Kevin Dennis MacNeill

The defendant employer brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's constructive dismissal claim with leave to amend to provide full particulars, and sought a protective order over a diversity survey and an ombudsperson report.

The court dismissed the motion for particulars, finding the defendant had already filed a statement of defence and the existing pleadings provided sufficient detail to know the case to meet.

The court also denied the protective order, ruling it was premature and that the documents were relevant to the plaintiff's allegations of systemic gender discrimination and a toxic work environment.

The defendant employer brought a motion to dismiss or permanently stay an employment action on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or forum non conveniens.

The plaintiff, a former employee, commenced an action in Ontario alleging breach of contract, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and discriminatory treatment arising from her dismissal without notice.

The defendant argued that the action should be stayed in favor of Manitoba courts, where the plaintiff was employed and where the alleged misconduct occurred.

The court found that a forum selection clause in the plaintiff's original employment contract with Atomic Energy Canada Limited (AECL) designated Ontario as the exclusive jurisdiction and remained enforceable against the defendant, a wholly-owned subsidiary of AECL that assumed the plaintiff's employment.

The court also found that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter based on multiple presumptive connecting factors.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant Health Unit sought judicial review of a labour arbitration award that found it breached the collective agreement by offering straight-time payouts for accumulated comp time during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Health Unit argued the breach was authorized by the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act and O. Reg. 116/20.

The Divisional Court determined the standard of review for interpreting the emergency order was correctness.

Although the court found the arbitration board erred in concluding the Act did not permit orders with financial consequences, it upheld the board's factual finding that the specific measure taken was not 'reasonably necessary' to respond to the outbreak.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 56.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking an order requiring the plaintiff, a resident of the United States, to post security for costs in a wrongful dismissal action.

The court considered the plaintiff’s financial circumstances, the stage of the litigation, and the apparent merits of the claim.

Evidence indicated the plaintiff had limited financial resources and that his financial situation may have been affected by the defendants’ conduct in relocating him to Canada for employment.

The court found the claim possessed some merit and that requiring substantial security could effectively terminate the litigation and undermine access to justice.

In the circumstances, the court declined to order security for costs.

The appellant employer appealed a conviction under s. 25(1)(c) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act arising from a workplace accident where a worker fell more than three metres from a sawmill catwalk while clearing a conveyor jam without fall arrest protection.

The trial court had acquitted the employer on a guardrail-related charge but convicted on a fall-arrest charge.

On appeal, the employer argued the trial judge made inconsistent findings on foreseeability and lacked evidence supporting the conclusion that workers would cross the guardrail to access the conveyor.

The Superior Court held that the trial judge’s reasoning distinguished between the guardrail and fall-arrest charges and properly found that accessing the conveyor to clear jam-ups was foreseeable.

The court concluded that the employer failed to establish due diligence because it did not implement reasonable safety precautions or training requiring fall arrest protection.

The conviction was upheld.

The applicant alleged discrimination in employment on the basis of disability, claiming her employment was terminated while she was on medical leave.

The Tribunal found that the respondent organization, a non-profit, was experiencing severe management and financial difficulties that led to the cessation of its operations and the transfer of its remaining programs.

The termination of the applicant's employment was a consequence of the organization's closure, and there was no evidence that her disability was a factor in the decision.

The application was dismissed.

The Ontario Nurses Association brought a motion to review and set aside a decision of Molloy J., which struck out an affidavit containing correspondence between an arbitration chair and the employer's nominee.

The underlying judicial review application by the Board of Health alleged a denial of natural justice because the arbitration board did not discuss the evidence before the chair issued a proposed decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, agreeing with Molloy J. that the correspondence was unnecessary to introduce as evidence because the facts it sought to establish were already addressed in the chair's reasons and were not disputed.

La requérante a déposé une requête alléguant une discrimination fondée sur un handicap après que son contrat de travail n'a pas été renouvelé pendant son congé de maladie.

L'intimée individuelle a demandé une ordonnance pour être retirée de la procédure, affirmant qu'aucune allégation ne la visait personnellement, et a demandé le rejet de la réclamation pour dommages-intérêts contractuels au motif qu'elle avait déjà été traitée par une agente des normes d'emploi.

Le Tribunal a rejeté la demande de retrait de l'intimée individuelle, notant qu'elle présidait le conseil d'administration et avait signé la lettre de non-renouvellement.

Le Tribunal a également refusé de rejeter la requête en vertu de l'article 45.1 du Code, concluant que la décision de l'agente des normes d'emploi ne portait pas sur le fond de la plainte pour discrimination.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment finding that it wrongfully dismissed the respondent employee.

The employee had forged his supervisor's signature on a letter regarding severance pay for a subordinate.

The trial judge applied the principle of proportionality, concluding the forgery was an isolated error in judgment rather than a fundamental breach of trust justifying dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's appreciation of the evidence or application of the law.

The complainant, a Sikh security guard who wears a turban, was assigned to a Home Depot construction site.

The assistant store manager ordered him to wear a hard hat and, when the complainant refused due to his religious beliefs, ordered him to leave the premises.

The Tribunal found that the hard hat rule was selectively enforced against the complainant, as other workers were permitted in the same areas without hard hats.

The Tribunal also found that the assistant store manager subjected the complainant to discriminatory harassment by goading him to remove his turban and taunting him with termination.

The hearing was bifurcated, with the duty to accommodate and occupational health and safety issues deferred to a second stage.

The complainant filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and disability, as well as reprisals, against his former employer, a school board, and two individuals.

He had also commenced a civil action against the school board for wrongful dismissal and intentional infliction of mental suffering arising from the same events.

The Tribunal held that the complaint against the school board and its human resources director was barred by section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the civil action sought remedies for the same alleged Code infringements.

The complaint against the individual respondent who was not named in the civil action was permitted to proceed.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment on the basis of disability regarding his termination.

He had previously filed a civil action for wrongful dismissal, seeking damages and alleging the respondent failed to accommodate his disability.

The Tribunal found that the factual situation in the application was the same as in the civil action, and the applicant was effectively seeking damages for a Code breach in court.

Consequently, the application was barred by section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code and dismissed.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of an arbitration award that found a deemed termination of a grievor's employment, entitling him to termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the award, finding that the arbitrator breached natural justice by deciding the case on the basis of frustration of contract—an issue not advanced by the union—without allowing the parties to address it.

The Court also found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because he failed to determine a specific termination date and ignored evidence of a continuing employment relationship.

The applicant filed a human rights application against her employer and several individuals.

The corporate respondent filed for bankruptcy protection and argued the application was stayed under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The applicant requested to amend her application to withdraw all monetary claims against the corporate respondent.

The Tribunal granted the amendment and held that because the applicant was no longer seeking monetary remedies, she was not a creditor with a claim provable in bankruptcy, and therefore the proceedings were not stayed.

The Tribunal also addressed requests to withdraw against two individual respondents, a request to expedite, and a request for document production.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested to intervene in the human rights complaint and sought to bifurcate the hearing.

The Proposed Intervener suggested that the first stage address the location of the complainant's duties without its participation, and if the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) is engaged, it would participate in the second stage.

The complainant and the Commission consented to this approach.

The respondents consented to the intervention but argued the Proposed Intervener should participate throughout.

The Tribunal granted the request to intervene and bifurcate the hearing, allowing the Proposed Intervener to participate only in the second stage if the interaction between the OHSA and the Human Rights Code needs to be addressed.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint alleging disability discrimination by his former employer.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission decided not to refer the complaint to a board of inquiry under s. 36 of the Human Rights Code because the employer had made an adequate settlement offer, which the appellant refused.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's application for judicial review.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Commission was entitled to consider the settlement offer, which was not privileged against the Commission, and that the Commission's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Ontario Human Rights Commission's decision not to refer his discrimination complaint to a Board of Inquiry.

The Commission had declined the referral because the employer had made a reasonable settlement offer that matched what the applicant could expect at a hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Commission was correct to consider the settlement offer in exercising its gatekeeper function under the Human Rights Code.

The claimant applied for a review of an Employment Standards Officer's refusal to issue an order for termination pay, alleging he was constructively dismissed due to continuous harassment and an alleged physical assault by his supervisor.

The Board found that the physical contact between the supervisor and the claimant was minimal and did not constitute an assault or a repudiation of the employment contract.

The Board also rejected the allegations of a campaign of harassment, finding that the employer had accommodated the claimant and that the claimant's subsequent resignation was voluntary.

The application was dismissed.