Steven Pickard

The appellants, landlords of student housing, appealed the dismissal of their claims for negligent investigation, malicious prosecution, Charter violations, and bad faith against fire prevention officers and the City of Windsor.

The claims arose after the appellants were charged with Fire Code violations for operating their properties as lodging houses, which charges were later withdrawn or acquitted.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the fire prevention officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay charges, did not conduct a negligent investigation, and did not act with malice.

The court also dismissed the Papic appellants' additional claims related to property development delays, finding them to be policy decisions or lacking legal basis.

The court-appointed receiver sought approval of a vesting order, ancillary orders, and a distribution order for the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers Inc. A creditor of a related company in receivership, Banwell Development Corporation, objected to the payment of post-receivership interest to Royal Timbers' creditors, arguing the interest should instead be paid pro rata to Banwell's creditors due to a potential shortfall in the Banwell estate.

The court rejected this argument, holding that the two receivership estates were separate and the unsecured creditors of Royal Timbers were entitled to post-receivership interest from the surplus generated by the sale of Royal Timbers' assets.

The plaintiff landlords sued the City of Windsor and its fire investigators for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution after being charged with operating non-compliant boarding, lodging, or rooming houses under the Fire Code.

The plaintiffs argued the investigators lacked reasonable grounds and were motivated by a desire to curb student housing.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the investigator had reasonable grounds to believe the properties were rooming houses based on the statutory definitions, and that he acted reasonably by seeking advice before laying charges.

The court also found no evidence of malice or oblique motive.

The appellants sought summary judgment to determine whether an insurance policy obtained by the mortgagees covered the mortgagors' interest in the property and whether the insurer could exercise subrogation rights.

The mortgagors had failed to obtain property insurance after their existing policy was cancelled.

The mortgagees obtained a policy in their own names covering only their mortgagee interest.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that the policy was for the sole benefit of the mortgagees and that the mortgagees were entitled to pursue subrogation rights.

The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Standard Charge Term 16 of the mortgage imposed the obligation to insure on the mortgagors and that any insurance obtained by the mortgagees was permissive and for their benefit alone.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a Small Claims Court costs order to the Divisional Court.

The underlying matter involved three small claims actions tried together.

The moving party argued the Deputy Judge erred in applying the 15 percent limit on costs under section 29 of the Courts of Justice Act and in awarding costs against him on a claim that was struck.

The court validated service of the motion on the respondent's paralegal and granted leave to appeal, finding strong grounds that the Deputy Judge may have erred in principle regarding the statutory costs limit and the awarding of costs on the struck claim.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for malicious prosecution and other torts against multiple public servants and entities, the successful defendants sought costs.

The court considered the Rule 57.01 factors, noting the complexity of the case, the plaintiffs' unfounded allegations of malice and conspiracy, and the defendants' reasonable offers to settle.

The court fixed costs at $260,000 for the municipal defendants and $231,100 for the provincial defendants, representing an amount between partial and substantial indemnity.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and misrepresentation related to a failed real estate development project.

The plaintiff sought rescission of the contract and recovery of his $500,000 investment.

The defendants argued that the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and raised genuine issues regarding the existence of a fiduciary duty, the cause of the project's failure, and the calculation of damages.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding that there were multiple genuine issues requiring a trial, including the nature of the relationship between the parties, the state of the defendants' knowledge, and the limitation period.

The plaintiffs owned a property that was intentionally set on fire by a tenant, resulting in severe injuries to occupants.

The police and fire marshal investigated and concluded the property was an illegal rooming house with multiple Fire Code violations that contributed to the spread of the fire.

The plaintiffs were charged with arson by negligence under s. 436 of the Criminal Code, but were discharged at the preliminary inquiry.

They subsequently sued the investigating police officer, fire marshal investigators, and their municipal employers for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, negligent investigation, and Charter breaches.

The Superior Court dismissed the action in its entirety, finding no evidence of malice or bad faith, and concluding that the investigating officer had reasonable and probable grounds to lay the charges based on the evidence gathered.

The plaintiff pharmacy brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add four new defendants and a new cause of action for conspiracy against the existing landlord defendants.

The plaintiff alleged the landlords conspired with the proposed defendants to sell the commercial property to them and oust the plaintiff.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed amended claim did not disclose a viable cause of action for conspiracy against the landlords, as they were merely exercising their legal right to sell their property to a bona fide third-party purchaser.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for an order to allow the late filing of his statement of claim regarding the sale of allegedly defective dairy cows.

The appellant failed to file the statement of claim within the 30-day deadline after issuing a notice of action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellant's explanation for the delay lacked necessary detail and that the respondent suffered prejudice due to the expiry of the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The parties were unable to agree on costs following a two-hour motion.

The court noted that the responding party's submissions suffered from hyperbole and caused unnecessary rancour, while the moving parties' costs request was wildly excessive and unsubstantiated.

The court fixed costs at $5,000 in the cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend its statement of claim to add a related numbered company as a defendant.

The defendants opposed, arguing prejudice and noting the plaintiff failed to request leave under Rule 48.04.

The court granted the motion, finding the failure to request leave was a technical defect that could be remedied.

The court noted the defendants and their counsel appeared to be engaged in a game of 'catch us if you can' regarding the complex ownership of the property where the materials were supplied, and found no prejudice in allowing the amendment.

The respondents brought a motion to vary a consent order, which the court determined was an interlocutory injunction, to remove restraints on their ability to deal with the assets of 1889072 Ontario Limited.

The applicant sought the continuation of this injunction.

The court found that the applicant failed to satisfy the prerequisites for an interlocutory injunction as established in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), specifically regarding a strong prima facie case, irreparable harm, and an undertaking as to damages.

Consequently, the respondents' motion was granted, and the interlocutory injunction was not continued.

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from the successful motions by several defendants to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay.

The successful defendants sought full or substantial indemnity costs, alleging the plaintiff's action was frivolous or vexatious, or that there was a Mary Carter agreement.

The court found no sufficient justification to depart from the usual order of partial indemnity costs, as there were no findings on the merits of the action, nor evidence of frivolous conduct or collusion.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the successful defendants, specifying amounts for the motion to dismiss and the remainder of the action.

The plaintiff brought a motion compelling former counsel to deliver the litigation file after the lawyer removed himself as counsel of record due to unpaid accounts.

The former solicitor asserted a solicitor’s lien over the file under s. 6(6) of the Solicitors Act.

The court reviewed the distinction between situations where a solicitor discharges the client and where the client discharges the solicitor.

Because the solicitor had withdrawn from the retainer, the court held the file must be delivered to allow continuation of the underlying lawsuit, though the solicitor’s lien remained preserved.

The court ordered delivery of the file subject to undertakings from new counsel and maintained the lien against any eventual recovery.

The appellant municipality appealed an application judge's interpretation of a development agreement regarding the costs of operating a pumping station.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's conclusion that the costs of operation, as distinct from maintenance and repair, are to be borne by the municipality and not the developer.

The appeal was dismissed.