Other Tribunals

This endorsement clarifies the administrative nature of scheduling urgent matters before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court emphasized that the Chief Justice's Notice to the Profession provides guidelines for urgent services, not statutory rules, and that the scheduling process is an administrative function.

Submissions on the merits or the issue of urgency are not required or helpful once a matter has been scheduled, as they clog court resources and are not part of the legal dispute between parties.

The court scheduled the applicant's proposed matter for an urgent case conference, dismissing the respondent's subsequent submissions against urgency.

The appellant, an involuntary psychiatric patient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her attending physicians' finding that she was incapable of managing her property.

The appellant argued the assessment was flawed and that her limited income negated the need for property management.

The Superior Court of Justice applied a reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision.

The court found that the appellant's delusional beliefs regarding property ownership and marriage prevented her from understanding information relevant to her housing and discharge planning, thereby satisfying the test for incapacity.

The appellant, an inpatient diagnosed with schizophrenia, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable with respect to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and incapable of managing his property.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence and reached unreasonable conclusions.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review to the Board's findings of mixed fact and law.

The court found that the Board's conclusions regarding the appellant's inability to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his decisions, due to his denial of illness and paranoid delusions, were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a patient at a mental health centre, appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board.

A teleconference was scheduled to set dates for factums and the appeal hearing, but the self-represented appellant failed to attend.

The court ordered deadlines for the filing of factums and scheduled a motion requested by the respondent for an Interim Treatment Order under section 19 of the Health Care Consent Act.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Animal Care Review Board confirming the removal of her horses and a goat by the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (OSPCA) due to chronic distress.

The Superior Court of Justice conducted a new hearing and found that the animals were in distress, lacking proper food, water, and veterinary care, and that the appellant had failed to comply with previous OSPCA orders.

The court upheld the removal and ordered the appellant to pay $62,554.53 in maintenance costs, deducting the costs for two horses that were mistakenly omitted from the removal notice.

A former senior official of an international fisheries organization sued for wrongful dismissal and related employment remedies in Canadian court.

The organization invoked functional jurisdictional immunity under its governing privileges and immunities order, which grants immunity to the extent required for the performance of organizational functions.

The Court held immunity barred the managerial and dismissal-related claims because adjudication would unduly interfere with organizational autonomy, notwithstanding the absence of an internal dispute forum.

However, immunity did not bar the contractual separation-indemnity claim, which the organization conceded and which did not intrude on core functions.

The appeal was allowed in part and remitted for adjudication of that remaining claim.

Two applicants sought judicial review of municipal by-laws implementing a volume-based solid waste user fee and associated rebate program introduced by the City of Toronto.

The applicants argued that the waste collection charge was in substance an unlawful tax affecting provincial tax ratio rules and that the rebate constituted an impermissible redistribution of property taxes contrary to the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court held that the waste charge was a valid user fee because a sufficient nexus existed between the amount collected and the cost of providing waste services.

The court further held that the rebate was properly characterized as a municipal grant authorized under s. 83 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 rather than a tax rebate.

The applications to quash the relevant by-law provisions were dismissed.

An application was brought seeking a declaration interpreting a municipal zoning by-law to determine whether an existing church could expand its use onto an adjacent parcel of agricultural land once the parcels were merged.

The municipality argued that the by-law permitted only “existing churches” on lands where such uses existed at the time the by-law was passed, thereby preventing expansion onto new lots.

Applying the modern principle of statutory interpretation, the court examined the wording, purpose, and scheme of the by-law.

The court held that the exemption for “existing churches” applied to the building rather than to a specific lot and that the by-law did not expressly restrict expansion onto adjoining lands.

A declaration was granted permitting the merged lands to be used for church purposes.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association applied on behalf of Salma Jaffer for court-assessed fees above the legal aid rate of $88.00 per hour for work performed as amicus curiae in a serious sexual offence case.

The defendant was charged with multiple serious sexual offences, had difficulty maintaining solicitor-client relationships, and had questionable fitness.

The court appointed Jaffer as amicus to assist in ensuring the preliminary inquiry proceeded while protecting the defendant's fair trial interests.

The court granted the application and set Jaffer's remuneration at $150 per hour, finding that while the legal aid tariff is a significant factor, it is not conclusive and must be balanced against counsel's experience, the importance and complexity of the assignment, and the broader interests of the administration of justice.