H.A. Hubbard

Following a finding that the respondents discriminated against the complainant in employment on the basis of race and ethnic origin, the parties were unable to agree on remedies.

The Board of Inquiry reconvened and, with the agreement of the parties, ordered the respondent school board to pay $10,000 in general damages and to review its transfer procedures and policies to ensure compliance with the Human Rights Code.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion to amend Anthony Wong's human rights complaint to add 'age' as an additional ground of discrimination.

The original complaint alleged discrimination based on race and ethnic origin regarding his placement on a list of surplus teachers.

During the hearing, evidence emerged suggesting age might have been a factor.

The Board of Inquiry allowed the amendment, finding that the respondents would not be prejudiced as they had ample time to prepare for cross-examination and to call further evidence.

The complainant, a dental assistant, alleged that her employment was terminated because she was pregnant.

The respondent claimed she was dismissed because his wife was returning to work.

The Board of Inquiry found the respondent's testimony less credible and concluded that the complainant was dismissed and denied part-time work because of her pregnancy, in violation of the Human Rights Code.

The Board awarded $2,000 for mental anguish and ordered the parties to negotiate special damages for lost wages.

The Commission moved to amend a human rights complaint to add a reference to section 11 of the Human Rights Code, which deals with constructive discrimination.

The respondents objected, arguing that the Board of Inquiry lacked jurisdiction to amend the complaint to include what they characterized as an entirely new, uninvestigated complaint.

The Board of Inquiry allowed the amendment, finding that section 11 does not create a separate ground of discrimination but rather stipulates a way in which a right may be infringed.

The amendment merely provided notice of the Commission's intention to argue that the respondents' facially neutral transfer procedures had an adverse discriminatory effect on the complainant.

The complainant, who developed a physical disability and a marked limp after a workplace accident, alleged harassment and discrimination by his employer, Domglas Inc., and several individuals.

The Board of Inquiry found that the complainant's supervisor and a co-worker engaged in a course of vexatious conduct by mocking his limp and making sarcastic comments about his disability pension.

The plant manager and personnel manager were found personally liable for failing to investigate or stop the harassment, thereby permitting a poisoned work environment.

The corporate employer was held liable under the organic theory of corporate liability.

Furthermore, the Board found that the employer discriminated against the complainant by denying him a standard salary increase due to disability-related absences, and by denying him a promotion without properly assessing his capabilities or considering reasonable accommodation.

The respondents were ordered to pay compensation for lost wages and general damages for mental anguish.

The complainant, a probationary employee, was released from his position as a Systems Operator due to unsatisfactory performance.

He alleged that his poor performance was caused by a mental handicap (depression and anxiety) and that the employer failed to accommodate him by extending his probationary period.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the complaint, finding no indirect discrimination as the evidence indicated the complainant would not have performed satisfactorily even without the handicap.

Furthermore, the Board held that extending the probationary period to accumulate symptom-free time would constitute an undue hardship and was not a reasonable accommodation that would enable the complainant to fulfill the essential duties of the position.

The respondent company, Domglas Inc., brought a preliminary motion to adjourn the hearing of a human rights complaint against it pending the outcome of an application to the Divisional Court to quash the appointment of the Board of Inquiry.

The respondent argued that a six-year delay by the Ontario Human Rights Commission in processing the complaint violated its rights under sections 7 and 11(b) of the Charter and the rules of natural justice.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that the Charter provisions did not apply to the corporate respondent or to the nature of the complaint (discrimination based on handicap), and that the balance of convenience favoured proceeding with the hearing in the public interest.

The complainant, who has seasonal allergies, applied to be a firefighter with the City of Ottawa.

His application was rejected three times on medical grounds despite evidence from his own allergist and the City's consulting specialists that his condition was mild and would not impede his ability to perform the duties of a firefighter.

The Board of Inquiry found that the City discriminated against the complainant because of a handicap, acting recklessly by ignoring expert medical advice.

The Board ordered the City to pay special and general damages, to allow the complainant to complete the physical testing, and to offer him employment if successful.

In a human rights complaint alleging discrimination on the basis of a handicap (seasonal allergies) in a firefighter application, the Commission sought to introduce a consultant's report commissioned by the respondent City regarding the physical demands of firefighting.

The City objected on the grounds that the report had not been adopted and that it constituted a subsequent remedial measure inadmissible under the exclusionary rule.

The Board of Inquiry held that the report was relevant and admissible regardless of its adoption by the City.

Furthermore, the Board found that the exclusionary rule for subsequent remedial measures did not apply, as the report was merely an opinion and not a remedial action, and the proceedings did not involve an issue of negligence.

The complainant, a black man, was dismissed from his probationary employment as a mechanic at the respondent's truck centre.

He alleged that his dismissal and treatment during employment were the result of racial discrimination and harassment.

The respondents maintained that the complainant was dismissed because he was too slow at his work, citing several instances where he exceeded the allotted time for repairs.

The Board of Inquiry found that the respondents' explanation was credible and supported by the evidence, including the testimony of the Commission's own expert witness.

The Board concluded that there was no evidence of overt or systemic discrimination, nor any evidence of harassment, and dismissed the complaint.

The complainant alleged that the respondent breached a settlement agreement resolving an earlier human rights complaint by failing to recall her with full seniority.

The settlement agreement provided that the complainant would be credited with full seniority and granted recall rights.

However, under the collective agreement, all employees laid off at the relevant time lost their seniority after six months.

The Board of Inquiry found that the settlement agreement did not exempt the complainant from the collective agreement's loss-of-seniority clause, and the respondent acted properly in rehiring her as a new employee.

The complaint was dismissed.

The Board awarded costs to the respondent on a solicitor and client basis, finding that the Commission acted irresponsibly and that false allegations of harassment and reprisals were made in bad faith, causing undue hardship to the respondent.

The complainant, a refrigeration technician, alleged that his employment was terminated because of his race and that he was subjected to racial slurs by his supervisors, creating a poisoned work environment.

The Board of Inquiry found the complainant and his witnesses to be not credible, preferring the evidence of the respondent's witnesses.

The Board concluded that the complainant was dismissed for legitimate reasons, including insubordination and poor work performance, and that the isolated use of a racial slur by one supervisor in a private conversation did not constitute a racially oppressive condition of employment.

The complaint was dismissed.

The respondent brought a motion for non-suit at the close of the Commission's case and requested that the motion be heard without the respondent being required to elect whether to call evidence.

The Board of Inquiry held that the procedure in civil actions applies, requiring the respondent to elect to call no evidence if they wish the motion to be decided immediately.

If the respondent wishes to call evidence, the motion will be reserved until all evidence is heard.