Mary Eberts

In an interim decision, the Board of Inquiry granted a motion on consent to add First North American Insurance Company as a respondent to the human rights complaint.

The added party was a wholly owned subsidiary of the respondent North American Life Assurance Company and was the actual contracting party with the complainant for the group benefits policy at issue.

The respondent insurance company brought a motion to restrict the evidence in a human rights complaint to the specific illness of the complainant (AIDS), arguing that evidence regarding the impact of an exclusion clause on persons with other disabilities was irrelevant and hypothetical.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, ruling that because the exclusion clause itself was alleged to be discriminatory, evidence of its broader impact was necessary and admissible to determine its validity.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission issued a search warrant against Sun Life Assurance Company, a provincially regulated entity, in relation to a discrimination complaint against the Bank of Montreal, a federally regulated entity.

Sun Life appealed the validity of the warrant.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the warrant was properly issued because the complaint was directed solely at the Bank of Montreal and the matter was merely investigatory, not directed at Sun Life itself.

Hay Management Consultants Limited sought to be added as a party intervenor in pay equity proceedings between the Ontario Nurses' Association and St. Michael's Hospital.

Hay argued it had a commercial interest because the union alleged its job comparison system was gender-biased.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that Hay had no rights or obligations under the Pay Equity Act and no maintainable action against the union, and therefore was not entitled by law to be a party under section 5 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.

Following a decision finding the respondents liable for violations of the Labour Relations Act, the respondents requested a re-attendance to address the impact of an Employment Standards award on the Board's compensation order, and to amend the wording of the Notice to Employees.

The Board found the request regarding compensation premature, as the parties had not yet attempted to resolve the quantum of damages themselves.

The Board agreed to amend the Notice to Employees to accurately reflect the specific remedy granted in the decision.

The union filed complaints alleging that the employer failed to bargain in good faith, interfered with the union's representation rights, and engaged in an unlawful lock-out by transferring work to a related, unorganized entity.

The Ontario Labour Relations Board found that the employer breached the Labour Relations Act by failing to send an informed committee to negotiations, failing to disclose its intention to move work, bargaining directly with employees, and locking out employees to undermine the union.

The Board ordered the employer to cease and desist, return the transferred work, compensate employees for lost wages, and provide the union with employee addresses.

During a hearing regarding the employer's alleged failure to negotiate a gender-neutral comparison system and pay equity plan, William M. Mercer Limited applied for intervenor status.

Mercer sought to protect its commercial interests, arguing that allegations of gender bias in its job evaluation methodology could negatively affect its business.

The Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that Mercer was not a party under section 32(1) of the Pay Equity Act, 1987, and had only a commercial and incidental interest rather than a direct legal interest in the proceedings.

Granting intervenor status would unnecessarily lengthen and complicate the hearing.

The respondents and interveners brought motions to dismiss the sex discrimination complaints of two female public elementary school teachers.

The complainants alleged that the Ontario Teachers' Federation by-law requiring them to be statutory members of the Federation of Women Teachers' Associations of Ontario, and denying them statutory membership in the Ontario Public School Teachers' Federation solely because of their sex, violated their right to equal treatment under the Human Rights Code.

The Board of Inquiry denied the motions to dismiss, finding that the complainants had established a prima facie case of discrimination.

Although the complainants suffered no economic detriment, the mandatory assignment to a gender-segregated organization against their wishes constituted an injury to their dignitary interests, which is sufficient to establish discrimination under the Code.

The union filed an application alleging an unlawful lock-out.

During the proceedings, the individual respondent refused to produce unredacted application forms, prompting the Board to state a case to the Divisional Court.

The Court found the respondent had no lawful excuse but directed the Board to give her another opportunity to produce the documents.

At the reconvened hearing, the respondent requested an adjournment pending an application for leave to appeal the Court's decision.

The Board denied the adjournment, finding it would cause greater injustice to the applicant.

The respondent was given another opportunity to produce the documents but again refused.

This is a second interim decision regarding procedures of the Board of Inquiry hearing the complaints of Margaret Tomen and Linda Logan-Smith alleging that a by-law of the Ontario Teachers' Federation discriminates against them because of their sex.

The Board of Inquiry decides on the order of appearance of the parties and interveners, the onus of proof on the complainants and respondents, procedures regarding expert evidence, and hearing dates.

The Board ruled that the Commission is not required to anticipate and rebut a section 13 special program defence as part of its prima facie case.

The appellant sued the respondent on an instrument alleging it to be a promissory note.

The instrument included a promise to pay a principal amount 'with interest on the unpaid principal from the date of advance'.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the instrument was not a promissory note within the meaning of the Bills of Exchange Act because the 'date of advance' was not specified on the face of the document, making the amount of interest, and therefore the total sum payable, uncertain.

The appeal was dismissed.