plus $200 for hydro. The apartment was large but totally unsuitable, since during a rainfall there would be as much as two inches of water on the floor, and therefore their quarters were constantly damp. This condition caused constant respiratory ailments for herself and the child, and they paid many visits to doctors and clinics. Also, she was pregnant at the time.

20She moved several times thereafter, until at last she obtained space in a government-supported housing facility, where she lives now and is very satisfied. The witness described herself as someone who speaks six language[s] and is currently teaching ESL (English as a second language) to adults. She asserted that her contact with Ms. Lu was not marked by any lack of understanding on the latter's part, and that communication between them was unimpeded by any linguistic difficulties.

3. Ms. Lu

21At the time of the incident, she had become unemployed, which led her to advertise the apartment (which had never been rented before), and eventually also forced one of her sons to interrupt his schooling and earn money for the family. In addition, her mother suffered an accident, was hospitalized and needed looking after; her mother-in-law came to stay with them (though she ended up returning to Taiwan, because she did not like it in Toronto) — altogether, it was a time of upheaval for her and her family.

22On March 30, 1989, she found a letter at her door which had been sent by Parkdale Community Legal Services, an agency that Ms. Thurston had consulted (Exhibit 4). It informed her that her refusal to rent to Ms. Thurston appeared to be a breach of ss. 2(1) and 8 [now 9] of the Code, and that she might wish to reconsider her earlier refusal. She thereupon telephoned the Commission, spoke to officer Zahra Hazan,² and agreed to rent to Ms. Thurston after all. However, she added an additional demand for $70/ month for electricity, because now the facility would serve not one but two persons. Also, she wanted the Commission to hold her harmless of any potential injury caused by or happening to the child. While the witness did not indicate that a response to the latter condition had been made by Ms. Hazan, testimony established that the amended offer was refused by the complainant.

23When informed of this, Ms. Lu decided not to rent the room at all and keep it for her family, especially in view of the expected visit — or possibly permanent stay — of her husband's mother.

24Respondent did not deny that she originally turned Ms. Thurston away, but there were parts of the latter's testimony with which she disagreed.

(1) Ms. Thurston had in fact called on her on three occasions, and had indicated at one time that she needed to ask her family's approval of her intended move. Ms. Thurston denied this as preposterous, since she had only minimal contact with her family.

(2) When they met, Ms. Thurston threatened her and, since not renting to her and the child was against the law, added that she would sue her, unless Ms. Lu paid her money. All of this was categorically denied by the complainant: she had neither threatened Ms. Lu nor demanded money. She had merely pointed out that the refusal to rent was illegal.

25The respondent further expanded upon the reasons that led her to refuse Ms. Thurston's application:

(1) When she had asked Ms. Thurston whether she was — as the ad stated — "one lady," the answer had been yes. Therefore, when Ms. Thurston suddenly appeared with her child, it became clear to the respondent that this was not an honest woman, and therefore would not make a desirable tenant.

(2) The basement was no place for a child, even without the hazard of the appliances, for it was always cold and damp.

(3) Water pressure in the house was low, and an additional person using the water would slow the flow to a trickle.

26She further testified that she had received advice from the neighbourhood legal clinic and had been urged to write everything down for future reference. With the help of one of her children she did so on April 18, and the testimony noted above is reflected in her memo (which was considered part of the evidence, rather than an exhibit):

1. In mid-March 1989, I, Su Chen, posted an ad for the rental of the basement of my home.

2. A few days later, on March 28, 1989, a person by the name of Ms. Thurston called me in response to the ad I had posted. I asked her if the apartment was just for herself. She answered "Yes, I am single." I continued to ask a few more questions concerning whether she smoked or had pets. She replied in the negative. She then asked me if the bathroom had a tub and I assured her that it did. I added that she would find the place suitable for one person and suggested that she come and see it.

3. Since she had given me the impression over the phone that the apartment was for herself only, I was surprised that she had brought someone else with her. I asked her whether the child was her son. She replied, "Yes, he is." Feeling that I had been deceived, I said to her, "You told me that it was just for yourself." She then said threateningly, "You have no right to just rent for one person. Do you know that this is against the law? If you don't want to rent it to me, I'm going to sue you or you must find a place for me or pay me!" I was stunned by her behavior and found her threat unreasonable. "Pay you for what?" I asked. She replied that because the [sic] had made the trip to come here, I had to pay her. I felt that she was taking advantage of me. She had been dishonest with me from the start by misleading me when I asked her if she was looking for a place for herself only. Why did she not mention that she was looking for a place for two people? If she had discussed this with me over the phone, I would've explained fully why the apartment was only suitable for one person. She wouldn't have had to come at all.

[4.] However, because she mislead [sic] me and threatened me, I could no longer deal with her. At the end of the appointment, she asked me why I did not rent to children. I just said that the place was only good for one person. I added that I had two children who needed a quiet place to study. She then mistook that as discrimination against her child, and told me she wanted to sue me, unless I paid her. I refused to pay her, then she left.

27Respondent denied that in her dealings with Commission she had been uncooperative. Either she had not received their letters or — if there was a notice (which she could not recall) — her family situation totally absorbed her. She paid no further attention to the complaint, which she considered a closed matter after there had been no action for several years.

ARGUMENT BY THE COMMISSION

28To begin with, Ms. Ffolkes-Abrahams, counsel for the Commission, spoke to the background of the respondents. She noted that they had been in Canada for some sixteen or more years and, in 1985, had bought the home which is the locale of the apartment at issue. Their comprehension and use of English were good. By implication, a culture gap that could explain the breach of the Code played no role in this case.

29She stressed that, as time went on, Ms. Lu had raised an ever increasing number of reasons why the space could not have been rented to Ms. Thurston. At first it was the noise the child would make; then, that complainant had not been forthright with her and therefore she could not establish the kind of relationship with the complainant which was necessary in such intimate quarters; then, that she did not like being threatened; that the basement was dangerous for a child because of the appliances; and further, that it was cold and damp. All told, the basement was unsuitable for a child.

30According to counsel, all these explanations were being voiced ex post facto. With the exception of the noise factor, they were not made at the time when she refused the rental. Thus, she did not mention her fear for the child's safety when she spoke to Ms. Hazan, Commission officer.

31Counsel also pointed to the respondent's failure to answer mail or telephone calls, which she described as a thoroughly uncooperative attitude. As uncontradicted testimony showed, Ms. Lu had been highly negative about any enforcement possibilities that might arise from a breach of the Code. She had responded to the effect that Canada was after all not a communist country and that no one could force her to do anything she did not want to do.

THE LAW AND ITS APPLICATION

32The complaint had been laid under ss. 2(1) and 8 (now 9) of the Code. The latter section contains the generalized prohibition of infringing a right set forth in the Code. Section 2 deals with accommodation and reads:

2(1) Every person has a right to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of accommodation, without discrimination because of race, ancestry, place of origin, colour, ethnic origin, [citizenship,] creed, sex, sexual orientation, age, marital status, family status, handicap or the receipt of public assistance.

33At issue in the instant case is the application of "family status." The relevant section is s. 9(1)(d) (now 10(1)), which defines the term:

"family status" means the status of being in a parent and child relationship.

34A further section of the Code that needs to be considered is s. 20 (now 21)(1):

The right under section 2 to equal treatment with respect to the occupancy of residential accommodation without discrimination is not infringed by discrimination where the residential accommodation is in a dwelling in which the owner and his family reside if the occupant or occupants of the residential accommodation are required to share a bathroom or kitchen facility with the owner or family of the owner.

It is clear that this latter exception does not apply, because neither bathroom nor kitchen facilities were shared.

35The space in question consists of a sizable room for living and sleeping, with built-in shelves, a gas-control box and a fuse box. The room has its own door to the outside, and another door closes it off from additional space.

36Immediately outside the latter door is an open space, with a staircase going to the upper floors and the following appliances: a gas furnace, a hot water heater and a washing machine — all of which serve the entire house. In that space also are found facilities for the use of the tenant: refrigerator, sink, stove and burners. Further, there are a bathroom (with door) for the lessee, a door to a cold room and a back door to the outside.

37This means that living and sleeping took place in a space that could be closed, while the rest of the basement (with the exception of bathroom and cold room) was one open area, part of which was set aside in part for the use of the owners and in part constituted the essential support area for the renter: kitchen and bathroom, and neither facility was shared.

38When asked by the Commission why in the ad Ms. Lu had asked for a woman, she answered that she herself did her family's laundry and for that purpose had to use the downstairs area. Thus, since kitchen and bathroom facilities were not shared, the exception of s. 2021 does not apply.

39We must therefore examine whether the provisions of s. 2(1) have been infringed by the respondents.

Counsel suggested that aside from all else, even the words "one lady" in the ad most likely constituted an infringement of the Code, but that it was irrelevant here because clearly another provision of the law had been infringed. For, by denying the space because of the child, Ms. Lu had breached the accommodation section of the law which protects a family from precisely this situation.

40By including "family status" as a prohibited ground and by defining it as a "parent and child relationship," the Code aims at assuring facilities for families with children. All too often there have been advertisements for "adults only" or other, more subtle ways of keeping children out. Ms. Thurston vividly described her search for adequate quarters as desperate, and her fate has been shared by a significant segment of the community. It is to this that the Code addresses itself.

41Ms. Thurston was considered eligible for rental if she was alone, but as a mother with child she was not. Hence, by telling her that the child was not welcome, Ms. Lu would appear to have offended against the equality provision of the law. (Cf., in an analogous case, Fakhoury v. Las Brisas Ltd.(1987), 1987 CanLII 8549 (ON HRT), 8 C.H.R.R. D/4028 at [D/4031] para. 31866 (Ont. Bd.Inq.) and following speak about the difficulty which parents, and especially single parents, face when they try to obtain rental accommodation. See also Westbury v. Trump Investments Ltd.(1992), 1992 CanLII 14257 (BC HRT), 17 C.H.R.R. D/516 (B.C.C.H.R.), which addresses a case of children being unwelcome.) The preference which an apartment owner had for married people was dealt with in Booker v. Floriri Investments (1989), 1989 CanLII 9077 (ON HRT), 11 C.H.R.R. D/44 (Ont. Bd.Inq.), and declared a violation of the Code.

42A Manitoba Board of Inquiry dealt specifically with the fear of apartment owners that children would make too much noise (Moxon v. Samax Investments Ltd. (1984), 1984 CanLII 5077 (MB HRC), 6 C.H.R.R. D/2835). It held that if there was reason to believe that objectionable noise would indeed occur, there would be no discrimination. But denial of accommodation on this basis could only be based on the record of the specific family and not on a generalization which says, "Children made too much noise" [at D/2838, para. 23184].

It is clear that the policy in general, and as it was applied in each of these cases was to presume that families with children would generate an unacceptable level of noise, and to deny accommodation on that basis. It is also clear from the evidence that not all families with children in the buildings in question were, in fact, unacceptably noisy.

Ms. Thurston insisted that her child was very quiet, but Ms. Lu was adamant in her refusal.

ANALYSIS

43By denying the complainant any opportunity to apply for the proffered accommodation and to reject her outright because she had a child, respondents engaged in prima facie discrimination. They must show that there were cogent reasons for them to do so.

44Can it be said that Ms. Lu was threatened by Ms. Thurston, as was claimed? Observing the complainant during her testimony I formed the opinion that she was not likely to have uttered threats in the ordinary meaning of the word. What happened most likely was that the applicant's invocation of the Human Rights Code was perceived as a threat. Ms. Lu felt that she could do with her property what she wanted; that this was a free country (hence the reference to communism at a later stage); in sum, that she simply did not want the child. She was probably unaware that the moment she advertised a room for rent she exposed herself to human rights law; but ignorance of the law or intent are not necessary in such an instance. Therefore, whether or not she said that she knew it was against the law is not material to my decision.

45I also think that, when she told Ms. Thurston that she did not want the child because it would disturb her sons' studies, hers was not necessarily a reasoned response. Ms. Lu was surprised by the appearance of the child and she knew one thing at once: she did not want the boy in her home. She told Ms. Thurston that noise would be a factor, which I believe was the very first excuse that came into her head. What she said in effect was: "I don't want to rent to you, because you are renting not only for yourself, you are renting also for your child, and I will have no child in this apartment."

46I am also certain that her later argument about Ms. Thurston's dishonesty was genuine from her perspective. The complainant had not revealed to her that she had a child who would be sharing the apartment with her, and the boy's sudden appearance made Ms. Lu feel that she had been deceived. She judged the situation from her own perspective, which was a normal way of dealing with her surprise. She did not appreciate the prospective renter's dilemma of trying to obtain a space that would accommodate both her and her child. She had been turned away a number of times (she testified) and therefore tried a different tactic this time. As indicated, she had even thought of waiting until she moved in, but gave that up and took the child with her on her visit to the landlord.

47Ms. Lu knew nothing of the persons who had come to her door, and what followed is a classical case of two perceptions failing to meet each other. The unhappy result of this failure was that Ms. Thurston did not obtain the apartment and the respondents thereby violated the law.

48Were there any other circumstances which would force me to reverse this conclusion? The only matter that needs to be examined in this respect is the claim by respondents that the space was ipso facto unsuitable for a child.

49After Ms. Lu had received information about her legal responsibilities from Parkdale Legal Services and from the Commission's officer, she bethought herself and decided to rent the apartment to Ms. Thurston after all. She so informed the officer, and indicated her readiness to abide by the law, even though she was most likely not keen about having to do so.

50However, she wanted to be relieved of all responsibility for any danger that might arise because of the child's presence in the facility. This was a way of saying that they were justified in denying the apartment to Ms. Thurston, for a child would not be safe there. The burden of proof is on the respondents to show that this was indeed so. The fact that Ms. Lu raised the question of the child's safety at a later time is not relevant, if in fact there was a demonstrable danger to the boy, or a likelihood that he might cause damage.

51Looking at the layout of the apartment I note that there is a single door between the living quarters and the rest of the facilities (with the exception of the bathroom which has its own door). Refrigerator, gas furnace, washing machine, hot water heater, sink and stove are all in one open space. Once the door to the living area is open, these facilities are fully accessible, as they would also have been at a time when the mother was cooking or washing and the child was with her.

52Was there a safety problem? There possibly was. Furnaces and hot water heaters are not always child-friendly appliances, a fact which would make the space less than fully secure and desirable for small children.

53One might argue that safety was the responsibility of the mother and not of Ms. Lu. But if there ever were an accident, it would most likely be claimed that the owners had a responsibility for securing these facilities and had not done so in sufficient measure. Furthermore, the owners had an additional stake in safety: any untoward action of a small child might endanger all persons in the house, as well as the property itself.

54Therefore, I cannot rule out that Ms. Lu's condition might have had an objective basis in fact. But no testimony was brought in this respect, and since the burden of proof lies upon the respondents, they failed to support their condition.

55There was also a second condition which respondents made when they reconsidered their earlier refusal. They wanted an additional $70 in hydro charges to compensate them for the presence of the boy. But Ms. Thurston did not accept this change, and the mediation process by Ms. Hazan proved unsuccessful.

A violation of the Code had occurred and was not remedied.

DAMAGES

56Commission counsel requested that respondents pay the complainant special and general damages.

1. Special Damages

57Counsel requested $5,847, which represents the difference between what she would have paid at Ms. Lu's and what she had to pay elsewhere later on. Included in this sum are also four years' interest.

58I find this request unjustified, for the following reasons.

Respondents did offer to rent the apartment to Ms. Thurston if she paid $70 for hydro, to compensate them for the extra person in the family. If this was a reasonable condition which Ms. Thurston turned down, then she would thereby have waived any claim to special damages that she might incur thereafter. On the other hand, if this hydro charge constituted nothing but a de facto increase in rent (which would offend the Code), then the original discrimination against Ms. Thurston's family status would engender the financial consequences flowing therefrom.

59In order to arrive at an answer I had to place Ms. Thurston's application for the apartment into its social and economic context. In the late 1980s, Toronto was a "boom town," and prices for any kind of accommodation were sky-high. The oft quoted vacancy rate at the time was less than 1 percent. It was a landlord's market.

60It would seem that Ms. Lu's reaction to the conundrum she faced could be phrased like this. If I have to rent the space, at least I ought to get something for the extra person. Even a small child will require additional electricity for bathing and laundry. The applicant has had a problem finding a space, and she probably will be willing to pay me something extra — if not the $70 I have asked for, then maybe something less. But I ought to get something to cover added expenses.

61According to Ms. Hazan's notes which were introduced at the hearing, she told the respondent that Ms. Thurston turned the amended offer down, because she "could not afford more than $520." But when subsequently she succeeded in renting an apartment she paid $625/ month in rent, and an additional $200 in hydro charges. Had she agreed to Ms. Lu's condition she would have saved no less than $235 a month.

62During the hearings, Ms. Thurston stated that the space she ended up renting was water-logged and led to medical problems for her and her child. Affordability did not seem to be an issue.

63It is my conclusion, therefore, that by peremptorily turning Ms. Lu's revised offer down, she could not thereafter claim special damages for the increased rent she had to pay elsewhere. Just as Ms. Lu had not explored with Ms. Thurston whether the boy would indeed be noisy or constitute a problem in any other way, so the latter did not explore with Ms. Lu whether the extra charge could be reduced, because the boy would not use $70 worth of electricity. I conclude therefore that the complainant is not entitled to any special damages representing the differential between the advertised $520 and the sums Ms. Thurston had to put out for later accommodations.

2. General Damages

64By being turned away at Ms. Lu's door Ms. Thurston suffered the dismal fate of so many families, and single parents in particular, the very fate that the Code hoped to correct by its "family status" clause. This disappointment, which was part of a series of refusals she had encountered, constituted mental suffering as construed by ample legal precedent.

I award the complainant $2,000 in general damages.

ORDER

65Cheng Ching Lu and Su Chen Lu, respondents, having infringed the Code, are ordered to pay Leslie Thurston, complainant, the sum of $2,000.

Footnotes

1. 1The matter of legal ownership was not brought up at the hearings, at which both Ms. Lu and her husband (the respondents) appeared together. They clearly considered the building their own. Since the husband was working at the time, Ms. Lu handled the renting; she was also the one who spoke and testified for both at the hearings.
2. 2Ms. Hazan now lives in Australia and did not appear at the hearings.