HRTO 1993

The complainant, a dental assistant, alleged that her employment was terminated because she was pregnant.

The respondent claimed she was dismissed because his wife was returning to work.

The Board of Inquiry found the respondent's testimony less credible and concluded that the complainant was dismissed and denied part-time work because of her pregnancy, in violation of the Human Rights Code.

The Board awarded $2,000 for mental anguish and ordered the parties to negotiate special damages for lost wages.

The complainant, a casual cleaner, alleged she was denied a promotion to a part-time or full-time day cleaner position because of her sex.

The Board of Inquiry found that the site manager refused to promote her because he believed a woman should not hold the position, and that the workplace was de facto segregated by gender.

The Board held the site manager personally liable for sex discrimination and the corporate employer vicariously liable.

The respondents were ordered to pay $9,000 in special damages for lost wages and $1,000 in general damages.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission requested directions regarding a prior interim decision that imposed a publicity ban on a sexual harassment hearing until the Board's decision is released.

The Commission sought approval to issue a notice to the media containing the time, place, and a summary of the allegations.

The respondents objected to disclosing the nature of the complaint, arguing it would prejudice the public.

The Board of Inquiry approved the Commission's draft notice, finding it essential for the public to know what the inquiry is about to make an informed decision to attend, provided the notice prominently displays the limitations imposed by the publicity ban.

The respondent hospital sought disclosure of documents and information relating to a human rights complaint alleging systemic discrimination.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission objected, arguing the request was premature and that the information was privileged.

The Board of Inquiry held that the Stinchcombe doctrine of disclosure applies to human rights proceedings given the serious nature of the allegations.

The Board found that while documents prepared for conciliation or litigation are privileged, statements gathered during the investigation stage are not.

The Board quashed the hospital's subpoena as premature but ordered the Commission to disclose complainant statements and relevant witness statements.

The respondents brought a motion requesting that the adjudicator disqualify himself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias, as the adjudicator had an outstanding human rights complaint before the Commission.

The respondents argued the adjudicator might favour the Commission to induce a favourable outcome in his own case.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the apprehension of bias was not reasonably held.

Involvement as a party in another case with different issues, where the decision could have no effect on the other proceeding, does not constitute grounds for removal.

The complainant, a group insurance underwriter, alleged that she was denied permanent employment and subsequently discharged because of her sexual orientation.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the initial delay in offering full-time employment could not be directly attributed to the respondents due to the death of the responsible manager, the decision to terminate her employment was tainted by discrimination.

Although the employer's requirement to transfer the complainant's partner to avoid a conflict of interest was reasonable, the precipitous withdrawal of the job offer and immediate discharge were influenced by the complainant's open homosexuality and the homophobic attitudes of senior management.

The respondents were ordered to pay special and general damages.

The complainant, who uses a motorized wheelchair, alleged discrimination when she was unable to find a designated handicapped parking space at the respondent's shopping plaza and was rudely told to leave a fire route by an employee.

The Board of Inquiry found that the failure to provide handicapped parking constituted adverse effect discrimination in the provision of services.

The Board rejected the respondent's arguments that the lack of a municipal by-law requiring such parking excused them from the duty to accommodate.

The Board ordered the respondent to provide a designated handicapped parking space and to pay the complainant $1,000 in damages.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss a human rights complaint alleging sex discrimination due to undue delay, arguing that the death of a key witness prejudiced their defence.

The Board of Inquiry denied the motion, finding the delay did not make a fair hearing impossible.

The respondents also objected to the admission of hearsay evidence regarding statements made by the deceased witness about the respondent supervisor's alleged bias against women.

The Board ruled the hearsay evidence inadmissible because it lacked probative value and was highly prejudicial.

However, the Board allowed direct evidence from another witness regarding the supervisor's statements, despite the Commission's failure to disclose this evidence prior to the hearing.

The respondent brought preliminary motions to stay a human rights complaint regarding wheelchair accessibility at a Sears store, following the death of the complainant.

The respondent argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction, the issue was moot, delay prejudiced the case, and proceeding was an abuse of process.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed all motions, finding that the Trustee Act permits the estate to continue the action, the public interest prevents the issue from being moot, facts could still be established through other witnesses, and the Commission's decision to proceed despite an investigator's recommendation was not an abuse of process.

The complainant alleged sex discrimination after she was passed over for a promotion to chief steward in favour of a male employee with less seniority.

Upon learning of the decision, the complainant resigned.

The Board of Inquiry found that sex was a factor in the decision to promote the male employee, violating the Human Rights Code.

However, the Board held that the complainant's precipitous resignation was not reasonable, and therefore she was not entitled to compensation for her total lost wages.

She was awarded $2,718.75 for the loss of the promotion opportunity, $5,000 in general damages, and interest.

The complainant, who had worked as a snack bar counter person at a golf course in 1989, was offered re-employment for the 1990 season.

Upon disclosing her pregnancy, the offer was revoked because the operations manager wanted someone available for the entire season.

The Board of Inquiry found that treating pregnancy as synonymous with unavailability constituted direct discrimination on the basis of sex.

The Board rejected the argument that availability for the whole season was a bona fide occupational qualification, noting that the complainant only required three weeks off and could have been easily accommodated.

The respondents were ordered to pay $5,487.23 for lost wages and $5,000 for mental anguish, plus interest.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss four human rights complaints alleging discrimination in tenancy based on the requirement to pay 'key money'.

The respondents argued the complaints should be dismissed due to unreasonable delay, failure to disclose allegations, prior rent review proceedings, and lack of corporate liability.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint against one individual respondent for lack of evidence but rejected the other motions.

The Board found the delay did not cause serious prejudice, the disclosure was sufficient, the rent review proceedings did not address discrimination, and the corporate respondent could be liable for its employee's actions.

The Board also declined to separate the complaints or exclude similar fact evidence at the preliminary stage.

The complainant, who is HIV positive, alleged discrimination based on a deemed termination clause in the collective agreement.

Preliminary motions were brought to determine the appropriate parties to the complaint.

The Board of Inquiry added the successor union (CEP) as a respondent because it assumed the obligations of the predecessor union.

The Board declined to add the current union (CBRT) as it was not a party to the impugned agreement.

The Board also refused to dismiss the complaint against individual union officers, finding that individuals who participate in negotiating a discriminatory clause may be personally liable under the Human Rights Code.

The respondent Ministry brought a preliminary motion to dismiss a human rights complaint as an abuse of process due to delay.

The Ministry argued that it could not present a defence because documents generated during the civil service competition in question had been routinely destroyed.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the delay was not chargeable to the Commission and there was no evidence of an ulterior purpose.

The Board held that the Ministry could not rely on its own policy of routinely destroying internal documents to insulate itself from a human rights inquiry.

The respondent brought preliminary motions challenging the jurisdiction of the Board of Inquiry to hear a human rights complaint regarding the provision of handicapped parking spaces.

The respondent argued that the matter should be dealt with under the Municipal Act or Planning Act, and that the delay in bringing the complaint forward violated s. 7 of the Charter and constituted an abuse of process.

The Board dismissed the motions, finding that the Human Rights Code takes precedence over municipal by-laws, that s. 7 of the Charter does not apply to these proceedings, and that the delay did not prejudice the respondent's ability to have a fair hearing.

The complainant, a Mohawk Indian, was denied the opportunity to register his fish in the respondent's fishing derby because he did not possess a provincial fishing licence, which he was not legally required to have.

The complainant died before the hearing.

The Board of Inquiry found that the respondent's neutral rule requiring a fishing licence had an adverse effect on the complainant based on his ancestry, constituting indirect discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The Board awarded special and general damages to the complainant's estate.

The complainant, a single mother, applied to rent a house from the respondent.

The respondent refused her application because she had a dog and because he wanted a male tenant who could perform household maintenance.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the respondent would have refused the application anyway due to the dog, his refusal to consider the complainant because of her sex was an operative factor based on stereotypical assumptions.

The Board concluded this constituted sex discrimination under the Human Rights Code.

The complainant was awarded $1,000 in general damages for injury to her dignity and self-respect, but no special damages were awarded since she would not have obtained the accommodation regardless.

The complainant, a Black woman from Jamaica, alleged that the superintendent of her apartment building harassed her and her children because of their race.

The superintendent issued multiple notices of early termination for alleged loitering and directed racial slurs at the complainant.

The Board of Inquiry found that the superintendent's conduct was racially motivated and constituted harassment under the Human Rights Code.

The Board also held that the employer, Effort Trust Realty Company, was liable for the superintendent's actions as he was part of the 'directing mind' of the corporation.

The employer was ordered to pay $3,500 in general damages.

The complainants, two teenage girls, were barred from playing in a quarter-final soccer game for their boys' rep team because the Ontario Soccer Association rules prohibited mixed teams in that tournament.

The Board of Inquiry found that the Association's policies and actions violated the complainants' right to equal treatment with respect to services without discrimination because of sex under section 1 of the Human Rights Code.

The Association was ordered to pay each complainant $3,500 in damages for loss of dignity and to amend its rules to permit females to play on boys' teams.

The respondents moved to dismiss or permanently stay a human rights complaint on the grounds of abuse of process, excessive delay, and lack of disclosure.

The Board of Inquiry found that while the investigating officer's bias, the five-year delay, and the Commission's restricted disclosure policy might not individually warrant dismissal, their combined effect seriously prejudiced the respondents' ability to prepare their case.

The complaint was dismissed.