Anthony D. Griffin

The applicants sought judicial review to quash a decision of the Ontario Human Rights Commission referring a discrimination complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario.

The applicants argued the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the postulancy process is not a 'service' under the Human Rights Code and the subject matter of the complaint had ceased to exist.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the preliminary jurisdictional issue of whether the relationship constitutes a 'service' is best decided in the first instance by the Tribunal, and that the amended complaint was properly before the Tribunal.

During a lengthy hearing before the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, the presiding Vice-Chair was appointed as a Justice of the Peace and became unable to complete the hearing.

The Commission brought a motion to have the new adjudicator continue the hearing by relying on the former Vice-Chair's handwritten notes or, alternatively, the notes of Commission counsel, as a substitute record of the evidence.

The Tribunal dismissed the motions, holding that procedural fairness and the principle of 'he who hears must decide' required a fresh hearing, as the notes could not be deemed an official transcript and their use would breach deliberative privilege.

The complainant alleged that she was subjected to sexual harassment by her supervisor, including inappropriate comments and touching, during her employment.

The Tribunal found that the case turned entirely on credibility, as the supervisor denied all allegations.

The Tribunal concluded that the complainant was not a credible witness due to the vagueness of her evidence, contradictions by other witnesses, and her admission of friendly interactions with the supervisor that defied logic given her allegations of fear and intimidation.

The complaint was dismissed.

The applicant, a deaf person, filed a human rights complaint alleging that the failure of the Building Code to require rear window captioning in movie theatres constituted discrimination.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to the Human Rights Tribunal, finding insufficient evidence of a denial of a service and noting that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to amend legislation.

The applicant sought judicial review.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission's gate-keeping decision was not patently unreasonable, as the Tribunal cannot read in provisions to the Building Code to make it comply with the Human Rights Code.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging disability discrimination by his former employer.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry under s. 36 of the Human Rights Code because the employer had made an adequate settlement offer, which the appellant refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Commission was entitled to consider the settlement offer, which was not privileged against the Commission, and that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission brought a motion seeking an order that the Tribunal lacks jurisdiction to find that section 2(9) of the respondent's Operating Agreement violates the Human Rights Code, based on a prior Court of Appeal decision regarding interjurisdictional immunity.

The complainant opposed the motion, arguing that all evidence should be heard before determining jurisdiction.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion as premature, finding that it must fully understand the Operating Agreement and hear from all witnesses before deciding whether the Code applies and should be read down.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss or stay the human rights complaints, alleging that the Commission's investigation was flawed, biased, and inadequate.

The Tribunal dismissed the motion, holding that its hearing is de novo.

Relying on established jurisprudence, the Tribunal found that even a flawed investigation does not deprive it of the ability to conduct a hearing unless it results in an abuse of process, and there was no evidence that the respondents were prevented from defending the case.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against her former employer.

The Commission decided not to deal with the complaint.

The appellant sought judicial review and requested production of a legal opinion provided to the Commission by its in-house counsel.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that solicitor-client privilege applies to legal advice given to an administrative board by in-house counsel just as it does in private law.

The appeal was dismissed, and the legal opinion was protected from disclosure.

The appellant, a housing co-operative resident receiving social assistance, filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on a rent calculation condition in the co-op's operating agreement with the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC).

The Board of Inquiry added CMHC as a respondent, but the Divisional Court quashed the order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the condition was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, concluding that the provincial Human Rights Code must be read down so as not to apply to the core of the federal spending power, thereby exempting CMHC and the impugned condition from the Code's application.

The applicant sought judicial review of two decisions by the Ontario Human Rights Commission refusing to deal with his age discrimination complaint on the basis that it was filed outside the six-month limitation period.

The applicant argued that the Commission breached the rules of natural justice by providing insufficient reasons and that its decision was patently unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission's screening function attracts a standard of patent unreasonableness, the reasons provided were adequate for an administrative screening decision, and the decision to dismiss the complaint for untimeliness was supported by the evidence.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission appealed a Board of Inquiry decision dismissing complaints against Ford Motor Company and a union alleging constructive discrimination based on religion.

The complainants, adherents of the Worldwide Church of God, sought to be excused from Friday night shifts to observe the Sabbath.

The Board found that accommodating the complainants would cause undue hardship to Ford due to high absenteeism, quality, and safety concerns, and to the union due to significant interference with the seniority rights of other workers.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The applicant, a federal Crown corporation, sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Board of Inquiry adding it as a respondent to a human rights complaint.

The complainant alleged that the rent calculation formula for social assistance recipients in her co-operative housing, mandated by the applicant's funding agreement, was discriminatory.

The Divisional Court quashed the Board's order, holding that the applicant's imposition of funding conditions was a valid exercise of the federal spending power under s. 91(1A) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Court applied the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity, finding that provincial human rights legislation must be read down so as not to impair the essential powers of a federal agency carrying out its core functions.

The complainant in a human rights proceeding brought a motion for the production of documents relating to his termination, including the corporate respondent's financial statements and Parts Department sales figures.

The respondents brought a cross-motion for productions, which was consented to.

The adjudicator ordered the production of the Parts Department sales figures for the three years prior to and the year of the complainant's termination to assist in establishing his work performance, but declined to order the production of the broader financial statements.

The complainant brought a motion for the production of documents relating to his termination, including the corporate respondent's financial statements and Parts Department sales figures.

The respondents brought a cross-motion for productions, which was consented to.

The adjudicator ordered the respondents to produce the year-end Parts Department sales figures for the three years prior to the complainant's termination and the year of termination, as they were relevant to establishing the complainant's work performance.

The request for financial statements was denied as unnecessary given the production of the sales figures.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Human Rights Commission's refusal to refer her discrimination complaint to a board of inquiry and sought broad pre-hearing examination and production under r. 39.03.

The Court of Appeal split on whether further disclosure could be compelled from the Commission, with the majority holding that deliberative secrecy and the absence of general discovery on judicial review do not bar a focused examination where there is an objectively reasonable concern that undisclosed facts, arguments, considerations, or strategic factors may have informed the decision.

The court held that the appellant was entitled to examine a senior Commission official on what additional material was before the commissioners, whether strategic concerns influenced the decision, and whether unrevealed reasons existed.

The appeal from the order striking portions of the appellant's affidavit was dismissed, but the appeal concerning the scope of examination was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The complainant, a wheelchair user, alleged that the respondents operated inaccessible motion picture theatres, violating his rights under the Human Rights Code.

The respondents acknowledged the breach of the complainant's rights, noting that the theatre in question had been closed.

The Board of Inquiry issued a consent order declaring the infringement, prohibiting the future operation or subletting of the theatre, and awarding the complainant $6,000 in general damages.

Three complainants alleged that the respondent landlords discriminated against them by using minimum income criteria and rent-to-income ratios to deny them rental accommodation.

The Ontario Board of Inquiry found that the use of these criteria constitutes adverse effect discrimination on the basis of sex, marital status, family status, age, citizenship, place of origin, and receipt of public assistance.

The Board held that the landlords failed to establish that the income criteria were reasonable and bona fide, as there was no empirical evidence showing that rent-to-income ratios accurately predict a tenant's likelihood of defaulting on rent.

The Board ordered the landlords to cease using income criteria and awarded general and specific damages to the complainants.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion to dismiss or permanently stay a human rights complaint alleging racial discrimination in employment.

The respondents argued that the Commission's process was an abuse of process, breached procedural fairness, and that the significant delay between the events and the referral prejudiced their ability to defend the case.

The adjudicator applied the test for delay prejudice and found no evidence of prejudice of sufficient magnitude to impact the fairness of the hearing.

The adjudicator also found that the Commission reasonably exercised its discretion to accept the complaint despite some events occurring outside the six-month window, and that there was sufficient evidence to warrant referral to the Board of Inquiry.

The motion was dismissed.

The respondents brought a preliminary motion seeking an order to compel the Ontario Human Rights Commission to permit access to the investigator who investigated the complaint.

Although the Commission subsequently agreed to allow access, the respondents requested a written ruling.

The Board of Inquiry held that the principles of disclosure from criminal and civil law apply to human rights proceedings.

The fruits of the investigation are not the property of the Commission, and there is no property in a witness.

Therefore, the respondents' counsel is legally entitled to interview the Commission's investigator.

The complainant, a single mother receiving Mother's Allowance, signed a lease for an apartment and provided a post-dated cheque.

The property management company returned the cheque, stating they did not accept post-dated cheques and would not accept applications from persons on Mother's Allowance unless their caseworker ensured direct payment of rent.

The complainant subsequently died, and her executrix continued the human rights complaint.

The Board of Inquiry found that the direct payment requirement was a flagrant and willful discrimination based on the receipt of public assistance, contrary to section 2(1) of the Human Rights Code.

The respondents were ordered to pay $1,750 in special damages and $2,500 in general damages, and to cease requiring direct payment of rent from persons receiving public assistance.