Mary Eberts

The applicants, families of adults with severe autism, sought judicial review of the Ministry's decision to discontinue special, non-statutory funding for Applied Behavioural Analysis (ABA) therapy and transition them to mainstream adult developmental services.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the allocation of public funds is a political decision not subject to judicial review absent bad faith.

The court also dismissed the applicants' Charter claims, reaffirming that section 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to fund specific health or social services, and finding no breach of sections 7, 9, or 12 regarding one applicant's involuntary hospitalization under the Mental Health Act.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard motions for leave to intervene from three public interest organizations (1492 Windsor Law Coalition, Aboriginal Legal Services, and Canadian Civil Liberties Association) in an appeal concerning the striking of an Indigenous appellant's pleadings and a substantial costs award in an injunction proceeding related to a land dispute.

The motions judge had found the appellant in contempt of court.

The Court dismissed all motions for intervention, finding that 1492 WLC and ALS's submissions inappropriately expanded the legal issues on appeal by focusing on injunctions, and CCLA's submissions largely overlapped with the appellant's arguments.

The court concluded that the appellant could adequately address the Indigenous perspective.

No costs were awarded against the proposed interveners.

The appellant, Dr. Lynn Gehl, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for registration as an "Indian" under the Indian Act.

Dr. Gehl's entitlement to status turned on the 1985 amendments to the Act, which restored status to individuals whose ancestors had been unjustly deprived of it.

The central issue was whether the Registrar's Policy, which imposed strict evidentiary requirements for proving paternity, unreasonably denied Dr. Gehl registration when the identity of her paternal grandfather was unknown.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted a declaration that Dr. Gehl was entitled to be registered under section 6(2) of the Indian Act.

The appellant, Her Majesty The Queen in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on appeal.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence was designed to address an issue not central to the argument on appeal and not useful to the disposition of the appeal.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The province appealed a trial judgment finding that the exclusion of school-age autistic children from an intensive early intervention program, and the failure to provide equivalent in-school services, infringed s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that the age-based exclusion from the targeted ameliorative program did not amount to age discrimination, and that the disability claim failed because the claimants did not establish that the Minister had denied them the statutory entitlement to appropriate special education under s. 8(3) of the Education Act.

The court further held that, if necessary, the age limit would have been justified under s. 1, given the pressing objectives of early intervention and allocation of scarce resources.

It also held that s. 7 did not impose a positive constitutional obligation to provide the specific therapy sought, that the parents' derivative equality claims failed, and that no private law duty of care supported the negligence claim.

Damages were unavailable alongside declaratory relief absent bad faith, abuse of power, negligence or wilful blindness.

The applicants sought an interim mandatory order requiring the Toronto District School Board to maintain Yifat Barmapov as the Special Needs Assistant for Carly Fleischmann, a child with severe autism, pending a judicial review application.

The applicants argued that replacing the assistant without a transition plan and without ensuring the replacement had Applied Behavioral Analysis (ABA) training would cause irreparable harm.

The court found a strong prima facie case that the Board's actions conflicted with its duties under the Education Act to consult with parents on the Individual Education Plan.

The court granted the interim order, finding that the balance of convenience favoured the applicants and that the child would suffer irreparable harm if the assistant was replaced.

The appellants sought damages and restitution from the Government of Canada for the 'head tax' imposed on Chinese immigrants between 1885 and 1923.

They argued the legislation violated section 15 of the Charter, breached customary international law, and resulted in unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision to strike the claim, finding that the Charter cannot apply retrospectively, customary international law did not invalidate the historical domestic legislation, and the validly enacted statutes provided a juristic reason for any enrichment.

The appellants challenged the exclusion of a woman from membership in a fraternal order under s. 8(a) of the Yukon Human Rights Act, arguing that the order's historical activities and membership practices amounted to services offered to the public.

The majority held that the proper inquiry focused on the service being offered and whether it created a public relationship, and concluded that the collection and recording of historical material were private activities while the public-facing service was only the end product made available without discrimination.

The majority further held that membership in the order, viewed as a spectrum of benefits, did not amount to a public service on the agreed facts.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, with two dissenting reasons that would have found s. 8(a) engaged.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of section 14(1) of the Public Accounting and Auditing Act, which restricted the practice of public accounting to members of the provincial institute of chartered accountants.

They argued the provision infringed their rights under sections 2(b), 6, and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeal, finding no restriction of those Charter rights based on its previous decisions.

During constitutional reform discussions, the federal government provided funding to four national Aboriginal organizations but not to the Native Women's Association of Canada (NWAC).

NWAC sought an order of prohibition, arguing that the failure to provide equal funding and participation violated their freedom of expression and equality rights under the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the government's decision did not violate ss. 2(b), 15(1), or 28 of the Charter, as freedom of expression does not generally place a positive obligation on the government to fund or consult anyone.

The Court also found no violation of s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and concluded that the Federal Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief.

The appellant, a self-employed lawyer, sought to deduct nanny wages as business expenses rather than under the capped child care deduction in the Income Tax Act.

The majority held that, although child care expenses raise difficult questions under general business-expense principles, s. 63 specifically and comprehensively addresses child care costs incurred to enable a taxpayer to carry on a business, and therefore precludes deduction under ss. 9 and 18.

The majority further held that the appellant failed to prove that s. 63 drew a distinction based on sex for the purposes of s. 15(1) of the Charter, because the evidentiary record established disproportionate social burdens of child care on women but not disproportionate payment of child care expenses.

The appeal was dismissed, with two judges dissenting on both statutory interpretation and equality analysis.

The appellant brought a motion to prohibit the intervener from presenting arguments on the federal peace, order and good government (POGG) power.

The intervener sought to argue that the impugned provincial legislation fell under POGG, an issue not raised by the respondent or included in the constitutional questions framed by the Chief Justice.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, holding that an intervener is not entitled to widen or add to the points in issue, and cannot introduce a new constitutional issue that would circumvent the notice requirements for Attorneys General.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission issued a search warrant against Sun Life Assurance Company, a provincially regulated entity, in relation to a discrimination complaint against the Bank of Montreal, a federally regulated entity.

Sun Life appealed the validity of the warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the complaint was directed solely at the Bank of Montreal and the matter was merely investigatory, not directed at Sun Life itself.

The appellant sued the respondent on an instrument alleging it to be a promissory note.

The instrument included a promise to pay a principal amount 'with interest on the unpaid principal from the date of advance'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the instrument was not a promissory note within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act because the 'date of advance' was not specified on the face of the document, making the amount of interest, and therefore the total sum payable, uncertain.

The appeal was dismissed.