H. A. Bassford

The complainant, an Indigenous woman, was denied service and sexually harassed by the co-owner of a second-hand store when she attempted to purchase a box spring.

After filing a human rights complaint, the co-owner engaged in a pattern of intimidation and threats against the complainant and human rights investigators.

The Board of Inquiry found that the respondents discriminated against the complainant with respect to services based on sex and ancestry, and that the co-owner engaged in unlawful reprisal.

The Board ordered the respondents to pay general damages and damages for mental anguish, and issued orders restricting the co-owner's contact with the complainant and witnesses.

The respondent, Sears Canada Inc., brought a motion for costs against the Ontario Human Rights Commission following a decision that found the respondent had accommodated the complainant's disability after initial discrimination.

The respondent argued the complaint was trivial, frivolous, vexatious, or made in bad faith, and caused undue hardship.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the Commission had a factual basis for proceeding and did not act in bad faith or cause undue hardship.

The complainant alleged that she was sexually harassed and solicited by her supervisor, who subsequently terminated her employment.

The Board of Inquiry found that the supervisor engaged in a course of vexatious sexual comments and conduct, including an unwanted kiss and a threat of reprisal.

This conduct constituted sexual harassment, sexual solicitation, and discrimination on the basis of sex by creating a poisoned work environment.

The corporate employer was held liable because the supervisor was part of the directing mind of the corporation.

The respondents were ordered to pay damages for lost wages, loss of dignity, and mental anguish.

The respondent brought a preliminary motion arguing that the 31-month delay in proceeding with a sexual harassment complaint violated his rights under ss. 7 and 11 of the Charter.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, holding that s. 11 does not apply because human rights proceedings are not criminal in nature.

The Board also held that s. 7 does not apply to remedial proceedings under the Human Rights Code, as they do not involve the potential for incarceration or criminal sanction and do not affect security of the person.

The respondents brought preliminary motions to dismiss four human rights complaints alleging discrimination in tenancy based on the requirement to pay 'key money'.

The respondents argued the complaints should be dismissed due to unreasonable delay, failure to disclose allegations, prior rent review proceedings, and lack of corporate liability.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint against one individual respondent for lack of evidence but rejected the other motions.

The Board found the delay did not cause serious prejudice, the disclosure was sufficient, the rent review proceedings did not address discrimination, and the corporate respondent could be liable for its employee's actions.

The Board also declined to separate the complaints or exclude similar fact evidence at the preliminary stage.

Following the dismissal of a human rights complaint alleging discrimination in dental services on the basis of handicap (AIDS), the respondent sought costs under s. 40(6) of the Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry found that the complainant acted in bad faith by being untruthful about central matters, including the respondent's offer to treat him at the end of the day.

While the Commission did not act in bad faith, it failed to adequately investigate the complaint or seek professional medical advice regarding treatment protocols.

The combination of the complainant's bad faith and the Commission's investigative failures caused undue hardship to the respondent.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a solicitor-client basis, up to a maximum of $80,000.

The respondent brought preliminary motions to stay a human rights complaint regarding wheelchair accessibility at a Sears store, following the death of the complainant.

The respondent argued that the Board lacked jurisdiction, the issue was moot, delay prejudiced the case, and proceeding was an abuse of process.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed all motions, finding that the Trustee Act permits the estate to continue the action, the public interest prevents the issue from being moot, facts could still be established through other witnesses, and the Commission's decision to proceed despite an investigator's recommendation was not an abuse of process.

The complainant, a person living with AIDS, alleged that the respondent dentist discriminated against him by refusing or delaying dental treatment because of his handicap.

The Board of Inquiry found that AIDS is a handicap under the Human Rights Code.

However, the Board concluded that the respondent did not refuse treatment but merely postponed it to the end of the day.

The Board held that the postponement was justified under section 16 of the Code because proper dental procedure for an AIDS patient required consultation with a physician and a deeper cleaning performed by the dentist rather than a hygienist, which could not be accommodated during the originally scheduled appointment without undue hardship.

The respondent dentist in a human rights complaint requested the production of the complainant's complete medical and psychiatric records.

The complainant alleged he was refused dental treatment because he is HIV-positive.

The respondent argued the records were necessary to assess the complainant's credibility regarding a health questionnaire and to explore stereotypical assumptions about the psychiatric profile of persons with AIDS.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the request, finding the complete records were not relevant and that the moral presumption of confidentiality required keeping disclosure to a minimum.

The complainant's voluntary undertaking to provide specific medical confirmation was deemed sufficient.