COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-19041
DATE: 20191122
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Martin Peakovic and 1128636 Ontario Inc. o/a Automotive Prototype and Tooling
Plaintiffs
– and –
Ford Motor Company of Canada/Ford du Canada Limitee, Ecodevelopments Windsor Inc., 1670120 Ontario Ltd., Thyssenkrupphearn Industrial Services Canada, Inc., Onofrio D’Agostini, Terry Aldea, Donald Hearn Jr.
Defendants
Daniel Z. Naymark, for the Plaintiffs
xxx Groper for Ford Motor Company of Canada/Ford du Canada Limitee
Rodney Godard and Colin Bondy for 1670121 Ontario Ltd. and Onofrio D’Agostini
xxx Serafimovski for Donald Hearn Jr. and Thyssendrupphearn Industrial Services Canada Inc.
HEARD: August 20, 2019
RULING ON MOTION
hebner j.
[1] On February 21, 2013 the plaintiff commenced this proceeding by way of issuing a notice of action. The statement of claim was filed March 22, 2013. In the statement of claim the plaintiffs claim damages for: breach of contract in the amount of $5 million; negligent misrepresentation in the amount of $5 million; and negligence in the amount of $5 million. The events set out in the statement of claim are purported to have occurred between July 2008 and March 30, 2011.
[2] The matter came before the Court by way of a motion brought by the plaintiffs for an order scheduling a status hearing, an order setting a timetable for further steps in the action and an order directing the registrar not to dismiss the action pursuant to rule 48.14, Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194. The defendants brought a cross motion for an order dismissing the action for delay. This is my ruling on the motions.
Background Facts
[3] The plaintiff, Mr. Peakovic, is the founder, sole officer and director of the plaintiff, 1128636 Ontario Inc. carrying on business as Automotive Prototype and Tooling (“APT”).
[4] When the statement of claim was issued, the plaintiffs were represented by Claudio Martini of the firm Shulgan Martini Marusic LLP. Lead counsel was initially Mr. Martini and then Ms. Marusic. The Shulgan Martini Murusic firm handled other litigation matters in which the plaintiff was involved, contemporaneous with this litigation.
[5] The allegations that the plaintiffs have made against the defendants are complicated. Mr. Peakovic claims that through APT he provided precision machining, drafting/designing, prototyping, part manufacturing, emergency repairs and other services for Ford Motor Company of Canada (“Ford”). He claims that the bulk of APT’s revenues came from Ford. He claims that the defendants, Onofrio D’Agostini and Terry Aldea, held senior positions at Ford. He claims that in 2011 he refused to provide Mr. D’Agostini and Mr. Aldea with kickbacks they demanded in exchange for arranging a large project from Ford. He claims that after he refused to agree to the kickback scheme, Ford abruptly stopped doing business with APT altogether. He claims that Mr. D’Agostini and Mr. Aldea caused Ford to stop working with APT following his refusal to participate in the kickback scheme. He claims involvement by the other defendants in various capacities. The plaintiffs claim significant damages.
[6] Steps were taken in this litigation during the year immediately following the issuance of the statement of claim. The plaintiffs settled its claim against Terry Aldea and Ecodevelopments Windsor Inc. and the remaining defendants all served notices of intent to defend. Some of the defendants served requests to inspect and demands for particulars. The plaintiffs served responses to the demands for particulars and requests to inspect. All of these steps were completed by the end of 2013. Thereafter, the defendants Mr. D’Agostini and Donald Hearn Jr. brought a motion for summary judgment and security for costs. Responding materials were served and a timetable was set for the hearing of the motion. This motion was withdrawn on March 28, 2014, on consent without costs. After that event, the case foundered. The fault lies at the feet of the plaintiffs’ lawyers, Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic.
[7] The plaintiffs’ current counsel helpfully provided a chronology of events that occurred. I outline them here.
• Between April and December, 2014, Mr. Peakovic asserts that he repeatedly called his previous lawyers seeking updates. The plaintiff was assured that the case was moving forward.
• On October 8, 2014, Mr. Martini was suspended by the Law Society for seven months for not advancing client files and misleading clients about the status of their claims.
• On November 20, 2014, Mr. Martini obtained a stay of his suspension pending appeal.
• On January 5, 2015, in a separate proceeding relating to the taking of trust funds, the Law Society Tribunal suspended Mr. Martini on an interim basis. Mr. Peakovic was not advised of the suspension.
• Between January 2015 and May 2016, Mr. Peakovic called Ms. Marusic three to four times per month, met with her two to three times at his request and sent at least 12 emails, in an attempt to seek updates and obtain the status of the action. When she did respond, Ms. Marusic assured the plaintiff the action was moving forward, or shortly would be.
• On April 7, 2015, the Law Society Tribunal extended Mr. Martini’s suspension on an interlocutory basis.
• On May 6, 2015, the Law Society Tribunal imposed supervisory practice restrictions on Ms. Marusic based on evidence that she participated with Mr. Martini in a scheme of misappropriating client trust funds while the two were engaged in an extramarital affair.
• On June 11, 2015, Mr. Peakovic sent an email to Ms. Marusic expressing frustration with her lack of responsiveness, saying that he was aware of “ongoing personal/professional issues” and “if you are not able to handle these matters, for whatever reasons, please let me know this week”.
• Ms. Marusic responded on June 12, 2015: “My personal/professional issues do not impact my work. I have been and continue to be in a trial in Ottawa for the last month. I am unsure what several requests you have made. My office continues to operate. My assistant is available. We have document issues in Ford. I have asked for examination dates to be scheduled in the Ford matter.”
• Mr. Peakovic’s email on June 16, 2015 to Ms. Marusic reads: “This is the first I’ve heard of “document” issues with Ford. An explanation would be very helpful in assisting me to try and resolve the issues.” It doesn’t appear as though an explanation was forthcoming.
• On November 20, 2015, Ms. Marusic’s assistant sent an email to Mr. Peakovic enclosing an authorization and direction for the plaintiffs to sign so that the assistant could serve and file a notice of change of solicitor, from Shulgan Martini Marusic LLP to Marusic Law. In the email, the assistant said, “I would like to… schedule discoveries on the Ford and D’Agostini action”. Mr. Peakovic signed the authorization, but Ms. Marusic did not schedule discoveries or deliver a notice of change of solicitor.
• On January 26, 2016, Mr. Peakovic sent an email to Ms. Marusic requesting an update on the discoveries and a copy of correspondence to Ford regarding the storage of materials. On January 27, 2016, Ms. Marusic responded, “I will ask my assistant to provide you with scheduling information regarding discoveries.” On January 29, 2016, Mr. Peakovic sent another email about the storage of Ford materials and said: “Please answer my question(s) and provide a copy of the letter you were supposed to send to Ford Counsel last year, if it exists”. Ms. Marusic provided a copy of the letter by email dated January 29, 2016.
• Between March and May, 2016, Ms. Marusic did not respond to calls and an email from Mr. Peakovic seeking updates.
• On May 6, 2016, Mr. Peakovic sent Ms. Murusic the following e-mail: “The legal matters have stagnated for years making it appear you are either too busy or not interested in pursuing them. Either way, I’m tired of excuses and delays. Please have all of my legal files prepared for pickup on Monday.”
• According to Mr. Peakovic, between April and October 2016, he searched for new counsel. He did not succeed in finding replacement counsel and Ms. Marusic remained counsel of record.
• On October 31, 2016, the Law Society Tribunal appeal panel suspended Ms. Marusic on an interlocutory basis based on fresh evidence that she engaged in improper conduct in concert with Mr. Martini. Ms. Marusic’s subsequent application for judicial review and motion to vary were unsuccessful.
• According to Mr. Peakovic, between November 2016 and May 2017, he searched “in earnest” for new counsel. He said he spoke to, or met with, at least 12 different lawyers between April 2016 and May 2017. The plaintiffs retained their current counsel, Naymark Law, in late May or early June 2017. The plaintiffs’ current counsel also took over the other litigation files from Ms. Marusic.
• In June to July, 2017, Mr. Naymark obtained a copy of the court file and requested the plaintiffs’ file from Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic.
• Mr. Peakovic deposes that he has suffered from ongoing health problems that have required a series of hospitalizations, medical procedures and prescription narcotics. In October 2017, he was hospitalized in London, Ontario with a serious septic infection and a blood clot. He remained in hospital until December 20, 2017. During that time, he was unable to instruct counsel.
• Mr. Peakovic claims health limitations, and to a lesser extent, financial limitations made it impossible to advance all of APT’s litigation matters simultaneously. He said he instructed his counsel to focus on the most urgent. One of his claims, against Mazak Corporation Canada, had been dismissed for delay in June 2017. Mr. Peakovic instructed his counsel to bring a motion to set aside the dismissal. That motion was heard by Pomerance J. on February 26, 2018. Pomerance J. released her decision on April 30, 2018 setting aside the dismissal order.
• The plaintiffs commenced their motion for a status hearing by notice of motion dated March 21, 2018. It was adjourned several times until it was eventually heard by me on March 18 and August 20, 2019.
[8] Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic remain suspended by the Law Society.
[9] I note the state of the litigation in this matter. The pleadings are not complete. Some of the defendants have not filed their statements of defence. The discovery process has not even been started. Affidavits of documents have not been prepared or served. Examinations for discovery have not taken place. This case that was started in February 2013, is still in its infancy.
[10] There is no evidence that any of the defendants took any steps to move the action forward.
The Issue
[11] The only issue is whether the plaintiffs’ action ought to be permitted to proceed, or whether it ought to be dismissed for delay. The plaintiffs take the position that they have shown sufficient cause for the action to proceed. The defendants take the position that the action ought to be dismissed for delay.
The Law
[12] Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure deals with the dismissal of an action for delay. Subrule (1) provides that the action is to be presumptively dismissed by the registrar if it has not been set down for trial by the fifth anniversary of the commencement of the action. The fifth anniversary of the commencement of this action was February 21, 2018, a month before this motion was launched. Just by happenstance the registrar had not yet signed a dismissal order.
[13] Subrule 48.14 (5) allows any party to bring a motion for a status hearing before the expiry of the five-year period. At the status hearing, the plaintiff is required to show cause why the action should not be dismissed for delay. The onus is on the plaintiff. Although this motion was brought a month after the expiry of the five-year period, counsel argued the issue in the same vein, namely that the plaintiff must show cause why the action should not be dismissed for delay.
[14] Counsel agreed on the test set out in the jurisprudence. It is articulated in the Court of Appeal decision of Faris v. Eftimovski, 2013 ONCA 360, [2013] O.J. No. 2551 at paragraph 32. The court is required to consider two factors:
a) whether the plaintiff has demonstrated that there was an “acceptable” explanation for the delay; and
b) whether the defendant would suffer noncompensable prejudice of the action were allowed to proceed.
[15] In Faris, the plaintiff had commenced the action in 2007 alleging damages arising from two real estate transactions that had occurred in 2003 and 2005. The action was dismissed at a status hearing in April 2012. At that point, pleadings had not been finalized and there had been no document productions or examinations for discovery. The Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal. At paragraphs 32 and 41 the court said:
The plain wording of rule 48.14 (13) makes clear that the onus is on the plaintiff to demonstrate why the action should not be dismissed for delay. The test, as stated by the status hearing judge in the case at bar, requires the plaintiff to demonstrate that there was an acceptable explanation for the delay and establish that, if the action were allowed to proceed, the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice: Khan v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Canada, 2011 ONCA 650 at para 1. (para 32)
The onus placed on the plaintiff under rule 48.14 (13), therefore, is mandated not only by the plain wording of the rule but also by the greater severity of the plaintiff’s delinquency in pursuing its claim. In other words, at this juncture, the emphasis on the objectives expressed in rule 1.04 (1) to “secure the just, most expeditious and least expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits” must necessarily shift towards ensuring that disputes be resolved expeditiously and, in a time, efficient manner. (para 41)
Although rule 48 was amended in 2016, the test remains the same.
[16] In H.B. Fuller Co. v. Rogers, 2015 ONCA 173, the plaintiff’s action had been dismissed for delay under the application of the former rule 48.14, which required that an action be set down for trial within two years after the filing of the first statement of defence. The plaintiff brought a motion to have the action reinstated. The motion judge dismissed the motion. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the dismissal and reinstated the action. On a reading of the facts of that case, it appears as though the court found that there was a mistake made by plaintiff’s counsel. At paragraphs 25–26, the Court of Appeal discussed the two underlying policies at odds with each other. “The first is that civil actions should be decided on their merits. The second is that civil actions should be resolved in a timely and efficient manner in order to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.” The Court of Appeal referenced a bias in favour of deciding matters on their merits. At paragraph 27, the Court of Appeal said:
“The court’s preference for deciding matters on their merits is all the more pronounced where delay results from an error committed by counsel. As the court stated in Habib, at paragraph 7 “on a motion to set aside a dismissal order, the court should be concerned primarily with the rights of the litigants, not with the conduct of their counsel”. In Marché, Sharpe J. A. stated, at paragraph 28, “The law will not ordinarily allow an innocent client to suffer the irrevocable loss of the right to proceed by reason of the inadvertence of his or her solicitor”.
[17] In 1482241 Ontario Limited v. Clear Customs Brokers Ltd., 2017 ONSC 7320, a decision of Master McGraw, the action arose from an alleged breach of a commercial lease. The statement of claim was issued September 28, 2010. The plaintiff’s motion for a status hearing was heard September 12, 2017. The examinations for discovery had not been completed. The master found that the bulk of the delay was attributed to plaintiff’s counsel, and that the plaintiff ought not to bear full responsibility for the conduct of its counsel in the circumstances of that case.
[18] In Southwestern Sales Corp. v. Spurr Bros. Ltd., 2016 ONCA 590, 132 O.R. (3d) 794 (CA) the Court of Appeal upheld this writer’s ruling dismissing a motion to set aside a dismissal order made at a status hearing. That case dealt with a proceeding under the Construction Lien Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30. The claims for lien were registered in December 2000. The respondent paid into court approximately $330,000 to obtain an order vacating the claims for lien. The trial record was filed in January 2003. In 2012, the actions were struck from the trial list and actions were dismissed at a status hearing in October 2014. By that point, the actions themselves were more than 13 years old. The uncontroverted evidence of the plaintiff was that it had been misled by its counsel as to the status of its action. In my motion decision dismissing the action I noted the following:
The plaintiff’s evidence is that Mr. Istl did not keep it informed as to the progress of the action. Mr. Istl did not advise the plaintiff that he was failing to move the matter along. Mr. Istl misled the plaintiff as to the status of its action. I have no doubt that all of this is true. What the plaintiff did not address in its evidence is how often the plaintiff contacted Mr. Istl to inquire as to the progress of the action. When years had passed without any substantive steps being taken towards a resolution, why did the plaintiff not investigate and demand that steps be taken? Why did the plaintiff not retain another counsel to move the action forward? There was no evidence offered to answer these questions.
[19] The above passage was noted by the Court of Appeal. In its decision, the Court of Appeal confirmed that the plaintiff bears primary responsibility for the progress of its actions. At paragraph 22, the Court of Appeal said:
As part of its obligation to move its construction lien actions along, the appellant was required to take reasonable steps to supervise its counsel’s work to ensure there would be an expeditious determination of the actions on their merits. On a motion to set aside a dismissal order, one would expect a commercial plaintiff like the appellant to file concrete evidence describing the steps it had taken to supervise its counsel’s handling of its actions. The appellant did not do so. Given the absence of such evidence, it is understandable the motion judge was not prepared to accept that the assertions of the appellant’s controller amounted to an acceptable explanation for a 13-year delay.
[20] Although the onus is on the plaintiffs to move the action forward, the conduct of the defendants is not irrelevant, particularly considering the question of prejudice. In Carioca’s Import & Export Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (2015), 2015 ONCA 592, 128 O.R. (3d) 143 the Court of Appeal, at paragraph 53, said:
While this court has stated frequently that the plaintiff bears the primary responsibility for moving a case forward, it has also acknowledged that the conduct of a defendant is a factor, especially where a plaintiff encounters some resistance when trying to move the action along: 1196158 Ontario Inc., at para. 29. The suggestion that it is normal and acceptable for a defendant, if not to actively delay, to simply wait for the plaintiff to make the next move, may be based on a conventional view of litigation strategy. The objectives of timely and efficient access to justice, and effective use of court resources require all parties to play their part in moving actions forward, and for counsel to act in a way that facilitates rather than frustrates access to justice: Hryniak, at para. 32. For these reasons, although the burden of proof on the motion is on the plaintiff, the conduct of all parties in relation to the litigation is relevant in determining whether to restore an action to the trial list.
With these legal principles in mind, I turn to the case at hand.
Have the Plaintiffs provided an acceptable explanation for the delay?
[21] This status of the case at the time of the motion appears to be similar to the status of the case in Faris when the Faris case was dismissed for delay. Pleadings have not been completed. The plaintiffs have not delivered an affidavit of documents. Certainly, examinations for discovery have not been undertaken. The real difference between the Faris case and this case is the plaintiff’s evidence that he was misled by his counsel. I must then consider the principles set out in Southwestern Sales.
[22] The plaintiffs’ counsel, first Mr. Martini and then Ms. Marusic, were clearly the cause for the bulk of the delay in this matter. I have no reason to question the plaintiffs’ evidence in that regard. Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic did nothing for the plaintiffs from the end of March 2014 forward. I accept Mr. Peakovic’s evidence of his attempts to contact Ms. Marusic between April 2014 and May 2016. I accept that he called and emailed Ms. Marusic on numerous occasions in an attempt to obtain the status of his claim. I accept that Ms. Marusic gave Mr. Peakovic assertions that the case was moving forward; that she was scheduling examinations for discovery; that she was working through “document issues”.
[23] There are three things that make this case different from Southwestern Sales. The first is that the delay in Southwestern Sales was a delay of 13 years while the delay here is one of just over five years. The second is that in Southwestern Sales, there was no evidence of attempts made by the plaintiff to contact its solicitor and inquire as to the progress of the action, investigate and demand that steps be taken. There is evidence of the plaintiffs taking those steps here. The third is that Southwestern Sales was a lien action. The defendant was required to pay approximately $330,000 into court to discharge the liens and free up title to its property.
[24] In my view, the plaintiff has provided sufficient explanation for the delay to at least May 2016, when he decided to retain new counsel. He asserts that it took him a year to find new counsel to take the matter on. I have some concern with that assertion as it seems to me it ought not to take that long to find another lawyer. However, there was no evidence of the availability of experienced, competent counsel who is willing to take on a matter such as this, and Mr. Peakovic’s evidence is that he contacted or attempted to contact 12 different lawyers. The delay from May 2017 forward is partially explained by the plaintiff’s health problems. The plaintiff also deposes that APT had a number of claims that required immediate attention due to Ms. Marusic’s inaction and choices had been made as to priorities. In my view, that point alone would be insufficient to satisfy as an acceptable explanation for the delay. However, coupled with the plaintiff’s health problems, I am prepared to accept Mr. Peakovic’s explanation.
[25] Overall, in my view the plaintiffs have provided an acceptable explanation for the delay. That is not the end of the matter though. The test is conjunctive, and I must then turn to the second branch.
The Question of Prejudice
[26] The Court of Appeal, in Carioca’s Import & Export Inc. v. Canadian Pacific Railway Ltd. (2015), 2015 ONCA 592, 128 O.R. (3d) 143, said the following about this part of the test at paragraphs 49 – 50:
The issue of prejudice is a factual question. The plaintiff bears the onus of demonstrating that the defendant would suffer no non-compensable prejudice if the action were allowed to proceed. The mere passage of time cannot be an insurmountable hurdle in determining prejudice, otherwise timelines would become inflexible and explanations futile.
A defendant is not required to offer evidence of actual prejudice. However, the court is entitled to consider the conduct of the defendant in light of its assertions of prejudice. As Weiler J.A. noted in Fuller, it is an error for a judge considering dismissal for delay to fail to consider the respondent’s conduct in relation to the question of prejudice: at para. 39.
[27] The prejudice at issue is the prejudice to the defendant’s ability to defend the action as a result of the plaintiff’s delay, not as a result of the sheer passage of time (Carioca para 57).
[28] The onus is on the plaintiff to disprove prejudice. However, if the defendants have been passive and have not displayed any sense of urgency in moving the matter forward, that passivity is inconsistent with the presence of prejudice. (H.B. Fuller Co. v. Rogers, 2015 ONCA 173 para. 42)
[29] In this case, the defendants have been passive. There has been no sense of urgency from any of the defendants to move the matter forward. The defendants made no complaint about the delay until the plaintiffs brought this motion. That passivity is inconsistent with prejudice. However, the defendants submit that actual prejudice has been proven in the form of lost documents. The defendants point to the following evidence:
In his affidavit sworn July 4, 2018, Mr. Peakovic deposes that Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic have not provided him with the plaintiffs’ complete file. He said, “As a result, APT does not have the full file in this matter. I have partially reconstructed it from documents in my possession and from documents in the court file, which my current counsel arranged to be copied. However, some documents are missing, and for that reason and because of the challenges I had communicating with Martini and Marusic, there are gaps in the information and documentary record I am unable to provide in this affidavit.”
In his cross examination, Mr. Peakovic gave the following evidence (transcript at page 23 – 24):
Q. And so what I’m getting at is the fact that you indicated, and its further on in your affidavit, that you provided your documents related to this matter to Claudio (Mr. Martini) and Maria (Ms. Marusic) in 2014. You’ve now said it’s 2013, which is fine. But you provided them with the documents, correct?
A. Correct.
Q. And you picked up the file in June 2016 and you’ve indicated that some of those documents were missing?
A. I would say the majority.
Q. The majority of them are missing. And those documents were never provided to the defendants. We know an affidavit of documents was never produced, correct?
A. Not that I know of.
Q. Okay. And the fact that you didn’t have these documents, did that prevent you from progressing the litigation or the action forward?
A. It made it more difficult to find legal counsel or explain the status, yes.
Q. Because you didn’t have the documents?
A. Correct.
Q. And were you able to locate all of these documents?
A. No.
Q. Some of them Claudio and Maria had but lost?
A. I don’t know that they lost them.
Q. But they were never returned to you?
A. Correct.
- In his cross-examination Mr. Peakovic said that he had an electronic backup of documents on his computer hard drive but that the hard drive was broken and that it was in a computer repair shop in Toronto, Ontario for attempted repair. He gave an undertaking to keep counsel advised of the status of the repair efforts. In his answers to undertakings, Mr. Peakovic indicated that, at that point in time, the company hired to do the repair work could not recover the data. In his supplementary answers to undertakings he said that two of three hard drives were recovered.
[30] Based on the evidence given by the plaintiff at his cross examination, I conclude that he provided all of his relevant documents to Mr. Martini and Ms. Marusic in 2013 or 2014. There is no indication as to the nature or breadth of those documents, however I conclude that they must have been relevant documents if the plaintiff provided them to his litigation counsel. According to the plaintiff, the majority of those documents are missing. The fact of the missing documents has been sufficiently significant to make it difficult for the plaintiff to find legal counsel to carry the matter forward.
[31] At this point, the defendants have not received documentary disclosure. They have not received an affidavit of documents. Given the loss of documents, the plaintiffs are not in a position to provide a complete affidavit of documents as well as copies of all relevant documents. The court can’t ignore the absence of these documents. It seems to me that the defendants ought not be required to defend this case without complete disclosure of all relevant documents. The evidence is that complete disclosure of relevant documents cannot happen. This isn’t a case where documents may have gone missing. This is a case where the evidence is that relevant documents have gone missing. I conclude that complete documentary disclosure can’t happen because of the plaintiffs’ delay in pursuing the claim and not just because of the passage of time.
[32] I find that the defendants have been prejudiced by the plaintiffs’ delay.
Disposition
[33] Counsel have agreed on the articulation of the legal issues on the motion. To be successful, the plaintiffs are required to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay and the plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice as a result of the delay. For the reasons set out above, I find that the plaintiffs have met the first branch of the test. The plaintiffs have not met the second branch of the test in that they have not demonstrated that the defendants would not suffer non-compensable prejudice.
[34] For these reasons, I find that the plaintiffs’ action must be dismissed for delay.
Pamela L. Hebner
Justice
Released: November 22, 2019
COURT FILE NO.: CV-13-19041
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
Martin Peakovic and 1128636 Ontario Inc. o/a Automotive Prototype and Tooling
And
Ford Motor Company of Canada/Ford du Canada Limitee, Ecodevelopments Windsor Inc., 1670120 Ontario Ltd., Thyssenkrupphearn Industrial Services Canada Inc., Onofrio D’Agostini, Terry Aldea, Donald Hearn Jr.
RULING ON MOTION
Hebner J.
Released: November 22, 2019