Anthony D. Griffin

The applicants sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision finding they breached the procedural duty to accommodate the respondent employee's disability.

The applicants argued the employee had repudiated his employment contract, negating any duty to accommodate.

The Divisional Court held the Tribunal's conclusion that the employer failed to sufficiently inquire into the employee's medical condition was reasonable.

The Court also declined to dismiss the application for undue delay, accepting counsel's explanation of ill health.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with costs.

The Divisional Court heard three applications for judicial review of decisions by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Tribunal had found that a Toronto police officer discriminated against a Black mail carrier on the basis of race when he stopped and questioned him in an affluent neighbourhood.

The Tribunal also found the Toronto Police Services Board jointly and severally liable for the officer's conduct and awarded $10,000 in damages.

The officers and the Board sought judicial review of the liability and remedy decisions, while the complainant sought increased damages and systemic remedies.

The majority of the Divisional Court dismissed all three applications, finding that the Tribunal's conclusion that race was a factor in the stop was reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The Court also upheld the finding that the Board was liable as the officer's employer under the Human Rights Code.

A dissenting judge would have set aside the liability decision, finding the Tribunal's analysis fundamentally flawed.

The appellant, an Evangelical Christian organization operating community living residences, appealed a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a support worker on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Tribunal had held the organization could not rely on the religious exemption in s. 24(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code because it served the broader public rather than primarily serving its own religious group.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) by failing to consider the organization's subjective religious purpose in providing charitable services.

However, the Court upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the prohibition on same-sex relationships was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a support worker, as the role did not involve religious proselytization.

The Court also upheld the finding of a poisoned work environment but narrowed the systemic remedies ordered by the Tribunal.

The applicant police officers sought judicial review of two interlocutory decisions of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario ordering the production of records concerning prior complaints against them.

The Divisional Court quashed the application for prematurity, finding no exceptional or extraordinary circumstances to justify fragmenting the administrative proceedings before the Tribunal.

The applicant police officers sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision ordering the production of their personnel files in relation to a human rights complaint.

After the police service confirmed no responsive records existed, the respondents argued the application was moot.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding no live controversy remained.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot case, noting that recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence regarding police disciplinary records should be applied in a genuine adversarial context.

Four organizations brought motions seeking intervener status in an appeal by Christian Horizons from a decision of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The Tribunal had found that Christian Horizons infringed the rights of an employee and could not rely on the special employment exemption in s. 24.1(a) of the Human Rights Code.

The court granted Egale Canada Inc., the Canadian Council of Christian Charities, and The Evangelical Fellowship of Canada intervener status as friends of the court.

The Ontario College of Catholic Bishops was granted leave to intervene as an added party with a limited right to file additional evidence.

The applicant's application for judicial review of a human rights commission decision was dismissed.

The respondents sought costs of $5,000 each.

The applicant argued she should be relieved of paying costs because her case raised public policy issues and she was impecunious.

The Divisional Court declined to award costs against the applicant, finding it appropriate to relieve her of the obligation due to the public interest issues raised and her difficult financial circumstances.

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Ontario Human Rights Commission referring a discrimination complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The applicants argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the postulancy process is not a 'service' under the Human Rights Code and the subject matter of the complaint had ceased to exist.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the preliminary jurisdictional issue of whether the relationship constitutes a 'service' is best decided in the first instance by the Tribunal, and that the amended complaint was properly before the Tribunal.

The applicant, a deaf person, filed a human rights complaint alleging that the failure of the Building Code to require rear window captioning in movie theatres constituted discrimination.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal, finding insufficient evidence of a denial of a service and noting that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to amend legislation.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission's gate-keeping decision was not patently unreasonable, as the Tribunal cannot read in provisions to the Building Code to make it comply with the Human Rights Code.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging disability discrimination by his former employer.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry under s. 36 of the Human Rights Code because the employer had made an adequate settlement offer, which the appellant refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Commission was entitled to consider the settlement offer, which was not privileged against the Commission, and that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against her former employer.

The Commission decided not to deal with the complaint.

The appellant sought judicial review and requested production of a legal opinion provided to the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solicitor-client privilege applies to legal advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel just as it does in private law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the legal opinion was protected from disclosure.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission refusing to deal with his age discrimination complaint on the basis that it was filed outside the six-month limitation period.

The applicant argued that the Commission breached the rules of natural justice by providing insufficient reasons and that its decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's screening function attracts a standard of patent unreasonableness, the reasons provided were adequate for an administrative screening decision, and the decision to dismiss the complaint for untimeliness was supported by the evidence.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Board of Inquiry decision dismissing complaints against Ford Motor Company and a union alleging constructive discrimination based on religion.

The complainants, adherents of the Worldwide Church of God, sought to be excused from Friday night shifts to observe the Sabbath.

The Board found that accommodating the complainants would cause undue hardship to Ford due to high absenteeism, quality, and safety concerns, and to the union due to significant interference with the seniority rights of other workers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant, a federal Crown corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry adding it as a respondent to a human rights complaint.

The complainant alleged that the rent calculation formula for social assistance recipients in her co-operative housing, mandated by the applicant's funding agreement, was discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's order, holding that the applicant's imposition of funding conditions was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, finding that provincial human rights legislation must be read down so as not to impair the essential powers of a federal agency carrying out its core functions.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Human Rights Commission's refusal to refer her discrimination complaint to a board of inquiry and sought broad pre-hearing examination and production under r. 39.03.

The Court of Appeal split on whether further disclosure could be compelled from the Commission, with the majority holding that deliberative secrecy and the absence of general discovery on judicial review do not bar a focused examination where there is an objectively reasonable concern that undisclosed facts, arguments, considerations, or strategic factors may have informed the decision.

The court held that the appellant was entitled to examine a senior Commission official on what additional material was before the commissioners, whether strategic concerns influenced the decision, and whether unrevealed reasons existed.

The appeal from the order striking portions of the appellant's affidavit was dismissed, but the appeal concerning the scope of examination was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant.